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ELODIE AVIOTTE
ULSTER UNIONIST DIMENSION IN THE USA
Prioritising Neutrality or Leverage, Third Party mediation 
with a reluctant actor: U.S. government and Ulster Unionists
as a case study
This thesis looks at the evolution of the interaction between the Ulster Unionist 
Party and the US government during the peace process that led to the signing of the 
Good Friday Agreement and its implementation. It uses mediation in ethnic conflict 
resolution as a theoretical framework as it defines the role that the US played in the 
peace process, presenting itself as an honest broker. This thesis contributes, firstly, to 
the gap in the literature on the unionist perception of the US involvement and provides 
new insight into the peace process. Secondly, it contributes to the wider debate in 
international mediation using Ulster Unionists-US relationship as a case study, in order 
to define to what extent leverage guarantees a long-term success.
If the US mediation in Northern Ireland has been fruitful in that it contributed to 
the signing of the agreement, and somehow established links with the most hostile 
actors, its long-term success is still questionable. It actually operated in relation to the 
Unionists who had not clearly perceived any kind of hurting stalemate and whose 
internal division caused a serious threat to peace.
The monitoring of the implementation of the agreement revealed that the 
majority of the Unionist community remained very hostile towards it. Thus, despite 
David Trimble’s pragmatic approach to reform Unionist strategy, he did not convince 
his electorate of the quality of the agreement. The primary cause for this is the lack of 
internal motivation within Unionism to support the agreement. Therefore, this study 
teaches us that even if leverage is an essential parameter in mediation, it cannot 
overcome the lack of internal driving force.
OUTLINE OF ABBREVIATED TERMS
AIA: Anglo-Irish Agreement
AN1A: Americans for a New Ireland Agenda
BIS: British Information Service
DUP: Democratic Unionist Party
GFA: Good Friday Agreement
IAFCG: Irish-Americans for Clinton/Gore
IICD: International Independent Commission in Decommissioning
INC: Irish National Caucus
IRA: Irish Republican Army
LVF: Loyalist Volunteer Force
NIO: Northern Ireland Office
NORAID: Irish Northern Aid
NSC: National Security Council
PUP: Progressive Unionist Party
UDA: Ulster Defence Association
UDP: Ulster Democratic Party
UNSC: United Nations Security Council
UUP: Ulster Unionist Party
INTRODUCTION
The involvement of the US administration under President Clinton in the 
attempted resolution of the Northern Ireland conflict is one of the most 
significant aspects of the recent peace process. This represented a significant 
shift in US engagement with Northern Ireland, reversing the hands off approach, 
which had dominated since Sinn Féin attempted to get recognition for an Irish 
Republic in 1919 (Cronin, 1987). The involvement of the Clinton administration 
has encouraged a significant literature examining the motivation behind this 
decision and the impact it had on the peace process (e.g. Wilson, 1996, O’Clery,
1996, Cox, 2000, Arthur, 2000). Most of the general literature on the peace 
process has also devoted attention to this aspect dedicating a chapter or a 
substantial passage to this topic (e.g. Todd and Ruane, 1996, Cox, Guelke & 
Steven, 2000). However very little of this literature addresses the attitude of 
unionist political parties in Northern Ireland towards US involvement, their 
reaction to this development, their capacity to engage with it or the impact such 
engagement may have had on the wider political strategies of Ulster Unionism. 
This dissertation proposes to address that missing dimension. The election of 
President Clinton saw the elevation of this regional conflict on the international 
agenda. For eight years, Northern Ireland became one of the major foreign policy 
issues for the most powerful country in the world. The Unionists were forced to 
change their strategy, because US involvement in the conflict became inevitable.
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This thesis draws on theoretical approaches in ethnic conflict resolution 
that focus on mediation by external actors, in particular the works of Bercovitch 
(1996), Rubin (1981) and Kriegsberg (1991). Changes in international context, 
such as the collapse of the USSR, indirectly aided efforts at developing a new 
peace process in Northern Ireland. The post World War II international order was 
based on the legal principle of non-intervention. Thus, the international system 
along with the Anglo-American special relationship favoured the United 
Kingdom and the Unionist pro-status quo position. But in the post-cold war era, 
the disequilibrium of strength between the US, being the only remaining super­
power, and the UK transformed the situation into one where a US intervention 
became possible.
The development for the first time in Northern Ireland of a serious 
external intervention at least created the possibility of a new dynamic in the 
conflict. Given its novelty in the Northern Ireland context, the wider international 
literature on external mediation provides a good context for this research.
In turn, this thesis adds a new case study to the international debates on 
external mediation. In particular, because the intervention came from the US and 
was generally seen to have played a positive role despite Unionists’ initial 
hostility to it. Therefore, this dynamic in the Northern Ireland case adds to our 
understanding of the often-competing pressures between neutrality and leverage 
in international mediation. Clearly, a more “neutral” mediator from a unionist 
perspective could have been found. However, this thesis, in analysing the 
reaction of Ulster Unionists, looks at whether the strong leverage brought by the 
US was ultimately more important.
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The reluctance by Ulster Unionists to accept any US intervention at the 
beginning of Clinton’s first presidency appears to have progressively vanished 
and been replaced by a real attempt to create a relationship between the Unionists 
and the American government. This raises a number of fundamental questions. 
Did the unionist position actually alter over time? If Unionists, who for so long 
stuck to their traditional position of opposition to external involvement, shift 
toward a more pragmatic approach to the issue, why did they do this? What was 
the impact of US mediation on the Unionists’ political approach to the situation 
in Northern Ireland? Did it diminish their “under-siege mentality” and in that 
sense make Unionist politicians more comfortable engaging outside Northern 
Ireland? Did Unionists come to see any advantages in external mediation over 
time? Finally, does this analysis raise issues of a wider interest for international 
scholarship on mediation in regional conflicts?
The focus of the thesis is on the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), as it was 
then the largest party, and how their stance regarding US involvement appeared 
to evolve throughout the peace process. Even if the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP) nurtured much greater connections in the US, more particularly with 
South East American fundamentalist Protestantism, they remained quite 
intransigent in their rejection of the US playing the role of a third-party. Thus, it 
was more important to focus on the UUP and analyse the evolution of their 
relationship with the US.
The research from the thesis is largely based on a series of interviews 
with key UUP actors including David Trimble, Jeffrey Donaldson and Jim 
Molyneaux, along with those who interacted with them in the US or elsewhere,
such as Nancy Soderberg or Peter King, other Northern Irish parties’ members 
and British and Irish officials.
The thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter is dedicated to the 
contextualisation of the UUP engagement with the US as mediators. It discusses 
the alternative theoretical frameworks on mediation and how they promote a 
useful context for the analysis of the UUP’s relationship with the US. The second 
chapter is divided into two main parts. The first division deals with the 
methodological approach. The second part introduces the historical background 
of the relationship between the US and the Ulster Unionists, examining the 
historical reasons for the lack of a pro-Unionist political platform in the US in 
spite of the massive Protestant immigration to the American colonies throughout 
the 18th century. It also offers an analysis of the Unionists’ perception of the US 
administration prior to Clinton’s involvement in the Northern Ireland issue. 
Chapter three and four deal with the UUP’s engagement with the US during 
Clinton’s first term. Chapter five covers Clinton’s second term and corresponds 
to the period of negotiations that led to the signing of the Good Friday 
Agreement (GFA) on 10 April 1998. It includes a section on the monitoring of 
the implementation of the GFA and an analysis of the US role in light of the 
UUP perspective. The final chapter sets out conclusions to the thesis.
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CHAPTER ONE
CONTEXTUALISING UNIONIST ENGAGEMENT 
WITH 
US MEDIATION
INTRODUCTION
Northern Ireland throughout the height of the recent conflict was studied 
primarily from an internal conflict perspective. Very limited reference was made 
in the literature to the possible international context and its influence on the 
conflict evolution and eventual resolution (Cox, 2000, p.249). However, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union generated a debate on the impact of the end of the 
Cold War on the Northern Ireland conflict and its resolution. Michael Cox 
triggered this controversy in advocating that the influence of the Cold War on 
Northern Ireland was greater than most academics had anticipated. The point is 
not to defend Cox’s argument but to agree with the idea that very little was said 
about Northern Ireland in a wider international political spectrum. John Whyte 
himself, in Interpreting Northern Ireland (1990), a commended bibliography 
about the Troubles, did not identify any significant literature connecting 
Northern Ireland to an international context.
However, this international influence on the Northern Ireland conflict can 
be witnessed in several areas. Firstly, Northern Ireland cannot be isolated from
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the external context and thus evolves within a changing worldwide situation. 
Secondly, Northern Ireland is under British sovereignty, in other words, it 
involves one of the most prominent states in the international system. The 
geopolitical changes resulting from the collapse of the USSR did not directly 
contribute to the launch of a new peace process, but certainly offered new 
perspectives as external intervention became more acceptable. Thirdly, the US 
diplomatic intervention was obviously not aimed at imposing a solution, but 
rather at offering a mediation process enabling a positive environment for all­
party talks in order to encourage an end to violence and make the province 
democratically governable.
The US intervention in Northern Ireland sparked a significant literature. 
However, Unionists’ relationship with US representatives during the peace 
process has not been adequately covered and deserves closer attention due to 
three main points. Firstly, the Unionists’ traditional position was always one of 
opposing any type of external involvement, and their relationship with London 
has always been more ambiguous than the official attitude that both Unionists 
and London tended to show. Secondly, the US involvement created a new sphere 
of negotiation between the third party and the actors o f the conflict. This 
involvement, as is often the case, generated a “triadic relationship” as Bercovitch 
argued: ‘mediation turns an original bilateral dispute into triadic interaction of 
some kind. By increasing the number of actors from two to three mediation 
effects considerable structural changes and creates new focal points for an 
agreement’ (1992, p.4). This “triadic interaction” is worth studying in the 
Northern Ireland case because of the double level of “triadic relationship” that 
the US involvement generated, both internally and with the two governments and
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which will be discussed below. Thirdly, relocating the Northern Ireland issue in 
the broader spectrum of international relations and more specifically in the field 
of mediation raises new questions on the nature and evolution of the relationship 
between the Americans and Unionists, in other words, between the third party 
and the most reluctant actor to any external intervention.
This thesis seeks to analyse the impact of the Clinton administration’s 
involvement in the peace process on the Ulster Unionist Party as evidenced 
through the expressed view of party elites, and to analyse the party’s actions and 
publications. This not only requires an analysis of the party’s traditional attitude 
to the external involvement of the US in particular, but also demands an 
examination of the lack of any pro-active international strategy of their own and 
in particular the failure of Ulster Unionists to develop a domestic lobby within 
the USA on par with the nationalist “Irish-America”.
As will be discussed in the first two parts of this chapter, Ulster Unionists 
were reluctant to accept any kind of external involvement. Therefore, Ulster 
Unionists initial attitude raises crucial questions for the thesis. The first one is 
what made them change their mind? Did Unionists perceive a “hurting 
stalemate”? Had they reached an impasse or simply realised that they would 
never win, creating the right opportunity for an external intervention?
The relatively successful mediation process by the USA also raises issues 
of more international and comparative interest, The US position on the Northern 
Ireland conflict has not been perceived as neutral, at least in the first instance. 
The interplay between their obvious international power and the negative
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reaction of Unionists to a suggested role is of relevance in the on-going debate 
between those prioritizing neutrality or leverage as characteristics of successful 
international mediation as in Bercovitch (1992, 1996, 2002), Kleiboer (1998) or 
Zartman (1995) among others and this will be more fully discussed in the third 
part of this chapter.
This introductory chapter is divided into three main parts designed to help 
define the questions raised in this thesis. The first part contains two aims. Firstly, 
it defines the Cold War international context and its impact on the Northern 
Ireland situation, and how it favoured the Ulster Unionist side. Secondly, it 
discusses the impact of the end of the Cold War on the Northern Ireland 
situation, focusing on the Unionists’ perception. Then, on the basis that Unionists 
have always rejected any potential third party involvement in the conflict, the 
second part of this chapter will cover the evolution of the events within Northern 
Ireland from a Unionists’ viewpoint focusing on their perception of the rather 
ambiguous attitude of the British government, the role of the Irish government 
and finally the upheaval that the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) generated and its 
role in creating the conditions for the involvement of a third party.1 Thirdly, this 
external involvement is located in the broader theoretical context of international 
mediation. This final part discusses the relative importance of the sometimes 
conflicting priorities of neutrality and leverage and discusses it in the light of the 
Ulster Unionists’ initial reluctance.
1 The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement is also known as Hillsborough Agreement
I- THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT TO THE NORTHERN 
IRELAND CONFLICT
Three key elements of the International System had a significant impact 
on the Northern Ireland case: firstly, the priority given in International Relations 
to the preservation of the status quo; secondly, the principle of non-intervention 
along with the Cold War context and the necessity to maintain stability within 
the two opposing blocs; and thirdly, the impact of the post-Cold War world-wide 
upheaval on the involvement of a third-party in the Northern Ireland peace 
process.
A-Preservation of the Status Quo
The stability of the nation-state system is intimately linked to the 
principle of sovereignty that guarantees the harmony of the relationships between 
states based on the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of any 
other sovereign state. This principle is based on each state’s acceptance within 
the international system that there is only ‘a single source of authority within the 
state and none beyond it’ (Mayall, 1990, p. 22).
In an international context, the Northern Ireland conflict rests on the 
controversy over the legitimate source of sovereignty over the province. 
Northern Ireland is internationally recognised as a part of the United Kingdom. 
However, its nationalist minority and the Republic of Ireland (until the removal 
of article 2 and 3 from its constitution) contested British sovereignty over the 
province. While there is a considerable international sympathy for the Nationalist
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position (Guelke, 1988, p. 11), under international law, this opposition to the 
British authority was not acknowledged.
The principle of self-determination as the right of every nation to 
determine its own future is the basis of the popular sovereignty ideology that 
shaped modem-nation states (Taras and Ganguly, 2000, p.49). President 
Woodrow Wilson reaffirmed it at the beginning of the 20th century in his famous 
14 points (Young, 1976, p. 19, Taras and Ganguly, 2000, p. 49). Nevertheless, 
with the re-attestation of the Nation-State after World War II, its implementation 
could only be limited, as its universal practice would have led to the destruction 
of states based on a potential partition of territory (Taras and Ganguly, 2000: 
p.50). The principle of self-determination, seen as the sine qua non condition of 
the Nation-State, was necessarily constrained by the principle of a majority’s 
right to secure the sovereignty of each state and the presumption in favour of 
existing states boundaries. By enacting the principle of majority consent in 1949 
Great Britain reinforced the legitimacy of its sovereignty over the province since 
it' was based on the will of the majority of its inhabitants. They overruled the 
potential opposition within the nationalist minority.
Nevertheless, since its creation, the United Nations has guaranteed the 
right of self-determination to its member-states. Articles 1 and 55 of the United 
Nations Charter assert that member-states should ‘develop friendly relations 
among nations based on the respect for the principle of equal rights and self- 
determination of the peoples’ (Mayall, 1990, p.27). Article one of the two United 
Nations Conventions of Civil Rights and of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (1966) reaffirmed the right of self-determination (Mayall, 1990, p.28).
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The term “peoples” in the first quotation is obviously vague. Indeed, what 
does “people” exactly refer to in this phrase? It seems likely to have been 
deliberately ambiguous in order to regulate the possibility of intervention 
according to some fluctuating criteria such as economic or strategic interests. 
Thus, the implementation of the principle of self-determination was in reality 
confined to the issue of independence of the third world colonies (Young, 1976, 
p. 20, Taras and Ganguly, 2000, p.53). Self-determination actually became a 
synonym of decolonisation and transition to majority rule in South Africa 
(Mayall, 1991, p.424). Even in the case of decolonisation, self-determination was 
a restricted issue. First, access to independence happened within the boundaries 
drawn under the authority of the colonial powers. Secondly, the UN General 
Assembly enacted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples on 14 December 1960 in which article 6 overruled the 
right to partition within the newly independent states.2 Thus, a strict line existed 
between self-determination and minority rights. Colonies could have access to 
independence but only individual rights would protect their minorities 
(Wippman, 1998, p. 13). Only Bangladesh benefited from the international 
acknowledgement of its partition from Pakistan between 1945 and 1991 
(O’Leary and McGarry, 1993, p .l, Taras and Ganguly, 1990, p. 53). The pressure 
of the Cold War along with the contempt for the notion of ethnicity, assimilated 
to tribalism, in western countries generated the need for a constant status quo 
reinforcing the notion of limited self-determination. Therefore, in the light of the
2 General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), 14 Dec. 1960, Declaration on the Granting o f  
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, art. 6: ‘Any attempt aimed at the partial or 
total disruption o f the national unity and the territorial integrity o f a country is incompatible 
with the purposes and principles of the Charter o f the United Nations.’ And art. 7: ‘All States 
shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions o f the Charter o f the United Nations, the 
Universal Declaration o f Human Rights and the present Declaration on the basis o f equality, 
non- interference in the internal affairs o f  all States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all 
peoples and their territorial integrity.’
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parameters mentioned above, along with the absolute principle of sovereignty, 
ethno-nationalist movements in Western Countries did not benefit from any 
significant international support, and the nationalist agitation against partition in 
Ireland fitted into this broad model.
The recognition of only one source of authority in each state greatly 
limits any potential recognition of contesting ethnic minorities who challenge the 
status quo. The United Nations favours the rights of individuals rather than 
minority groups in such circumstances. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights insists on individual rights rather than groups. Its preamble stipulates that 
‘Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their 
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person 
and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social 
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom’, but its does not refer to 
the case of any minority group. Therefore, the international system favoured the 
principle of non-intervention based on the recognition that there is no higher 
authority than the state (Mayall, 1990, p.20). Discriminated ethnic minorities’ 
means and remedies were extremely limited. The use of chemical weapons on 
the Kurd minority in Iraq in 1988 illustrates this point. The Geneva Convention 
in 1972 reaffirmed the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons and extended 
it to their production and storage. Iraq was condemned but this condemnation did 
not lead to any international intervention.4
3 General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III), Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights, 10 
December 1948, preamble, statement number 5.
4 Convention on the Prohibition o f the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction, 10 Apr. 1972
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Northern Ireland has never reached such an extreme level of violence and 
Great Britain recognised the political existence of a nationalist minority in the 
province. Nonetheless, the United Nations’ limited acknowledgement of minority 
groups’ rights prevented the organisation or any of its powerful members from 
putting pressure on the British government to favour a more political and 
conciliatory strategy rather than a military and security one.
Northern Ireland was internationally perceived as being an integral part of a 
democratic state where political means other than violence were potentially 
accessible. There was very limited international support for any intervention at 
the level of the states or international organisations prior to 1969. This did not 
change much in the 1970s and 1980s. The case of other nationalist movements 
such as the Corsicans or the Basques in the rest of Europe confirms this 
tendency. Governments facing such an issue aimed at securing stability within 
their borders.
Even if these nationalist movements gained some sympathy, the 
importance attached to the stability of the international system ensured there 
would be no external pressure to resolve the conflict. International law on the 
principle of non-intervention would have prevented any possibility of 
interference, at least on a jurisdictional basis. Moreover, even if, from a Northern 
Ireland perspective, the UN Charter can be interpreted in a pro-Nationalist or a 
pro-Unionist context, its practice favoured the Unionist and British government 
positions.
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B-Principle of non-intervention
The principle of non-intervention is ‘one of the cardinal principles of 
international law’ (Heraclides, 1991, p.26). The Declaration on the Rights and 
Duties of States adopted by the UN Law Commission in 1949 strictly regulates 
the possibilities of intervention. Article 1 emphasises the ‘right of every state to 
independence without dictation by other state’ and article 3 insists on the duty of 
every state ‘to refrain from intervention’ which protects the sovereignty of the 
states from any non-wanted interference.2 These latter articles are the 
confirmation of the explicit content of article 2 paragraph 7 of the UN Charter:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction o f any state or shall require the Members to submit such 
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall 
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
Still, International law authorises intervention, as Heraclides sums up, ‘in 
exceptional circumstances, and for such reasons as defence, peace and security 
(in which case there is collective intervention by an intergovernmental 
organisation or by its members following a specific resolution), and in rare cases 
for humanitarian considerations, in particular in flagrant instances of 
institutionalised racism and violence against a majority, and in classical 
colonialism’ (in Taras & Ganguly, 2002, p.48). On an international level, articles
2 Art. 1: Every State has the right to independence and hence to exercise freely, without dictation 
by any other State, all its legal powers, including the choice o f  its own form o f government.
Art 3: Every State has the duty to refrain from intervention in the internal or external affairs of 
any other State.
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1 and 3 of Declaration on the Rights and Duties o f States prevent states from 
intervening but also protect them from doing so. In the case of a diaspora or a 
part of the population strongly in favour of intervention, a government can 
entrench itself behind international law without becoming too unpopular. 
American presidents adopted this attitude as Irish-American support to Irish 
Nationalism in the mid- 19th century started growing.
Nevertheless, interventions were in practice carried out during the period 
prior to the collapse of the communist bloc. They were however all confined to 
second and third world countries. The USA and the USSR were the ones that 
most often intervened. Touval calculated the level of intervention strictly in the 
field of mediation, including conciliation and good offices by the two 
superpowers. The United States intervened in 90 cases as a mediator and the 
USSR in 17 cases between 1945 and 1989 (1992, p.232). They obviously, and 
quite regularly, were infringing the principles of international order, thanks to 
what James Mayall calls the “political dispensation”(1990, p.22). The hierarchy 
of the states involved’overcomes the jurisdictional equality of the sovereign state. 
These interventions were generally of two types. Firstly, several were made in 
order to defend threatened state sovereignties such as in Korea, Vietnam or 
Congo. Secondly, the two superpowers engaged in a series of unofficial support 
for anti-governmental guerrillas in civil wars such as El Salvador and Angola.
The US intervention in Vietnam, the USSR intervention within its eastern 
European satellites’ internal affairs in 1953, 1956 and 1968 and the invasion of 
Afghanistan by the Red Army in 1980 to ensure the presence of a “friendly 
government”, were not judicially condemned because of the states’ permanent
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presence within the Security Council. Though these countries had rights, they 
were powerless since the UN could not act against the intervening forces.
The United Nations, as its name defines it, is a Nation-state alliance and 
therefore makes it impossible to establish a supra-national and independent 
system. The five permanent members of the Security Council (UNSC), including 
the UK, with the power of veto, cannot be forced by the UNSC to follow 
international rules (Heuser, 1997, p.82). Thus, states holding real power over­
rule the principle of equality between sovereign states. For example, the 
Republic of Ireland called for the deployment of peacekeeping forces in Northern 
Ireland in August 1969. On 19 August, the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs 
called for serious talks among the Security Council by virtue of article 35 of the 
UN Charter. There was no reaction in the international organisation (Arthur,
1996, p. 115). The United Kingdom used its power of veto and thus prevented 
any attempt at intervention. In this regard, the absence of international 
intervention in the period up to the early 1990s is in keeping with the nature of 
the international system and the United Kingdom’s place within it.
If the Cold War played a major role in limiting possible intervention in 
the world but also indirectly in Northern Ireland, favouring the British and 
Unionist stances, then the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the end of the bi-polar 
world had an undeniable impact on a possible third party intervention in 
Northern Ireland, therefore weakening the pro-status quo side.
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C-Impact of the end of the Cold War on the Northern Ireland 
peace process
The end of the Cold War generated a worldwide upheaval in the 
International System. According to Wippman, it engendered three major 
changes:
First, the end of the US-Soviet rivalry accompanied, in some respects facilitated, 
a proliferation o f virulent ethnic conflicts (...) . Second, the immediate corollary 
to the end of bipolar competition was the beginning of new possibilities for 
great power co-operation in international organisations, the Security Council in 
particular. Though the potential for such co-operation has often been overstated, 
the fact remains that in recent years the UN and other international organisations 
have displayed a far greater ability and willingness to intervene in what might 
previously have been considered the domestic affairs o f member states (...).
Third, the collapse o f socialism as an alternative to the liberal democratic 
capitalism promoted by Western states has accelerated a shift in international 
norms pertaining to the legitimacy o f state power and external intervention in 
internal affairs (1998, p.l).
The Northern Ireland situation could not be isolated from the 
international changes as scholars also questioned the impact of the end of the 
Cold War on the Northern Ireland peace process. Cox (1997) initiated the debate, 
arguing that the Cold War had had a major impact on the peace process in 
Northern Ireland, as it redefined the Republican approach to the British presence 
in Northern Ireland, changing the argument of the strategic interest to keep a part 
of Ireland within the UK and therefore under NATO’s influence into an obsolete
17
one (Cox, 2000, p.253). Cox even argued that the end of the Warsaw Pact made 
the IRA cease-fire feasible (Cox, 2000, p.254).
The importance that Cox conferred to the international dimension, and 
the Cold War in particular, triggered criticism among other scholars such as 
Jonathan Tonge, faulting Cox for ‘attempting some form of weighting in 
promoting the collapse of the Soviet bloc as primary force in shifting republicans 
[leading to] some important omissions of internal changes and a suspect 
chronology’ (Tonge, 2001, p.263). Paul Dixon, another detractor of Cox’s 
analysis, suggested that ‘the “Cold War” argument missed the continuities of 
British policy and exaggerated the significance of developments in British 
policy’ arguing that ‘the origins of the peace process probably pre-dated the Cold 
War’ (2000, p.226). However, Cox clearly stated that his aim was not to deny the 
roles of these internal factors (2000, p.251) but to add the under appreciated 
international dimension, a point also raised by Guelke (2002, p.2). Moreover, 
Cox pointed out that the US engagement as a third party in the Northern Ireland 
issue ‘would not have been done during the Cold War when the United States 
was locked into an intimate security partnership with the United Kingdom’ 
(1998, p.63). This argument is sustainable when considering the importance of 
the nation-states’ system of alliances during the Cold War. The United Kingdom 
was America’s best ally in Europe. Therefore, the immediate post-Cold War 
period did not overturn the international system entirely. There was still 
reluctance at acknowledging new states other than when inevitable as with the 
collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia. The United Kingdom’s position as a UN 
veto holder remained, but their other power vis a vis the US inevitably became
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changed this situation, leaving Unionists ill equipped to face the US involvement 
at first.
II- NORTHERN IRELAND S PECULIAR STATUS
The mutation of the international system was not the only factor that 
facilitated a heightened internationalisation of the Northern Ireland conflict. 
Ulster Unionists had long been aware of Great Britain’s ambiguous position on 
the Northern Ireland issue especially after the signing of the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement (AIA). This section looks at the influence of the implementation of 
the AIA in weakening the Unionists’ position within the British government 
decision-making process and to what extent it may have influenced their ultimate 
acceptance of the US as a third-party.
One of the Unionists’ deepest fears is that the British government is ready 
to ‘sell them out’ at any time. As Aughey argues, Unionists have always felt 
misunderstood for two main reasons: they consider that Britain has an equivocal 
perception of the Union, and perhaps more importantly they perceive that Britain 
‘subscribes to the main Irish viewpoint’. Hence, the search for safeguards against 
the danger of Irish unification is at the heart of Unionism (1989, p.21). If this 
view is by no means universal, its importance in the nature of Ulster Unionism 
justifies an analysis of the British position in this context.
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A-The British Position
The British position toward Northern Ireland had been a complex one, 
oscillating between keeping some political distance with the province, as the 
largely autonomous Old Stormont regime or the attempt at “Ulsterising” the 
conflict in the 1970s show, and reaffirming Northern Ireland’s Britishness by 
passing acts such as the 1949 Ireland Act.
One aspect of Northern Ireland political life is that all political parties are 
local ones. None of the major British parties are represented in Northern Ireland 
even though some links have existed between the UUP and the British 
Conservative Party. Such a system facilitated Northern Ireland’s transformation 
into a small autonomous political entity within the United Kingdom. ‘Provided 
that the Ulster issue was not thrust before the general public’s consciousness, 
Westminster was more than willing to remain aloof (Arthur, 1980, p. 72).
The British government often sought to offer the image of an arbitrator of 
the conflict between the two communities rather than one of a biased actor. Sir 
Patrick Mayhew set out this self-image in December 1992 when he declared in 
the interview for Die Zeit (quoted in Irish News, 24 Apr. 1993) that the role of 
the British government was the one of a ‘“facilitator” with no independent 
political agenda’ (Bruce, 1994, p.65). Sir Patrick Mayhew continued saying:
Many people believe that we would not want to release Northern Ireland from 
the United Kingdom. To be entirely honest-with pleasure, no, not with pleasure,
I take that back. But we would not stand in the way o f Northern Ireland, if  that 
would be the will o f  the majority (Bruce, 1994, p.66).
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Dixon argues that ‘the British government has not been the sponsor of 
Ulster Unionism in the way the Irish government has supported Irish 
nationalism’ (2002, p.4). This mutual lack of understanding between Unionists 
and London was due to the difference in their perception of the Union and the 
place of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. David Trimble 
emphasised this point in an interview with Feargal Cochrane, “one has to 
acknowledge the possibility that there will be circumstances where the other 
party [Great Britain] to the Union would wish unilaterally to end it” (Cochrane,
1997, p.69). Indeed, the Union is founded on a contract rooted in a conditional 
loyalty to the Crown. As Arthur and Jeffery argue, this loyalty can only be 
conditional as Unionists have doubts that Britain will maintain the Union at all 
costs (1996, p.36).
While Britain clearly demonstrated considerable political, military and 
economic commitment to defeating the IRA and at least by extension to 
defending the position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom, there was 
always sufficient ambiguity in their position to uphold Unionists’ fears. Although 
there is no clear evidence that the British government wishes to abandon Northern 
Ireland and few could or would argue that Unionists’ concerns had no basis in 
reality.
There seems to be a general acknowledgement that Northern Ireland has 
always been treated as “a place apart” (Coulter, 1996, p.170, Aughey, 1989, p.33, 
O’Leary and Arthur, 1990, p.27). As Coulter recalls, ‘direct rule did not change 
this perception’ (1996, p .170). If this idea of “difference” is undisputed among
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scholars, a question remains: To what extent does this difference put the place of 
Ulster Unionists within the United Kingdom in jeopardy?
Aughey (1989) and Cochrane (1997) argue that London’s secret agenda 
was to favour the unification of the island as the ultimate goal. Cochrane argued: 
“Few people within mainstream Unionism expect the British to announce a 
sudden policy change or declare their intention to withdraw from Northern 
Ireland. Many Unionists however, believe that the British are leaving by the 
backdoor” (1997, p. 372). Aughey stated that ‘Westminster exercises a reluctant 
sovereignty, one based on necessity and expediency rather than expressing a 
sense of common will (1989, p.33). This argument finds some echoes in Dixon’s 
claim that there are a lot of signs justifying British untrustworthiness through an 
analysis o f the 1970-1976 period and the aftermath of the AIA (2002, p. 1).
Garret Fitzgerald’s approach is slightly different, arguing that the British 
government did not have any clear agenda to resolve the issue but that their 
policy had been ‘dominated by a belief that what they faced there was a security 
problem that they could overcome by intensifying security measures’ (2003, 
p. 180). His argument is echoed by O’Duffy’s argument that the British 
government favoured a containment approach rather than a conflict resolution 
approach (1993, p .129).
If these arguments find a justification in ambiguous British behaviour, 
they ignore the real attempts by British government to find a solution based on a 
strong security response to the IRA, isolation of Sinn Fein and the establishment 
of a power-sharing system between moderate Nationalists and Unionists as
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strongly advocated in McGarry and O’Leary. In this regard, the British 
government had an agenda regarding Northern Ireland conflict resolution by 
adopting the position of a neutral arbitrator (1993, p.l 83).
The question of Britain “being a neutral arbitrator” on the Northern 
Ireland issue is a cause of fear, suspicion and indignation among the Unionist 
community. These feelings are well depicted in Aughey’s words: ‘The British 
government cannot be taken at its word if only because it cannot simultaneously 
be neutral and partisan’ (1989, p. 39).
Therefore, the signing of the AIA and the re-introduction of the Irish 
dimension in the Northern Ireland conflict resolution process was interpreted as a 
sign that, not only was the British government not willing to defend the Union as 
it should, but also that it favoured the idea of a United Ireland by conferring on 
Dublin a right to have a say in Northern Ireland’s internal affairs, whereas 
Unionists regarded the Republic of Ireland as an irredentist force willing to 
swallow them into an Irish Catholic state.
The 1984 New Ireland Forum report contested the British self-image of 
neutrality and accused London of preserving the Unionists veto on any reform:
4.1- ( ...)  In practice [ ...] , [the British guarantee] has been extended from consent to 
change in the constitutional status o f  the North within the United Kingdom into an 
effective unionist veto on any political change affecting the exercise o f nationalist 
rights and on the form o f government for Northern Ireland.
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4.2: Although the policy o f  the British government was to favour power sharing, 
there was no firm determination to insist on the implementation o f  this policy in 
practice.6
These articles illustrate the Irish Republic’s open criticism of the way the 
British government handled the situation, favouring Unionists’ standpoint over 
stability in the province. The Forum was also interesting in that it challenged the 
British Government to over-rule Unionist objections to internal reform in return 
for the recognition by the Irish government of British sovereignty over Northern 
Ireland, without any of the more specific reforms included in the 1998 Good 
Friday Agreement (GFA).
British policy in Northern Ireland, as perceived by Unionists, strengthened 
the tendency towards isolation and a retreat into communal solidarity. If the 
sovereign government could not be relied upon to oppose Irish nationalism what 
hope was there that an external actor from another country would be more 
sympathetic? The role of the British government, like the international system, re­
enforced Unionists’ reluctance to pro-actively engage internationally.
If the Forum demonstrated some mutation of Irish nationalism, it also 
triggered some changes in British policy: the signing of the 1985 AIA conferred 
on the Irish government what Garret Fitzgerald described as a “more than 
consultative but less than executive” role (in O’Leary and McGarry, 1993, p.226)
6 New Ireland Forum Report, 1984, p. 17
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without consulting Unionists (Aughey, 1994, p.58), therefore, overcoming the 
Unionist veto in this area of reform at least.
The advocacy of the security imperative by former Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher is underlined in her current view that the AIA was a mistake: 
‘our concession alienated the Unionists, without gaining the level of security co­
operation we had the right to expect’ (Thatcher, 1993, p.415). Thatcher did not 
convince Unionists that playing the Dublin card as an ally against Sinn Fein and 
the IRA was in their interests.
The Unionist rejection of Dublin is illustrated by Porter’s argument that if 
Unionists want to fight for their survival they must accept the Irish dimension 
(1996, p.35). Porter in 1996 believed that Unionists had not changed their line on 
that matter ten years after the AIA. Trimble, elected as leader of the UUP in 
September 1995, was the first Unionist leader to go to Dublin and meet the Irish 
Prime Minister. As Richard English argues, Trimble was the key figure of a 
‘significant section of the Unionist family looking to make a new deal with Irish 
nationalism’ (2001, p. 10). Nevertheless, it took Ulster Unionists ten years after 
the AIA to open direct official contact with Dublin.
Thus, the Unionists’ position vis a vis London is of significance as it 
underlines the tremendous difficulty for the unionist political leadership to grant 
credit to any actor outside their own community. This very ambiguous and often 
explosive relationship with London certainly affected their perception of a 
potential international involvement, as, from their perspective, even the 
sovereign state did not seem to show much sympathy for their cause.
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B-Unionist Position after the AIA
From a Unionist perspective, the fact that the Republic of Ireland wanted 
to act as an intermediary between Northern Irish Nationalists and London was 
unacceptable. To most Unionists, the Republic remained an irredentist state. For 
instance, Chris McGimpsey, though often depicted as a liberal Unionist, declared: 
“The South’s demand for the destruction of Northern Ireland -  Eire’s claim for 
Lebensraum- is equivalent to Hitler’s claim over Czechoslovakia”, portraying the 
Irish Republic as Nazi Aggressors and Unionists brave liberal Czechs in 1990.7 
Other analogies have been made such as Steven King, David Trimble’s current 
adviser, stating that the return of partition as a solution for Yugoslavia 
undermined the illusion of multi-ethnic state reinforcing the well-founded basis of
n
the Irish partition. Another example of this perception is a quotation from John 
Taylor in an interview with Feargal Cochrane, in which he recognizes the need 
for some collaboration but rejects any interference (1997, p .106-107):
I believe that Unionists should find some accommodation with the Irish 
Republic. That requires an awful lot from the Irish Republic mind you; they 
have got to act as good neighbours and they have been far from good 
neighbours, over the last twenty years... I think that Unionism should be big 
enough to be able to embrace that and face up to the Irish Republic and say ‘yes, 
we believe that we have got a separate identity, we want to maintain that 
separate identity, but where there are areas o f common concern we can work 
with you.
1 Irish Times, “Opposition to Articles 2,3 endorsed”, 29-30 Oct. 1990
8 Belfast Telegraph, “Partition Back in Vogue”, 13 May 1999
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It appears that Unionists did not immediately accept the Republic as a 
valid and trustworthy partner in potential negotiations.
Aughey underlines the Unionists’ uncomfortable approach to a 
potentially non-irredentist Irish nationalism advocating that Haughey is preferred 
by Unionists ‘as they know where he stands’ whereas Fitzgerald’s position is 
seen as a disguised speech to attract Unionists into a politically unified Ireland 
(1989, p.46). These signs of fear towards an Irish irredentist position suggest that 
the AIA did not change the Unionists’ perception of the Republic of Ireland. 
Nevertheless, its signing impacted on Unionists’ strategy as they appeared to be 
completely isolated and powerless for the first time.
According to Cochrane, ‘the agreement shocked many Unionists because 
they finally realised they were an unwanted child’ (1997, p.31). Unionists were 
certainly aware long before the signature of the AIA that their position within the 
United Kingdom was not fully accepted. Indeed, as Arthur argues, ‘from the 
bottom up to the elites, there is reluctance and distrust in the elite, especially the 
British government, above all since 1985’ (1999, p.480).
Therefore, contrary to Cochrane’s statement, Unionists were certainly not 
surprised as they expected a potential “treason”, but they definitely did not 
anticipate the extent of the potential “betrayal”. This surprise was even bigger 
because they were not expecting such an attitude from Margaret Thatcher who 
was famous for her hard-line position vis a vis the Northern Ireland situation. 
Meanwhile, John Hume played an important role in the elaboration of the 
agreement. Thus, Unionists who represent the majority of the people of Northern 
Ireland were not included in the process whereas the leader of the constitutional
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nationalists had played a key role. Lord Maginnis depicted the agreement as ‘a 
great realisation for Ulster Unionists that it did not matter that we sent our young 
people to die in 1916, it did not matter that we had always been, in many ways, 
been more British than the English.’9
The signing of the AIA revealed that the British government was ready to 
negotiate with the Republic of Ireland without any unionist participation. The 
lack of consultation was likely to be seen as a betrayal from the Unionist 
perspective. However, it can also be interpreted as a warning that a British 
government could negotiate without them.
The resignation of Unionist MPs, along with the rally in Belfast to try and 
wreck the agreement, as in 1974, did not work out for several reasons (Arthur, 
2000, p.228, Cunningham, 2001, p.50). The most obvious one is that having 
negotiated without them, the British government did not formally pay too much 
attention to their silence or their anger. Moreover and more crucially, as McCall 
suggests, the AIA and IGC were extra-governmental organisations so they did 
not need Unionists to work. Therefore, the AIA signalled the end of the Unionist 
veto on the structure of policy making in Northern Ireland (1999, p.46).
If Unionists wanted to undermine the AIA, they would have to negotiate. 
Therefore, the AIA transformed the situation. For the first time, Unionists had to 
establish a form of dialogue in order to justify the need for an alternative to the 
AIA. Also, for the first time, Unionists were forced to be introspective in order to 
solve, comprehend and deal with their own weaknesses. As Porter puts it, the 
first weakness to eradicate was the lack of communication (1996, p.14). The
9 Lord Maginnis, UUP Headquarter, Belfast, 6 Dec. 2002
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“behind the barricade” mentality resolutely had a negative effect on Unionism 
and actually played into their adversaries’ hands. The acknowledgement of the 
necessity to modify their way of thinking became visible with the cross-party, 
DUP/UUP publication of An End to Drift. According to Dermot Nesbitt, ‘it 
contemplated that Unionists should not be “ashamed to adapt to the changing 
circumstances” and that both parties should perhaps abandon “pure majority 
rule”’(2001, p.3). While the UUP had evolved toward a power-sharing approach 
over time, DUP maintained its pro-majority rule position.
Transformation was made even more necessary when, during the early 
1990’s, Brooke mentioned the possibility of finding an alternative to the 
Hillsborough Agreement (Cunningham, 2001, p.78). The then Secretary of 
State’s statement opened the way to new negotiations and offered an opportunity 
for Unionists to participate in order to defend their position.
Nevertheless, in spite of this experience with the AIA, this change of 
trajectory did not necessarily imply an immediate acceptance of a third party. As 
already mentioned, the signing of the agreement did not convince Unionists to 
interact differently with Dublin.
Academic literature, including Aughey (1989), Fitzgerald (2003), 
O’Halloran (1987), Ruane and Todd (1996), agrees that Unionists see the Irish 
government as being hostile. But, beyond this primary consensus, scholars are 
divided regarding the real motivations behind the Irish government’s willingness 
to play a part in negotiations. This debate focuses on the level of irredentism in 
Irish nationalism (in this context nationalism in the Republic of Ireland). Two
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streams came into being. On the one hand, there are those arguing that Irish 
nationalism is deeply irredentist such as Aughey stating that a “united Territory” 
remained more important for the [Irish] authorities than “uniting people” (1989, 
p.42), or Clare O’Halloran arguing that Irish nationalism was deeply irredentist 
at least until the 1970s, even arguing that the New Ireland Forum of 1984 “hides 
traditional demands behind conciliatory speech’ (1987, p.210). On the other 
hand, Garret Fitzgerald argues that Fine Gael and the Irish Labour Party 
abandoned their irredentist claims during the autumn of 1969, only Fianna Fail 
kept them until the Downing Street Declaration (2003, p. 177). In addition, 
Former Dail Deputy, Desmond O’Malley argues that Ireland called off its 
irredentist claims in 1985, offering the possibility to build a positive relationship 
with the British government (2003, p.68). O’Leary and Arthur reach the same 
conclusion and contradict O’Halloran’s approach, stating that, ‘the Forum 
produced a revision to traditional Irish Nationalism and enabled Dr. Fitzgerald’s 
government to negotiate and sign the Anglo-Irish Agreement in November 1985” 
(1990, p. 43). All writers acknowledge the irredentist nature of Irish nationalism 
but are divided as to when this irredentism faded away.
If Unionists could no longer ignore the Irish dimension, they did not 
necessarily try and change the traditional strategy of the “empty chair” vis a vis 
Dublin. Yet, as Lord Maginnis crucially argued: ‘one thing that Unionists were 
determined about was that nobody would ever again make an agreement behind 
their backs.’10
10 Lord Maginnis, UUP Headquarter, Belfast, 6 Dec. 2002
The best way to prevent this from happening was to be present in all 
negotiations. Boycotts, strikes and other traditional practices became obsolete, as 
the 1985 failure showed.
Moreover, as seen above, the AIA played a major role in increasing the 
level of Unionists’ isolation in the Northern Ireland political arena. There was no 
alternative but to engage in negotiations to defeat the AIA. So, if the US were 
going to play a part in the launch of fresh talks, Unionists would not be able to 
boycott them or walk out from the negotiation table without missing out on the 
opportunity of putting an end to the AIA. This certainly is part of the answer to 
the question why, in spite of Unionists’ strong reluctance towards the US 
involvement, they never organised any protest, not even when Bill Clinton 
visited the province in 1995, as it would have appeared to be ludicrous. The UUP 
was clearly aware of it. The Belfast Telegraph reported that Taylor declared that 
any Unionists boycott ‘would play into the hands of Republicans and lead to 
Unionists being portrayed as unreasonable.’11
Thus, the ambiguous British strategy, the “treason” of the AIA and, the 
impossibility of removing the Irish dimension, isolated Ulster Unionists up to the 
point that when mediation was offered, even if they expressed extreme reluctance 
to it as seen in chapter 3, they remained in the negotiations. This was not 
necessarily a demonstration of their wish to collaborate on the issue as the DUP 
leader Paisley expressed as early as December 1994: ‘his party would take seats 
in any new assembly - but its priority would be to work from within to destroy
11 Belfast Telegraph, “ ‘Revolving Reception’ plan in move to avoid boycott”, 16 Oct. 1995
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* 12 •it.’ Thus, Paisley’s statement is the illustration that the acceptance or the 
reluctant toleration of the inclusion of a third-party in the negotiation does not 
equate to an involvement in peace making.
Unionist’s traditional attitude to the British government and their fear that 
the latter may abandon them, heightened their apprehension of other mediators 
as, if the British government desire to withstand pressure was not strong, they 
might have compromised even more in formal third party negotiations. Yet, 
Unionists accepted the US involvement. Perhaps, the literature on Unionists’ 
reaction to the AIA offers a mode of analysis that can explain the Unionists’ 
position. There is certainly no internal dynamic in favour of mediation but 
perhaps the experience of the failed campaign of 1985-1988 against the AIA 
generated a desire within the UUP not to be excluded -  at almost whatever price 
had to be paid. This aspect of Unionist motivation will be fully explored in 
chapters 3 and 4.
III-THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF MEDIATION
The Northern Ireland conflict was largely defined as quasi-insoluble, with 
some, such as Rose in Governing Without Consensus, arguing that ‘in the 
foreseeable future, no solution is immediately practicable’ leaving virtually no 
chance to solve the issue (1971, p.21). Two possibilities had never been tried 
prior to the 1990s: firstly, the implementation of fully inclusive talks, secondly,
12 The Press Association Limited, “Sinn Féin Strategists meet-as Paisley Threatens Wrecking 
tactics”, 3 Dec. 1994
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the inclusion of a third party within the discussions to act as a mediator between 
all actors involved.
The peace process that started in the early 1990s contained both these two 
new parameters. Through Brooke’s declaration in 1989, Britain had expressed 
that it had “no selfish, strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland” (Bew 
and Gillespie, 1999, p.242). As Jonathan Caine, former political advisor to Sir 
Patrick Mayhew, argued: ‘the phrases were actually directed to the Nationalists 
and Republicans and it was quite simply saying that the colonial presence in 
which we are determined to hold on to Northern Ireland for our own interest is 
unfounded. Come what may, Northern Ireland has no special strategic 
importance for us.’ The British government wanted Sinn Fein to be part of the 
negotiations with the condition of an end to IRA violence. The US administration 
initiated contacts in 1992 to volunteer as a third-party facilitator.
The US administration opted for mediation, as it was the only acceptable 
diplomatic tool in a situation such as Northern Ireland. Indeed, mediation differs 
from any other type of intervention on two fundamental points. ‘It is not based 
on the direct use of violence and it is not aimed at helping one of the participants’ 
(Zartman & Touval, 1997, p.445). The privileged relationship between the US 
and Britain and the location of the conflict in Western Europe within a 
democratic country made the use of other diplomatic tools than mediation 
unthinkable.
As the US role was defined according to the concept of mediation, their 
relationship with UUP naturally operated within that framework. Indeed, in
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contrast to Irish nationalists who benefited from a certain influence in the US, the 
Ulster Unionist political community did not have any political presence there. 
Therefore, the first Ulster Unionist official contacts with the US administration 
took place in the context of the US offering their service as a third party.
There is ‘a myriad of possible mediators and the range of mediatory roles 
and strategies is (...) wide’ as ‘mediation may take place between states in 
conflict, within states, between groups of states, between organisations, and 
between individuals’ (Bercovitch, 2002, p.7). Following Bercovitch, mediation is 
here defined as ‘a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from 
the parties own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or 
accept an offer of help from, an outsider (...) to change their perception of or 
behaviour and to do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the 
authority of law’ (Bercovitch, 1992, p.7, 1997, p .130).
Unionists naturally expressed strong resentment at the US proposal, 
arguing first, that Northern Ireland was a British issue and second, expressing 
considerable reservation regarding the neutrality of the US, accusing them of 
holding pro-nationalist sympathies. As Jeffrey Donaldson commented: ‘the vast 
majority of Americans were not terribly interested in Northern Ireland and they 
were not terribly interested in a foreign policy issue that does not have a direct 
bearing on their day to day life, but of course from this distance it appeared to 
Unionists that [...] the whole of America had this pro-nationalist view which was 
not accurate at all.’14 Still, Unionists agreed, though reluctantly, to interact with 
the US. This leads to a debate that transcends the Northern Ireland situation, in
13 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 25 Jun. 2003
14 Jeffrey Donaldson, UUP Office, Lisburn, 15 Apr. 2003
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the wider literature on international mediation theory, focusing on the debate 
between those advocating neutrality as a priority and those favouring leverage. In 
the Ulster Unionists’ case, has neutrality or leverage been more crucial in their 
decision to progressively engage with the US? Did the fact that the US, the only 
remaining superpower, was a candidate to play the role of a third-party influence 
them into, at least officially, altering their reactive attitude? This is clearly of 
relevance to the debates in the literature on who can actually intervene, and how 
can this potential mediator intervene?
These three main questions as per “when”, “who” and “how to intervene” 
correspond to the content of the three subdivisions of this part of the chapter, as it 
facilitates the implementation of theoretical concepts to the UUP-US 
administration relationship.
A-When to intervene?
Is it better to intervene before or after what Bercovitch calls the “point of 
strength” (1996, p.23)? The traditional or structuralist approach including 
Zartman (1982, p.45, 1985, 1995, 1997), Bercovitch (1997) and Rubin (1981, 
p.5) among others, advocates that intervention is more efficient when the actors 
of the conflict have reached the “ mutually hurting stalemate” defined as the 
realisation by both sides that they are ‘never going to win or solve the problem’ 
(Zartman & Touval, 1997, p.452-453). Nevertheless, this solution is increasingly 
being questioned due to the multiplication of ethnic conflicts in the aftermath of 
the Cold War and on humanitarian principles. Indeed, the lack of external 
intervention generates a high risk of triggering a snowball effect in neighbouring
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countries. Moreover, it is morally not acceptable to let people kill each other and 
then wait until they are tired of it and let genocides such as in Rwanda or former 
Yugoslavia take place. As Bercovitch rightly points out, ‘The adversaries’ 
perception of the issues is a key factor in determining whether or not to accept a 
mediation initiative and influencing whether it will have much success’ (1996, 
p.24). To what extent can the international system let the actors of the conflict 
judge whether or not they reached this “hurting stalemate”?
Some academics such as Timothy Sisk (1996, p. 108) advocate the use of 
preventive diplomacy. Furthermore, even if Zartman still advocates the “hurting 
stalemate”, he and Touval underline that it would be better if there was an 
implementation of preventive diplomacy in order to make conflicting actors 
perceive this hurting stalemate as a much lower level of violence (1997, p. 453). 
Zartman and Touval’s 1997 argument highlights the shifts on ethnic conflict 
regulation theory in response to the evolution of the global situation and the 
greater consideration taken of humanitarian issues. International political figures 
such as the Norwegian minister Gro Harlem Bruntland have evoked the necessity 
to apply more preventive diplomacy (Arthur, 1999, p.476). Even though 
preventive diplomacy has not been used in many cases, some relatively 
successful examples exist such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE) intervention in Macedonia (Hauss, 2001, p.44).
The problem is that, as Hauss argues: ‘one actor will not abandon the 
fight as long as he is persuaded he can win the war or at least avoid losing’ 
(2001, p.58). Thus, reaching the hurting stalemate often offers the greater chance 
of positive results in mediation. This idea is seen in the literature dealing with
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Northern Ireland with for example, John Darby stating that ‘there has been no 
resolution because the violence has not been intolerable’ (1986, p. 10).
Therefore, even if mediation was seriously considered and then took 
place in the Northern Ireland context in the mid-nineties, in other words twenty- 
five years after the eruption of the modern troubles, it appears worth analysing 
whether the main actors of the conflict had reached this hurting stalemate by the 
beginning of the 1990s. If Unionists did so, did it have an impact on their 
decision to accept the US involvement?
Bercovitch provides a list of points required if a conflict is to benefit from 
intervention. This list will be used as the theoretical framework for the Northern 
Ireland issue focusing on the extent to which the UUP was ready to solve the 
issue peacefully and consequently to accept the contribution of a third party. This 
choice relies on the fact that Bercovitch’s method consists of ‘large-scale 
systematic studies that draw on numerous cases of international mediation to 
formulate and test proposition about effective mediation and to assess the 
conditions under which mediation can be made to work better.’ Bercovitch’s 
sampling did not include the Northern Ireland issue. Thus, it is interesting to 
apply these criteria to Northern Ireland and analyse to what extent this conflict 
corresponds to Bercovitch’s conceptual model focusing on Ulster Unionists. 
Bercovitch distinguishes four main criteria: the length of the conflict, the actors 
must reach an impasse, the level of readiness to carry on the struggle at any cost 
and the willingness to accept the assistance of a third-party (Bercovitch & 
Houston, 1996, p .13, Bercovitch, 1997, p .133, 2000, p.8).
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Firstly, it must be a “long term conflict”. Northern Ireland was in a 
situation of protracted conflict. Still, looking at the number of deaths and 
casualties, it would be located internationally among the low-level conflicts. In 
case of low-level conflicts, the possibility to reach agreement is lower as the 
casualty rate still remains at a level that is tolerable if not morally acceptable.
Secondly, there is an impasse in the efforts committed by the actors 
involved (1996, p .13, 1997, p.133, 2000, p.8). In Northern Ireland, Republicans 
remained persuaded of their capacity to win the war against the British 
“occupation” for a long time. However, leaked documents from the late 1980s 
and early 1990s such as the Totally Unarmed Strategy (TUAS) document ‘which 
was circulated within the IRA and Sinn Féin in the summer of 1994’ (Mallie & 
McKittrick, 1996, p.311) suggest that the leadership of the IRA had come to the 
conclusion that while they could remain “undefeated” they could not secure a 
united Ireland based on their own strength and resources.15 The Social 
Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) former leader John Hume was involved in a 
sériés of informal talks with Sinn Féin leader, Gerry Adams, and constantly 
reported their substance to the Irish government. These talks were crucial as 
Hume was contributing to the reorientation of Sinn Féin’s position that later 
resulted in their inclusion within the peace talks.
The new British conservative Prime Minister John Major appeared to be 
more flexible on the issue than Thatcher as the famous Brooke’s declaration 
suggests, quoted above and directed at Republicans in order to persuade them to 
give up the use of weapons and progressively be integrated in the talks. In
'5 The TUAS document is wholly reproduced in Mallie & McKittrick (1996) Appendix 3, pp- 
481-484
addition, the Irish Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds benefited from a greater 
popularity in British political circles than his predecessors and had a convivial 
relationship with Major, which was an encouraging sign of improvement in the 
relationship between London and Dublin on the Northern Ireland issue. He was 
also much more willing than his predecessors to engage privately with Sinn Fein. 
Therefore, in the early 1990s, the British government along with the Republicans 
assisted by the constitutional nationalists and indirectly by the Irish government 
may not have been ready to make a step forward to enter inclusive negotiation 
but had reached an “impasse”. They may have reached a mutually hurting 
stalemate in their own perception of the conflict. No actor involved was willing 
to make the first step towards negotiations by fear of making compromises that 
would weaken their initial position.
However, there is some evidence that the British government, the IRA, 
Sinn Fein and the Irish government favoured a process of negotiation over the 
status quo or attempts at military escalation. As far as Unionists were concerned, 
however their status quo objective was focused on advocating a containment 
policy. Ulster Unionists’ determination to maintain the status quo did not 
intrinsically require much effort to solve the issue peacefully. The Unionists’ 
perception of peace was to eliminate the IRA and certainly not negotiate with 
Republicans. They did not perceive their position as a hurting stalemate, still 
pushed for a robust policy on security to defeat the IRA, and rejected talks with 
Sinn Fein and/or the Irish government on Northern Ireland. A section of 
Unionists in the early 1990s still believed in a potential security victory over the 
IRA and demanded an escalation of the security battle. This conception that the 
“Republican enemy” can be defeated is omnipresent in Unionists’ declarations
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until fairly recently. James Molyneaux declared that ‘the key to success in the 
battle against terrorism is the denial of the expectation of victory. The so-called 
guarantee (...) is itself a cause of instability because it recognises the possibility 
of change’.16 Trimble affirmed: ‘to hold out the possibility of change is to 
encourage terrorism.’17 And Robert McCartney argued that ‘the great problem 
that the British government have faced for the last 25 years is that they have a 
political policy directed towards withdrawal and are faced with the position that 
an effective security policy would frustrate their own political objective.’18 Thus, 
a part of the Unionist political community remained persuaded that political 
violence could be defeated.
Bercovitch’s third criterion is that “neither actor is prepared to 
countenance further costs or escalation of the dispute” (Bercovitch, 1996, p. 13,
1997, p. 133, 2000, p.8). The Northern Ireland conflict had lasted for about 
twenty-five years and it was clear that the British government based its strategy 
more on containment than conflict resolution and this choice proved to be 
inefficient (O’Duffy, 1993, p. 128). The IRA did not seem to be able to win the 
war against the British, as after more than twenty years of conflict, Northern 
Ireland was still a part of the United Kingdom. Thus, both the British 
government and the Republicans had definitely reached the point of “mutually 
hurting stalemate”. Nonetheless, Ulster Unionists had not reached this stalemate. 
The conflict was a low level one and somehow contained with efficacy. The 
British government mostly carried the cost.
16 House of Commons, 12 Mar. 1990, vol.169, col. 61.
17 House o f Commons, 5 Jul. 1990, vol. 175, col. 1204
18 Northern Ireland Forum, 17 Jan. 1997, vol. 24 p. 17
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Thus, the only motivation for Unionists to enter the peace process was to 
defeat the AIA. Even if this was a positive point as they were willing to engage, 
peace was not their primary motivation. Secondly, this evolution does not 
necessarily imply that Unionists were more inclined to welcome a third party in 
potential negotiations.
Bercovitch’s fourth main criterion is that ‘Both parties welcome some 
form of mediation and are ready to engage in direct or indirect dialogue’ (1996, 
p .13, 1997, p.133, 2000, p.8). If the Nationalists along with the Irish Government 
were encouraging the inclusion of an external mediator, above all the US, the 
British government and Unionists, for different reasons, were fiercely against any 
external involvement. Besides, the British government had imposed conditions 
on direct dialogue with Republicans, starting with a renunciation of violence. 
However, Unionists refused to deal directly or indirectly with Sinn Fein until the 
election of the 1996 assembly. Only then did the UUP accept any engagement 
with Republicans and even then only indirectly until fairly recently. The first 
meeting between Adams and Trimble only took place after the signing of the 
GFA during the summer of 1998.
Bercovitch identifies key issues, which seem to fit the other actors in thr 
Northern Ireland case but certainly need further examination from the Unionist 
perspective. The application of Bercovitch’s model to Northern Ireland suggests, 
from an initial study, that only one out of four criteria is fully represented in the 
situation: it is a protracted conflict. If the other criteria are largely present among 
most of the actors involved, it is not at all clear that Ulster Unionists had reached 
any form of hurting stalemate and were perhaps ready to maintain the situation
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under the status quo applying a containment policy to violence in the region or 
even agreeing with an escalation in military strategy. They also clearly resisted 
external mediation. Does the fact that Ulster Unionist behaviour did not 
correspond to any of the criteria necessarily imply that it was not the right time 
for a mediation process to be implemented?
In the Northern Ireland case, the early 1990s context appeared to be the 
right time for the insertion of a third party due to the positive mind-set of most of 
the other actors. Moreover, if Ulster Unionists had been consulted on that matter, 
no external intervention would have ever taken place as the time would have 
never been right. Did Unionists’ subsequent acceptance of US involvement 
suggest a greater degree of “hurting stalemate” thinking with the UUP than they 
first suggested or does it indicate that those criteria are not as crucial as the 
literature suggests?
B-Who can intervene?
Unionists perceived the United States as a biased actor in the Northern 
Ireland issue due to the strong Irish-American connection that had played a 
fundamental role in Clinton’s victory in November 1992. The later successful 
intervention therefore suggests that other parameters can be more crucial than 
initial suitability. This leads to a discussion on the nature of the mediator based 
on two main points, neutrality and leverage, starting with trying to answer the 
questions: who is a suitable candidate for intervention? Which factor does 
determine the suitability of a candidate for intervention?
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First, several political or non-political entities such as a non­
governmental organisation, individuals, or state-coalitions can play the role of 
mediator (Rubin, 1981, p.9) but this study is located at the crossroad between the 
state as mediator, which generally uses ‘the services of one of the top decision­
makers’ (Bercovitch, 2002, p. 11) and an individual as mediator in the sense that 
‘he or she is not a government official or political incumbent’ (Bercovitch, 2002, 
p. 10). Senator Mitchell was not a US government representative and had been 
appointed as an independent chairman by London and Dublin. Nevertheless, the 
role that the US administration and Clinton in particular played is strongly 
intermingled with Mitchell’s role even though they were taking place on 
different levels as covered in chapter 4.
As Bercovitch argues, ‘a greater number of definitions [of the role of 
mediation] emphasize neutrality and impartiality, as opposed to bias, as the 
distinguishing features of mediation’ (2002, p.6). Thus, at first sight, neutrality in 
the potential third party is necessary tends to make them acceptable to the 
conflicting parties. As Fisher declares: ‘the ideal mediator is [often] seen as a 
kind of eunuch from Mars who happens to be temporarily available’ (1981, 
p.97).
If one considers that the will to be involved in mediation is based on the 
“cost-benefit calculation”, neutrality can seriously be questioned (Zartman and 
Touval, 1996, p.451). Carnevale and Arad confirm this point arguing that there 
are two types of mediators: on the one hand, the “biased mediator” who is closer 
to one side than another, on the other hand, the “impartial mediator in the sense 
that he or she has no opinion regarding the conflict at hand, however unlikely it
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might be” (1996, p. 40). Yet, they argue that impartiality remains one of the 
means to provide influence to the mediator over the actors involved. When the 
mediator is perceived as being impartial, the negotiations are more likely to 
succeed. “When the disputants believe that a mediator is biased against them, 
they are likely to be less receptive to mediation” (Rubin, Pruitt and Kim, 1994, 
p.201). Still, they agree that impartiality, often expected, is almost impossible to 
reach.
However other authors argue that partiality does not necessarily lead to 
negative outcome. The party which nurtures a close relationship with the 
mediator is willing to preserve this privileged relationship and the less privileged 
one can appear to be ready to launch a relationship (Cameval & Arad, 1996, 
p.42). In some cases, it can also help the weaker party to gain power and reach a 
certain level of equality with the adversary in order to launch balanced 
negotiations (Rubin, 1981, p. 12)
In the Northern Ireland case, almost all potential mediators would have 
been perceived as favouring the Nationalist side as Unionists were dedicated to 
preserving the status quo and were opposed to any kind of mediation. In 
Northern Ireland, a potentially more neutral but less powerful mediator would 
almost certainly have been rejected in the first place. Indeed, the price for 
rejection of such a person would not have been high enough to overcome 
Unionists’ reluctance. Besides, in the highly unlikely case of their acceptance by 
the parties, their suggestions would have been easily refuted and then the 
negotiations would have failed, such as when Sir Ninian Stephens, a prestigious 
Australian lawyer and politician (Bruce, 1994, p.73) was invited to chair the talks
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on strand 2, the negotiations about the north-south relations round of talks 
launched by Brooke in 1991-1992. If the intention was to bring a third voice, 
Stephens did not have any material ability to persuade both sides of the rightness 
of his suggestions. There is obviously very little possible comparison between 
Stephens’ role that was not clearly defined as one of a mediator and Mitchell’s 
part in the 1996-98 peace-talks. Nevertheless, the presence of outsiders in the 
talks was not new but doomed to failure, as they did not have enough leverage to 
make influential suggestions.
‘A mediator is not chosen by the actors because of their impartiality but 
because of their ability to influence, protect or extend their interest of each party 
in conflict’ (Bercovitch, 1996, p.26). Hopmann also states that mediators are 
chosen on the basis of ‘the weight of the state or organisation they represent and 
personal skills’ (1996, p.221). Following this logic it may be that US mediation 
was the only option. It was certainly one of the few possibilities that Unionists 
could not veto once the British government had agreed. The Unionists’ 
perspective on this is discussed in detail in chapter 3.
In fact, the American proposition was difficult to turn down. As Touval 
argues, there are ‘offers that cannot be refused’ (1992, p.232). Thus, Bercovitch’s 
argument that ‘the parties retain (...) their freedom to accept or reject mediation 
or mediator’s proposal’ (1992, p.5, 2002, p. 5) can be contradicted by the 
political realities that can constrain their freedom or strongly influence their 
judgement. Unionists had two options. They could agree to try and implement an 
agreement with the Nationalist minority or they could reject the US involvement. 
This last option may have led to unanimous condemnation of international public
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opinion. It would have helped the IRA justify the use of violence. Unionists 
would have gained nothing out of such a strategy. They took the lesser “evil”. It 
may have been that the awareness of a section of the Unionist politicians, mainly 
from the Ulster Unionist Party, of this sensitive situation progressively led to a 
compromise in the acceptance of the US involvement. The issue, basis for UUP 
acceptance of US mediation is analysed in more details in chapter 3, in the 
context of these debates.
C-Intervention: Creating a triadic relationship?
Each case requiring a third-party involvement is unique and therefore it is 
barely possible to build up a conceptual model that works indefinitely in any case 
and any location. Nevertheless, some constants exist such as the creation of a 
triadic relation as a consequence of a third-party involvement. In that sense, the 
Northern Ireland case appears to be even more complicated as it generates the 
creation of a double level of triadic relations. The United States, as a third-party, 
launched a triadic relationship with the two sovereign states, the United Kingdom 
and Ireland, but also with the representatives of the two local communities, in 
other words with Nationalists and Unionists. Moreover, this double level of 
triadic relationship is also on the US side, since Senator Mitchell benefited from 
an explicit role as chairman of the negotiation but Clinton played the role of an 
imprecise third-party, constantly intervening on the side of London and Dublin to 
provide substantial leverage.
The point is not to underestimate the efficiency of small states involved in 
mediation such as Algeria during the 1979 American Embassy Hostage Crisis in
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Teheran but to demonstrate that leverage is a major factor in general and 
certainly was in Northern Ireland. In fact, in this case, and in the majority of 
others, mediation always implies leverage, as pressures on the conflicting parties 
are obviously more telling (Touval, 1992, p.233). Indeed, a more powerful third- 
party has rewards to offer to conflicting parties in the case of progress in 
negotiations (Hopmann, 1996, p.227). In such a situation ‘strong mediators like 
those from the US are needed when the parties lack sufficient motivation to settle 
when a “rearranging pay-off is needed to tip the cost-benefit calculation of each 
side’” (Pruitt, 2002, p.51). As covered in the first subdivision, Ulster Unionists 
had not reached a “hurting stalemate”. Therefore, the potential mediator had to 
be sufficiently influential to convince them that their presence was positive or, at 
least, to convince them that to reject them would generate a worst outcome than
to acknowledge them. Due to the British government’s importance on the
international stage, mediation required somebody with significant authority to 
have any influence on every actor involved. Few apart from the US could have 
done so.
As Kleiboer argues:
A great power ‘brings a higher degree of authority to the mediation process, since 
it is much more perilous to alienate a great power than less powerful international 
actors, ( .. .)  [it] can wield far more and more diverse sticks and carrots which each
party believes will help to achieve its objectives or minimise its losses. (. . .) [It]
has the ability to compensate parties making concessions. (. . .)  Finally, [it] is often 
the only one that can guarantee that a negotiated agreement will be implemented 
(2002, p.129).
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Rewards are not the only type of leverage that the third party can use to 
put pressure on parties. Zartman introduces two others, positive ones or “carrots” 
such as ‘attractive outcome for both’ and negative ones or “sticks” such as ‘the 
threat to end the mediation process through withdrawal’ (1995, p. 21). Rubin 
provides other important tools at the mediator’s disposal such as “expert power”, 
which means that the mediator has a better knowledge and experience of certain 
issues, or “a legitimate power”. In the Northern Ireland case, London and 
Dublin’s joint appointment of Mitchell conferred a certain degree of legitimacy 
to the new chairman (1992, p.29). This list is obviously not exhaustive.
The American government, by offering to play a role, appeared to possess 
all the qualities since they had clearly sufficient leverage. They could also offer 
substantial investments, as the organisation of a big conference on investment in 
both parts of Ireland demonstrated in May 1995. Former Senator Mitchell, who 
later became the Chairman of peace-talks organised the conference.
‘Moreover, leverage does not only depend on the resources alone but also 
on the willingness of the mediator to deploy them and the skill with which it is 
done’ (Kleiboer, 2002, p. 127). Therefore, such a major event can also be 
interpreted as the introduction of the massive US potential that could not be 
seriously rejected looking at the critical economic situation of Northern Ireland. 
Unionists were aware of it since both the DUP and the UUP sent a delegation to 
the conference which took place a little more than a month after Gerry Adams’ 
invitation to the White House for the St Patrick’s Day celebration which they had 
boycotted.
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Leverage does not ensure success but it can be argued that ‘acceptability 
is determined by power-political consideration, by the expected consequences of 
acceptance or rejection not by perceptions of impartiality’ (Hopmann, 1996, p. 
225). Thus, in the early 1990s, the situation in Northern Ireland had considerably 
improved. Some of the actors were ready to make a step toward peace. 
Nevertheless, others, Unionists in particular, lacked motivation to engage into a 
peace process. In those circumstances, it appeared that the lack of internal 
agreement on mediation prevented a weaker leverage-free mediator. Therefore, 
the US appeared to be the only powerful third-party that could intervene in the 
Northern Ireland conflict resolution process.
The International System created after World War II was based on the 
preservation of states and on the principle of non-intervention. Thus, the limited 
acknowledgement by the United Nations of rights to any minority groups limited 
the capacity of Northern Irish nationalists to put pressure on the British 
government to favour a political and conciliatory strategy rather than a military 
and security one. More crucially, the United Kingdom as a permanent member of 
the Security Council benefited from the veto and thus would have barred any 
attempt at intervention. Thus, the international system benefited the United 
Kingdom and Ulster Unionists’ positions. However, the multiplication of inter- 
and intra-state conflicts throughout the world becoming ‘the most serious 
challenge’ in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War made intervention more 
acceptable (Taras & Ganguly, 2002, p.2). Mediation became ‘the most tolerable 
way to deal with civil wars’ as it represented ‘a low-cost alternative between the 
choice of doing nothing and large-scale military intervention’ (Crocker, 
Hampson and Aall, 1999, p.7).
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The end of the Cold War certainly played a role in facilitating the 
inclusion of the US as the third-party because of the weakening of the British 
position. But, did Unionists’ limited vision of the importance of the international 
context, mostly focusing on the regional one, prevent them from analysing the 
end of the Cold War as a source of danger for the status quo in the province? 
Therefore, where can we find the roots of Ulster Unionists’ decision to 
progressively accept the US as a mediator in the 1990s peace process? Are they 
actually located in the internal evolution of the situation and mostly in the 
reaction of the Unionist community in general to the AIA? These questions will 
be answered in chapters 3 and 4.
Moreover, the use of Bercovitch’s criteria tends to indicate that Ulster 
Unionists had not reached a “mutually hurting stalemate”. Did however 
Unionists perceive an impasse and finally recognise their incapacity to maintain 
the status quo due to the British government’s unwillingness to escalate the 
security response? Ultimately, can this study of Unionism contribute to a more 
nuanced understanding of the concept of “hurting stalemate” and “ripeness”?
According to Kriegsberg, ‘mediation is successful in so far as it 
contributes significantly to a de-escalating movement, to mutually acceptable 
agreement or to reconciliation, and it is responsive to the prevailing condition’ 
(1996, p.220). Then, the US participation can be interpreted as a success since it 
effectively contributed to the signing of the GFA on 10 April 1998 providing the 
province with a constitution and the tools to create a proportional devolved 
assembly and executive committee.
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The purpose of this study is not to minimise the contribution of other 
actors of the peace process but to focus on the ones who were the most reluctant 
to accept any external intervention and try and understand the impact of such an 
involvement on Unionist political strategy.
To maximise the chances of reaching an agreement, the duty of the 
United States, as the one offering assistance, was to take Unionists into account 
by treating them as a separate actor as equal as the others. This strategy was 
crucial from the viewpoint of equality of treatment but also from the unionist 
stance, as they did not trust the British government, and above all the British 
Foreign Service, to protect their interests. This point appears to be fundamental 
and it is a central topic of this thesis. The literature has closely examined the 
relationships between the British and Irish governments along with the Northern 
Irish Nationalists position in the USA. Yet very little has covered the Unionists, 
more particularly the UUP, relationship with the White House and the American 
delegation led by Mitchell during the Clinton era and beyond. This lack of 
analysis prevents a full understanding of the current peace process as it overlooks 
the views of the representatives of the majority of the population in Northern 
Ireland on what is a crucial element of the peace process.
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Therefore, three main interrelated questions are addressed in this thesis:
First, the UUP reluctance to accept external involvement is grounded in 
their sense of being under siege and their fear of the British government’s long­
term interventions. During the Cold War, this view was largely unchallenged as 
international intervention was also resisted by the British government and was 
limited. In the post Cold-War period, the British resistance to external 
(specifically US) involvement diminished and Unionists were forced then to 
engage. While this was the structural situation faced by Unionists, the following 
chapters will explore the impact of a wider international system change. Did 
Unionists sense any change in the British government position at the end of the 
Cold War? Did they pro-actively seek to develop a new international strategy? 
Internally, the literature on the AIA suggests a UUP move after the failure of the 
Ulster Unionist campaign. Certainly, they sought not to be isolated. Does this 
however amount to “hurting stalemate” evidence of an internal desire for 
mediation to resolve the underlying conflict? Alternatively, the mediation 
process can be seen as externally imposed in opposition to Unionist views. If 
internal motivation was found to be lacking why did Unionists engage as fully as 
they did?
Secondly once the UUP engagement began did the nature of that 
engagement shift over time? Was it simply that they lacked the power to refuse 
once the British government agreed? Did their policy remain defensive? Did they 
at any stage come to consider the US involvement as offering them a possibility 
to extend their influence or was their strategy only one of resistance? If their 
strategy was one of resistance, was it pro-active or simply reaction?
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Thirdly as the UUP-US relationship developed what did the UUP case 
offer the broader debate on neutrality and leverage? Was the UUP perception of 
the US a major barrier in practice? Was their response a pragmatic one? Did they 
engage once they realised they could not stop US involvement? Did US power 
feature in the relationship and was leverage ultimately more important than 
neutrality?
These core research questions will be addressed not simply as a generic 
overview but in the context of a unionist response to 18 specific events ranging 
from Clinton’s first election Campaign, the visa to Gerry Adams, or Trimble’s 
election as UUP leader in September 1995 to Bill Clinton’s re-election in 
November 1996, Labour Victory during the May 1997 general elections, the 
GFA and the Unionists’ perception of the American influence on its signing and 
finally Mitchell’s return to negotiations in September 1999. The basis of this 
approach is discussed in the following chapter on methodology. This next 
chapter also sets out a brief historical background, up to the beginning of the 
Clinton presidency.
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CHAPTER TWO
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
&
HISTORICAL FOUNDATION 
INTRODUCTION
In seeking a basis to analyse unionist perspectives on US involvement as 
mediator in the Northern Irish peace process, this study focuses on the stance of 
the Ulster Unionist Party, as expressed in public debate, in unionist publications 
and interviews. Their view is essential in understanding the impact of the US 
mediation, as their political leadership was the one who actively engaged with 
the US representatives.
The study covers the period between 1992 and 2000 and is therefore 
fairly recent and still very sensitive. The outcome of the Unionist-US relationship 
is still a subject of controversy within Unionist politics. Indeed, it is strongly 
linked to the perception of the degree of interventionism that the US practised in 
the signing of the Good Friday Agreement and the UUP leadership’s response to 
it. Consequently, access to some of the relevant documents such as internal 
memos is limited. Thus, the body of this analysis is limited to the public 
discourse generated by newspaper articles and official speeches and those aspects 
of the relationship which the actors involved from the UUP, the US 
administration, the Irish and British governments have been willing to divulge.
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The primary aim of this chapter is to set out the methodological basis for 
this study. It explains why the Ulster Unionist Party was selected, how the time 
period has been defined and the reasoning behind the analytical divisions which 
have been drawn. The data for this study ranges from documentary sources, 
including newspapers and parliamentary records to the publications of unionist 
organisations and interviews. The nature of the data and the methodological 
approach adopted is described along with the basis upon which interpretations of 
such material can be made.
An essential historical context for this study is to understand the reasons 
why Ulster Unionists in general did not benefit from an equivalent political 
platform to Irish nationalists in the US, despite a massive wave of Irish Protestant 
emigration during the 18lh century. While the focus of this thesis is the Clinton 
era, the absence of a unionist constituency in the USA is clearly of relevance, 
given the long history of emigration from Ireland. This question provides a 
fundamental background to the core period of analysis in the dissertation and is 
an essential aspect that has been little discussed in the literature. This chapter 
therefore includes a brief historical background and a discussion on that question.
I-METHODOLOGICAL PROCESS 
A-Research Design
As Robert K. Yin argues: ‘In general case studies are the preferred 
strategy when “how” or “why” questions are being posed, when the investigator 
has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary
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phenomenon within some real-life context’ (1984, p. 13). Yin’s words 
summarise the foundation of this analysis as being based on a developmental 
argument in the sense that it examines the development of the relationship 
between the US and the UUP. The option of a case study approach was also 
based on the fact that no prior research had been attempted in this area. Thus, 
available sources were not to be found easily. Finally, the developmental 
argument required a detailed and contextual study.
However, relying on one case study can be controversial in an analytical 
sense since, as Rose expresses: ‘case-studies, are at best suggestive, not 
definitive in their conclusion’ (1971, p. 19). This point is valid when the case 
study in question is strictly limited in time and location. Richard Rose is right in 
the sense that the conclusions drawn from the UUP-US relationship are not 
directly applicable to other case studies. However, they can bring some crucial 
information in the internal comprehension of the Northern Irish conflict and add 
to the attempt at strengthening theory more generally.
Furthermore, one case study can actually be composed of several sub­
case studies. In that sense, as King, Keohane and Verba argue: “instead of 
treating the ultimate outcome as the dependent variable, new dependent variables 
are constructed: for instance each decision in a sequence, or each set of 
measurable perceptions by decision-makers of others’ actions and intentions, 
becomes a new variable” (1994, 227). This forms the very heart of this project as 
it is based on the analysis of eighteen major events, which contribute to the study 
of the changes within the unionist community vis a vis the US involvement and 
highlight its evolution. The study of the unionist reaction to the US involvement 
is neither a study of a single event nor a continuous narrative description. It is
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rather a review of key issues that dominated public discourse and UUP-US 
relations during the peace process under Clinton’s presidency. Therefore, this 
thesis looks at the eighteen crucial cases, which are described below. This 
approach provides a diversity of specific issues and covers the full chronological 
period. It allows a range of cases to judge any evidence of change over time and 
allows to some extent an ability to reduce the influence of “outlier” events, which 
depart from general trends.
1-The choice o f a time period
The choice of time period for this thesis was based on the recent changes 
in international context such as the collapse of the USSR, which indirectly 
offered perspectives for a new peace process in Northern Ireland. It is also the 
period under which the US stance shifted from the traditional hands-off position 
in Northern Ireland to quite an active intervention under Clinton.
Since the unprecedented US involvement had started with Clinton’s 
election, it appeared natural to start this study at the end of 1992. However, to 
determine its ending was a bit more complex since President Bush had been 
elected at the end of 2000 and had declared his intention to remain involved in 
the Northern Irish case. The Bush administration was closer to the Unionists’ 
traditional ideology located in the shades of conservatism. However, the Bush 
administration left the brief in the hands of the State Department. The tragic 
events of September 11th and the “war against terrorism” that followed inevitably 
pushed Northern Ireland down the list of US foreign policy priorities. Moreover, 
it appears to be too soon to draw conclusions about the effect of Bush’s 
presidency on the Northern Irish peace process.
Kriegsberg divides the process of mediation into four stages, 
“preparation”, “initiation”, “negotiation” and “implementation” (1996, p. 227). 
These four stages correspond to the approach that the US administration used and 
adapted on a practical level to progressively participate in the peace process, and 
to try and persuade Unionists in general but mostly the UUP in particular to 
engage with their presence. This division of the peace process period in Northern 
Ireland also highlights the progress that the US made in that sense. The first 
period is the one of pre-negotiation that corresponds to the proposition of an 
alternative agenda; alternative solution and potential reasons to accept their 
involvement as a third party. This period corresponds to the decision made by the 
US administration and especially the National Security Council (NSC) to grant 
the visa to Adams, inviting every actor involved to expose their case in the US 
and propose assistance in order to counterbalance the visa. This era ended with 
the submission of Mitchell’s report on decommissioning in January 1996.
The second stage is the period of initiation to help the parties organise the 
topics of negotiation and set up agendas for talks. This phase began with 
Mitchell’s appointment by the British and Irish governments to be the 
Chairperson of the negotiations. During that period of time, Mitchell had to work 
to be accepted by every side of the unionist political spectrum, as they were not 
convinced of the benefit of the “intrusion” of an American, even appointed as 
independent, in the peace process. The third stage is the time when the mediator 
acts as an intermediary between actors involved, makes suggestions and leads to 
an analysis of a practical application of the leverage and neutrality theory 
developed in the first chapter. This stage corresponds to the period from the start 
of the talks on 10 June 1996 until the signing of the GFA. In this third period, the 
study will examine the evolution of the relationship between the UUP and
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Mitchell during the talks and UUP’s relationship with the US administration, 
above all with Clinton. The last stage is the monitoring of the implementation of 
the peace agreement. It is crucial in the aftermath of its signing as the return of 
Senator Mitchell at the end of 1999 to chair the first official review of the 
agreement shows.
2-The UUP as actors
In looking for a basis to analyse the Clinton administration’s relationship 
with the UUP during the Northern Ireland peace process, this research is limited 
to the party political leadership, as they were the ones directly involved in the 
peace talks. Even though Northern Irish politicians, being elected, are clearly 
influenced in their decision making by wider public opinion, the focus of this 
study is on those political elites, their strategies and actions.
This thesis focuses on the position of the UUP as they were the largest 
party in this period of time and their position seemed to have evolved. Contrary 
to the UUP, the DUP was much more involved in the US through various 
religious links especially with South East American fundamentalist 
Protestantism. The biggest illustration of this link is the honorary doctoral degree 
that Rev. Paisley received from Bob Jones University. Therefore, Rev. Paisley’s 
ideology if not well known in the US was not unknown either. Moreover, the 
DUP fiercely objected to the US government’s involvement in the Northern Irish 
peace process, refusing to acknowledge the Senator as chairperson of the talks 
(Mitchell, 1999, p.50). Paisley tried to weaken the peace process by boycotting it 
and therefore using one of the strategic weapons that Unionists of all shades have 
used over the years. The DUP engagement with the official US mediation effort
was limited and relatively unchanging in its nature. Therefore, it appeared to be 
more important to focus in detail on the UUP, then the main Northern Ireland 
Unionist party, which adopted various strategies, some quite innovative from the 
Unionist side, to advance their political position in negotiations. The adoption of 
a much more pragmatic approach by the party leadership, especially after 
Trimble’s election as party leader, was progressively more and more apparent. 
Thus, it appeared logical, without completely omitting the strategic importance 
of the DUP and other minor Unionist political parties, to focus on the UUP 
reaction and way of dealing with the USA’s involvement. The first interviewees 
of this project actually confirmed this point. As described in greater detail below, 
the first interviews for this research were conducted in the US and therefore, the 
US side provided a perception of how they dealt with Northern Irish Unionists in 
general. Two main points were recurrent: the interviewees’ difficulty in dealing 
with the DUP on a diplomatic level and the importance of Trimble’s leadership 
in the establishment of regular bridges of communication.
3-Eighteen events as case studies
The eighteen main events, which characterised the detail of the US 
involvement in the Northern Ireland peace process, were selected based on the 
secondary reading, newspapers reports, and the first interviews. These semi­
structured interviews gave the respondents the opportunity to describe the events 
that were the most striking in the evolution of the relationship between the UUP 
and the US representatives. The different interviewees usually mentioned the 
same events. Some of these events do not require much justification regarding 
their impact on the relationship. Some other events, such as the creation of the
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UUP North American office in Washington DC in 1995. were more low profile 
regarding their impact on this relationship.
These selected events are as follows:
• Clinton’s first election (Nov. 1992)
• The Downing Street Declaration (Dec. 1993)
• Visa to Gerry Adams (Feb. 1994)
• The IRA cease-fire (Aug. 1994)
• The St Patrick’s Day celebration at the White House (Mar. 1995)
• Economic Conference, Washington D.C. (May 1995)
These first six events, justified briefly in the next section and 
developed in full in chapter three cover the early initiatives from the 
first Clinton election campaign to Trimble's election as leader. While 
the detail of each of the cases differ slightly, collectively they allow 
an examination of the UUP's early hesitancy, their initial refusal to 
accept US involvement and their very reluctant engagement with the US 
event to defend their own position.
• David Trimble’s election as Leader of the UUP (Sep. 1995)
• Opening of the UUP North American Bureau (Oct. 1995)
• Clinton’s First Trip to Northern Ireland (Dec. 1995)
• Mitchell’s report on Decommissioning (Jan. 1996)
• Mitchell as Chairman of the talks (Jun. 1996)
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The second set of cases, developed in chapter four, cover the period from 
Trimble’s election to Mitchell’s appointment as chairman of the Talks. This 
corresponds to the period when the UUP began a more active strategy towards 
the US administration in order to defend their position, while still reluctant to see 
any positive potential in the USA.
• US Presidential election (Nov. 1996)
• Blair’s victory in British general election (May 1997)
• IRA ceasefire (Jul. 1997)
• The signing of the GFA (Apr. 1998)
• The “yes” Campaign for the Referendum (May 1998)
• Clinton’s trip to Northern Ireland (Sep. 1998)
• Mitchell’s return as facilitator in the review of the agreement (Jul.-Dec.
1999)
The final set of cases, discussed in chapter five, covers the period of
active negotiation from Blair's election and the second IRA cease-fire to
Mitchell's return to Northern Ireland to try and facilitate a review of the then 
stalemate. In this period they engaged actively with the US and on occasion saw 
potential to enlist the US in their support.
The next section briefly sets out the reasons for choosing each of the 18 cases.
Clinton’s campaign in 1992 is a starting point for this study as his victory 
triggered the modem US involvement in the Northern Irish peace process. Its
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study is essential as it sets out the new administration’s motivation for becoming 
involved and also raised Ulster Unionists’ fears regarding this involvement.
The Downing Street Declaration has been selected as it represents a 
turning point in the US attitude towards Northern Ireland. The US side viewed it 
as a positive signal regarding the visa to Gerry Adams as from then on Hume 
offered his support to the visa application. The conciliatory declaration by the 
Irish and British Prime Ministers and the mild support emanating from the UUP 
contributed to the US involvement as the US officials perceived it as sign of 
progress.
The visa granted to Gerry Adams is the first major decision that the US 
administration made with regards to the Northern Irish issue and definitely 
underlined a turning point in the US involvement in the Northern Ireland political 
situation. Such a decision clearly had an impact on Ulster Unionists and 
obviously requires deeper analysis.
The first IRA cease-fire in 1994 was fundamental as it underlined the will 
of the Republican movement to engage in peaceful discussions to reach an 
agreement. The US appeared to have played a role in influencing the 
Republicans towards this decision as developed in the third chapter. It also made 
the Ulster Unionist position more delicate in the debate as the cease-fire meant 
that the inclusion of Sinn Fein in impending peace talks was likely despite 
Unionists’ objections.
The St Patrick’s Day celebration is symbolically highly important, as 
Gerry Adams received international acknowledgement as a politician. It
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underlined the British government’s weakness in their inability to prevent the 
invitation. It also demonstrated that Unionists were not ready to engage, with the 
notable exception of Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) leader Gary McMichael, as 
they refused to attend the celebration. The boycott was not fruitful and certainly 
induced Ulster Unionists into changing their strategy, as less than two months 
after Adams’ invitation at the White House, both major Unionist parties sent a 
delegation to the Washington Economic conference in May 1995.
The Washington Economic Conference is of relevance as the US 
managed to gather every political shade in Northern Ireland in the same room, 
and presented the huge investment that could follow if the peace process 
developed. It appeared to be a significant step forward regarding its involvement, 
as Mitchell organised the event, being his first formal role, and presented one of 
the most significant weapons used in the context of mediation: economic 
investment as a way to influence actors towards peace.
David Trimble’s election as leader of the UUP is fundamental for three 
main reasons. Firstly, a change of leader often has an impact on the strategy of a 
political party. Secondly, his hard-line background did not initially give much 
prospect of peace. Thirdly, even though Molyneaux had made some steps toward 
greater collaboration with the US, Trimble was cited in every interview in the US 
(whether positively or negatively) as the key player in the negotiations on the 
Unionist side.
American officials did not see the opening of the Northern American 
office as a major point in their relationship with the UUP. Some UUP members 
praised it and others despised it. Even if the role of the office remained
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controversial and limited, it was nevertheless a significant event in the 
relationship between the US and the UUP and therefore it justifies its 
incorporation within the most illustrative facts in the evolution of the relationship 
between the US and the UUP.
Clinton’s first trip to Northern Ireland was unprecedented since no US 
president in office had ever made an official visit to Northern Ireland. Moreover, 
a series of events that took place during the trip underlined a significant shift 
from both the UUP and the US administration.
Mitchell’s report on decommissioning was crucial as it made official the 
necessity to adopt a twin-track approach with regard to arms and negotiations. It 
also guaranteed some Unionist demands such as the election of representatives 
prior to the beginning of the peace talks. Mitchell’s role and his high level of 
credibility led him to the position of chairman of the talks in June 1996. 
Unionists widely rejected the British and Irish governments’ decision at the time. 
This period is significant, as the UUP, though clearly unhappy, did not openly 
object even though they expressed some reservations. The fact that the UUP 
remained in the negotiations was crucial for the peace process.
The inclusion of Clinton’s second election is natural, as his defeat may 
have changed a considerable number of parameters in the peace process. The 
UUP also had a greater awareness of the US relationship when compared with 
the Clinton’s first election.
The Labour party victory during the general election was worth analysing 
in light of the UUP’s perspectives for three main reasons. Firstly, there was a 
change in the British leadership and this change was confirmed by the huge
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Labour victory that made Unionists less influential in the House of Commons 
than they had been under Major’s premiership. Secondly, Blair had a much more 
cordial relationship with his American counterpart and thirdly, it is also 
important to consider the UUP strategy in the run up to this long awaited Labour 
victory.
The IRA cease-fire in July 1997 and the reintegration of Sinn Fein 
representatives in the peace talks is essential as it provoked the final DUP/UKUP 
departure from the talks while the UUP remained.
The choice of discussing the signing of the GFA in April 1998 and the US 
interaction with the UUP representatives is self-explanatory.
The campaign for the referendum in favour of the “yes” vote to the 
agreement is also fundamental, as it directly included the population in the peace 
process. It is also interesting to observe Trimble’s reluctance to get the US 
involved in the campaign as Clinton had planned to do.
Clinton’s trip in September 1998 is significant, as it was the second 
presidential visit in the province. Even though the trip was certainly planned a 
long time in advance, it coincided with the aftermath of the Omagh bombing and 
appeared to be designed to boost a chaotic peace process as no institution 
planned in the GFA had been established by this time. This led to Senator 
Mitchell’s return to review the changes by the end of 1999.
Mitchell’s return is significant because Nationalists and pro-agreement 
Unionists accepted him. It also demonstrated the US administration’s willingness
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to complete its task by monitoring the implementation of the agreement. The 
monitoring of the implementation of an agreement is essential in a peace process 
as it is often argued in conflict mediation theories (Crocker & Hampson, Autumn 
1996, p.57).
Collectively these eighteen cases allow a significant analysis of the 
questions at the heart of this dissertation:
• To what extent did Unionists perceive the changing international 
environment as being dangerous for their political situation?
• How did the UUP strategy evolve over this time period? What factors are 
associated with elements of change and elements of continuity?
• Is there evidence that the mediation process itself shifted the Unionist 
position over these eighteen cases?
• Were these factors, which altered their attitude to the US, internal to the 
UUP, internal to Northern Ireland, or external?
Individually, none of these eighteen events could offer a definitive answer 
to these questions. However, taken collectively, they are more persuasive. In 
addressing the same fundamental questions across all eighteen events it is 
possible to draw common factors for the analysis, which is at least suggestive in 
providing some answers to the more fundamental and over-arching questions.
B-Nature of the Data
While a significant level of public discourse took place, there was often 
an absence of detail and there was limited media coverage of some of the
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selected events. In some cases, the UUP have been reluctant to state their 
position publicly or appeared to be very strongly reluctant to alienate the US 
administration. Therefore, while almost all of the case studies draw on a variety 
of sources, party documents, media reports, parliamentary speeches, the comer 
stone of the data gathering for this thesis was a set of interviews with leading 
UUP elites and others who interacted with them during this period.
1-Interviewing process
Forty-nine interviews were conducted on both sides of the Atlantic 
Ocean. While in America as a Visiting Scholar, the opportunity arose to 
interview American officials such as Nancy Soderberg who offered significant 
insights regarding the US administration’s perception of their work with the 
UUP. Some major figures on the US side such as George Mitchell or Trina 
Vargo did not wish to be interviewed. Still, the interviews conducted in the US 
both those named in this thesis some who gave interviews but do not wish to be 
named offered the possibility to obtain a very complete overview of the US 
position. These interviews helped sharpen the topic and contributed to the 
decision to focus on the UUP, as interviewees’ answers were almost exclusively 
dealing with the UUP within the unionist spectrum. The interviewing process 
provided an unprecedented dimension to this study, as Unionists had remained 
fairly discrete about it in public. Documents were used to double-check the 
interviewees’ responses, as will be dealt with in the following parts.
The interviewing process also requires a theoretical preparation in order 
to maximise the quality of the data obtained. To adopt the interviewing process 
as a main research tool can make the researcher dependent on the potential
69
interviewees willingness first, to be interviewed, and second to agree to 
cooperate on the crucial questions of the research and to provide the researcher 
with substantial information. First, key members of the UUP could have refused 
to be interviewed. The issue was of relevance as the unionist side had the 
reputation of being quite reticent to speak to researchers. They actually appeared 
to be very open to the discussion, with the notable exception of John Taylor who 
refused an interview, granting a large amount of time and, in some exceptional 
cases, agreeing to meet for a second interview. Several occasions occurred to 
interview UUP senior figures and UUP members from the whole spectrum 
within the party, for instance, David Trimble, Steven King, Lord Molyneaux, 
Lord Maginnis, Lord Laird, Jeffrey Donaldson, and Willie Ross among others.1
Commencing the interviewing process in the US instead of Northern 
Ireland appeared to be useful as it helped me gauge the extent of the progresses 
that the UUP made in the US to advance their position. This was useful, as US 
officials did not suffer from much pressure regarding Ulster Unionists and 
generally freely expressed their opinion.
My being French, with no Irish or British background, may have 
contributed to Unionists’ accessibility. Moreover, as described above, contacts 
with the UUP started in the USA and not in Northern Ireland. This was also of 
considerable help as I had the chance, thanks to Anne Smith, UUP representative 
in Washington DC, to observe the UUP’s work in the USA as I attended an 
investment event in Washington D.C. in March 2002. The contacts developed in 
the USA then opened up interviews in Northern Ireland.
1 Full list o f interviews in appendix one
70
In addition, this project would not have been complete without 
interviewing those, apart from US officials, who engaged with the UUP. 
Therefore, Sinn Fein members, such as Rita O’Hare and Mairead Keane, DUP 
representative St Clair McAlister, SDLP leader Mark Durkan, PUP 
representative David Ervine and British and Irish civil servants who do not wish 
to be mentioned have also been interviewed.
Unlike interviewing processes involving anonymous people, as is often 
the case in social and ethnographic studies, the group of people that compose the 
sample of interviews used for this study are part of the political or journalistic 
contexts. Thus, the respondents were all extremely well trained, and used to 
being asked questions. This advantage represented a challenge in conducting the 
interviews. This perception is reinforced by the fact that, contrary to in-depth 
interviews, which are often described as ‘repeated face to face encounters 
between the researcher and the informants’ (Taylor & Bogdan, 1985, p.77), the 
meeting with leading officials generally occurred only once. Thus, it was 
necessary to obtain as much useful information in a limited amount of time as 
possible considering that it would almost certainly be the only opportunity to do 
so. The approach was logically a face-to-face one based on a structured interview 
model as ‘there is generally little room for variation in responses ( ...) ’ (Fontana 
& Frey, p.649). There are several interpretations of how a structured interview 
should be conducted, but Fontana and Frey’s advice appeared to be very helpful 
because of their clarity and the degree of comparability between interviews, 
which their approach allows. Their advice, which also found some echo in 
Holstein and Gubrium’s work, The Active Interview (1995) are summarised in 
the six main points which follow:
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• ‘Never get involved in long explanations of the study; use standard explanation’
•  ‘Never deviate from the study introduction, sequence o f  questions, or question wording’
• ‘Never let another person interrupt the interview, do not let another person answer for 
the respondent or offer his or her opinion on the question’
• ‘Never suggest an answer or agree or disagree with an answer. Do not give the 
respondent any idea o f your personal views on the topic o f the question’
• ‘Never interpret the meaning of a question; just repeat the question’
• ‘Never improvise, such as by adding answer categories or making wording changes.’ 
(2000, p.650)
All these points are common sense at first sight but they do tend to be 
more delicate to apply to the interviewing process. Even if this method offers 
some safety for the interviewer, the researcher is not safe from mistake, and 
cannot control the answers and the purpose behind the type of answers provided.
As Taylor and Bogdan rightly argue: ‘no other method can provide the 
detailed understanding that comes from directly observing people and listening to 
what they have to say’ (1985, p.82). However, the interviewing process is 
generally an account of past events by people who lived it but which can easily 
be, deliberately or not, distorted.
Indeed, as Fontana and Frey argue, the mistake or the weakness of the 
interviewing process can be located in the fact that ‘the respondent may 
embellish a response, give what is described as a “socially desirable” response, 
or omit certain relevant information. The respondent may also err due to faulty 
memory’ (2000, p.650). Taylor and Bogdan corroborate Fontana and Grey’s 
approach when arguing that ‘as a form of conversation, interviews are subject to 
the same fabrications, deceptions, and distortions (...) that may lend insight into
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how they think about the world and how they act, there can be a great 
discrepancy between what they say and what they actually do’ (1985, p.81). In 
other words, when I interviewed Lord Maginnis about his vision of the US 
involvement in the peace process in December 2002, his answers may have been 
completely different from the ones he would have provided at different stages 
during the peace process.
One of the methodological questions of this thesis was to what extent 
were the answers relevant to construct a valid project. Would the time gap and 
potential distortion completely undermine the research? It was obviously going 
to affect it, but the thesis is based on the evolution of perception of a group of 
individuals towards another group within a single context. Mason argues that ‘the 
knowledge is at the very least reconstructed, rather than facts simply reported in 
interview settings. Qualitative interviewing consequently tends to be seen as 
involving the construction or reconstruction of knowledge more than the 
excavation of it’ (2002, p.63). It appears important not to accept “uncritically” 
the facts provided by the informants and as Taylor and Bogdan argue every piece 
of information provided should be examined ‘for consistency between different 
accounts of the same events (1985, p.99).
Therefore, it is indispensable to double-check the interviewees’ answers, 
for instance, through written data that was produced at the time of the event in 
question. The access to newspaper archives has been of great help, as they 
provided a certain amount of contemporary information. The Northern Irish 
Forum for Political Dialogue was also very valuable, as it became almost 
immediately exclusively “unionist” with Sinn Féin non-attendance and the 
SDLP’s quick departure. Thus, it provided some safe location where Unionists
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could feel more comfortable and express themselves more freely about the US 
involvement. UUP members’ statements about the US involvement have been 
very sparse during the peace process until the end of Clinton’s second term. 
Nonetheless, there was sufficient written material to crosscheck much of the 
views expressed in interviews. Furthermore the interviewees represented a good 
cross-section of opinion, within a divided UUP and also US, British and Irish 
officials. Therefore, even within the interview transcripts themselves there 
existed significant opportunity to cross-reference views expressed by people who 
had no reason or opportunity to have an agreed story to tell.
This leads to the next issue which deals with the nature of the settings and 
informants. As already mentioned, the research focused on the UUP political 
leadership. Therefore, the primary goal was to interview members of the party in 
order to obtain their opinion of the Clinton administration’s involvement and the 
way they perceived the evolution of their relationship with it. However, it was 
also important to interview representatives of the Irish-American community, the 
U.S. administration, British and Irish governments’ officials, activists and 
journalists who covered the peace process to rebalance the data. It also offered 
the opportunity to make interesting comparisons between ‘the different 
experiences and accounts of the same event and set of interaction’ (Mason, 2002, 
p.66). Such a research strategy allowed: firstly, to double-check of the unionists’ 
position in the eyes of other protagonists, and secondly, an opportunity to 
investigate the misunderstandings between the US government representatives 
and the UUP leadership through their different perceptions of particular events. 
Finally, it helped identify the events that had been striking to them.
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The selection of the respondents was based on the choice that the ultimate 
goal of the thesis was to focus the study on the political leadership, therefore, the 
most important group of interviewees were leading Unionists figures, and Senior 
American, British and Irish Civil Servants who liaised with them.
Moreover, some other actors proved to be indispensable such as leading 
figures of Irish American lobbying group including Niall O’Dowd Irish Voice 
and Irish America editor and co-founder of the Irish American for Clinton/ Gore 
Association, Ray O’Hanlon, editor of The Irish Echo. They both played an 
instrumental role in Clinton’s first election and consequently in making sure that 
Northern Ireland would be on the US Foreign policy agenda.
The names of the interviewees are all reported at the end of the thesis in 
appendix one with the obvious exception of those who only agreed to talk 
anonymously.
2-Written Sources
The written sources were primarily used to supplement, contextualise and 
crosscheck the material from interviews. The research also involved the analysis 
of different types of written documents. This aspect is naturally extremely 
significant in research as writings endure and then produce an historical insight 
(Hodder, 2000, p.703). It cannot be separated from its context and then obliges 
us to do the necessary research on the specific context of publication or writing. 
This automatically expands our investigation field. The most significant 
documents analysed were the activities of Unionist political actors from the main 
political parties including:
75
•  The collection o f unionist publications available in the Linen Hall Library, Belfast
•  Archives in the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland
•  The newspaper archives in the Linen Hall Library and the Belfast Central Library
•  The verbatim records of the Northern Ireland Forum (1996-98)
•  The verbatim records of Westminster House o f Commons (1994-2000)
•  A database of Irish, American and British newspaper articles on the Northern Irish 
issue that I started to construct from the beginning o f the research
Many significant documents regarding the internal and external policy of 
the UUP are archived in the Linen Hall Library. It offered access to unionist 
sources regarding the US involvement and provided an excellent insight on the 
unionist cultural perception of America, especially in some magazines which are 
not otherwise available in complete collections such as the New Ulster, The 
Protestant Telegraph and the Loyalist magazine Combat. It also provided the 
possibility to have access to unionist publications like the UUP magazine 
published on an irregular basis. All these documents also provided some useful 
information regarding Unionist elites’ self-perception.
C- Data management
As many qualitative researchers argue ‘a purely literal reading is not 
possible, just as a purely objective description is not possible, because what we 
see is shaped by how we see it’ (Mason, 2002, p. 149). Therefore, as already 
expressed above, this research uses interpretative readings of the data as its main 
concern is in the perception of the interviewees and how they analyse a series of 
events. The indexing of interviews provided a multilayered interpretation of the
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Unionists’ relationship with the US representatives that avoids simplification or a 
caricature of the way they interacted.
The written and interview data have been similarly coded using a 
thematic division of the information such as the Ulster Unionists’ perception of 
the US prior to Clinton’s involvement or the paramilitary ceasefires. As Ryan 
and Bernard argue: ‘themes are abstract constructs that investigators identify 
before, during and after data collection’ (2000, p.780). On the ontological level 
of the research, the types of data used have been indexed according to the 
chronological evolution of the peace process focusing on its main events. The 
classification of the data was founded on the eighteen main cases that are the 
basis for this analysis.
This classification also contains the advantage that, once the transcription 
of the interviews was over, the interviewees’ answers were categorised according 
to the event they were dealing with. This method facilitated the browsing of the
answers, their evaluation according to the position of the interviewee and the
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easy comparison of the answers, provided by different people.
The material extracted from written sources was also classified according 
to the eighteen main cases easing their combined use with the interviews. This 
organisation facilitated the use of the accurate data according to the topic 
approached at a given time. This result contributed to a faster and more efficient 
possibility of comparison between the answers from each actor. This greatly 
eased the selection of documents according to their relevance at the time of the 
writing of one aspect of the project.
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The arguments presented are logically mostly interpretative or narrative 
in a sense that this study is limited to the way the actors and other documents 
interpreted the issue but it would be too presumptuous to consider that only one 
version is probable on such a topic. However, the basis of the interpretation of 
interviews and documents is clear to the reader, throughout allowing for a re­
interpretation by others.
This thesis begins with the Clinton election campaign of 1992 as that 
represents the origin of the shift in US activity and also the public awareness of 
the peace process in Northern Ireland. The continuity of US policy in earlier 
periods has been well documented, for instance Cronin’s book, Washington’s 
Irish Policy, 1916-1986 (1987), among others. However, despite the absence of 
an organised Unionist Diaspora or political constituency in the USA mentioned 
by some authors such as Connor O’Clery in a few pages of the Greening o f the 
White House, there is very little analysis of the Unionist leadership vision of 
America. There is certainly a potential social basis for such a constituency due to 
the high level of Ulster-Scots emigration to North America. The absence of a 
political constituency for Ulster Unionists in the USA is therefore briefly 
discussed as a historical context for the body of the thesis.
The design of this study by dividing the analytical narration into eighteen 
separate events provides a basis for comparing the UUP engagement with the US 
administration over a range of issues. This allows a greater degree of analysis to 
be drawn and a stronger basis for interpretation. The basic data for analysis from 
almost fifty interviews conducted for the project and an analysis of publicly 
available publications, newspaper reports and parliamentary records provides a
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solid data set for the analysis. Together they provide a solid methodological basis 
for the research,
This research is meant to be illustrative as it is theory testing rather than 
theory building and it does not seek to universalise the conclusion. Nevertheless, 
this study raises interesting questions regarding the theory of ‘ripeness’ in 
conflict resolution and international mediation.
II-ULSTER PRESBYTERIAN EMIGRATION TO AMERICA 
AND THE ABSENCE OF AN AMERICAN-UNIONIST 
POLITICAL PLAFORM
The significance attached by so many Americans to their roots launched a 
fairly recent debate about the Scotch-Irish (Americans of Ulster-Scots ancestry) 
and their possible political impact. The importance of this topic must not be 
overstated. Yet, it is exemplified by the creation of the Ulster-Scots Institute at 
the University of Ulster in Magee College (Derry) in 2000 promoting the growth 
of academic relationships between US Universities and Northern Ireland or the 
foundation of the Ulster Scots Agency and the debate that it generated on a 
political level. DUP MP Gregory Campbell in the Northern Ireland Forum For 
Political Dialogue summarised the historical situation as he saw it: ‘In earlier 
days the tradition moved out from the North of Ireland, as it was then, to 
America and a diminution, unfortunately, occurred. In the Southeast comer of the 
United States of America, there is a huge volume of interest. (...) But again, it is 
untapped, unlike the green Irish- American interest that exists on the East Coast. 
There has been an indigenous retention of the Irish tradition there. Unfortunately, 
the people who went out between 200 and 250 years ago became an indigenous
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part of the American population and in the early years forgot their Ulster-Scots 
roots. Only now, in the past 20 or 30 years, is that interest beginning to revive. ’2
Indeed, the dominant view of Irish emigration to the USA places it in the 
context of the Famine or post-Famine exodus. The mostly Catholic community 
was forced to leave Ireland to flee a social catastrophe on a scale never 
experienced before and which was made all the more tragic by the inaction of the 
British government. This perspective conceals the fact that the first Irish 
emigrants to America were actually Protestant. This Protestant emigration mostly 
occurred during the 18th century, when 70% of emigrants were Presbyterians 
(Miller, 1985, p .149). This section will focus on the study of Presbyterian 
emigration from Ulster, as it has been generally overlooked in studies of Irish 
emigration. This relative lack of analysis is explained by the absence of a 
significant pro-Unionist Ulster-Scots political constituency in modem America. 
The lack of political Diaspora has certainly influenced the Ulster Unionists’ 
attitude to the US involvement in Northern Ireland. Some limited comparisons 
with the 19th century Catholic emigration is provided to highlight the impact of 
emigration on the strong pro-Nationalist Irish-American political platform and 
the relative non-existence of a pro-Unionist political platform in the USA right 
up to the present day.
Despite the strained relationship between Northern Irish Unionists and 
the American political leadership, modem Unionists tend to believe America has 
a debt to the Ulster-Scots. However, Unionists do not ferociously defend their 
key role in American history. For example, David Trimble, leader of the UUP,
2 Northern Ireland Forum For Political Dialogue, 10 Jan. 1997
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has admitted the absence of cultural and political connections between Ulster- 
Scots and Scots-Irish without expressing concern regarding its impact on the 
UUP’s US agenda.3
Nevertheless, some unionist publications over the past ten years and 
beyond, based on the cultural promotion of the Ulster-Scots identity, have 
demonstrated an interest in and a commitment to re-establishing what Unionists 
see as the forgotten truth.4 Considering that by emigrating to the colonies, Ulster- 
Scots provided a rich heritage to modem America, why have the links not been 
preserved? Why did Unionists not benefit from a political platform equivalent to 
the Irish-American one? Answers to these questions can help an understanding of 
their attitude to the US involvement in the contemporary peace process.
The term Scotch-Irish is confusing regarding the nature of its link with 
the Ulster-Scots. In fact, the idiom “Scotch-Irish” is American (Leyburn, p. XI, 
Blethen & Woods, 1997, p .l) and defines the Protestant population who left the 
north of Ireland during the first wave of transatlantic emigration from the 
beginning of the 18 th century to the early 19th century.
The Irish Protestants adopted it after 1850 to avoid assimilation with the 
less regarded Irish Catholics arriving in great numbers in America, fleeing the
3 David Trimble, St Regis Hotel, Washington D.C., 14 Mar. 2002
4 These publications are o f  different kind:
Articles: New Ulster, “Garden of Waxhaw”, winter 1993, “Money is very plenty...”, “Ulster 
Emigrants abroad”, winter 2000, Ulster Defender, “The Irish in America”, Sep. 1994.
Belfast Telegraph, “About the Famine”, 27 Nov. 1995, “Scotch-Irish the secret o f American 
Greatness”, 30 Nov. 1995
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Great Famine (Leyburn, 1962, p.333, Cowan, 1997, p. 23). In this regard then, 
Scotch-Irish means American Ulster-Scots. This argument is substantial, as the 
majority of modern Irish-Americans are Protestants. Lord Laird of Artigarvan, 
former President of the cultural Ulster Scots Agency and active member of the 
Ulster Unionist Party, argued that the Scotch-Irish represented 22 million out of 
roughly 40 million Irish-Americans.5 Although this figure appears over-stated, as 
it is more than five times the one provided by the American Bureau of Census, it 
indicates the complexity of dealing with any question of identity.6 First, not all- 
Protestant Irish Americans define themselves as Scotch-Irish. Their faith is not 
necessarily rooted in their Irish ancestry since Irish Catholics mixed with other 
migrants of various religious denominations. Second, the figures provided by 
Laird suggest that some members of the Irish American community are not 
aware of their Scotch-Irish lineage. The influence of Irish nationalism on the 
Irish American community is clear in promoting the existence of a single Irish 
nationhood beyond cultural and religious cleavages. There is little American 
awareness of the Ulster-Scots’ fight for the recognition of their ethnic identity on 
the island of Ireland to justify partition as a quasi-natural process. In this context, 
Ulster Unionists felt that America was suffering from amnesia, summarised in 
Owen Wister’s statement, an American, quoted in Marshall’s pamphlet Ulster 
Sails West:
Americans are being told in these days that they owe a debt o f  support to
Irish independence, because the Irish fought with us in our own struggle for
Independence. Yes, the Irish did, and we do owe them a debt o f support. But
Pamphlets: Rev. Ian Paisley (1976, 1995), America Debt to Ulster, Rev. Cromie (1976), Ulster 
Settlers in America, Hanna Ronnie (1992), Land o f  the Free, Ulster and American Revolution
5 Lord Laird, Holy wood Road, 14 Mar. 2003
6 According to the figures provided by the US Bureau o f Census, the Scotch-Irish represented a 
little bit less than four and a half million inhabitants in the United States in 1990. See: 
www.census.gov
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it was the Orange Irish who fought in our Revolution and not the Green 
Irish. (1944, p.54)
In turn, despite the fact that during the 18th century, up to 250 000 Ulster- 
Scots, mostly Presbyterians, have been estimated to have migrated to the 
American colonies, Ulster Unionists failed to argue their case among their 
descendants (Leybum, 1962, p.157, Miller, 1985, p. 137). The conditions of 
emigration along with the absence of cultural solidarity cannot offer a holistic 
explanation of the Ulster Unionists’ attitude to the USA but migration generates 
two main questions. Firstly, ‘why does emigration occur and how is it sustained 
over time? Secondly, ‘what happens to the migrants in the receiving society, and 
what is the political consequence of their presence?’ (Schmitter Heisler, 2000, 
p.77). In examining the impact of Ulster-Scots emigration in the USA, this part is 
divided in four main subdivisions. Firstly, it will focus on the notion of 
emigration itself. Secondly, it will deal with the economic motivations of the 
Ulster-Scots emigrants. The third part will be dedicated to the religious 
motivations for emigration and the final part will focus on the lack of bridges of 
communication between Ulster Unionists and the US administration prior to 
Clinton’s election. Collecting these historical factors can provide a basis for 
understanding the weak political identity and agency of the modem US based 
Scotch-Irish community and this can assist in an understanding of the Ulster 
Unionists’ attitude to US mediation in Northern Ireland.
A-Emigration: Diverging Perceptions
The term “emigration” defines a permanent or quasi-permanent departure 
from the homeland to another country. It implies the crossing of national borders.
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If so, Ulster-Scots emigrated in geographic terms but not in political ones as they 
moved to American British colonies. Thus, Ulster-Scots have experienced in- 
migration rather than emigration. In that sense, Catholic emigration differs as 
Catholics arrived in an independent American Republic.
The Ulster-Scots had better knowledge of the opportunities that America 
offered compared to the Catholic emigrants during the Great Famine, as the 
urgency of the situation greatly differed. Emigration also implies a progressive 
detachment from the mother country. Ulster-Scots did not have to adapt to the 
weight of old and deeply implemented political structures, as the only existing 
ones were the colonial ones. They fully integrated into American society and 
contributed to the definition of American identity itself. Yet, Native Irish 
emigration took place after the birth of the American Democracy. Therefore, the 
new emigrants faced a routinised political system in an established Anglo- 
American dominant society, which resembled the British Ascendancy in Ireland. 
The native Irish had always been rejected by the dominant elites in Ireland and 
they met the same exclusion in America. Feeling rejected prevented them from 
creating a mental distance from their home country but rather created a feeling of 
nostalgia for Ireland. The emigrants’ perception of their departure plays a 
fundamental part in the formation of a reconstructive identity on arrival in 
unknown territory. While the conditions of post-Famine departure and arrival 
created a condition for an active pro-nationalist Irish-American constituency the 
very different conditions of the 18th century Presbyterian emigration did not do 
so and indeed their motivation for migration strengthened this tendency further.
B-Economic Motivations for Emigration
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Ulster-Scots ancestors came to Ireland at the beginning of the 17th century 
due to the policy of plantation that the English monarchy had established on the 
island. This policy was aimed at making Ireland governable and at setting up 
permanent frontline garrisons in case of invasion. Thus, the migrants were 
attracted to a substantially better standard of living away from the poor Scottish 
lowlands. This reality changed with the Ulster economic crisis at the end of the 
17th century.
Ulster’s ‘social and economic dislocation following the Williamite wars’ 
motivated the Ulster-Scots emigration to America (Kirkham, 1997, p.77). 
Though, Presbyterians benefited from some toleration due to their role in 
Protestant victory, this would not last. The Ulster-Scots emigration began to be 
of significant proportion in 1718, though Kirkham has drawn attention to the 
earlier signs of Ulster-Scots migrating from as early as the 1690s (1997, p.76). 
‘Rent, prices, and wages formed a mighty triumvirate in determining the extent 
of northern Irish emigration’ (Dickson, 1966, p. 13). Three main economic 
parameters will be the object of analysis as they played a fundamental role in 
Ulster-Scot Presbyterians’ decision making to leave the island.
1- Land Rack renting
Land renting conditions after the Williamite wars were beneficial as 
leases could be contracted for thirty years at a very modest rate. Around 1718, 
the year of the first significant wave of emigration, a large number of leases were 
ending or being replaced by unaffordable contracts. Kirkham gives the example 
of the Murray estate in South Donegal where ‘nineteen leases (...) were relet in
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1720 for a short term of seven years with an overall rise of more than 75%’ 
(1997, p. 88). Even if such a high increase might have been exceptional, the price 
of the land increased so much that some external witnesses such as Benjamin 
Franklin who toured in Ireland in 1771 underlined the precarious conditions of 
farming in Ireland. “Renting one acre of land for a single year costs as much as 
the purchase price of an acre of fertile, if yet uncleared, American soil” (in 
Miller, 1985, p. 139). The Ulster-Scots could not afford or refused to pay such a 
price after years of privileged rates. They were consequently evicted and often 
replaced by Catholic tenants who accepted these precarious conditions. Indeed, 
Catholic natives did not have much but they did have their ancestral culture, their 
religion and the feeling that Ireland was their home beyond English occupation. 
Therefore, Catholics largely rejected the idea of emigration. Although Ulster- 
Scots were mostly countrymen, they felt they deserved certain privileges due to 
their service to the Crown. Therefore, they were not ready to tolerate a poorer 
standard of life and certainly saw this rack-renting strategy as an injustice from 
the Crown dominated by Anglican clergymen. The feeling of injustice in Ulster 
provoked the desire to leave.
Thus, the high price of the land became the main cause of emigration. A 
series of devastated crops and cattle that had caught the rot appended the 
situation (Chepesiuk, 2000, p.99). This unsurprisingly triggered an increase in 
prices of goods around the mid-1710s.
2-Exportation Disadvantages
Since the 1660 Navigation Act, which authorised the Irish to trade 
directly with the colonies, equality with England progressively faded away up to
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the detrimental 1699 Woollens Act passed by the Irish parliament under pressure 
from the Crown (Leybum, 1962, p. 159). This act limited the exportation of Irish 
linen to Wales and Scotland destroying the major part of Irish exports to the 
profit of English and Scottish manufacturers. ‘Ireland was denied the privilege of 
intercolonial trading, a privilege denied to no other British colony’ (Dickson, 
1966, p. 7). To the Protestants, this was further proof that their service to the 
Crown generated little interest on the mainland.
3-Ship owner advertisements and encouraging letters
Advertisements appeared around 1718 to promote the passage to the 
colonies at low rates or promoting contracts such as indentures as payment,7 and 
such advertising continued throughout the 18th century. One among a host of 
various examples is the offer by William Smith Jr., on 20 March 1768 and 
published in the Belfast News Letter on 1 July 1768.
The Province o f New-York is one of the healthiest Countries in the
-i"
World, The Inhabitants live to the Age of 80 and 90 Years. [...]  There is 
no provincial Establishment of any one Sect above the rest, nor any 
general Church Rates, or religious Taxes or Impositions; each 
Denomination supporting the Worship o f God in their own Way, without 
Force or Penalties, but all by voluntary Contribution. [...] Innumerable 
Farms may be had at a very easy rate, either by purchase in Fee, or upon 
Leases. [...]  If any are inclined to come over to New York, and become 
Purchasers, they may apply to the Subscriber.8
7 Common practice during the 18th and 19th century as most of migrants could not afford the £10 
required to cross the Ocean. They made a contract with the ship owner before departing. They 
obtained a free passage in exchange o f a period of “contracted service” once they had arrived in 
America (Chepesiuk, 2000, p. 102).
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The offers exclusively targeted Protestants to help build a Protestant 
America.9 William Smith Jr. evokes the absence of Catholic in the Province of 
New York as a positive aspect.
There are no Catholicks, there being a Law passed when the Earl of Bellamont 
was Governor, nearly 70 Years ago, that makes it Felony for a Popish Priest to 
be in the Colony 24 Hours.10
The frequent advertising of low prices and fertile lands provided the 
necessary “pull factor” for Ulster-Scots to migrate. Along with these 
advertisements, encouraging letters from relatives in America enticed the Ulster- 
Scots to migrate. A letter by John Dunlop, the printer of the Declaration of 
Independence (1776) to his brother-in-law, who remained in Strabane dating 
back to 12 May 1785, illustrates this point:
We are told that the Parliament o f Ireland means to lay restriction on those 
who want to come from that country to this. [...] The young men o f Ireland 
who wish to be free and happy should leave it and come here as quick as 
possible. There is no place in the world where a man meets so rich a reward 
for good and industry as in America.11
Economic motives for emigration between the two communities are very 
different. Indeed, the Catholics perceived emigration as compulsory. The Great 
Famine drove unwilling Catholics to emigrate so as to survive. Figures 
demonstrate the near-impossibility to find food as the 1846 crop corresponded to 
20% of the average estimation prior to the Famine (Miller, 1985, p.282). Thus,
8 Belfast News Letter and General Advertiser, 1 Jul. 1768, The Central Library, Belfast
9 America was mostly composed o f Anglicans, but religious toleration was vigorously defended 
in some regions such as Penn’s land later known as Pennsylvania.
10 Belfast News Letter and General Advertiser, 1 Jul. 1768.
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the Irish wave of emigration can be portrayed as being generated by “push 
factors”. The urgency of the situation did not give Catholics much time to make a 
balanced decision based on accounts and advertising. In America, they mainly 
gathered in urban slums and some even lived in basements (Miller, 1985, p. 310). 
The possibilities to find a job were slight due to their bad reputation in a strongly 
anti-papist America. The rejection of Irish Catholics by the American population 
is summarised in the proliferation of job notices specifying: “Irish no need 
apply” in major American cities (Miller, 1985, p.323).
C- Religious Motivation
The religious aspect of Ulster-Scots emigration cannot be avoided. 
Firstly, it is a part of their cultural heritage and one of the major foundations of 
the cultural identity of not only Scotch-Irish but also of Ulster-Scots. Several 
modem articles published in Ulster-Scots cultural magazines such as New Ulster 
or Unionist newspapers corroborate this point, so do pamphlets by Rev. Paisley 
(1976, 1998) or Rev. Cromie (1976).12 Secondly, it gives an idea of the nature of 
the political influence they might have had in the building of modem America. 
There are two crucial aspects that need to be analysed: firstly, the reality of 
religious motivations in Presbyterian emigration and secondly, the Ulster-Scots 
own perception of the role of religion as a reason for leaving.
11 PRONI, T. 1336/1/22
12 See, e.g. Belfast Telegraph, “Scotch-Irish, the Secret o f American Greatness”, 30 Nov. 1995
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1-Religious Discriminations
Economic sanctions such as the 1699 Woollens Act affected the totality 
of the Irish Protestant population. Discrimination against Presbyterians became 
official in the 1704 Test Act, even if Catholics were the primary targets of the Act 
(Leybum, 1962, p. 165). Civil servants were compelled to take communion in 
Anglican Church for a period of three months after their employment 
(Chepesiuk, 2000, p.94). Presbyterian marriages ‘were declared invalid, and their 
chapels were closed. They could not maintain schools and hold any office above 
that of a petty constable’ (Bolton, 1910, p. 15). Presbyterian ministers no longer 
had any legal right to officiate. Thus, persons of indisputable reputation were 
sued in the Bishop’s court as “fornicators” for living with their wives, and their 
descendants were consequently seen as “bastards” (Leybum, 1962, p. 166, 
Bolton, 1910, p.63). Presbyterians’ desire to leave a land they believed they 
deserved and a monarchical system they had fervently defended is 
understandable since this same system reduced them to second-class citizenship. 
This created concern on an official level, for example, contemporary accounts 
such as a letter from the Lords of Justices of Ireland to the Lord Lieutenant 
expressed this preoccupation:
My Lord, we have had account from most parts o f  the Kingdom 
especially the North, o f  very great numbers o f Protestants, with their 
families, shipping themselves off for New England or other parts of  
the west Indias.13
13 In Rev. Latimer, 1902, p. 387
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The fate of Presbyterians improved with the 1719 Toleration Act 
(Bolton, 1910, p.64, Connolly, 1997, p.26). This date corresponds to the first big 
wave of Protestant emigration. However, Presbyterians began their massive 
exodus. The 1673 Test Act was not the first discriminatory amendment against 
Presbyterians. They had previously suffered from severe persecution in 
Scotland14 and also in Ireland.
The 1666 Act o f  Uniformity ‘made it illegal for anyone not episcopally 
ordained to administer communion and required that all schoolmasters be 
licensed by the Anglican Archbishop’ (Connolly, 1997, p25). Thus, the 
improvement of their status could be provisional, as the failure to abrogate the 
Sacramental Test in 1733 tends to show (Connolly, 1997, p.26).
Religion was obviously mixed with political realities. Presbyterians 
represented a serious challenge to the preservation of doctrinal domination over 
Ireland (Kirkham, 1997, p. 86). Bolton claims that the Test Act was to reduce 
Presbyterians ‘on a level of disability with the Roman Catholics’ (1910, p. 63). 
So, despite their loyalty, their social status became comparable to the Catholics. 
To them, this was unbearable. Presbyterians were very influential in some 
aspects of political and civic life. The Test Act consequently provoked the quasi­
destruction of the Corporation in Belfast and ten of the twelve aldermen of Derry 
were ousted (Leyburn, 1962, p. 166).
Beyond political considerations, these acts can be interpreted as a lack of 
freedom to preach freely. As Ulster-Scot Presbyterians had little to gain by
14 For further information on this point see Chepesiuk (2000) p.70-71.
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staying, Ulster became an inferno to flee and for that matter America could be 
perceived as the “Promised Land”.
2-Religious Interpretation o f Departure
This aspect of the analysis is essential as it refers to the migrants’ 
perception of their departure. As Cowan argues, ‘Myth [...] is not to be despised 
(...) On the contrary they should strive to understand and analyse the 
phenomenon as a codification of historical truth’ (1997, p. 15).
Presbyterian ministers wishing to cross the ocean seem to have used 
religious interpretation of departure with efficacy. Besides, British and Irish local 
authorities eased their tasks in enacting the discriminatory laws mentioned 
above. Among contemporary letters evoking the issue, the one by Ezekiel 
Stewart from Co. Donegal to Judge Michael Ward from Co. Down dating from 
the 25 March 1729 is interesting.
The Presbyterians ministers have taken share o f pains to seduce their poor 
ignorant hearers by bellowing from their pulpits against the landlords and the 
clergy, calling them rackers o f  rents and screwers o f  tithes, with other 
reflections o f this nature which they know is pleasing to their people; at the 
same time telling them that God had appointed them to dwell in (naming New  
England) and desires them to depart thence, where they will be freed from the 
bondage o f  Egypt and go to the land o f Canaan etc.15
15 PRONI, D. 2092/1/3
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The style of the letter is very contemptuous towards Presbyterians and 
seems to reflect the antagonism between the two Protestant traditions. Stewart 
accuses Presbyterian ministers of using their position within their community to 
induce the members of their congregation into migrating. This argument seemed 
to be confirmed as several ministers led their congregation to the new land.
Francis Makemie from Co. Donegal and later known as “the father of 
American Presbyterianism” left in the early 18th century and contributed to the 
organisation of the first Presbyterian Church in the colonies (Dickson, 1966, 
p.20). In 1764, Rev. Thomas Clark of Monaghan who had been arrested several 
times for refusing to take the oath by kissing the bible finally led his 
congregation to America (Miller, 1985, p. 159). The fact that Ministers led 
emigration movements reinforced the determination of those who had decided 
to leave. However, according to a letter from the Lords of Justices of Ireland to 
the Lord-Lieutenant, dating back to 28 March 1729, Presbyterian Ministers 
rejected having any responsibility in the phenomenon.
The Dissenting Ministers, in Ulster from whom we have received letters, 
do for themselves and their Brethren, as far as they know, utterly deny 
that they solicited, or any way encouraged, the people to depart out o f the 
Kingdom.10
Still, a short resumé by a Minister is added to the advertising about the 
Province of New York, mentioned above, to guarantee the truth of the contents 
and the honorability of the writer. In these circumstances, if Presbyterian 
ministers made speeches to attract their disciples, their argumentation was well
16 Letter from 8 Mar. 1729 in Rev. Latimer, 1902, p. 392
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founded considering that Presbyterians had to pay the tithe, thereby enriching the 
Anglican Church of Ireland (Bolton, 1910, p.65, Miller, 1985, p.160). This tithe 
also increased along with the rent (Bolton, 1910, p.66). Presbyterians had 
benefited from the Regium Donum - annual allocation to Presbyterians since 
1672 but this was suspended with the 1704 Test Act (Bolton, 1910, p.63, 
Leyburn, 1962, p. 167).
Presbyterians certainly considered that it was better to emigrate and 
worship freely (Dickson, 1966, p.32) than stay and remain as second-class 
subjects. They felt that ‘their ancestors had struck a sacred bargain with the 
English monarchy which guaranteed their religious and political “liberties” in 
return for serving as the King’s loyal garrison in the midst of his “papist” 
enemies’ (Miller, 1985, p. 159).
Stewart’s letter also shows preoccupations concerning Presbyterian 
emigration. This concern is also expressed in the contemporary letters 
preoccupied with the decrease of Protestant tenants and the obligation to rent the 
lands to the Catholics. A 1745 pamphlet quoted in an article about Protestant 
emigration in Dublin University Magazine dating back to May 1833 confirms it:
Popish tenants are daily preferred and Protestant rejected, either for the 
sake o f swelling a rental, or adding some more duties which Protestants 
will not submit to. [...]. The Protestants being thus driven out o f their 
settlements, transport themselves, their families, and effects to America,"' 
there to meet a more hospitable reception among strangers to their
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persons, but friends to their religion and civil principles.’ (Dublin 
University Magazine, May 1833)17
Nevertheless, some letters from agents or head agents to their Landlords 
shows that the concern is real.18
Miller states that the Presbyterians were trying to intimidate the 
Anglican authorities with the risk of massive emigration to obtain the abolition 
of the 1704 Test Act (1985, p. 159). Stewart’s suspicion seems well founded as 
politics played a major part in these religious quarrels. The London and Dublin 
parliaments did not seem to have taken any effective measures to prevent 
Presbyterians from departing Ireland as the letter by John Foster, acting 
Chancellor of the Irish Exchequer, to the Chief Secretary, Sir Richard Heron 
dating back as late as 25 October 1778 shows. Foster implores the authorities to 
make economic reforms in order to reduce emigration:
The moment American troubles cease, emigration from hence will probably 
begin. Thousands will leave a country sinking into ruin, where industry is 
cramped and the natural means o f wealth cut off. But if the strongest 
prospect o f  every commercial benefit, by a certainty of being allowed to 
make full use o f every natural advantage of this island, be given to us before 
that time, those thousands may be induced to stay at home and enrich 
themselves and their mother country in their native soil.19
17 Dublin City Magazine, “On Protestant Emigration”, Vol. 1, N o.5, May 1833, pp. 471-83
18 PRONI, T.2541/IA1/10/51, Letter from James Hamilton, head agent on the Earl o f  Abercon’s 
estates in Co. Tyrone and Donegal to the landlord, 4 Aug. 1772
Public Record Office, Northern Ireland, T. 1893, Letter by George Portis, agent on the Co. Antrim 
estate o f Earl o f  Donegal to his landlord o f  on 4 May 1773. These letters are both from the end of 
the 18<h century, which corresponds to end o f the massive movement o f emigration.
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Even if the Ulster-Scots emigration was explained more by economic 
factors than by religious discrimination, it is clear that the attraction of having 
greater religious freedom in their New World contributed to their waves of 
emigrants. They had the prospect of moving to a flourishing new land where 
they could live in total harmony with their principles thanks to religious 
toleration. During the Famine, Catholics who had not much to lose moved to 
America with the feeling they had not much to gain either. The post-famine 
emigration was different as economic prospects considerably improved for 
Catholics at the end of the 19th century. Yet, the trauma of the first massive 
wave of emigration shaped the Irish-American cultural identity, as the first wave 
of Ulster-Scots emigration shaped their social and political attitudes towards 
integration into American society.
America was a material and spiritual “Eldorado” for Ulster-Scots. They 
mostly felt emigration was a positive experience as they benefited from the low 
price of the lands and adapted to the conditions of life. Moreover, their 
assimilation to other cultural groups was facilitated by shared religious beliefs. 
America was a wild land where everything had to be built including moral 
values. Leyburn estimated that Scotch-Irish ‘next to English [were] the largest 
community in [America]’ (1962, p .188). Their number gave them the 
opportunity to contribute to the establishment of the institutions according to 
their own perception of religion and politics (then strongly intermingled). Thus, 
it is clear that even if there were some “push factors” behind the Ulster-Scots 
motives for emigrating, they benefited from a higher amount of “pull factors”.
19 PRONI, D.562/832
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The Ulster-Scots and Catholics were still alienated from the British 
government for different reasons. This frustration considerably influenced 
Ulster-Scots in strongly participating in the American War of Independence 
against the British. The Catholics could not act in the same way, as Rev. Paisley 
(1976) and Cromie (1976) expressed it, they were not there. Actually Catholics 
were in America in small number, as religious freedom in America appeared to 
be the privilege of Protestant denominations. Besides, when Irish Catholic 
emigration took place mostly during the second half of the 19th century, 
emigrants chiefly perceived it as involuntary. Their view was then based on 
“push factors” but very little on “pull factors”, except from the perspective of 
survival. Their arrival did not offer the same perspective of success and the 
rejection by the American population slowed down their assimilation prospects 
and contributed to the birth of Irish-American nationalism in support of Irish 
independence.
3-Widening Political Gap
The American war of independence had some support from the Protestant 
population in Ireland (Hanna, 1992, p.66). The Belfast News Letter, then a more 
radical paper, was the first newspaper to publish the full version of the 1776
■ 90American Declaration of Independence. The leading political figures in the 
United Irishmen such as Wolfe Tone, Emmet or Neilson supported the war of 
independence. These men, mostly from a Presbyterian background, were the 
ancestors of those who would fight for the Union less than a century later. As 
Lecky expressed it, ‘the defection of the Presbyterians from the movement of
20 J. McIntyre, Interview, 19 Mar, 2003
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which they were the main generators, and the great and enduring change which 
took place in their sentiments are facts of the deepest importance in Irish history 
(...)’ (1919, p. 386). If this event obviously had major consequences on Irish 
history, it also may have affected the Ulster Presbyterian’s relation with their 
American cousins since the latter were Republican and the former had renewed 
their support for British monarchy.
The progressive growth of Irish Catholic nationalism both in Ireland and 
America certainly confirmed this perception and explains the absence of links 
between America and the province. In spite of common original aspirations, 
America did not integrate the change of perspectives of cultural identity among 
Ulster Presbyterians. In turn, Ulster Presbyterians rejected any form of 
Republicanism that they progressively saw as part of the Catholic threat. The 
widening gap between Ulster-Scots Presbyterians in Ireland and Scotch-Irish 
political views in the USA prevented the creation of a culturally based Unionist 
political support in the USA comparable to the pro-Nationalist one. Indeed, 
beyond the ideological break up that the United Irishmen triggered, the Ulster- 
Scots perception of emigration does not reflect the definition of Diaspora. The 
fact that they acted as pioneers, benefited from the use of lands, low prices and 
religious freedom did not create the feeling of longing for the Mother Country 
as they felt they had been pushed to leave. Contrary to the Catholic Irish who 
perceived their Mother Country as being under external domination, and 
therefore not responsible for their fate, the Ulster-Scots perceived Ireland as 
being part of the British possession. Therefore, they loathed assimilation with 
the government or the land that altogether embodied Ireland to them. The will to 
remain in touch with their relatives and friends who remained in Ireland lasted 
as long as they were alive. But poor communication channels along with the
newly acquired American independence led to the natural end of the links 
between the cross-Atlantic cousins, Scotch-Irish quickly perceived themselves 
as Americans, as they felt they strongly contributed to its creation, and they did 
not want to return to Ireland. Their contact with Ulster-Scots might have been 
maintained as long as the Ulster Scots supported the cause of the American 
independence, but they were then cut. America had become independent from 
England and was sympathetic to Nationalist ideas whether Protestant or 
Catholic. It then became a place where it would be difficult to advocate what the 
Americans had fought against, the maintaining of Ireland within the British 
Empire.
D- Ulster Unionists and the US Government before Clinton’s 
election
The emergence of the strongly anti-Catholic Orange Order re-affirming 
Protestant supremacy, the threat from the Catholic majority and the failure of the 
1798 rebellion, attracted sympathy of fearful Protestants and also some United 
Irishmen opposed to the Catholic emancipation. The idea of full integration 
within the United Kingdom would grant them the security they were expecting 
and the assurance of their privileged position. In some cases, the British 
government had enacted a banishment act against the members of the 1798 
rebellion. Lord Castlereagh, then Chief Secretary in Dublin and strong 
contributor to the 1800 Act of Union, wrote a letter on 29 October 1798 
expressing his support for the exile of the United Irishmen to the United States.
*[...] The necessary orders have in consequence been given to prevent
any o f these persons from proceeding to America till the King’s further
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pleasure is signified on the subject. I fear these gentlemen are yet likely to 
prove an embarrassment to us. Exclusive o f the eighty whose names are set 
forth in the banishment bill, from two to three hundred persons are now 
confined in different parts o f the kingdom. (...) The majority o f our prisoners 
are not more dangerous than the general class o f American settlers. Were it not 
that the loyal would be disgusted and indignant at their being at large in this 
kingdom, the greater part of them might be discharged without much danger to 
the state. It would be very desirable for many reasons to get rid o f  them as 
speedily as possible’21
By becoming the refuge of hundreds of United Irishmen, Unionists 
perceived America as a shelter for British traitors. Thus, the United Irishmen 
movement and its aborted rebellion proves to be a turning point in the Ulster 
Presbyterianism position vis a vis London but indirectly also vis a vis the U.S. 
One of the biggest symbols of the ideological gap between Irish-Americans, 
Protestants and Catholics alike, and Unionists is the celebration of the century of 
the United Irishmen rebellion in the U.S. in 1898 (Wheelan, 1998, p.l 10). After 
US independence the United States became the land of exile for Irish Nationalists 
and therefore, America was not seen as a place to seek help in order to maintain 
Northern Ireland within the Union.
Unionists in Ireland along with the British officials were since the middle 
of the 19th century aware of the increasing strength of the Irish-American 
community in their support for the Irish Nationalist cause.
Indeed, since the beginning of the arrival of Catholic Irish in America 
dating back to the 1820’s, in other words, thirty years prior to the Great Famine,
21 PRONI, Mic.224/41, vol. 79, ff65-6, 29 Oct. 1798
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pro-Irish nationalist political associations came into being. The most famous one 
was the Fenian Brotherhood, a secret society founded in 1858 by John 
O’Mahony. It nurtured strong links with the Irish Republican Brotherhood which 
can be perceived as a private army of resistance against the British domination in 
Ireland during the 19th century. The Fenian Brotherhood was actually configured 
as a small army since in 1860, it benefited from support among Irish-Americans 
and they received 500000 dollars to buy arms and weapons (Wilson, 1996, p.6). 
This example illustrates the importance of Irish-America as being the financial 
and military shoulder of the Irish Nationalist movement.
The Irish-American support was not limited to informal actions, as, since 
the beginning of the 20th century, Irish-Americans, due to their presence in cities 
and therefore close to the centre of power, constituted a political strength that the 
US administration could not ignore. The formation of an Irish-American 
commission in favour of the establishment of an Irish Republic illustrates this 
strong political activism.
During the post-World War I period, the American Commission on Irish 
Independence was created during the Irish Race Annual Conference in 
Philadelphia in February 1919 to put pressure on President Woodrow Wilson to 
make him declare his support for an independent Ireland (Carroll, 1985, p. 4). 
This generated an isolated movement among Ulster Unionists that tried to 
counter-attack the powerful Irish-American lobby. This attempt is confirmed by 
the existence of a Unionist pamphlet, America and the Irish Question: A short 
account o f  the visit o f  the Delegation (1920), which dates back to the time of 
partition reporting the progress made by an Ulster Unionist delegation during a 
trip to America. Some limited contacts were restored during World War II, as
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Northern Ireland became a pivotal base in the Battle of the Atlantic. The 
aftermath of the War generated the creation of some organisations such as the 
Ulster Historical Foundation or Ulster American Folk Park but once again the 
effort as much as the interest was clearly limited on the Unionist side.
During the 1990 US census, around 40 million people claimed their 
roots in Ireland (Arthur, 1991, p. 143). Among these forty million clearly not 
everyone shares an interest in the Northern Irish issue. According to Roger 
MacGinty, around two million still have a very strong sense of Irish identity. 
‘Most interest in Northern Ireland from the Irish-American community has been 
in favour of Irish nationalism” (1996, p.32). The people who supported Clinton’s 
candidature during the 1992 campaign confirm this affirmation. Even prior to 
that, every link nurtured in the US was either pro-Nationalist or pro-Republican. 
John Hume efficiently represented the constitutional nationalists thanks to his 
considerable popularity and powerful connections, such as his friendship with 
Senator Edward Kennedy. Republicans also found a strong support through the 
creation of organisations such Irish Northern Aid, better known as NORAID or 
Father McManus’ Irish National Caucus (INC), to quote two of the most famous 
ones.
Unionists did not benefit from the same potential platform due to 
historical reasons but also did not try and expose their case as their connections 
were fairly limited. No public organisation appears to have offered open support 
to the Unionist case in America except the small northern Virginia Ulster-Scots 
Society. Its representative, Maureen Mercker, declared on US television that the 
problem was ‘poor Catholic education and that the Republic of Ireland was an 
imperialist nation’ (O’Clery, 1996, p. 135). This type of statement on American
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television, while sitting next to an extremely conservative US political figure, Pat 
Buchanan, obviously could not help the Unionists’ image in the USA.
Besides, Unionists were not paying much attention to Washington and 
they were right in the sense that Washington did not have any particular interest 
in Northern Ireland either. Nevertheless, they were alarmed from time to time by 
the Nationalist potential in America such as the statement by Jimmy Carter 
during the 1976 presidential campaign in favour of a greater American 
involvement in the Northern Irish issue on Human Rights and for the unification 
of the island. This declaration provoked the fury of Unionists summed up by 
James Molyneaux: “the irresponsible opportunism of this peanut politician had 
undone much of what has been achieved in persuading Americans to stop 
supplying arms to the IRA” (O’Clery, 1996, p. 136). This statement also 
summarised the Unionists’ outlook on America as they exclusively focused their 
limited activity on the US territory to stress the violent consequences of 
supporting the IRA and tried to convince people to stop financially supporting 
the IRA campaign. Lord Maginnis recalled this aspect when talking about his 
first trip to America in 1983:
I was the only person who had ventured to America with the late Harold McCusker.
He had a lot o f contacts in America and he was the first to say that [... ] there was the
Irish American lobby and they were doing untold damage.22
Some Unionists were very much aware of the Irish American lobby’s 
capacity. During an interview, Jeffrey Donaldson mentioned straight away that 
‘there is a strong Irish American lobby in the US that is particularly active on
22 Lord Maginnis, UUU Headquarters, 6 Dec. 2002
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political level whereas it is no way as strong as the Jewish lobby it is 
nevertheless quite influential’.23
Nevertheless, the attitude of successive presidential American 
administrations, whether Republican or Democratic, demonstrated the limited 
influence that this lobby had on US Presidents. This was the traditional attitude 
of the American presidency due mostly to the strong relationship with the British 
government. Thus, in spite of his statement quoted above, Jimmy Carter did very 
little regarding Northern Ireland once elected. Reagan’s resistance to the Irish 
American lobby to use his influence over Thatcher during the dramatic event of 
the Hunger Strike in 1980-81 is another proof of Britain’s deeply rooted links 
with the US administration. More importantly, it seems that during Reagan’s 
Presidency, the US mostly backed the British on the Northern Irish issue with the 
signature of the Anglo-American supplementary extradition treaty in June 1985. 
This supplementary treaty includes a retroactive clause in article 4 permitting the 
extradition of suspects who entered the US territory prior to the signing of this 
agreement or IRA paramilitaries who had benefited from political status until 
then.24 The Reagan administration’s attitude went along with the war on 
international terrorism that the President had launched. Nevertheless, it is widely 
accepted that Reagan played a role in the Northern Irish issue as he is said to 
have had some influence on Thatcher over the signing of the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement .
23 Jeffrey Donaldson, UUP Lisburn office, 15 Apr. 2003
24 Supplementary Treaty, Jun. 1985, art.4: “This Supplementary Treaty shall apply to any offence 
committed before or after this Supplementary Treaty enters into force, provided that this 
Supplementary Treaty shall not apply to an offence committed before this supplementary treaty 
enter into force which was not an offence under the laws o f  both Contracting Parties at the time 
of its commission.”
25 “At a meeting in California, Shultz [then Head of US State Department] and Reagan told the 
Prime Minister o f their desire to see progress in Anglo-Irish discussions and offered American 
financial support in the event of an agreed political initiative.” Garret Fitzgerald quoted in Wilson 
(1996, p. 246).
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If this cannot be denied, it was nevertheless an informal involvement 
followed by financial investment with the signing of a resolution to provide the 
International Fund for Ireland with 50 million US dollars. The US Congress 
approved this resolution by 380 “yes” to 1 “no” (Guelke, 1996, p.532). 
Moreover, Thatcher made clear in her autobiography that she had signed this 
agreement with the Republic of Ireland in order to reduce Sinn Fein’s electoral 
advance and to gain a better collaboration with Dublin on security matters, as 
already discussed in chapter one (Thatcher, 1993, p.415). This way of thinking 
is in harmony with Reagan’s view of the international situation. The closeness 
between the US and UK governments protected the Unionists from any serious 
danger emanating from the Irish American lobby until Clinton’s election.
Unionists never had a deep interest in the US and therefore let the 
British Embassy deal with anything regarding Northern Ireland. The situation 
changed with the end of the Cold War, the decreasing importance of the Anglo- 
American special relationship, and the election in 1992 of Bill Clinton.
Unionists generally ignored and let the British Foreign Service deal with 
the Northern Ireland issue in a land perceived as utterly pro-nationalist. The 
Anglo-American special relationship protected them from any official US 
involvement. Therefore, when Clinton was elected, the strong support that he 
received from Irish America along with his supposedly pro-nationalist 
suggestions, such as the visa to Gerry Adams, naturally led to a hostile if 
subdued reaction.
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CHAPTER THREE
CLINTON’S FIRST TERM: INITIAL UNIONIST 
REACTION TO US INVOLVEMENT
INTRODUCTION
Prior to the Clinton administration’s involvement, Unionist 
representatives never seriously contemplated an American political agenda in 
order to counter-balance the pro-Nationalist Irish-American activity in the United 
States. As Jeffrey Donaldson argued: ‘the vast majority of Americans are not 
terribly interested in Northern Ireland and they are not terribly interested in a 
Foreign policy issue that does not have a direct bearing on their day to day life 
but of course from this distance it appeared to Unionists that [...] the whole of 
America had this pro-nationalist view which was not accurate at all.’1 The last 
part of Donaldson’s statement about broader unionist views of the USA 
embodies the general unionist perception of the US position prior to, and 
certainly even more so, at the beginning of the Clinton administration’s 
involvement.
Their fear also appeared to be well founded as major figures in American 
politics such as Senator Edward Kennedy or Daniel Patrick Moynihan had 
expressed serious criticisms of the way that the British government had handled
1 Jeffrey Donaldson, UUP Office, Lisburn, 15 Apr. 2003
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the explosive situation in the province. It obviously indirectly targeted Unionists 
and reinforced their opinion of America being hostile to the unionist position.
Nevertheless, as discussed in chapter one, Unionists were not able to 
prevent the American administration from being involved since the British 
Government also appeared to be powerless. Therefore, they had a choice 
between accepting and rejecting it with consequences that the unionist 
community would have to endure. The situation dramatically changed between 
the beginning of Clinton’s Presidency and the signing of the GFA. This 
transformation took place in spite of Unionists’ initial strong opposition to any 
external involvement and their perception of the US as being sympathetic to Irish 
nationalists. Indeed, President Clinton made several promises during the election 
campaign that seemed to favour the nationalist side. The promise to grant a visa 
to Gerry Adams and the intention of appointing a peace envoy were the most 
unacceptable ones from a unionist standpoint. It was perceived as an unwelcome 
interference and as being inevitably against their interests.
As Dr. King highlighted, at the beginning of the 1990s Unionists saw the 
US involvement as a nationalist agenda. However, the aim of this chapter is to 
see whether their position evolved over the years of negotiations or remained 
unchanged. This chapter deals mostly with the preparation of the US 
involvement in the Northern Ireland peace process and the reaction it generated 
among the UUP.
2 Dr. Steven King, Ulster Unionist Headquarters, Belfast, 23 Oct. 2003
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Clinton’s first term has been divided between two chapters to highlight 
the UUP initial reaction to the US involvement and its strategy until Trimble’s 
election as leader of the party in October 1995.
As discussed in chapter one, mediation requires a high level of patience 
and persuasion to induce every actor, or at least, the main ones, to appreciate the 
beneficial outcome and agree to the presence of a third party.
When the third party in question turns out to be the only remaining super power, 
as was the case with the United States, it may often seem better to agree with its 
involvement rather than see the super power shift to support the adversary’s 
position (Touval, 1992, p.239). Still, the American administration certainly 
agreed with softly “imposing” their involvement in Northern Ireland on the 
United Kingdom while never fully siding with Nationalists or the Republic of 
Ireland against London. This chapter examines the UUP’s initial reaction to the 
US involvement. The first point is to analyse the root of the UUP’s decision to 
progressively accept the US involvement. Why did not they react more quickly? 
What type of strategy did they initially adopt? To what extent was it successful? 
And in case of passivity, what factors motivated them to launch a new and more 
adaptive strategy? Did they perceive an impasse that would coincide with a 
“hurting stalemate” that was unperceived until then?
The remainder of the chapter is divided into five main parts, each covers 
one of the key events which marked the US involvement in Northern Ireland: the 
Clinton Election Campaign; the Visa to Gerry Adams; the paramilitary cease
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fires; the 1995 St Patrick’s Day at the White House; and the Economic 
Conference in May 1995.
I-CLINTON’S ELECTION, NOVEMBER 1992
A- Unionists and the 1992 US Election Campaign
An analysis of Bill Clinton’s presidential campaign is essential to 
understand his early involvement in the Northern Ireland issue and the reaction 
that his election generated among unionist elites.
Unionists knew of the weight of the militant Irish-American connection 
in fund raising and gun running for the IRA through organisations such as 
NORAID.3 As Lord Maginnis remarked, they were aware that ‘there was the 
Irish-American lobby and they were doing untold damage.’4 But, as Conor 
O’Clery argues, ‘Unionists never regarded Washington as an important city. The 
British government was doing the job for them. From 1921, the State Department 
considered Northern Ireland as an internal problem of the United Kingdom. Most 
presidents had the same consideration. The US would not do anything unless the 
United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland agreed with it.’5 Thus, as mentioned 
in chapter one, the “special relationship” between London and Washington was 
protecting Unionists from any undesired Irish-American interference at least on 
the strictly political level.
3 This connection turned out to be very efficient at least until the beginning o f the eighties when 
in ‘1981 a district court judge ruled that NORAID was “an agent o f the IRA providing money 
and services for other than relief purposes’” (Guelke, 1996, p.524).
4 Lord Maginnis, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 6 Dec. 2002
5 Conor O’Clery, New York City, 10 May 2002
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Moreover, as far as Unionists were concerned, Northern Ireland was a 
British internal issue. International opinion was of little significance since it 
could not influence British policy. Besides, as Unionists were British citizens, 
their view was that British embassies and foreign services had a duty to handle 
the situation. Unionists did not have to act because they simply did not need to. 
This traditional Unionist “indifference” changed, though not immediately, with 
Clinton’s arrival on the American national political scene.
The first point to examine is Unionists’ interpretation of Bill Clinton’s 
reasons for wishing to become involved in Northern Ireland. Among all the 
Unionist officials interviewed for this thesis, the vast majority asserted Clinton’s 
need for Irish-American support to win the presidential election. This point is 
obviously differently presented according to whether the interviewee was pro- or 
anti-GFA. Two statements from interviews made in the aftermath of Clinton’s 
intervention illustrate Unionist disparity on that matter. First, David Vance’s 
position as deputy leader at the time of the interview of the strongly anti-GFA 
United Kingdom Unionist Party (UKUP) was very disapproving with regard to 
the basis of US involvement:
I think there is absolutely no doubt about the fact that the Clinton administration 
recognised the importance o f  the “so called” Irish-American vote and its 
important delivering democrat victories. I think this is the primary driver o f what 
w e’ve all seen over the past ten years.6
6 David Vance, Stormont Castle, 15 May 2000
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The second statement is from Barry White, then UUP coordinator at 
Westminster:
( ...)  Why people were sceptical about Clinton was that he was after the Irish-
American vote. There aren’t too many Irish-American votes taking our side.
But he was an honest broker. We couldn’t have asked for more to be fair.7
These two quotes were obviously made years after Clinton’s first election 
as President. There was no significant contemporary reaction. As Prof. Paul Bew 
underlined: ‘no official declaration were made by the UUP until 1994 as they did 
not expect such an involvement’ (here referring to Adams’ visa).8
These two reactions exemplify Unionists’ perception of Irish-American 
influence on Clinton’s Northern Ireland policy. Vance argues that the necessity of 
attracting Irish-American votes pushed the American President into having a 
nationalist agenda, consequently bearing some of the responsibilities for what 
Vance sees as the failure of the Belfast Agreement. For the UKUP, it represents 
proof of Clinton’s lack of sincere interest in the Northern Ireland issue and 
evidence that he was promoting a nationalist agenda. On the other hand, White, a 
young pro-Trimble Unionist, accepts the Irish-American vote as a necessity for 
Clinton, but immediately points out Clinton’s sincere interest and neutral position 
and praises it.
7 Barry White, Westminster UUP office, 14 Feb.2003
8 Prof. Paul Bew, Queen’s University, Belfast, 18 Dec. 2003
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The UKUP represented the traditional opposition to external involvement 
in Northern Ireland. Its delegation constantly tried to undermine Mitchell’s 
position during the talks and finally walked out of the negotiations in July 1997. 
On the other hand, Barry White’s statement, which represents the pro-GFA UUP 
public position, demonstrates a much more pragmatic approach to US 
involvement.
Beggan and Indurthy argue that ‘historically, the Democrats have always 
been more in tune to the Irish situation because of the Irish component of their 
party” (1999, p. 13). Nevertheless, some academics contest the importance of the 
Irish-American votes as a major factor in Clinton’s involvement in Northern 
Ireland. Indeed, Roger MacGinty underlines the fact ‘that Democrats could no 
longer automatically rely on the increasingly wealthy Irish-American vote which 
has been attracted by Reagan’s economic policies’ as a way to dismiss the 
necessity for Clinton to base his campaign on seeking the Irish-American vote 
(1997, p. 34). However, MacGinty’s approach strongly minimizes the notion of 
cultural identity in American elections exemplified in the position pro-US 
Republicans, such as Ray O’Hanlon, who supported Clinton during the election 
campaign. Furthermore, it is clear that during the primary election, Clinton like 
his Catholic opponent, Jerry Brown, was interested in winning the Irish Catholic 
vote (O’Grady, 1996, p. 3), ‘They have supported the successful candidate in the 
past seven presidential elections, they vote in greater number than the general 
population and they are concentrated in states with large representation in the 
presidential Electoral College. Thus, it is assumed that candidates who respond to 
Catholic concerns, one of which is Northern Ireland can reap a significant 
electoral windfall’ (Wilson, 1997, p. 24). The fact that no candidate used this
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political strategy prior to 1992 can be explained by the importance of Anglo- 
American relationship, having more weight from a cost-benefit calculation 
standpoint and is also due to complacency as Irish-Americans were regarded as a 
safe Democratic vote until the first Reagan election.
Unionists put a pro-Irish nationalist label on candidate Clinton but without 
paying much attention to it. As King remarked: ‘Clinton made his first promises 
about Northern Ireland when he still was not a serious candidate.’9 Nevertheless, 
Clinton had managed to mobilise an Irish-American support group, called Irish- 
Americans for Clinton/Gore campaign group. The group sought to ensure the 
presence of the Northern Ireland issue on the US foreign agenda through their 
support for Clinton/Gore. Niall O’Dowd, co-founder of the Irish-Americans for 
Clinton/Gore (IAFCG) underlined:
Around the early 1990s, late 1980s, we became aware that there was a will to 
get involved in the US. I met with Bill Clinton when he was then candidate and 
from that things started to change.10
The formation of the group with the support of major Irish-American 
political figures such as Congressman Bruce Morrison and Senator Kennedy 
indicates the strong influence of Irish-Americans on Clinton’s campaign.
9 Dr. Steven King, UUP Headquarters Belfast, 23 Oct. 2003. King’s point is confirmed by the 
fact that Clinton voiced his position on Northern Ireland during the primary election when facing 
the catholic Californian governor, Jerry Brown, in New York at a ‘forum on Irish issues in the 
Sheraton Hotel in Manhattan’ in April 1992 (O’Clery, 1996, p. 6, Beggan & Indurthy, 1999, 
P-13).
10 Niall O’Dowd, Irish Voice and Irish America Offices, New York City, 13 May 2002
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The IAFCG became “Americans for a New Ireland Agenda” (ANIA) after 
Clinton’s election to continue the pressure on the new president to fulfil his
promises. Ray Flynn, then Mayor of Boston, and Former Connecticut
Congressman, Bruce Morrison, co-signed a letter in February 1993 setting out 
the fundamental points they wished the Clinton administration to agree to in 
their involvement in the Northern Irish issue. This statement of purpose is 
composed of five key points:
• The appointment o f a special envoy
• The elimination o f foreign interference in the US judicial system (which is
clearly a reference to a London attempt at getting a so called “terrorist on the 
run” deported to the United Kingdom)
• Attention to human rights abuses in NI
• Continuation o f visa opportunities for Irish citizens, ‘to halt the practice of 
denying visas to Irish political leaders solely on ideological ground.’ This is a 
reminder of the promise to grant a visa to Gerry Adams.
•  Support for the McBride principles and Investment11
It seems that Clinton partly used the Irish-American agenda as a 
guideline in the long term for his involvement in Northern Ireland with issues 
such as the envoy, the visa to Gerry Adams or even the adoption of the McBride 
principles on a federal level.
11 Flynn Raymond L. & Morrison Bruce A., “Irish-Americans For Clinton/ Gore”, Five 
Recommendations on Irish Issues, 5 Feb. 1993
Nevertheless, a later summary of his policy in November 1994 was 
unsurprisingly much more economically centred as it was diplomatically more 
acceptable.12
Unionists justified their fear of Clinton’s presidency by the importance of 
the Irish-American lobby in the new incumbent’s campaign and the extent of the 
lobby’s influence over his decision to become involved in Northern Ireland. 
Nevertheless, the Unionists’ preoccupation during his campaign and at the 
beginning of his presidency must not be overstated. As King argued, ‘[the 
promises] were made when he was not a strong candidate. He promised the 
envoy, a visa to Adams. So, nobody was thinking that he would seriously honour 
his promises.’13 Thus, Unionists initially did not interpret Clinton’s promises as 
serious threat.
Two points confirm King’s position. Firstly, Unionist publications 
scarcely covered Clinton’s victory. The Unionists’ position was highlighted in 
only two articles published in the Belfast biggest daily newspaper, The Belfast 
Telegraph, following Clinton’s victory on 3 November 1992. The title of the first 
article, published on 4 November, is explicit: “Ulster View Raises Fear on 
Clinton” and the article deals with Clinton’s pledge to send a peace envoy during 
the election campaign. The second article introduces what is going to be the DUP
12 Here is a document released by the Office of the Press Secretary, “Supporting Peace in 
Northern Ireland, White House Statement, 1 Nov. 1994. It is composed o f seven major initiatives:
• The White House conference for Trade and Investment in Ireland and Northern Ireland.
• Commerce Secretary Brown’s attendance at the Belfast Investment Conference
• Increased funding for the International Fund for Ireland
• Enhanced department o f Commerce programs for Ireland and Northern Ireland
• The US Information agency’s expanded programs for the island
• National endowment of democracy expansion in Northern Ireland
• US agency for international development review of working with the international fund 
for Ireland
13 Dr. Steven King, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 23 Oct. 2003
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attitude during the whole peace process toward the US involvement. The article 
entitled ““Hands o ff’, Paisley warns Clinton” reports part of a speech that 
Paisley made in Westminster:
I certainly would not welcome the proposals that the new president has made 
that he is going to interfere in the affairs o f Northern Ireland by sending a 
special envoy to beat our heads together and make us see a United Ireland as he 
wants us to see it.
A second indicator of the UUP’s low-key response is that, unlike Paisley, 
the UUP leadership did not emit any official comment and no individual 
quotation was found in the media on Clinton’s election.
B- The British government and Clinton’s election, indirect 
consequences on the Ulster Unionists position
The ultimate protection of Unionist interests was the Anglo-American 
“Special Relationship” which constantly overcame Irish-American pressure on 
the US government for an intervention in Northern Ireland.
The British government rejected the idea of a peace envoy in Northern 
Ireland. Jonathan Caine, Sir Patrick Mayhew’s former personal adviser, reports: 
‘(...) When asked about this during the Conservative Party conference, Sir 
Patrick asked by the Financial Times, replied by saying Northern Ireland needs a
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US envoy like it needs a hole in the head.’14 In addition, the British government 
openly favoured Bush Senior’s re-election getting involved in a manner that, 
although officially denied by Major after Clinton’s victory, infuriated Clinton’s 
team. Nancy Soderberg, senior member of the foreign policy team during the 
1992 campaign, stated: ‘during the campaign Major had been helping the 
campaign for Bush. The tricks they used did not help the relationship with 
Clinton.’15 The issue was with how some members of the British Conservative 
Party interfered in the US election campaign in assisting Bush’s team. Jonathan 
Caine acknowledged that ‘some officials from the Conservative Party [...] went 
to the US and advised the Republican Party on election campaigning16. [...] The 
most serious allegation is actually [...] that the British Home Office at the request 
of the Bush administration actually looked for evidence of Bill Clinton being 
involved in anti-Vietnam activity when he was a student in Oxford.’17 Caine also 
argues that the British government also shared the idea that ‘Bill Clinton got a 
strong interest because of the Irish vote. [...] The Clinton’s pledge was viewed 
with some alarm and some apprehension (...)’.18
John Major denies any knowledge in his autobiography of the 
“conspiracy” mentioning that ‘it was a staffers’ feud, and never an issue between 
the two of [them]’ (1999, p. 498). Yet, it is hardly believable that it did not do 
any damage to the Anglo-American relationship.
14 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 25 Jun. 2003
15 Nancy Soderberg became Security council staff director during Clinton’s first presidency, New 
York City, 14 May 2002
16 Two members of the Conservative Party, Sir John Lacy and Mark Fullbrook effectively 
travelled to America to help the Bush campaign. But, according to Downing Street, they acted on 
their own (Wilson, 1997, p.34).
17 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 25 Jun. 2003
18 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 25 Jun. 2003
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Arthur states that the impact of the issues between the Conservative 
government and the new American administration should not be exaggerated 
(2000, p. 156). Albeit it might have been a staffer’s issue, the importance of 
“staffers” such as Soderberg in the decision-making process invalidates Major’s 
point. Caine’s analysis also contradicts Major’s will to minimise the issue.
It soured the relations between the conservative government and the incoming 
US administration. I think that in that respect it was rather clumsy. It was a very 
good lesson for a government who tries to involve himself in internal affairs of 
other countries. ( ...)  This was a Conservative Party matter rather than a 
government matter but in the case the two became indivisible. So, it was 
damaging, there’s no doubt about that.19
Thus, beyond Irish-American strong mobilisation to support Clinton’s 
victory, the British government appears to have, at least informally, sought to 
prevent it. Therefore, if the main argument for previous American 
administrations’ non-interference in Northern Ireland was their strong 
relationship with London, then, this argument was weakened for two 
intermingled reasons. Firstly, as argued above, British interference in the 
American presidential election seriously damaged the personal relationship 
between Clinton and Major. Secondly, the new international context, discussed 
in the first chapter, weakened Britain’s importance as an American ally in the 
immediate post-Cold War era. As Cox highlights, the end of the Cold War ‘made 
it possible for a “Third Party”, the US, to play a far more decisive role in 
Northern Irish affairs’ (2000, p.251)
19 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 25 Jun. 2003
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Thus, Irish-American support for the new US administration and tense 
relations between the US and British governments placed Unionists in a very 
delicate position. Indeed, just as Unionists had benefited from the US-UK 
“special relationship”, they were exposed to the consequences that a soured 
relationship would generate in the Northern Ireland context.
Nonetheless, Paisley was the only one to publicly react to Clinton’s 
election promises. The UUP seemed to ignore the threat. This lack of reaction is 
well described by Lord Maginnis’ depiction of the unionist mentality prior to
1992 ‘The Unionists in Northern Ireland were never actually challenged in a 
political or international sense. They lived an insular life (...) People were pretty 
well insulated from the outside world.’20 Their lack of political skills and their 
lack of experience in dealing with real political pressure did not help to react or 
to measure “the level of danger” they were facing. “No” appeared to be enough 
of an answer. They could not see that, in terms of cost-benefit calculation, 
Northern Ireland could be an advantageous place for an America seeking to 
redefine its foreign policy in the immediate post-Cold War world.
C- The cost-benefit aspect, the American perspective and further 
Unionist weakening
‘No state or organisation gets involved on only altruistic purpose’ 
(Bercovitch, 1996, p.4). Zartman and Touval also argue that the motivation to be 
involved in mediation is based on a “cost-benefit calculation” (1996, p.451) and 
that otherwise no third party would intervene (1996, p. 446).
20 Lord Maginnis, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 6 Dec. 2002
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Until Clinton’s involvement, Unionists had benefited from the advantage 
that a potential involvement in Northern Ireland did not offer any benefit to 
external powers being ‘a low-level conflict on the periphery of western Europe’ 
(Guelke, 1996, p. 521). Nevertheless, with the changes of international context, 
Northern Ireland offered new perspectives.
On an international level and directly linked to the Unionists’ position in 
Northern Ireland, Clinton ‘did what no other American President had done or 
dared to do: upset British sensibilities by intervening into what they and others 
up to now regarded as a very British matter’ (Cox, 1998, p.63). There was no 
particular reason in the view of Clinton’s advisers to provide the United 
Kingdom with special treatment. ‘America’s interest no longer coincided with 
Britain’s interests, as the unfolding of the Bosnia crisis in the spring 1992 
showed’ (O’Grady, 1996, p.6). The British government could not defend the 
Unionists’ position (which corresponded to theirs on sovereignty matters) and the 
latter position was consequently weakened.
Moreover, as Hazleton puts it, the Northern Ireland issue ‘offered an 
opportunity for charting a new foreign policy direction. (...) Intervention in 
Northern Ireland appeared to be more “do-able” and promised to be 
comparatively inexpensive’ (2000, p. 108). This new foreign policy was 
symbolised by candidate Clinton’s speech at the Los Angeles World Affairs 
Council on 13 August 1992, “we must tear down in our thinking the gap between 
domestic and foreign policy” (in Thompson, 2001, p .162). This statement 
corresponds to the necessity for the United States to reshape its foreign policy in 
a new world where ‘no longer eastern internationalists or Atlanticists control the 
foreign policy agenda [and where] no longer are domestic and foreign affairs
120
perceived or handled as ‘separate’ in practice as well as in theory’ (Miller, 1994, 
p. 622). Northern Ireland embodied the perfect example of internal and 
international affairs being intermingled. Therefore, as Steven King said, if there 
was no strategic interest in being involved in the Northern Irish issue, there 
definitely was a political one.21
Besides, on the economic aspect, Senator Mitchell and Commerce 
Secretary Ron Brown often stated that Northern Ireland could represent ‘a 
bridgehead into the European market’ (Dumbrell, 2001, p.218). This point can 
also be interpreted as a diplomatic strategy to offer positive perspectives on US 
involvement to reluctant actors such as the UUP, as the primary goal of the third 
party is to ultimately ‘bring the parties toward an agreement acceptable for 
everybody’ (Zartman & Touval, p.445). Brown and Mitchell’s attitude also 
contains the “carrot” element mentioned in chapter one. This carrot could 
potentially influence Unionists, to whom Ulster “was not for sale”, as it could 
represent some relief for a local economy in deep crisis. Rev. Reynolds, an Ulster 
Unionist activist in the US, argued that Unionists did not want American 
money.22 Nevertheless, unionist politicians could hardly ignore the potential 
economic advantages. Evidence of this was seen in their participation at the 
Economic Conference in May 1995 in Washington. A striking example of the 
awareness of American potential investments and the importance of the 
conference appeared in the Belfast Telegraph article, “America’s interest” in the 
viewpoint column of this unionist newspaper:
21 Steven King, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 23 Oct. 2003
22 Rev. Charles Reynolds, Trinity College Dublin, 3 Sept. 2002
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This newspaper has consistently argued that economic investment is the greatest 
service which the US can make in the search o f peace in Northern Ireland. These 
are all potent selling points and Ulster Businessmen and trade representatives 
must ensure that the message gets across. This is an unique opportunity to sell 
Ulster to a huge audience with the influential backing o f the US President.23
However, despite some positive sounds about economic investment, there 
was very little unionist reaction and almost no UUP elite public reaction to the 
Clinton election -not even from those who were later anti-GFA. There is no 
evidence that any element of the UUP saw it as an opportunity. To the limited 
extent that they were engaged they saw it a threat. The second key event in the 
US involvement, the Adams’ visa, reinforced that view.
II- PREPARATION FOR INVOLVEMENT, A VISA FOR 
GERRY ADAMS, AND THE IMPACT ON THE UUP 
STRATEGY
Before granting the visa to Gerry Adams, the US administration took 
several steps, such as the establishment of diplomatic structures, to engage in the 
Northern Ireland peace process. Unionists generally ignored these progressive 
steps. In their defence, this progress was very low key. O’Grady and Wilson 
point out that Clinton’s administration did not have an active Irish agenda for 
about the first eighteen months of his first term (O’Grady, 1996, p.4, Wilson, 
1997, p.25). Unionists may have thought that Clinton’s promises would not be 
fulfilled. Therefore, Gerry Adams’s visa provoked the fury of the British and
23 Belfast Telegraph, “America’s interest, Clinton’s strategy, why Ulster must take full 
advantage”, 22 May 1995
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Unionists who were ill prepared for it. Paul Bew says that Unionists were not 
expecting it.24
However, even if the UUP did not expect the Adams visa decision, it 
came at the end of a period of preparation. So, it is necessary to examine this first 
eighteen months of the administration to put the visa decision in its American 
context, as their first significant public decision
A- Preparation to Involvement
Guelke states that ‘initially the Clinton administration disappointed the 
Irish-American lobby. No peace envoy was appointed and when Gerry Adams 
applied for a visa to visit the United States in November 1993, it was refused’ 
(1996, p.533). Arthur also asserts that ‘the early months of the Clinton 
administration proved a disappointment for the Irish republican lobby in 
Washington’ (2000, p. 156). The low level of coverage, from Clinton’s 
inauguration in January 1993 until January 1994, in the Belfast Telegraph about 
Clinton and Northern Ireland reflects the limited concern that Unionists had for 
the transatlantic activities at this time. The non-existence of any Senior UUP 
statement about the US administration during that period of time is another piece 
of evidence. Ulster Unionists seem to have taken the US administration’s 
apparent passivity as confirmation that the promises would not be honoured.
Firstly, Anne Smith, UUP representative in Washington, stated that the 
UUP thought that ‘Bill Clinton was very recently involved and the opinion was
24 Prof. Paul Bew, Queen’s University, Belfast, 18 Dec.2003
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rather nationalist. The people who advised him were pretty much nationalists.’25 
Soderberg corroborated Smith’s statement as she openly admitted her nationalist 
sympathies: ‘during the first year, I was very much SDLP and anti-Sinn Fein. 
Because of Kennedy’s connection the whole Unionist community assumed that I 
was pro-Sinn Fein/ IRA.’26
Secondly, it appears that Unionists could not or rather did not want to 
make a clear distinction between those Americans with pro-constitutional 
nationalist sympathies and those who supported Sinn Fein. The revelation of 
secret talks between Hume and Adams in 1992 was logically interpreted as the 
confirmation of the existence of this pan-nationalist agenda. It also demonstrated 
for them that Hume was sympathetic to the idea of a united Ireland. The strong 
role that Hume played in Adams obtaining the visa seemed to confirm it. Thus, 
the Unionists’ reluctance to acknowledge the legitimacy of even a constitutional 
nationalist position made it more difficult to see any positive side to US 
intervention.
In addition to the pressure from the Irish-American lobby, and in contrast 
to the highly violent preceding decades, a relatively positive atmosphere was 
emerging in Northern Ireland in the early nineties, creating a space for a US role. 
Peter Brooke’s declaration that Great Britain had “no selfish, strategic or 
economic interest in Northern Ireland” which was addressed to Irish
97 •Republicans signalled the launch of a new British policy.
25 Anne Smith, St Regis Hotel, Washington DC, 18 Apr. 2002
26 Nancy Soderberg, New York City, 14’May 2002
27 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 25 Jun. 2003
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Brooke’s declaration seemed to imply that some within the British 
government knew that they could not solve the issue without including Irish 
Republicans in the talks.
Moreover, the relationship between Dublin and London considerably 
improved with the election of John Major as Prime Minister and his close 
relationship with Taoiseach Albert Reynolds.
However, the UUP position underestimated the importance of preparation 
for future negotiations. As Raiffa argues, first you need to “know yourself’, in 
that context, your possibilities, the logistics you can use, know the situation in 
which you are planning to be involved, ‘give a thought to the negotiating 
conventions’ and ‘iterate and set your aspiration level’ (1982, p. 126-127). In 
fact, at this time, the US administration was very active on Northern Ireland. The 
team including Nancy Soderberg, former Senator Kennedy’s Foreign policy 
advisor was formed. Nancy Soderberg set the tone of Clinton’s early policy in 
Ireland: ‘In April 1992, Clinton promised the world to the Irish-Americans in 
New York City. So, [Irish-American activists] came to me when I was at the 
White House.’28 Soderberg’s point could imply that the US administration saw 
itself as acting in support of the nationalists as a payback for Irish-American 
electoral support at first, rather than adopting an immediate even-handed 
approach.
28 Nancy Soderberg, New York City, 14 May 2002
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Clinton decided to run his Northern Ireland policy from the NSC by 
bringing the issue into the White House rather than leaving it in the hands of the 
rather anglophile State Department. Jean Kennedy Smith, Senator Kennedy’s 
sister, was appointed as American Ambassador in Dublin. Her appointment 
counter-balanced the weight of anglophile US ambassador Ray Seitz at St James 
Court. Unionists utterly disliked her -Maginnis calling her “a pseudo-
* 29 *diplomat”. Unionists’ opinion of Kennedy Smith never changed. King claimed 
that US involvement became really helpful ‘once Jean Kennedy Smith went
away’,30
Niall O’Dowd also confirms that early efforts were made: ‘Basically, we 
[ANIA] created a group of four people who were committed to bring the 
Americans in the peace process and we did this by calling pressure on Sinn Fein 
and getting guarantees from them about the IRA. And then, going to the White 
House and saying you know we have this deal on the table and you should be 
interested.’31 So, the US administration was in indirect contact with Sinn Fein 
through ANIA briefings.
Therefore, when Guelke declares that Clinton’s attitude toward Northern 
Ireland initially disappointed the Irish-Americans, it is valid regarding the non­
active but supportive Irish-Americans but not for those such as O’Dowd who 
knew the evolution of the situation behind closed doors. O’Dowd himself 
confirmed it: ‘we knew that Irish policy was being decided by Clinton and by a
29 Sunday Times, “Nice Try or Sudden Conversation”, 22 Sep. 1996. There was not any official 
statement by UUP leaders in the Belfast Telegraph when Jane Kennedy Smith was appointed or 
official comment about Jean Kennedy Smith’s arrival in Dublin in June 1993.
30 Steven King, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 23 Oct. 2003
31 Niall O’Dowd, Irish Voice and Irish America Offices, New York City, 13 May 2002
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very special group around him and we had potentially created that situation by 
putting in front the idea of an IRA cease-fire. We were quite happy to do that.’32
Unionists, who would have always been fearful of any deal behind their 
backs since the 1985 AIA, did not pay much attention to the evolution of the 
situation on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. Steven King’s argument about 
unionist assumptions that Clinton promises would not be kept is a good enough 
argument. However, it seems that precursor signs, such as Kennedy Smith’s 
appointment, did not encourage the Ulster Unionists into preparing a “counter­
offensive” to make their point at the White House. Indeed, Kennedy Smith’s 
appointment did not generate any official Ulster Unionist reaction in the Belfast 
Telegraph of March 1993 even though her name had been mentioned in articles 
on 1 March and 16 March 1993.33 It is important to specify that Kennedy Smith 
did not have any prior experience in diplomacy and the post in Phoenix Park was 
often considered as a quasi-honorary position. The appointment of the 
inexperienced Kennedy Smith could have been interpreted as a reward for Ted 
Kennedy’s support during the presidential campaign and nothing more. Besides, 
she was not appointed to London so Unionists were out of her diplomatic 
jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the UUP may have been more preoccupied about the 
appointment of a peace envoy as reflected in the Belfast Telegraph with reports 
such as the article “Clinton backs off, Ulster envoy issue is dodged’.34 These
32 Niall O’Dowd, Irish Voice and Irish America Offices, New York City, 13 May 2002
33 Belfast Telegraph, “Kennedy is tipped”, 1 Mar. 1993
Belfast Telegraph, “Envoy warning sent to Clinton”, 16 Mar. 1993
34 Belfast Telegraph, “Clinton backs off, Ulster envoy issue is dodged”, 17 Mar. 1993
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articles contained reassuring information for the Ulster Unionists who then could 
believe that the promises were only electoral promises.
Ulster Unionists retained their traditional position of leaving the British to 
defend their case outside the Union. This point is characteristic of James 
Molyneaux’s integrationist view towards Northern Ireland. As White argues:
Direct rule was not ideal, far from it, but it was comfortable and you know, if 
Ulster was British and we were getting the most o f what we wanted (This is not 
the way I think, this is the way I imagine [the former leadership] thought). They 
felt comfortable; why they should bother. The IRA was still very active and as 
long as they remained active they obviously could not be in any sort of political 
institution. So, why bother?35
White’s words embody the traditional unionist strategy of just saying 
“no” to anything and fits Lord Laird’s description of Molyneaux’s strategy 
during his leadership, ‘his idea was to dose every fire with water, keep it all 
calm, keep our passion low’ which meant seeking to indefinitely contain the 
situation rather than try and solve i t .36 This point is crucial in the sense that the 
UUP’s attitude was based on the fact that the party was never really forced to 
make moves. First, the UUP dominated the Northern Ireland political situation 
for fifty years during the Old Stormont Regime. Second, the initially hated 
“direct rule” became the most comfortable situation. As long as the IRA was 
active, the best solution for the UUP was to let the British contain the situation 
on the security aspect and paralyse any perspective of a power-sharing 
government and any attempt at a united Ireland. The US involvement and
35 Barry White, former UUP coordinator at Westminster, Westminster, 14 Feb. 2003
36 Lord Laird, Offices Holywood road, Belfast, 14 Mar. 2003
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potential influence on the Irish Republicans put this situation in jeopardy, by 
creating a new dynamic away from the status quo.
In addition, as already discussed in chapter one, any impending third- 
party would have been perceived as favouring the Nationalist side in the 
Northern Ireland case as the Unionists’ priority was to preserve the status quo. 
So, if the United States appeared to be one-sided it was partly due to the Clinton 
administration’s determination to move the situation beyond the status quo and 
this matched the Nationalist agenda. This argument is not in contradiction with 
the will to accommodate Unionists. But, as seen above, in the Unionists’ mind, 
status quo preserved the Union. Molyneaux, contrary to younger and more 
pragmatic figures like Maginnis, Trimble or Donaldson, still believed in the 
possibility to maintain the status quo indefinitely. As Caine argues it:
The temptation for Unionists has always been if  we hold out, things might be 
better, but if  you look at the history from 1969 onwards every time Unionism 
sort of dug in and said no, they’ve ended up a few years down the line in a far 
weaker position. The moment dictated that they had to get involved.37
Indeed, for instance, the resignation of the UUP MPs following the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement, which was as Sean Neeson, former Alliance Party
o o
leader, put it: ‘simply to have an election based on the agreement,’ weakened 
their position as they lost a seat to the SDLP’s Seamus Mallon. Thus some 
Unionists, such as Trimble or Donaldson as mentioned above, understood that if 
they did not actively engage, the process would continue without fully taking
37 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 20 Oct. 2003
38 Sean Neeson, Alliance Party Headquarters, Belfast, 9 Jul. 2003
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their position into consideration. The very limited unionist input in the Downing 
Street Declaration confirmed it.
B- Ripeness: a crucial aspect of intervention
Ripeness can be defined as the time when a conflict has reached a turning 
point and it is possible to bring about some changes (Kriegsberg, 1991, p.4). In 
the Northern Ireland situation, it appears that the turning point for the US 
involvement was the Joint Declaration on 15 December 1993.
1-The Joint Declaration, a pivotal moment for US involvement
The White House welcomed the Joint Declaration as a positive step 
forward in the search for peace in Northern Ireland. The declaration was based 
on Hume’s idea (Major, 1999, p. 447). It was clearly based on the Hume-Adams 
document that Dublin had re-written. However, Major could not acknowledge 
he was even indirectly talking to Sinn Fein. Therefore the public position was to 
ignore Adams’ input.39
The DUP unsurprisingly rejected it as the title on the front page of the 
Belfast Telegraph, “Furious Paisley lashes “sell out””, on 15 December 1993 
shows.
39 Sec Mallie and McKittrick (1996), The Fight fo r  Peace, The Secret History Behind the Irish 
Peace Process, which includes a Sinn F£in draft (also known as Hume-Adams), dating back to 
June 1992, appendix I, p.375
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However, the UUP adopted a more reserved approach avoiding any 
stormy declaration about it but expressing their resentment through their silence.
The Downing Street Declaration was ‘a carefully balanced statement of 
principles and assurances designed to communicate that a permanent cease-fire 
would guarantee inclusion in future all-party talks’ (Hazleton, 2000, p. 109). 
Setting out this eventuality played the role of the detonator for US involvement. 
Indeed, things appeared to be moving quickly, The Observer had leaked the 
existence of a secret channel of communication between Major and the IRA on 5 
November 1993, even if this had a minimal effect on Unionists as Jonathan 
Caine confirmed:
I expected at the time that the consequences would be greater than it actually was 
but then I think on the Unionists side a lot of them would have said something 
like: oh, well, tell us something that we did not know. (...) Jim Molyneaux 
decided in a comment (...) to be conciliatory and to say that this link went back 
decades and successive governments.40
Nevertheless, as Unionists tended to accept it as a fact, it was an 
opportunity for Americans to open dialogue with Sinn Fein as well since, after 
all the British themselves were, though indirectly, in contact with them.
Furthermore, the ANIA used it as a confirmation of their argument that 
an Irish Republican cease-fire was imminent. This was clearly efficient, as 
Nancy Soderberg expresses it:
40 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 25 Jun. 2003
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By the fall, about December, I picked up that there was actually something going 
on. Irish-Americans kept on coming telling me there was about to have a cease­
fire. So, we said that we wanted to see something. They said there would be 
something. I began to really notice a consistent message. And the Joint 
Declaration on 15 December, by the same time John Hume who had been 
opposing any visa for Adams changed his position, supporting it. That really 
turned my attention to it.41
The Joint Declaration can also be interpreted as an acknowledgement of 
the impossibility for the British forces to eradicate the IRA. It also underlines 
that the IRA cannot win either as the renewal of the principle of consent 
highlights. This implicit acknowledgement of the “mutually hurting stalemate” 
between the IRA and the British government represented a problem for the 
traditional unionist position as the British were shifting from a containment 
strategy to a more “conciliatory” one and therefore were less and less supportive 
of the status quo.
The Downing Street Declaration was also a sign of the positive 
relationship between London and Dublin enriched by a very good personal 
relationship between both Prime Ministers (Major, 1999, p. 452-453). The 
Unionists negative or coldish reaction to it was expected since it renewed the 
idea of an Irish dimension within Northern Irish affairs. The UUP’s reserved 
approach on the declaration was the fruit of Molyneaux being consulted on 
several aspects of the declaration. Thus, the UUP could not, this time, accuse the 
British of conspiring behind their back. It was also a sign of a tacit acceptance, if
41 Nancy Soderberg, New York City, 14 May 2002
Moreover, John Hume’s huge importance in granting the visa is confirmed in an interview with 
Mark Durkan on 8 March 2000 in Derry: ‘I can remember a meeting. Nancy Soderberg was 
clearly under pressure because J. Hume was clearly saying that the visa should be granted.’
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an extremely reluctant one, that the Irish government had somehow to be 
included.
The British conciliatory approach along with the Irish government and 
the report of an imminent cease-fire favoured the visa for Gerry Adams as the 
US took advantage of a positive context to do the “unthinkable” without paying 
much attention to the highly expected unionist fury.
2-Gerry Adams ‘ visa
Gerry Adams had been denied access to the USA twice since Bill 
Clinton’s election. 42 ‘The Downing Street Declaration led to the hasty 
announcement by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy of a 
conference on Northern Ireland’ (O’Grady, 1996, p.4). The conference was to 
take place in New York on 1 February 1994 and every party would be invited 
including Sinn Fein and more importantly Gerry Adams.
The US administration was extremely divided about the visa. Soderberg
argued:
The entire US government were strongly opposed such as the FBI, State
Department. The British were reluctant and asked to think about it. We actually
did it and they were the most furious. To me, it was just quite tiring because it
42 It is worth noting that the two preceding applications for a visa had been done at the Belfast 
American consulate, directly linked to the American embassy at St James Court. The then 
strongly anglophile Ambassador, Ray Seitz, was strongly opposed to the visa. He fervently 
criticised it. Gerry Adams was allowed to apply in Dublin as Sinn F£in headquarters is located on 
Parnell Square.
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just looked as if  the world had ended and it is the first time that US ever blocked 
against the UK.43
Even Soderberg herself who played a crucial role in influencing the 
President in his decision to grant the visa was not convinced at first:
‘I would have initially done anything but grant the visa, an open 
dialogue, discussion or send an envoy or anything. This was in a context when 
Israeli had signed an agreement with PLO with non-equivalent conditions. They 
had to make them [SF/IRA] do something before the visa. The other option was 
that the visa was to be granted because it was one o f  the electoral campaign 
promises. ( .. .)  Ultimately, there was a logic that Clinton agreed with, which was 
that if we give the visa and Adams delivers peace then it would content 
anybody. If he does not it will help us show the rest o f the world he’s a fraud 
and help us to shut up sources o f funding. For the president, it was a win-win 
situation either way.’44
Soderberg did not mention Ulster Unionists once in this context. It tends 
to demonstrate the low level of preoccupation of the US about the Unionists’ 
reaction.
Unionists would always be opposed to the visa. Thus, the only option was 
to go forward in spite of the potential anger. Major and Mayhew along with the 
British Embassy were also powerless regarding Washington’s decision despite 
strong demonstration of their irritation. This point is confirmed by the report of a
43 Nancy Soderberg, New York City, 14 May 2002
44 Nancy Soderberg, interview, New York City, 14 May 2002.
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press conference given by Mayhew in Cookstown, “We did our best”, he said: ‘it 
is forty eight hours of very great and one-sided publicity.”45
Mayhew’s words demonstrate limits of London’s power. As Caine put it 
the new British strategy was to ‘to take the better out of the worse, the United 
States is by far and away the most powerful influence on earth and in the 
tradition of British diplomacy you face the situation and try to make the best of it 
by trying to mould them much more to match our point of view.’46
The British viewed the situation as a demonstration that the American 
administration was biased. Caine argues that ‘at the time, the US sided with 
whom they traditionally did. They used to side with the nationalists and the Irish 
against the British Government.’47 Caine’s point of view is very interesting as the 
US government’s traditional position contradicts it. The best US answer to this 
accusation is the leak in The Observer, previously mentioned, of the secret 
channel between Downing Street and the Republicans. As O’Hare argued, ‘the 
US were saying that the British were talking to Republicans so this gave to the 
US administration the right to do so as well.’48 Dr. Carol Rittner, member of the 
executive board of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 
confirmed it in the Belfast Telegraph:
45Belfast Telegraph, “We did our best: Mayhew”, 2 Feb. 1994
46 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 25 Jun. 2003
47 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 25 Jun. 2003
48 Rita O’Hare, Sinn Fein Headquarters, Dublin, 4 Sep. 2003
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Our decision was influenced by the fact the British government and Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland, Sir Patrick Mayhew, had been talking to Sinn F£in 
privately for a number of years. If they can talk to Sinn Fein why can’t we?49
According to Zartman, a potential third party has to see signs of will from 
each side involved to move toward negotiations. This often happens when each 
side has ‘no more faith in victory’ (1995, p.17). At the beginning of the US 
involvement, the American administration appeared to primarily see three sides to 
the equation: that is Sinn Fein and the British and Irish governments. The 
expected rejection by Unionists of any involvement led the US administration to 
ignore them or rather assimilate them to the British government and use the 
Unionists’ traditional position of non-involvement to their own advantage. When 
the UUP became ready to apply an autonomous foreign agenda, the US then 
incorporated them in their strategy. This only took place after the shock of the 
Adams’ visa when the possibility of getting rid of this unwelcome third party 
vanished as even London proved to be powerless. This was repeatedly confirmed 
during the following months as for example the British failed to prevent Adams 
from being invited for the St Patrick’s day at the White House in 1995.
This was the first time that the UUP openly reacted in the media. 
Donaldson stated in the Belfast Telegraph that ‘the visit to New York by Mr 
Adams was “a master stroke” for his party.’50 He added: “they now have more 
scope than ever to expound their message of hate against the Unionist people 
without having made one single concession, never mind rejected the use of 
violence.”
49 Belfast Telegraph, “Allowing visit to US appropriate, says Clinton”, 1 Feb. 1994
50 Belfast Telegraph, “Major is urged to examine Irish role”, 1 Feb. 1994
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Unionists were detaching themselves from the British government in 
spite of their common indignation about the visa.
The UUP initial reaction was to boycott the conference on peace in 
Northern Ireland because of the presence of Sinn Fein delegates for as Maginnis 
argued: “as a constitutional politician, I have to defend the greater number of 
people who are against violence, I cannot betray their trust by giving some sort of 
credibility to Adams.”51 Lord Alderdice, former leader of the Alliance Party (AP), 
was the only Unionist representative attending the conference but he left as soon 
as Adams started talking (O’Clery, 1996, p.113).
The conference took place in spite of the Unionist boycott. The traditional 
“empty chair” attitude, which had already demonstrated strong signs of weakness, 
was useless with the American administration because Ulster Unionists in general 
did not have any means of pressurizing them. Prof. John McCarthy from Fordham 
University (NY) declared in the Belfast Telegraph, that Unionists “had missed the 
boat”. More importantly regarding changes within unionism, this strategy was 
immediately questioned within the UUP. David Burnside, UUP MP for South 
Antrim, declared in the same article that they had made a blunder as they could
* 52have organised their own press conference.
Thus, these interrogations about the efficiency of the boycott regarding the 
visa forced the UUP into rethinking their strategy. The UUP reacted almost 
immediately in the aftermath of the conference, as an article in the Belfast 
Telegraph on 3 February 1994, “Unionists set up tour to counter Sinn Fein”,
51 Belfast Telegraph, “Will the Unionist boycott break any ice?”, 1 Jan. 1994
52 Belfast Telegraph, “Unionists deny giving boost to Sinn Fein”, 2 Feb. 1994
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shows. The title demonstrates the reactive attitude of Unionism. It is also worth 
noting that in the article, James Molyneaux did not appear among the delegation 
meant to go to Washington. The members were Jeffrey Donaldson who played a 
great part in delivering the Unionist message as will be discussed later, David 
Trimble, (who ultimately did not take part in the trip), Ken Maginnis, and the 
Rev. Martin Smyth, Grand Master of the Orange Order. Molyneaux’s attitude of 
avoiding confrontation in the USA is representative of the unionist old school - 
ignoring and refusing dialogue. Soderberg confirmed his refusal to communicate 
when she discussed the necessity of entering into dialogue with the UUP:
After the visa issue we were very conscious o f the fact that Unionists were 
suspicious o f it so we thought to proactively return to them. And the British 
encouraged us to do that. The problem was at that point, there was no leadership 
in the Unionist community; Molyneaux was away catching up butterflies from 
Australia. We could not get him on the phone, he just would not engage.53
Soderberg justifies American difficulties in starting a dialogue with the 
UUP on the absence of leadership. If this affirmation seems to be confirmed by 
Molyneaux’s attitude in choosing not to join the delegation, in spite of his 
position within the party, it also demonstrates the lack of US comprehension over 
the traditional unionist attitude. Indeed, what Soderberg calls an absence of 
leadership is a symbolic gesture to signify the leadership’s refusal to engage. 
Moreover, it also demonstrates Molyneaux’s lack of understanding of the US 
political expectations, as he himself justified his refusal to commit by stating: ‘I 
was not a great advocate of political tourism.’54
53 Nancy Soderberg, New York City, 14 May 2002
54 Lord Molyneaux, Westminster, 10 Feb. 2004
138
It also reveals the beginning of changes within the UUP and the growing 
division between two streams: firstly, the traditional one, that Caine described 
through his depiction of Molyneaux’s personality:
Molyneaux [who] would rather see Northern Ireland governed like a region of 
England. This was one of his Enoch Powell traits, which is sometimes to be 
found on the old fashioned right, very anti-American, very hostile to the US 
involvement. Jim was and would never have been comfortable with the White 
House.55
and secondly, the reformist stream, generally of a younger generation, and its 
progressive awareness of the necessity to engage. As Jeffrey Donaldson argues:
They were, I think, quite terrified seeing Gerry Adams given considerable airtime 
on US radio and television coast to coast and in an unchallenged way 
propagating his propaganda. And it was felt it had to be challenged. So, initially, 
myself and some others, promoted the idea within the UUP that we should be at 
least visiting the US on a more regular basis to talk to influencers on Capitol Hill 
and in the Clinton administration to try and provide some balance to what we 
regarded obviously as a very partisan message that Gerry Adams was 
delivering.56
Donaldson’s statement also confirms the importance of the visa in the 
UUP decision to change their strategy. Indeed, the fact that the US President 
could grant a visa to Adams without fearing most of his administration and 
British disapproval showed Unionists that the US could ignore their potential 
anger. Moreover, from the US standpoint, the choice of granting the visa to
55 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 25 Jun. 2003
56 Jeffrey Donaldson, UUP Lisburn Office, 15 Apr. 2003
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Adams could even become beneficial in terms of their future relationship with 
Unionists as it gave the US administration an opportunity to demonstrate their 
capacity.
The visa challenged Jim Molyneaux’s strong attachment to the comfort of 
direct rule. Adams was in New York on the speculation that a cease-fire would 
take place in the near future. If violence ended, the Joint Declaration guaranteed 
the possibility of inclusive talks. This scenario would put an end to Unionists’ 
comfort with the status quo since, whether they liked it or not, the simple fact that 
Adams was allowed into the USA demonstrated that the status quo was being 
more and more questioned.
Moreover, the British government would have no interest in rejecting the 
inclusive talks on the basis of an end to political violence as it could lead to a 
stabilisation of the political situation with all the advantages that implied, for 
instance, the end of a strong British army commitment. If Molyneaux was not 
able to see or acknowledge the progressive transformation of the Northern Ireland 
political situation, others such as Donaldson, Jim Nicholson, Maginnis and a few 
more started encouraging the idea of regular trips to the US to counterbalance 
Sinn Fein. This new vision within the UUP confirms that the visa and its 
emotional effect on Unionists played a huge part in the change of UUP strategy 
towards the US administration. The US was still seen as biased, but the UUP saw 
a need for the first time to advocate their case.
On that matter, bias seems to have encouraged the UUP to engage 
dialogue and such an attitude confirms the point made in chapter one that the
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primarily reluctant actor can change their position. First, as mentioned earlier, 
there are offers that cannot be refused (Touval, 1992, p.232), second, the cost- 
benefit calculation may demonstrate that acceptance of the US involvement along 
with proper Unionist engagement may be more effective and beneficial. On that 
matter, beyond neutrality lies leverage. The US had demonstrated that they could 
act without worrying about the consequences. Instead of choosing a frontal 
defiance, there might be a possibility to take advantage of this leverage. In that 
case, the UUP could benefit from the US influence on Gerry Adams and through 
him, the IRA.
Donaldson argued: ‘There were very regular visits, perhaps 3-4 times a 
year which, I know, it does not seem very regular but it was an attempt to match 
the frequency of visits by Adams and senior Sinn Fein members.’ Thus, those 
trips were primarily reactive to Republican trips. Once again, the UUP 
demonstrated that their interest in the US was minimal and depended on the Irish 
Republican attitude, as it was the main reason for contacts in the first place. These 
trips were reported in the Ulster Unionist Information Institute Bulletin. For 
example, an article by Jim Nicholson “Hitting the American Trail” reports the 
progress made by the UUP in meeting with Vice-President Gore and meeting 
senior Irish-Americans to expose their case and obtain a more balanced view 
from the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.
Not only did the UUP have to promote their vision of the Northern Ireland 
issue but they also had to present an alternative to the Paisleyite message. As 
Tony Culley-Foster, the Irish-American businessman who financed the creation
57 See Ulster Unionist Information Institute, “Visit by Ulster Unionist team to USA”, March 
1994, “Hitting the American Trail”, Jun. 1994.
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of the UUP North American Bureau in Washington DC, said: ‘The Americans 
[were] ignorant of the Ulster Unionists and the Protestant community. Their 
vision was Ian Paisley.’ Ian Paisley had the benefit of having nurtured strong 
connections with the American fundamentalist Bob Jones University, in North 
Carolina and also has established some Free Presbyterian congregations in the 
USA. The bickering between the two main Unionist parties is visible in the Ulster 
Unionist Information Institute bulletin with the quotation from the Washington 
Post: “the red Carpet treatment given to the Ulster Unionist leaders was in 
striking contrast to the cold shoulder given to the Rev. Paisley (,..).”59 The goal 
of these articles was clearly to persuade the Ulster Unionist electorate that these 
visits were well founded. Moreover, the prospect of American economic 
investments in accordance with potential negotiations may also have weighted the 
balance.
Ulster Unionist publications, while critical of the US, were in clear 
contrast with those from the Protestant Telegraph. For example, the article 
published in May 1994, “DUP delegation take Ulster’s case to the USA” exposed 
the “perfidy of the two governments”.60 Another more striking example is a 
document by Sammy Wilson, then DUP press officer, dating back to 17 March
1993 entitled “American interference in Northern Ireland lashed.”61
Donaldson also mentioned that ‘they were given access to a very high 
level, like Vice-President Gore, senior officials in the State Department and we 
began interfacing with Congressmen and Senators particularly the Senate Foreign
58 Tony Culley-Foster, Jury’s Doyle Hotel, Washington DC, 14 Mar. 2002
59 Ulster Unionist Information Institute, “What they said....”, Jun. 1994
60 Protestant Telegraph, “DUP delegation take Ulster’s case to the USA”, May 1994
61 DUP Press Release, Alderman Sammy Wilson Office, Press Officer, “American Interference in 
Northern Ireland lashed”, 17 Mar. 1993
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Affairs Committee or Foreign Relation Committee.’62 This corresponds to an a 
posteriori acknowledgement of the US attempt at showing their even-handedness 
by offering the same opportunities to any actor. Thus, the US actually treated 
everybody willing to engage equally. Therefore, when Unionists have accused 
Americans of pro-Irish Republicanism, the reason appeared to be that Ulster 
Unionists could not stand the fact that “terrorists” benefited from the same level 
of access as “democratic” politicians. Steven King argued: ‘there has been too 
much of carrots rather than stick. The US gave things unconditionally’.63 From a 
Unionist perspective, the fact that the visa to Gerry Adams was granted without 
any official prerequisite is an illustration of this “carrot” approach. But it can also 
be interpreted as a way to show to Gerry Adams the potential advantage of 
engaging in the peace process.64 In granting this visa, the American 
administration obviously used the carrot strategy but they also insinuated the 
“stick”. Indeed, it was the first of potentially even better treats for the Sinn Fein 
leader, but it could also be the last. So, the American administration gave a taste 
of what could be viewed as a first experience of potential rewards for Sinn Fein.
The reaction by the UUP to the Adams’ visa is instructive not so much for 
the negative reaction to the decision itself which was hardly unexpected; but 
rather because it marked a key turning point for the UUP. Up to the visa decision, 
they essentially ignored the USA and their increasing interest in Northern Ireland. 
They assumed nothing would happen or if it did the British Government could 
defend their interests. Their shock at the visa decision persuaded some UUP
62 Jeffrey Donaldson, UUP Lisburn Office, 15 Apr. 2003
63 Steven King, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 23 Oct. 2003
64 It is important to notice that no official direct contact between the US administration and Gerry 
Adams took place during his journey. Members of the White House started official 
communication with the Sinn Fein leader after the first IRA cease-fire on 30 August 1994, as it 
will be more extensively studied below.
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members that they needed a more active US strategy, though one which was 
essentially reactive at this time, seeking to counteract Sinn Fein activity in the 
USA. The image of the US is also still largely negative. The strategy is to block 
US activity. There is no evidence that they saw any potential for positive 
engagement.
III-THE IRA CEASE-FIRE, AUGUST 1994
The IRA proclaimed a cease-fire on 30 August 1994, followed six weeks 
later by a loyalist cease-fire on 13 October. Loyalist thinkers perceived the role 
of loyalist paramilitaries as being directly linked to the IRA activities. The 
loyalist declaration of cease-fire contained a “no first strike policy” (Sinnerton, 
2002, p. 168) as stated: ‘The permanence of our cease-fire will be completely 
dependant upon the continued cessation of all nationalist/republican violence, the 
sole responsibility for a return to war lies with them’.65
The role of the Irish-Americans is said to have been decisive in the IRA 
decision to implement a cease-fire. Indeed, as reported in the Belfast Telegraph, 
an ANIA delegation came to Ireland and met Sinn Fein officials on 26 August 
1994.66 These four men, including Niall O’Dowd and Congressman Bruce 
Morrison, went there to deliver a message from the White House stating that the 
US administration would not be interested in any temporary cease-fire and that 
Clinton was siding with Dublin and London on that matter.
65 Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC) Cease-fire Statement, 13 October 1994 (see 
CAIN web service for full text)
66 Belfast Telegraph, “Cease-fire Countdown”, 25 Aug. 1994
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The IRA had implemented a ten-day cease-fire during the time of their 
stay. The Unionists’ reaction to the visit of the US delegation was very negative. 
Jim Wilson, then UUP Secretary, said: “the stand taken by the unionist parties 
(...) and the decision to give the visiting Yanks a wide berth had been fully 
justified by comments they have made.”67 The harsh answer from the UUP 
reflected the party’s strong suspicion toward the Irish-American delegation and 
demonstrates the continuing strength of the traditional unionist attitude as the use 
of the derogatory expression “yanks” illustrates.
The US administration saw the cease-fire as a very positive development 
and hoped it would lead to greater British flexibility; as Soderberg said: ‘it was 
much easier for the British to actually listen and try and accommodate the terms 
of the IRA. As long as they had bombs going off, they were terrorists.’68 Some 
British officials also acknowledged the US administration’s role in the cease-fire, 
as Caine argues:
A lot o f work was done with the US administration more specifically in 1994.
It’s obvious the US had some influence on Irish Republicans; there are key 
figures in the US administration. I think Nancy Soderberg was one o f the key 
players, the National Security Council, Tony Lake, people like Kennedy and 
other Congressmen had influence. They obviously have an influence with them.69
However, other cease-fires had been declared during the conflict, therefore no 
one could be then absolutely sure that this one would last.
67 Belfast Telegraph, “Talk Cliff-hanger”, 26 Aug. 1994
68 Nancy Soderberg, New York City, 14 May 2002
69 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 25 Jun. 2003
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The UUP’s immediate reaction to the IRA statement was to be very 
suspicious as Molyneaux immediately started talking about decommissioning: 
“How are they going to justify retailing the weapons of war if they have stopped 
the war? That is the question the IRA have got to answer.” This topic was to 
become the biggest, most controversial and unsolved issue during the peace 
process negotiation.
In the polls conducted by the Belfast Telegraph and published on 2 
September 1994, 65% of the Protestant population believed that the cease-fire 
was the outcome of a deal, and only 9% believed it was permanent.71 This point 
was an immediate concern for the UUP, as Trimble expressed in an article from 
the Belfast Telegraph: ‘one consequence is that the Unionists should not worry 
about the cease-fire as such. Peace is not a threat to us. If anything it is 
advantage.’72 The mere fact that Trimble had to argue that “peace” was not a
threat to traditional unionist perspectives typified by Molyneaux’s idea of the
safety of the status quo. Thus, Trimble had to reassure his people of the fact that 
a republican step forward did not automatically imply a weakening of the 
unionist position. This point is crucial to understand the unionist attitude. They 
felt so much under threat that even peace itself had become a menace. This 
perception largely explains their reluctance to engage with the peace process in 
general and not just the US dimension of it.
The IRA’s decision to implement the cease-fire at that particular time, 
and the recognition of a US role, helped create the conditions for the UUP 
diplomatic engagement with the US.
70 Belfast Telegraph, “Molyneaux urges weapons gesture”, 31 Aug. 1994
71 Belfast Telegraph, “What Ulster People think?”, 2 Sep. 1994
72 Belfast Telegraph, “IRA’s War machine must be dismantled”, 9 Sep. 1994
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The US administration made a very measured statement highlighted the 
positive role the US strategy as facilitator played in the announcement of an IRA 
cease-fire. Myers, the White House Press Secretary, stated on the 31 August 
1994:
At the time we said that we hoped that [the visa to Gerry Adams] would 
encourage the peace process, ( ...)  it was always with the intended purpose o f  a 
permanent end to the hostilities o f the IRA renouncing the use o f violence and 
moving on to a political process, to a permanent and negotiated settlement. And 
that’s in effect what happened today. ( ...)  We think w e’ve taken steps that we 
hope would facilitate the process and we’re very pleased with the result today.
(...)  And I think that the President believes that’s this is a very significant step.
It’s a watershed, as the statement says, in a very old and very stubborn conflict.73
This new attitude was also unavoidable since the US administration was 
intent on building its own agenda as the phone call from A1 Gore to Adams on 2 
October 1994 or more importantly Adams’ invitation to the White House for St 
Patrick’s Day, 1995, demonstrated.74
IV-ST PATRICK’S DAY CELEBRATION AT THE WHITE 
HOUSE, MARCH 1995
The progressive inclusion of Sinn Féin logically led, at least initially, to 
the de-escalation of IRA violence. Republicans always previously argued that the 
use of weapons was necessary since Sinn Féin did not have access to 
negotiations even if they had a democratic representation through elected MPs
73 Federal information Service Systems, White House Briefing, 31 Aug. 1994
74 International Herald Tribune, “U.S., Ending Ban, Will Talk With Sinn Féin”, 4 Oct. 1994
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such as Gerry Adams. Unionists were apprehensive about a potential secret 
deal involving the IRA, the US and Irish governments. Dick Spring, Irish
Minister for Foreign Affairs, had to publicly deny any secret pact with the IRA
• • 1 ft • • and asked Unionists to support the peace process. So to Unionists, the “IRA
♦ 77 • • •[had] to say that it [was] permanent” otherwise the negotiations would take 
place under the lurking spectrum of violence, which from the Unionists 
perspective meant that there would be no negotiation at all. Unionists also argued 
that the cease-fire should not generate rewards for the IRA as they should never 
have launched an armed campaign. Donaldson, then Honorary Secretary of the 
UUP, in a Belfast Telegraph article entitled “UUP Chief greets truce”, declared: 
“the party would make it absolutely clear that there can be no reward in terms of 
political concessions being an end to violence.”78 It is worth noting that the title 
of this article does not mention a “cease-fire” but a “truce”, whereas the IRA had 
declared a “complete cessation of violence”.
The UUP did not perceive it this way and were very cautious about the 
meaning of the IRA statement. The use of this term implies a minimisation of the 
IRA statement.
75 Rita O’Hare, Sinn F6in Headquarters, Dublin, 4 Sep. 2003. It is also worth mentioning that 
Adams was not an MP anymore having lost his seat during the 1992 election.
76 Belfast Telegraph, “Back the peace process, Spring urges Unionists”, 1 Sep. 1994
77 Belfast Telegraphy Jim Nicholson quoted in “Premiers divided over what the IRA really 
means”, 1 Sep. 1994
78 Belfast Telegraph, “UUP chief greets truce”, 31 Aug. 1994
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The end of the ban on official US contacts with Sinn Fein took place with 
A1 Gore’s phone call to Adams on 2 October 1994. This clearly contradicted the 
UUP position as the White House justified the lifting of the ban ‘to reward Mr. 
Adams for his role in arranging the cease-fire announced by the IRA on Aug. 
31’.79 American officials’ approach demonstrates the lack of influence that 
Unionists had over the White House and the lack of understanding of the US 
administration’s motivations. Ken Maginnis declared: “the phone call was the 
result of intense pressure from the Irish-American lobby and not the result of a
SOsoftening of the US policy”. Maginnis’ argument highlights somewhat of a shift 
in UUP leadership attitude, making a distinction between the US administration 
and the Irish-American lobby, and presenting the US administration as a victim 
rather than a “perpetrator”. This distinction was necessary for the UUP to justify 
the maintenance of their contacts with the White House. This demonstrates the 
limited capacity to manoeuvre for the UUP, which had to accept certain facts on 
the ground and interpret them in a positive light for their own supporters. Thus, 
instead of being officially furious and boycotting the US invitation as they did 
after the first Adams visa, the UUP sent a delegation lead by Ken Maginnis who 
discussed the issue with A1 Gore. Thus, the US administration played a 
diplomatic game as the Sinn Fein leader receives a phone call and the UUP a 
meeting, as counter-balance and to keep them in the process. Nonetheless, the 
UUP did accept the invitation and so were drawn, even in a limited way, into the 
process.
79 International Herald Tribune, “U.S., Ending Ban, Will Talk With Sinn Fein”, 4 Oct. 1994
80 Belfast Telegraph, “Loyalists on cease-fire knife-edge”, 4 Oct. 1994
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During the week of the White House visit, Ken Maginnis agreed to 
appear on the Larry King Live show on CNN along with Gerry Adams, as long as 
there would not be any direct debate (O’Clery, 1996, p. 176). This point has often 
been seen as a media victory for the Sinn Fein leader who appeared very relaxed 
and full of confidence facing a rather nervous, aggressive adversary. Thus, 
Adams was seen as a peacemaker, and Maginnis, because of his refusal to 
directly speak to Adams and to shake hands, reinforced the US prejudice toward 
Unionists (O’Clery, 1996, p. 176).
Nevertheless, the Belfast Telegraph analysis of the debate did not regard 
it as a failure:
Combined with Adams’ assertions that it is “time to put out the hand of 
friendship and shake hands and move forward”, this initial “don’t-come-near- 
me” stance adopted by Maginnis may have been a mistake in terms o f how an 
American audience might have judged the intriguing encounter. ( ...)  The Sinn 
Fein leader’s constant refrain that he is looking forward rather than at the past, 
may have had an effect on an American audience but Maginnis’ constant 
questioning and Adams’ answers during the debate will almost certainly have 
given the States pause for thought.81
Sl Belfast Telegraph, “Adams ducks and dives”, 5 Oct. 1994
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If this cannot be denied, it was nevertheless an informal involvement 
followed by financial investment with the signing of a resolution to provide the 
International Fund for Ireland with 50 million US dollars. The US Congress 
approved this resolution by 380 “yes” to 1 “no” (Guelke, 1996, p.532). 
Moreover, Thatcher made clear in her autobiography that she had signed this 
agreement with the Republic of Ireland in order to reduce Sinn Fein’s electoral 
advance and to gain a better collaboration with Dublin on security matters, as 
already discussed in chapter one (Thatcher, 1993, p.415). This way of thinking 
is in harmony with Reagan’s view of the international situation. The closeness 
between the US and UK governments protected the Unionists from any serious 
danger emanating from the Irish American lobby until Clinton’s election.
Unionists never had a deep interest in the US and therefore let the 
British Embassy deal with anything regarding Northern Ireland. The situation 
changed with the end of the Cold War, the decreasing importance of the Anglo- 
American special relationship, and the election in 1992 of Bill Clinton.
Unionists generally ignored and let the British Foreign Service deal with 
the Northern Ireland issue in a land perceived as utterly pro-nationalist. The 
Anglo-American special relationship protected them from any official US 
involvement. Therefore, when Clinton was elected, the strong support that he 
received from Irish America along with his supposedly pro-nationalist 
suggestions, such as the visa to Gerry Adams, naturally led to a hostile if 
subdued reaction.
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CHAPTER THREE
CLINTON’S FIRST TERM: INITIAL UNIONIST 
REACTION TO US INVOLVEMENT
INTRODUCTION
Prior to the Clinton administration’s involvement, Unionist 
representatives never seriously contemplated an American political agenda in 
order to counter-balance the pro-Nationalist Irish-American activity in the United 
States. As Jeffrey Donaldson argued: ‘the vast majority of Americans are not 
terribly interested in Northern Ireland and they are not terribly interested in a 
Foreign policy issue that does not have a direct bearing on their day to day life 
but of course from this distance it appeared to Unionists that [...] the whole of 
America had this pro-nationalist view which was not accurate at all.’1 The last 
part of Donaldson’s statement about broader unionist views of the USA 
embodies the general unionist perception of the US position prior to, and 
certainly even more so, at the beginning of the Clinton administration’s 
involvement.
Their fear also appeared to be well founded as major figures in American 
politics such as Senator Edward Kennedy or Daniel Patrick Moynihan had 
expressed serious criticisms of the way that the British government had handled
1 Jeffrey Donaldson, UUP Office, Lisburn, 15 Apr. 2003
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the explosive situation in the province. It obviously indirectly targeted Unionists 
and reinforced their opinion of America being hostile to the unionist position.
Nevertheless, as discussed in chapter one, Unionists were not able to 
prevent the American administration from being involved since the British 
Government also appeared to be powerless. Therefore, they had a choice 
between accepting and rejecting it with consequences that the unionist 
community would have to endure. The situation dramatically changed between 
the beginning of Clinton’s Presidency and the signing of the GFA. This 
transformation took place in spite of Unionists’ initial strong opposition to any 
external involvement and their perception of the US as being sympathetic to Irish 
nationalists. Indeed, President Clinton made several promises during the election 
campaign that seemed to favour the nationalist side. The promise to grant a visa 
to Gerry Adams and the intention of appointing a peace envoy were the most 
unacceptable ones from a unionist standpoint. It was perceived as an unwelcome 
interference and as being inevitably against their interests.
As Dr, King highlighted, at the beginning of the 1990s Unionists saw the 
US involvement as a nationalist agenda.2 However, the aim of this chapter is to 
see whether their position evolved over the years of negotiations or remained 
unchanged. This chapter deals mostly with the preparation of the US 
involvement in the Northern Ireland peace process and the reaction it generated 
among the UUP.
2 Dr. Steven King, Ulster Unionist Headquarters, Belfast, 23 Oct. 2003
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Clinton’s first term has been divided between two chapters to highlight 
the UUP initial reaction to the US involvement and its strategy until Trimble’s 
election as leader of the party in October 1995.
As discussed in chapter one, mediation requires a high level of patience 
and persuasion to induce every actor, or at least, the main ones, to appreciate the 
beneficial outcome and agree to the presence of a third party.
When the third party in question turns out to be the only remaining super power, 
as was the case with the United States, it may often seem better to agree with its 
involvement rather than see the super power shift to support the adversary’s 
position (Touval, 1992, p.239). Still, the American administration certainly 
agreed with softly “imposing” their involvement in Northern Ireland on the 
United Kingdom while never fully siding with Nationalists or the Republic of 
Ireland against London. This chapter examines the UUP’s initial reaction to the 
US involvement. The first point is to analyse the root of the UUP’s decision to 
progressively accept the US involvement. Why did not they react more quickly? 
What type of strategy did they initially adopt? To what extent was it successful? 
And in case of passivity, what factors motivated them to launch a new and more 
adaptive strategy? Did they perceive an impasse that would coincide with a 
“hurting stalemate” that was unperceived until then?
The remainder of the chapter is divided into five main parts, each covers 
one of the key events which marked the US involvement in Northern Ireland: the 
Clinton Election Campaign; the Visa to Gerry Adams; the paramilitary cease
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fires; the 1995 St Patrick’s Day at the White House; and the Economic 
Conference in May 1995.
I-CLINTON’S ELECTION, NOVEMBER 1992 
A- Unionists and the 1992 US Election Campaign
An analysis of Bill Clinton’s presidential campaign is essential to 
understand his early involvement in the Northern Ireland issue and the reaction 
that his election generated among unionist elites.
Unionists knew of the weight of the militant Irish-American connection 
in fund raising and gun running for the IRA through organisations such as 
NORAID. As Lord Maginnis remarked, they were aware that ‘there was the 
Irish-American lobby and they were doing untold damage.’4 But, as Conor 
O’Clery argues, ‘Unionists never regarded Washington as an important city. The 
British government was doing the job for them. From 1921, the State Department 
considered Northern Ireland as an internal problem of the United Kingdom. Most 
presidents had the same consideration. The US would not do anything unless the 
United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland agreed with it.’5 Thus, as mentioned 
in chapter one, the “special relationship” between London and Washington was 
protecting Unionists from any undesired Irish-American interference at least on 
the strictly political level.
3 This connection turned out to be very efficient at least until the beginning of the eighties when 
in ‘1981 a district court judge ruled that NORAID was “an agent o f the IRA providing money 
and services for other than relief purposes’” (Guelke, 1996, p.524).
4 Lord Maginnis, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 6 Dec. 2002
5 Conor O’Clery, New York City, 10 May 2002
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Moreover, as far as Unionists were concerned, Northern Ireland was a 
British internal issue. International opinion was of little significance since it 
could not influence British policy. Besides, as Unionists were British citizens, 
their view was that British embassies and foreign services had a duty to handle 
the situation. Unionists did not have to act because they simply did not need to. 
This traditional Unionist “indifference” changed, though not immediately, with 
Clinton’s arrival on the American national political scene.
The first point to examine is Unionists’ interpretation of Bill Clinton’s 
reasons for wishing to become involved in Northern Ireland. Among all the 
Unionist officials interviewed for this thesis, the vast majority asserted Clinton’s 
need for Irish-American support to win the presidential election. This point is 
obviously differently presented according to whether the interviewee was pro- or 
anti-GFA. Two statements from interviews made in the aftermath of Clinton’s 
intervention illustrate Unionist disparity on that matter. First, David Vance’s 
position as deputy leader at the time of the interview of the strongly anti-GFA 
United Kingdom Unionist Party (UKUP) was very disapproving with regard to 
the basis of US involvement:
I think there is absolutely no doubt about the fact that the Clinton administration 
recognised the importance o f the “so called” Irish-American vote and its 
important delivering democrat victories. I think this is the primary driver of what 
w e’ve all seen over the past ten years.6
6 David Vance, Stormont Castle, 15 May 2000
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The second statement is from Barry White, then UUP coordinator at 
Westminster:
( ...)  Why people were sceptical about Clinton was that he was after the Irish-
American vote. There aren’t too many Irish-American votes taking our side.
But he was an honest broker. We couldn’t have asked for more to be fair.7
These two quotes were obviously made years after Clinton’s first election 
as President. There was no significant contemporary reaction. As Prof. Paul Bew 
underlined: ‘no official declaration were made by the UUP until 1994 as they did 
not expect such an involvement’ (here referring to Adams’ visa).8
These two reactions exemplify Unionists’ perception of Irish-American 
influence on Clinton’s Northern Ireland policy. Vance argues that the necessity of 
attracting Irish-American votes pushed the American President into having a 
nationalist agenda, consequently bearing some of the responsibilities for what 
Vance sees as the failure of the Belfast Agreement. For the UKUP, it represents 
proof of Clinton’s lack of sincere interest in the Northern Ireland issue and 
evidence that he was promoting a nationalist agenda. On the other hand, White, a 
young pro-Trimble Unionist, accepts the Irish-American vote as a necessity for 
Clinton, but immediately points out Clinton’s sincere interest and neutral position 
and praises it.
7 Barry White, Westminster UUP office, 14 Feb.2003
8 Prof. Paul Bew, Queen’s University, Belfast, 18 Dec. 2003
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The UKUP represented the traditional opposition to external involvement 
in Northern Ireland. Its delegation constantly tried to undermine Mitchell’s 
position during the talks and finally walked out of the negotiations in July 1997. 
On the other hand, Barry White’s statement, which represents the pro-GFA UUP 
public position, demonstrates a much more pragmatic approach to US 
involvement.
Beggan and Indurthy argue that ‘historically, the Democrats have always 
been more in tune to the Irish situation because of the Irish component of their 
party” (1999, p. 13). Nevertheless, some academics contest the importance of the 
Irish-American votes as a major factor in Clinton’s involvement in Northern 
Ireland. Indeed, Roger MacGinty underlines the fact ‘that Democrats could no 
longer automatically rely on the increasingly wealthy Irish-American vote which 
has been attracted by Reagan’s economic policies’ as a way to dismiss the 
necessity for Clinton to base his campaign on seeking the Irish-American vote 
(1997, p. 34). However, MacGinty’s approach strongly minimizes the notion of 
cultural identity in American elections exemplified in the position pro-US 
Republicans, such as Ray O’Hanlon, who supported Clinton during the election 
campaign. Furthermore, it is clear that during the primary election, Clinton like 
his Catholic opponent, Jerry Brown, was interested in winning the Irish Catholic 
vote (O’Grady, 1996, p. 3). ‘They have supported the successful candidate in the 
past seven presidential elections, they vote in greater number than the general 
population and they are concentrated in states with large representation in the 
presidential Electoral College. Thus, it is assumed that candidates who respond to 
Catholic concerns, one of which is Northern Ireland can reap a significant 
electoral windfall’ (Wilson, 1997, p. 24). The fact that no candidate used this
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political strategy prior to 1992 can be explained by the importance of Anglo- 
American relationship, having more weight from a cost-benefit calculation 
standpoint and is also due to complacency as Irish-Americans were regarded as a 
safe Democratic vote until the first Reagan election.
Unionists put a pro-Irish nationalist label on candidate Clinton but without 
paying much attention to it. As King remarked: ‘Clinton made his first promises 
about Northern Ireland when he still was not a serious candidate.’9 Nevertheless, 
Clinton had managed to mobilise an Irish-American support group, called Irish- 
Americans for Clinton/Gore campaign group. The group sought to ensure the 
presence of the Northern Ireland issue on the US foreign agenda through their 
support for Clinton/Gore. Niall O’Dowd, co-founder of the Irish-Americans for 
Clinton/Gore (IAFCG) underlined:
Around the early 1990s, late 1980s, we became aware that there was a will to 
get involved in the US. I met with Bill Clinton when he was then candidate and 
from that things started to change.10
The formation of the group with the support of major Irish-American 
political figures such as Congressman Bruce Morrison and Senator Kennedy 
indicates the strong influence of Irish-Americans on Clinton’s campaign.
9 Dr. Steven King, UUP Headquarters Belfast, 23 Oct. 2003. King’s point is confirmed by the 
fact that Clinton voiced his position on Northern Ireland during the primary election when facing 
the catholic Californian governor, Jerry Brown, in New York at a ‘forum on Irish issues in the 
Sheraton Hotel in Manhattan’ in April 1992 (O’Clery, 1996, p. 6, Beggan & Indurthy, 1999, 
p. 13).
10 Niall O’Dowd, Irish Voice and Irish America Offices, New York City, 13 May 2002
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The IAFCG became “Americans for a New Ireland Agenda” (ANIA) after 
Clinton’s election to continue the pressure on the new president to fulfil his
promises. Ray Flynn, then Mayor of Boston, and Former Connecticut
Congressman, Bruce Morrison, co-signed a letter in February 1993 setting out 
the fundamental points they wished the Clinton administration to agree to in 
their involvement in the Northern Irish issue. This statement of purpose is 
composed of five key points:
• The appointment of a special envoy
• The elimination of foreign interference in the US judicial system (which is
clearly a reference to a London attempt at getting a so called “terrorist on the 
run” deported to the United Kingdom)
•  Attention to human rights abuses in NI
• Continuation o f visa opportunities for Irish citizens, ‘to halt the practice of 
denying visas to Irish political leaders solely on ideological ground.’ This is a 
reminder of the promise to grant a visa to Gerry Adams.
•  Support for the McBride principles and Investment11
It seems that Clinton partly used the Irish-American agenda as a 
guideline in the long term for his involvement in Northern Ireland with issues 
such as the envoy, the visa to Gerry Adams or even the adoption of the McBride 
principles on a federal level.
11 Flynn Raymond L. & Morrison Bruce A., “Irish-Americans For Clinton/ Gore”, Five 
Recommendations on Irish Issues, 5 Feb. 1993
Nevertheless, a later summary of his policy in November 1994 was
unsurprisingly much more economically centred as it was diplomatically more
i ' j
acceptable.
Unionists justified their fear of Clinton’s presidency by the importance of 
the Irish-American lobby in the new incumbent’s campaign and the extent of the 
lobby’s influence over his decision to become involved in Northern Ireland. 
Nevertheless, the Unionists’ preoccupation during his campaign and at the 
beginning of his presidency must not be overstated. As King argued, ‘[the 
promises] were made when he was not a strong candidate. He promised the 
envoy, a visa to Adams. So, nobody was thinking that he would seriously honour 
his promises.’13 Thus, Unionists initially did not interpret Clinton’s promises as 
serious threat.
Two points confirm King’s position. Firstly, Unionist publications 
scarcely covered Clinton’s victory. The Unionists’ position was highlighted in 
only two articles published in the Belfast biggest daily newspaper, The Belfast 
Telegraph, following Clinton’s victory on 3 November 1992. The title of the first 
article, published on 4 November, is explicit: “Ulster View Raises Fear on 
Clinton” and the article deals with Clinton’s pledge to send a peace envoy during 
the election campaign. The second article introduces what is going to be the DUP
12 Here is a document released by the Office of the Press Secretary, “Supporting Peace in 
Northern Ireland, White House Statement, 1 Nov. 1994. It is composed o f seven major initiatives:
• The White House conference for Trade and Investment in Ireland and Northern Ireland.
• Commerce Secretary Brown’s attendance at the Belfast Investment Conference
• Increased funding for the International Fund for Ireland
• Enhanced department o f  Commerce programs for Ireland and Northern Ireland
• The US Information agency’s expanded programs for the island
• National endowment of democracy expansion in Northern Ireland
• US agency for international development review o f working with the international fund 
for Ireland
13 Dr. Steven King, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 23 Oct. 2003
115
attitude during the whole peace process toward the US involvement. The article 
entitled ““Hands o ff’, Paisley warns Clinton” reports part of a speech that 
Paisley made in Westminster:
I certainly would not welcome the proposals that the new president has made 
that he is going to interfere in the affairs of Northern Ireland by sending a 
special envoy to beat our heads together and make us see a United Ireland as he 
wants us to see it.
A second indicator of the UUP’s low-key response is that, unlike Paisley, 
the UUP leadership did not emit any official comment and no individual 
quotation was found in the media on Clinton’s election.
B- The British government and Clinton’s election, indirect 
consequences on the Ulster Unionists position
The ultimate protection of Unionist interests was the Anglo-American 
“Special Relationship” which constantly overcame Irish-American pressure on 
the US government for an intervention in Northern Ireland.
The British government rejected the idea of a peace envoy in Northern 
Ireland. Jonathan Caine, Sir Patrick Mayhew’s former personal adviser, reports: 
‘(...) When asked about this during the Conservative Party conference, Sir 
Patrick asked by the Financial Times, replied by saying Northern Ireland needs a
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US envoy like it needs a hole in the head.’14 In addition, the British government 
openly favoured Bush Senior’s re-election getting involved in a manner that, 
although officially denied by Major after Clinton’s victory, infuriated Clinton’s 
team. Nancy Soderberg, senior member of the foreign policy team during the 
1992 campaign, stated: ‘during the campaign Major had been helping the 
campaign for Bush. The tricks they used did not help the relationship with 
Clinton.’15 The issue was with how some members of the British Conservative 
Party interfered in the US election campaign in assisting Bush’s team. Jonathan 
Caine acknowledged that ‘some officials from the Conservative Party [...] went 
to the US and advised the Republican Party on election campaigning16. [...] The 
most serious allegation is actually [...] that the British Home Office at the request 
of the Bush administration actually looked for evidence of Bill Clinton being 
involved in anti-Vietnam activity when he was a student in Oxford.’17 Caine also 
argues that the British government also shared the idea that ‘Bill Clinton got a 
strong interest because of the Irish vote. [...] The Clinton’s pledge was viewed 
with some alarm and some apprehension (...)’.
John Major denies any knowledge in his autobiography of the 
“conspiracy” mentioning that ‘it was a staffers’ feud, and never an issue between 
the two of [them]’ (1999, p. 498). Yet, it is hardly believable that it did not do 
any damage to the Anglo-American relationship.
14 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 25 Jun. 2003
15 Nancy Soderberg became Security council staff director during Clinton’s first presidency, New 
York City, 14 May 2002
16 Two members of the Conservative Party, Sir John Lacy and Mark Fullbrook effectively 
travelled to America to help the Bush campaign. But, according to Downing Street, they acted on 
their own (Wilson, 1997, p.34).
17 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 25 Jun. 2003
18 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 25 Jun. 2003
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Arthur states that the impact of the issues between the Conservative 
government and the new American administration should not be exaggerated 
(2000, p. 156). Albeit it might have been a staffer’s issue, the importance of 
“staffers” such as Soderberg in the decision-making process invalidates Major’s 
point. Caine’s analysis also contradicts Major’s will to minimise the issue.
It soured the relations between the conservative government and the incoming 
US administration. I think that in that respect it was rather clumsy. It was a very 
good lesson for a government who tries to involve himself in internal affairs of 
other countries. ( ...)  This was a Conservative Party matter rather than a 
government matter but in the case the two became indivisible. So, it was 
damaging, there’s no doubt about that.19
Thus, beyond Irish-American strong mobilisation to support Clinton’s 
victory, the British government appears to have, at least informally, sought to 
prevent it. Therefore, if the main argument for previous American 
administrations’ non-interference in Northern Ireland was their strong 
relationship with London, then, this argument was weakened for two 
intermingled reasons. Firstly, as argued above, British interference in the 
American presidential election seriously damaged the personal relationship 
between Clinton and Major. Secondly, the new international context, discussed 
in the first chapter, weakened Britain’s importance as an American ally in the 
immediate post-Cold War era. As Cox highlights, the end of the Cold War ‘made 
it possible for a “Third Party”, the US, to play a far more decisive role in 
Northern Irish affairs’ (2000, p.251)
19 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 25 Jun. 2003
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Thus, Irish-American support for the new US administration and tense 
relations between the US and British governments placed Unionists in a very 
delicate position. Indeed, just as Unionists had benefited from the US-UK 
“special relationship”, they were exposed to the consequences that a soured 
relationship would generate in the Northern Ireland context.
Nonetheless, Paisley was the only one to publicly react to Clinton’s 
election promises. The UUP seemed to ignore the threat. This lack of reaction is 
well described by Lord Maginnis’ depiction of the unionist mentality prior to
1992 ‘The Unionists in Northern Ireland were never actually challenged in a
political or international sense. They lived an insular life (...) People were pretty
00 •  • * * well insulated from the outside world.’ Their lack of political skills and their
lack of experience in dealing with real political pressure did not help to react or
to measure “the level of danger” they were facing. “No” appeared to be enough
of an answer. They could not see that, in terms of cost-benefit calculation,
Northern Ireland could be an advantageous place for an America seeking to
redefine its foreign policy in the immediate post-Cold War world.
C- The cost-benefit aspect, the American perspective and further 
Unionist weakening
‘No state or organisation gets involved on only altruistic purpose’ 
(Bercovitch, 1996, p.4). Zartman and Touval also argue that the motivation to be 
involved in mediation is based on a “cost-benefit calculation” (1996, p.451) and 
that otherwise no third party would intervene (1996, p. 446).
20 Lord Maginnis, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 6 Dec. 2002
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Until Clinton’s involvement, Unionists had benefited from the advantage 
that a potential involvement in Northern Ireland did not offer any benefit to 
external powers being ‘a low-level conflict on the periphery of western Europe’ 
(Guelke, 1996, p. 521). Nevertheless, with the changes of international context, 
Northern Ireland offered new perspectives.
On an international level and directly linked to the Unionists’ position in 
Northern Ireland, Clinton ‘did what no other American President had done or 
dared to do: upset British sensibilities by intervening into what they and others 
up to now regarded as a very British matter’ (Cox, 1998, p.63). There was no 
particular reason in the view of Clinton’s advisers to provide the United 
Kingdom with special treatment. ‘America’s interest no longer coincided with 
Britain’s interests, as the unfolding of the Bosnia crisis in the spring 1992 
showed’ (O’Grady, 1996, p.6). The British government could not defend the 
Unionists’ position (which corresponded to theirs on sovereignty matters) and the 
latter position was consequently weakened.
Moreover, as Hazleton puts it, the Northern Ireland issue ‘offered an 
opportunity for charting a new foreign policy direction. (...) Intervention in 
Northern Ireland appeared to be more “do-able” and promised to be 
comparatively inexpensive’ (2000, p. 108). This new foreign policy was 
symbolised by candidate Clinton’s speech at the Los Angeles World Affairs 
Council on 13 August 1992, “we must tear down in our thinking the gap between 
domestic and foreign policy” (in Thompson, 2001, p. 162). This statement 
corresponds to the necessity for the United States to reshape its foreign policy in 
a new world where ‘no longer eastern internationalists or Atlanticists control the 
foreign policy agenda [and where] no longer are domestic and foreign affairs
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perceived or handled as ‘separate’ in practice as well as in theory’ (Miller, 1994, 
p. 622). Northern Ireland embodied the perfect example of internal and 
international affairs being intermingled. Therefore, as Steven King said, if there 
was no strategic interest in being involved in the Northern Irish issue, there
♦ 91definitely was a political one.
Besides, on the economic aspect, Senator Mitchell and Commerce 
Secretary Ron Brown often stated that Northern Ireland could represent ‘a 
bridgehead into the European market’ (Dumbrell, 2001, p.218). This point can 
also be interpreted as a diplomatic strategy to offer positive perspectives on US 
involvement to reluctant actors such as the UUP, as the primary goal of the third 
party is to ultimately ‘bring the parties toward an agreement acceptable for 
everybody’ (Zartman & Touval, p.445). Brown and Mitchell’s attitude also 
contains the “carrot” element mentioned in chapter one. This carrot could 
potentially influence Unionists, to whom Ulster “was not for sale”, as it could 
represent some relief for a local economy in deep crisis. Rev. Reynolds, an Ulster 
Unionist activist in the US, argued that Unionists did not want American 
money.22 Nevertheless, unionist politicians could hardly ignore the potential 
economic advantages. Evidence of this was seen in their participation at the 
Economic Conference in May 1995 in Washington. A striking example of the 
awareness of American potential investments and the importance of the 
conference appeared in the Belfast Telegraph article, “America’s interest” in the 
viewpoint column of this unionist newspaper:
21 Steven King, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 23 Oct. 2003
22 Rev. Charles Reynolds, Trinity College Dublin, 3 Sept. 2002
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This newspaper has consistently argued that economic investment is the greatest 
service which the US can make in the search o f peace in Northern Ireland. These 
are all potent selling points and Ulster Businessmen and trade representatives 
must ensure that the message gets across. This is an unique opportunity to sell 
Ulster to a huge audience with the influential backing of the US President.23
However, despite some positive sounds about economic investment, there 
was very little unionist reaction and almost no UUP elite public reaction to the 
Clinton election -not even from those who were later anti-GFA. There is no 
evidence that any element of the UUP saw it as an opportunity. To the limited 
extent that they were engaged they saw it a threat. The second key event in the 
US involvement, the Adams’ visa, reinforced that view.
II- PREPARATION FOR INVOLVEMENT, A VISA FOR 
GERRY ADAMS, AND THE IMPACT ON THE UUP 
STRATEGY
Before granting the visa to Gerry Adams, the US administration took 
several steps, such as the establishment of diplomatic structures, to engage in the 
Northern Ireland peace process. Unionists generally ignored these progressive 
steps. In their defence, this progress was very low key. O’Grady and Wilson 
point out that Clinton’s administration did not have an active Irish agenda for 
about the first eighteen months of his first term (O’Grady, 1996, p.4, Wilson, 
1997, p.25). Unionists may have thought that Clinton’s promises would not be 
fulfilled. Therefore, Gerry Adams’s visa provoked the fury of the British and
23 Belfast Telegraph, “America’s interest, Clinton’s strategy, why Ulster must take full 
advantage”, 22 May 1995
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Unionists who were ill prepared for it. Paul Bew says that Unionists were not 
expecting it.24
However, even if the UUP did not expect the Adams visa decision, it 
came at the end of a period of preparation. So, it is necessary to examine this first 
eighteen months of the administration to put the visa decision in its American 
context, as their first significant public decision
A- Preparation to Involvement
Guelke states that ‘initially the Clinton administration disappointed the 
Irish-American lobby. No peace envoy was appointed and when Gerry Adams 
applied for a visa to visit the United States in November 1993, it was refused’ 
(1996, p.533). Arthur also asserts that ‘the early months of the Clinton 
administration proved a disappointment for the Irish republican lobby in 
Washington’ (2000, p. 156). The low level of coverage, from Clinton’s 
inauguration in January 1993 until January 1994, in the Belfast Telegraph about 
Clinton and Northern Ireland reflects the limited concern that Unionists had for 
the transatlantic activities at this time. The non-existence of any Senior UUP 
statement about the US administration during that period of time is another piece 
of evidence. Ulster Unionists seem to have taken the US administration’s 
apparent passivity as confirmation that the promises would not be honoured.
Firstly, Anne Smith, UUP representative in Washington, stated that the 
UUP thought that ‘Bill Clinton was very recently involved and the opinion was
24 Prof. Paul Bew, Queen’s University, Belfast, 18 Dec.2003
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rather nationalist. The people who advised him were pretty much nationalists.’25 
Soderberg corroborated Smith’s statement as she openly admitted her nationalist 
sympathies: ‘during the first year, I was very much SDLP and anti-Sinn Fein. 
Because of Kennedy’s connection the whole Unionist community assumed that I 
was pro-Sinn Fein/ IRA.’26
Secondly, it appears that Unionists could not or rather did not want to 
make a clear distinction between those Americans with pro-constitutional 
nationalist sympathies and those who supported Sinn Fein. The revelation of 
secret talks between Hume and Adams in 1992 was logically interpreted as the 
confirmation of the existence of this pan-nationalist agenda. It also demonstrated 
for them that Hume was sympathetic to the idea of a united Ireland. The strong 
role that Hume played in Adams obtaining the visa seemed to confirm it. Thus, 
the Unionists’ reluctance to acknowledge the legitimacy of even a constitutional 
nationalist position made it more difficult to see any positive side to US 
intervention.
In addition to the pressure from the Irish-American lobby, and in contrast 
to the highly violent preceding decades, a relatively positive atmosphere was 
emerging in Northern Ireland in the early nineties, creating a space for a US role. 
Peter Brooke’s declaration that Great Britain had “no selfish, strategic or 
economic interest in Northern Ireland” which was addressed to Irish
97Republicans signalled the launch of a new British policy.
25 Anne Smith, St Regis Hotel, Washington DC, 18 Apr. 2002
26 Nancy Soderberg, New York City, 14"May 2002
27 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 25 Jun. 2003
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Brooke’s declaration seemed to imply that some within the British 
government knew that they could not solve the issue without including Irish 
Republicans in the talks.
Moreover, the relationship between Dublin and London considerably 
improved with the election of John Major as Prime Minister and his close 
relationship with Taoiseach Albert Reynolds.
However, the UUP position underestimated the importance of preparation 
for future negotiations. As Raiffa argues, first you need to “know yourself’, in 
that context, your possibilities, the logistics you can use, know the situation in 
which you are planning to be involved, ‘give a thought to the negotiating 
conventions’ and ‘iterate and set your aspiration level’ (1982, p. 126-127). In 
fact, at this time, the US administration was very active on Northern Ireland. The 
team including Nancy Soderberg, former Senator Kennedy’s Foreign policy 
advisor was formed. Nancy Soderberg set the tone of Clinton’s early policy in 
Ireland: ‘In April 1992, Clinton promised the world to the Irish-Americans in 
New York City. So, [Irish-American activists] came to me when I was at the 
White House.’28 Soderberg’s point could imply that the US administration saw 
itself as acting in support of the nationalists as a payback for Irish-American 
electoral support at first, rather than adopting an immediate even-handed 
approach.
28 Nancy Soderberg, New York City, 14 May 2002
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Clinton decided to run his Northern Ireland policy from the NSC by 
bringing the issue into the White House rather than leaving it in the hands of the 
rather anglophile State Department. Jean Kennedy Smith, Senator Kennedy’s 
sister, was appointed as American Ambassador in Dublin. Her appointment 
counter-balanced the weight of anglophile US ambassador Ray Seitz at St James 
Court. Unionists utterly disliked her -Maginnis calling her “a pseudo-
* 29 • • •diplomat”. Unionists’ opinion of Kennedy Smith never changed. King claimed 
that US involvement became really helpful ‘once Jean Kennedy Smith went 
away’.30
Niall O’Dowd also confirms that early efforts were made: ‘Basically, we 
[ANIA] created a group of four people who were committed to bring the 
Americans in the peace process and we did this by calling pressure on Sinn Fein 
and getting guarantees from them about the IRA. And then, going to the White 
House and saying you know we have this deal on the table and you should be 
interested.’31 So, the US administration was in indirect contact with Sinn Fein 
through ANIA briefings.
Therefore, when Guelke declares that Clinton’s attitude toward Northern 
Ireland initially disappointed the Irish-Americans, it is valid regarding the non­
active but supportive Irish-Americans but not for those such as O’Dowd who 
knew the evolution of the situation behind closed doors. O’Dowd himself 
confirmed it: ‘we knew that Irish policy was being decided by Clinton and by a
29 Sunday Times, “Nice Try or Sudden Conversation”, 22 Sep. 1996. There was not any official 
statement by UUP leaders in the Belfast Telegraph when Jane Kennedy Smith was appointed or 
official comment about Jean Kennedy Smith’s arrival in Dublin in June 1993.
30 Steven King, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 23 Oct. 2003
31 Niall O’Dowd, Irish Voice and Irish America Offices, New York City, 13 May 2002
126
very special group around him and we had potentially created that situation by 
putting in front the idea of an IRA cease-fire. We were quite happy to do that.’32
Unionists, who would have always been fearful of any deal behind their 
backs since the 1985 AIA, did not pay much attention to the evolution of the 
situation on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. Steven King’s argument about 
unionist assumptions that Clinton promises would not be kept is a good enough 
argument. However, it seems that precursor signs, such as Kennedy Smith’s 
appointment, did not encourage the Ulster Unionists into preparing a “counter­
offensive” to make their point at the White House. Indeed, Kennedy Smith’s 
appointment did not generate any official Ulster Unionist reaction in the Belfast 
Telegraph of March 1993 even though her name had been mentioned in articles 
on 1 March and 16 March 1993.33 It is important to specify that Kennedy Smith 
did not have any prior experience in diplomacy and the post in Phoenix Park was 
often considered as a quasi-honorary position. The appointment of the 
inexperienced Kennedy Smith could have been interpreted as a reward for Ted 
Kennedy’s support during the presidential campaign and nothing more. Besides, 
she was not appointed to London so Unionists were out of her diplomatic 
jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the UUP may have been more preoccupied about the 
appointment of a peace envoy as reflected in the Belfast Telegraph with reports 
such as the article “Clinton backs off, Ulster envoy issue is dodged’.34 These
32 Niall O’Dowd, Irish Voice and Irish America Offices, New York City, 13 May 2002
33 Belfast Telegraph, “Kennedy is tipped”, 1 Mar. 1993
Belfast Telegraph, “Envoy warning sent to Clinton”, 16 Mar. 1993
34 Belfast Telegraph, “Clinton backs off, Ulster envoy issue is dodged”, 17 Mar. 1993
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articles contained reassuring information for the Ulster Unionists who then could 
believe that the promises were only electoral promises.
Ulster Unionists retained their traditional position of leaving the British to 
defend their case outside the Union. This point is characteristic of James 
Molyneaux’s integrationist view towards Northern Ireland. As White argues:
Direct rule was not ideal, far from it, but it was comfortable and you know, if 
Ulster was British and we were getting the most of what we wanted (This is not 
the way 1 think, this is the way 1 imagine [the former leadership] thought). They 
felt comfortable; why they should bother. The IRA was still very active and as 
long as they remained active they obviously could not be in any sort o f political 
institution. So, why bother?35
White’s words embody the traditional unionist strategy of just saying 
“no” to anything and fits Lord Laird’s description of Molyneaux’s strategy 
during his leadership, ‘his idea was to dose every fire with water, keep it all
calm, keep our passion low’ which meant seeking to indefinitely contain the
i / '
situation rather than try and solve it. ’ This point is crucial in the sense that the 
UUP’s attitude was based on the fact that the party was never really forced to 
make moves. First, the UUP dominated the Northern Ireland political situation 
for fifty years during the Old Stormont Regime. Second, the initially hated 
“direct rule” became the most comfortable situation. As long as the IRA was 
active, the best solution for the UUP was to let the British contain the situation 
on the security aspect and paralyse any perspective of a power-sharing 
government and any attempt at a united Ireland. The US involvement and
35 Barry White, former UUP coordinator at Westminster, Westminster, 14 Feb. 2003
36 Lord Laird, Offices Holywood road, Belfast, 14 Mar. 2003
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potential influence on the Irish Republicans put this situation in jeopardy, by 
creating a new dynamic away from the status quo.
In addition, as already discussed in chapter one, any impending third- 
party would have been perceived as favouring the Nationalist side in the 
Northern Ireland case as the Unionists’ priority was to preserve the status quo. 
So, if the United States appeared to be one-sided it was partly due to the Clinton 
administration’s determination to move the situation beyond the status quo and 
this matched the Nationalist agenda. This argument is not in contradiction with 
the will to accommodate Unionists. But, as seen above, in the Unionists’ mind, 
status quo preserved the Union. Molyneaux, contrary to younger and more 
pragmatic figures like Maginnis, Trimble or Donaldson, still believed in the 
possibility to maintain the status quo indefinitely. As Caine argues it:
The temptation for Unionists has always been if  we hold out, things might be 
better, but if  you look at the history from 1969 onwards every time Unionism 
sort o f dug in and said no, they’ve ended up a few years down the line in a far 
weaker position. The moment dictated that they had to get involved.37
Indeed, for instance, the resignation of the UUP MPs following the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement, which was as Sean Neeson, former Alliance Party 
leader, put it: ‘simply to have an election based on the agreement,’38 weakened 
their position as they lost a seat to the SDLP’s Seamus Mallon. Thus some 
Unionists, such as Trimble or Donaldson as mentioned above, understood that if 
they did not actively engage, the process would continue without fully taking
37 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 20 Oct. 2003
38 Sean Neeson, Alliance Party Headquarters, Belfast, 9 Jul. 2003
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their position into consideration. The very limited unionist input in the Downing 
Street Declaration confirmed it.
B- Ripeness: a crucial aspect of intervention
Ripeness can be defined as the time when a conflict has reached a turning 
point and it is possible to bring about some changes (Kriegsberg, 1991, p.4). In 
the Northern Ireland situation, it appears that the turning point for the US 
involvement was the Joint Declaration on 15 December 1993.
1-The Joint Declaration, a pivotal moment for US involvement
The White House welcomed the Joint Declaration as a positive step 
forward in the search for peace in Northern Ireland. The declaration was based 
on Hume’s idea (Major, 1999, p. 447). It was clearly based on the Hume-Adams 
document that Dublin had re-written. However, Major could not acknowledge 
he was even indirectly talking to Sinn Fein. Therefore the public position was to
- in
ignore Adams’ input.
The DUP unsurprisingly rejected it as the title on the front page of the 
Belfast Telegraph, “Furious Paisley lashes “sell out””, on 15 December 1993 
shows.
39 See Mallie and McKittrick (1996), The Fight fo r  Peace, The Secret History Behind the Irish 
Peace Process, which includes a Sinn F6in draft (also known as Hume-Adams), dating back to 
June 1992, appendix I, p.375
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However, the UUP adopted a more reserved approach avoiding any 
stormy declaration about it but expressing their resentment through their silence.
The Downing Street Declaration was ‘a carefully balanced statement of 
principles and assurances designed to communicate that a permanent cease-fire 
would guarantee inclusion in future all-party talks’ (Hazleton, 2000, p. 109). 
Setting out this eventuality played the role of the detonator for US involvement. 
Indeed, things appeared to be moving quickly, The Observer had leaked the 
existence of a secret channel of communication between Major and the IRA on 5 
November 1993, even if this had a minimal effect on Unionists as Jonathan 
Caine confirmed:
I expected at the time that the consequences would be greater than it actually was 
but then I think on the Unionists side a lot of them would have said something 
like: oh, well, tell us something that we did not know. (...) Jim Molyneaux 
decided in a comment (...) to be conciliatory and to say that this link went back 
decades and successive governments.40
Nevertheless, as Unionists tended to accept it as a fact, it was an 
opportunity for Americans to open dialogue with Sinn Fein as well since, after 
all the British themselves were, though indirectly, in contact with them.
Furthermore, the ANIA used it as a confirmation of their argument that 
an Irish Republican cease-fire was imminent. This was clearly efficient, as 
Nancy Soderberg expresses it:
40 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 25 Jun. 2003
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By the fall, about December, I picked up that there was actually something going 
on. Irish-Americans kept on coming telling me there was about to have a cease­
fire. So, we said that we wanted to see something. They said there would be 
something. I began to really notice a consistent message. And the Joint 
Declaration on 15 December, by the same time John Hume who had been 
opposing any visa for Adams changed his position, supporting it. That really 
turned my attention to it.41
The Joint Declaration can also be interpreted as an acknowledgement of 
the impossibility for the British forces to eradicate the IRA. It also underlines 
that the IRA cannot win either as the renewal of the principle of consent 
highlights. This implicit acknowledgement of the “mutually hurting stalemate” 
between the IRA and the British government represented a problem for the 
traditional unionist position as the British were shifting from a containment 
strategy to a more “conciliatory” one and therefore were less and less supportive 
of the status quo.
The Downing Street Declaration was also a sign of the positive 
relationship between London and Dublin enriched by a very good personal 
relationship between both Prime Ministers (Major, 1999, p. 452-453). The 
Unionists negative or coldish reaction to it was expected since it renewed the 
idea of an Irish dimension within Northern Irish affairs. The UUP’s reserved 
approach on the declaration was the fruit of Molyneaux being consulted on 
several aspects of the declaration. Thus, the UUP could not, this time, accuse the 
British of conspiring behind their back. It was also a sign of a tacit acceptance, if
41 Nancy Soderberg, New York City, 14 May 2002
Moreover, John Hume’s huge importance in granting the visa is confirmed in an interview with 
Mark Durkan on 8 March 2000 in Derry: ‘I can remember a meeting. Nancy Soderberg was 
clearly under pressure because J. Hume was clearly saying that the visa should be granted.’
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an extremely reluctant one, that the Irish government had somehow to be 
included.
The British conciliatory approach along with the Irish government and 
the report of an imminent cease-fire favoured the visa for Gerry Adams as the 
US took advantage of a positive context to do the “unthinkable” without paying 
much attention to the highly expected unionist fury.
2-Gerry Adams ’ visa
Gerry Adams had been denied access to the USA twice since Bill 
Clinton’s election. 42 ‘The Downing Street Declaration led to the hasty 
announcement by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy of a 
conference on Northern Ireland’ (O’Grady, 1996, p.4). The conference was to 
take place in New York on 1 February 1994 and every party would be invited 
including Sinn Fein and more importantly Gerry Adams.
The US administration was extremely divided about the visa. Soderberg
argued:
The entire US government were strongly opposed such as the FBI, State
Department. The British were reluctant and asked to think about it. We actually
did it and they were the most furious. To me, it was just quite tiring because it
42 It is worth noting that the two preceding applications for a visa had been done at the Belfast 
American consulate, directly linked to the American embassy at St James Court. The then 
strongly anglophile Ambassador, Ray Seitz, was strongly opposed to the visa. He fervently 
criticised it. Gerry Adams was allowed to apply in Dublin as Sinn Fein headquarters is located on 
Parnell Square.
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just looked as if the world had ended and it is the first time that US ever blocked 
against the UK.43
Even Soderberg herself who played a crucial role in influencing the 
President in his decision to grant the visa was not convinced at first:
‘I would have initially done anything but grant the visa, an open 
dialogue, discussion or send an envoy or anything. This was in a context when 
Israeli had signed an agreement with PLO with non-equivalent conditions. They 
had to make them [SF/IRA] do something before the visa. The other option was 
that the visa was to be granted because it was one o f the electoral campaign 
promises. ( ...)  Ultimately, there was a logic that Clinton agreed with, which was 
that if  we give the visa and Adams delivers peace then it would content 
anybody. If he does not it will help us show the rest o f the world he’s a fraud 
and help us to shut up sources o f funding. For the president, it was a win-win 
situation either way.’44
Soderberg did not mention Ulster Unionists once in this context. It tends 
to demonstrate the low level of preoccupation of the US about the Unionists’ 
reaction.
Unionists would always be opposed to the visa. Thus, the only option was 
to go forward in spite of the potential anger. Major and Mayhew along with the 
British Embassy were also powerless regarding Washington’s decision despite 
strong demonstration of their irritation. This point is confirmed by the report of a
43 Nancy Soderberg, New York City, 14 May 2002
44 Nancy Soderberg, interview, New York City, 14 May 2002.
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press conference given by Mayhew in Cookstown, “We did our best”, he said: ‘it 
is forty eight hours of very great and one-sided publicity.”45
Mayhew’s words demonstrate limits of London’s power. As Caine put it 
the new British strategy was to ‘to take the better out of the worse, the United 
States is by far and away the most powerful influence on earth and in the 
tradition of British diplomacy you face the situation and try to make the best of it 
by trying to mould them much more to match our point of view.’46
The British viewed the situation as a demonstration that the American 
administration was biased. Caine argues that ‘at the time, the US sided with 
whom they traditionally did. They used to side with the nationalists and the Irish 
against the British Government.’47 Caine’s point of view is very interesting as the 
US government’s traditional position contradicts it. The best US answer to this 
accusation is the leak in The Observer, previously mentioned, of the secret 
channel between Downing Street and the Republicans. As O’Hare argued, ‘the 
US were saying that the British were talking to Republicans so this gave to the 
US administration the right to do so as well.’48 Dr. Carol Rittner, member of the 
executive board of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 
confirmed it in the Belfast Telegraph:
45Belfast Telegraph, “We did our best: Mayhew”, 2 Feb. 1994
46 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 25 Jun. 2003
47 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 25 Jun. 2003
48 Rita O’Hare, Sinn Fein Headquarters, Dublin, 4 Sep. 2003
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Our decision was influenced by the fact the British government and Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland, Sir Patrick Mayhew, had been talking to Sinn Fein 
privately for a number of years. If they can talk to Sinn Fein why can’t we?49
According to Zartman, a potential third party has to see signs of will from 
each side involved to move toward negotiations. This often happens when each 
side has ‘no more faith in victory’ (1995, p.17). At the beginning of the US 
involvement, the American administration appeared to primarily see three sides to 
the equation: that is Sinn Fein and the British and Irish governments. The 
expected rejection by Unionists of any involvement led the US administration to 
ignore them or rather assimilate them to the British government and use the 
Unionists’ traditional position of non-involvement to their own advantage. When 
the UUP became ready to apply an autonomous foreign agenda, the US then 
incorporated them in their strategy. This only took place after the shock of the 
Adams’ visa when the possibility of getting rid of this unwelcome third party 
vanished as even London proved to be powerless. This was repeatedly confirmed 
during the following months as for example the British failed to prevent Adams 
from being invited for the St Patrick’s day at the White House in 1995.
This was the first time that the UUP openly reacted in the media. 
Donaldson stated in the Belfast Telegraph that ‘the visit to New York by Mr 
Adams was “a master stroke” for his party.’50 He added: “they now have more 
scope than ever to expound their message of hate against the Unionist people 
without having made one single concession, never mind rejected the use of 
violence.”
49 Belfast Telegraph, “Allowing visit to US appropriate, says Clinton”, 1 Feb. 1994
50 Belfast Telegraph, “Major is urged to examine Irish role”, 1 Feb. 1994
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Unionists were detaching themselves from the British government in 
spite of their common indignation about the visa.
The UUP initial reaction was to boycott the conference on peace in 
Northern Ireland because of the presence of Sinn Fein delegates for as Maginnis 
argued: “as a constitutional politician, I have to defend the greater number of 
people who are against violence, I cannot betray their trust by giving some sort of 
credibility to Adams.”51 Lord Alderdice, former leader of the Alliance Party (AP), 
was the only Unionist representative attending the conference but he left as soon 
as Adams started talking (O’Clery, 1996, p.l 13).
The conference took place in spite of the Unionist boycott. The traditional 
“empty chair” attitude, which had already demonstrated strong signs of weakness, 
was useless with the American administration because Ulster Unionists in general 
did not have any means of pressurizing them. Prof. John McCarthy from Fordham 
University (NY) declared in the Belfast Telegraph, that Unionists “had missed the 
boat”. More importantly regarding changes within unionism, this strategy was 
immediately questioned within the UUP. David Burnside, UUP MP for South 
Antrim, declared in the same article that they had made a blunder as they could 
have organised their own press conference.
Thus, these interrogations about the efficiency of the boycott regarding the 
visa forced the UUP into rethinking their strategy. The UUP reacted almost 
immediately in the aftermath of the conference, as an article in the Belfast 
Telegraph on 3 February 1994, “Unionists set up tour to counter Sinn Fein”,
51 Belfast Telegraph, “Will the Unionist boycott break any ice?”, 1 Jan. 1994
52 Belfast Telegraph, “Unionists deny giving boost to Sinn Fein”, 2 Feb. 1994
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shows. The title demonstrates the reactive attitude of Unionism. It is also worth 
noting that in the article, James Molyneaux did not appear among the delegation 
meant to go to Washington. The members were Jeffrey Donaldson who played a 
great part in delivering the Unionist message as will be discussed later, David 
Trimble, (who ultimately did not take part in the trip), Ken Maginnis, and the 
Rev. Martin Smyth, Grand Master of the Orange Order. Molyneaux’s attitude of 
avoiding confrontation in the USA is representative of the unionist old school - 
ignoring and refusing dialogue. Soderberg confirmed his refusal to communicate 
when she discussed the necessity of entering into dialogue with the UUP:
After the visa issue we were very conscious o f the fact that Unionists were 
suspicious o f  it so we thought to proactively return to them. And the British 
encouraged us to do that. The problem was at that point, there was no leadership 
in the Unionist community; Molyneaux was away catching up butterflies from 
Australia. We could not get him on the phone, he just would not engage.53
Soderberg justifies American difficulties in starting a dialogue with the 
UUP on the absence of leadership. If this affirmation seems to be confirmed by 
Molyneaux’s attitude in choosing not to join the delegation, in spite of his 
position within the party, it also demonstrates the lack of US comprehension over 
the traditional unionist attitude. Indeed, what Soderberg calls an absence of 
leadership is a symbolic gesture to signify the leadership’s refusal to engage. 
Moreover, it also demonstrates Molyneaux’s lack of understanding of the US 
political expectations, as he himself justified his refusal to commit by stating: ‘I 
was not a great advocate of political tourism.’54
53 Nancy Soderberg, New York City, 14 May 2002
54 Lord Molyneaux, Westminster, 10 Feb. 2004
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It also reveals the beginning of changes within the UUP and the growing 
division between two streams: firstly, the traditional one, that Caine described 
through his depiction of Molyneaux’s personality:
Molyneaux [who] would rather see Northern Ireland governed like a region of 
England. This was one of his Enoch Powell traits, which is sometimes to be 
found on the old fashioned right, very anti-American, very hostile to the US 
involvement. Jim was and would never have been comfortable with the White 
House.55
and secondly, the reformist stream, generally of a younger generation, and its 
progressive awareness of the necessity to engage. As Jeffrey Donaldson argues:
They were, I think, quite terrified seeing Gerry Adams given considerable airtime 
on US radio and television coast to coast and in an unchallenged way 
propagating his propaganda. And it was felt it had to be challenged. So, initially, 
myself and some others, promoted the idea within the UUP that we should be at 
least visiting the US on a more regular basis to talk to influencers on Capitol Hill 
and in the Clinton administration to try and provide some balance to what we 
regarded obviously as a very partisan message that Gerry Adams was 
delivering.56
Donaldson’s statement also confirms the importance of the visa in the 
UUP decision to change their strategy. Indeed, the fact that the US President 
could grant a visa to Adams without fearing most of his administration and 
British disapproval showed Unionists that the US could ignore their potential 
anger. Moreover, from the US standpoint, the choice of granting the visa to
55 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 25 Jun. 2003
56 Jeffrey Donaldson, UUP Lisburn Office, 15 Apr. 2003
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Adams could even become beneficial in terms of their future relationship with 
Unionists as it gave the US administration an opportunity to demonstrate their 
capacity.
The visa challenged Jim Molyneaux’s strong attachment to the comfort of 
direct rule. Adams was in New York on the speculation that a cease-fire would 
take place in the near future. If violence ended, the Joint Declaration guaranteed 
the possibility of inclusive talks. This scenario would put an end to Unionists’ 
comfort with the status quo since, whether they liked it or not, the simple fact that 
Adams was allowed into the USA demonstrated that the status quo was being 
more and more questioned.
Moreover, the British government would have no interest in rejecting the 
inclusive talks on the basis of an end to political violence as it could lead to a 
stabilisation of the political situation with all the advantages that implied, for 
instance, the end of a strong British army commitment. If Molyneaux was not 
able to see or acknowledge the progressive transformation of the Northern Ireland 
political situation, others such as Donaldson, Jim Nicholson, Maginnis and a few 
more started encouraging the idea of regular trips to the US to counterbalance 
Sinn Fein. This new vision within the UUP confirms that the visa and its 
emotional effect on Unionists played a huge part in the change of UUP strategy 
towards the US administration. The US was still seen as biased, but the UUP saw 
a need for the first time to advocate their case.
On that matter, bias seems to have encouraged the UUP to engage 
dialogue and such an attitude confirms the point made in chapter one that the
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primarily reluctant actor can change their position. First, as mentioned earlier, 
there are offers that cannot be refused (Touval, 1992, p.232), second, the cost- 
benefit calculation may demonstrate that acceptance of the US involvement along 
with proper Unionist engagement may be more effective and beneficial. On that 
matter, beyond neutrality lies leverage. The US had demonstrated that they could 
act without worrying about the consequences. Instead of choosing a frontal 
defiance, there might be a possibility to take advantage of this leverage. In that 
case, the UUP could benefit from the US influence on Gerry Adams and through 
him, the IRA.
Donaldson argued: ‘There were very regular visits, perhaps 3-4 times a 
year which, I know, it does not seem very regular but it was an attempt to match 
the frequency of visits by Adams and senior Sinn Fein members.’ Thus, those 
trips were primarily reactive to Republican trips. Once again, the UUP 
demonstrated that their interest in the US was minimal and depended on the Irish 
Republican attitude, as it was the main reason for contacts in the first place. These 
trips were reported in the Ulster Unionist Information Institute Bulletin. For 
example, an article by Jim Nicholson “Hitting the American Trail” reports the 
progress made by the UUP in meeting with Vice-President Gore and meeting 
senior Irish-Americans to expose their case and obtain a more balanced view 
from the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.57
Not only did the UUP have to promote their vision of the Northern Ireland 
issue but they also had to present an alternative to the Paisleyite message. As 
Tony Culley-Foster, the Irish-American businessman who financed the creation
57 See Ulster Unionist Information Institute, “Visit by Ulster Unionist team to USA”, March 
1994, “Hitting the American Trail”, Jun. 1994.
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of the UUP North American Bureau in Washington DC, said: ‘The Americans 
[were] ignorant of the Ulster Unionists and the Protestant community. Their 
vision was Ian Paisley.’ Ian Paisley had the benefit of having nurtured strong 
connections with the American fundamentalist Bob Jones University, in North 
Carolina and also has established some Free Presbyterian congregations in the 
USA. The bickering between the two main Unionist parties is visible in the Ulster 
Unionist Information Institute bulletin with the quotation from the Washington 
Post, “the red Carpet treatment given to the Ulster Unionist leaders was in 
striking contrast to the cold shoulder given to the Rev. Paisley (...).”59 The goal 
of these articles was clearly to persuade the Ulster Unionist electorate that these 
visits were well founded. Moreover, the prospect of American economic 
investments in accordance with potential negotiations may also have weighted the 
balance.
Ulster Unionist publications, while critical of the US, were in clear 
contrast with those from the Protestant Telegraph. For example, the article 
published in May 1994, “DUP delegation take Ulster’s case to the USA” exposed 
the “perfidy of the two governments”.60 Another more striking example is a 
document by Sammy Wilson, then DUP press officer, dating back to 17 March
1993 entitled “American interference in Northern Ireland lashed.”61
Donaldson also mentioned that ‘they were given access to a very high 
level, like Vice-President Gore, senior officials in the State Department and we 
began interfacing with Congressmen and Senators particularly the Senate Foreign
58 Tony Culley-Foster, Jury’s Doyle Hotel, Washington DC, 14 Mar. 2002
59 Ulster Unionist Information Institute, “What they said....”, Jun. 1994
60 Protestant Telegraph, “DUP delegation take Ulster’s case to the USA”, May 1994
61 DUP Press Release, Alderman Sammy Wilson Officc, Press Officer, “American Interference in 
Northern Ireland lashed”, 17 Mar. 1993
142
Affairs Committee or Foreign Relation Committee.’62 This corresponds to an a 
posteriori acknowledgement of the US attempt at showing their even-handedness 
by offering the same opportunities to any actor. Thus, the US actually treated 
everybody willing to engage equally. Therefore, when Unionists have accused 
Americans of pro-Irish Republicanism, the reason appeared to be that Ulster 
Unionists could not stand the fact that “terrorists” benefited from the same level 
of access as “democratic” politicians. Steven King argued: ‘there has been too 
much of caiTots rather than stick. The US gave things unconditionally’.63 From a 
Unionist perspective, the fact that the visa to Gerry Adams was granted without 
any official prerequisite is an illustration of this “carrot” approach. But it can also 
be interpreted as a way to show to Gerry Adams the potential advantage of 
engaging in the peace process.64 In granting this visa, the American 
administration obviously used the carrot strategy but they also insinuated the 
“stick”. Indeed, it was the first of potentially even better treats for the Sinn Fein 
leader, but it could also be the last. So, the American administration gave a taste 
of what could be viewed as a first experience of potential rewards for Sinn Fein.
The reaction by the UUP to the Adams’ visa is instructive not so much for 
the negative reaction to the decision itself which was hardly unexpected; but 
rather because it marked a key turning point for the UUP. Up to the visa decision, 
they essentially ignored the USA and their increasing interest in Northern Ireland. 
They assumed nothing would happen or if it did the British Government could 
defend their interests. Their shock at the visa decision persuaded some UUP
62 Jeffrey Donaldson, UUP Lisburn Office, 15 Apr. 2003
63 Steven King, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 23 Oct. 2003
64 It is important to notice that no official direct contact between the US administration and Gerry 
Adams took place during his journey. Members of the White House started official 
communication with the Sinn Fein leader after the first IRA cease-fire on 30 August 1994, as it 
will be more extensively studied below.
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members that they needed a more active US strategy, though one which was 
essentially reactive at this time, seeking to counteract Sinn Fein activity in the 
USA. The image of the US is also still largely negative. The strategy is to block 
US activity. There is no evidence that they saw any potential for positive 
engagement.
III-THE IRA CEASE-FIRE, AUGUST 1994
The IRA proclaimed a cease-fire on 30 August 1994, followed six weeks 
later by a loyalist cease-fire on 13 October. Loyalist thinkers perceived the role 
of loyalist paramilitaries as being directly linked to the IRA activities. The 
loyalist declaration of cease-fire contained a “no first strike policy” (Sinnerton, 
2002, p. 168) as stated: ‘The permanence of our cease-fire will be completely 
dependant upon the continued cessation of all nationalist/republican violence, the 
sole responsibility for a return to war lies with them’.65
The role of the Irish-Americans is said to have been decisive in the IRA 
decision to implement a cease-fire. Indeed, as reported in the Belfast Telegraph, 
an ANIA delegation came to Ireland and met Sinn Fein officials on 26 August 
1994.66 These four men, including Niall O’Dowd and Congressman Bruce 
Morrison, went there to deliver a message from the White House stating that the 
US administration would not be interested in any temporary cease-fire and that 
Clinton was siding with Dublin and London on that matter.
65 Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC) Cease-fire Statement, 13 October 1994 (see 
CAIN web service for full text)
66 Belfast Telegraph, “Cease-fire Countdown”, 25 Aug. 1994
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The IRA had implemented a ten-day cease-fire during the time of their 
stay. The Unionists’ reaction to the visit of the US delegation was very negative. 
Jim Wilson, then UUP Secretary, said: “the stand taken by the unionist parties 
(...) and the decision to give the visiting Yanks a wide berth had been fully 
justified by comments they have made.” The harsh answer from the UUP 
reflected the party’s strong suspicion toward the Irish-American delegation and 
demonstrates the continuing strength of the traditional unionist attitude as the use 
of the derogatory expression “yanks” illustrates.
The US administration saw the cease-fire as a very positive development 
and hoped it would lead to greater British flexibility; as Soderberg said: ‘it was 
much easier for the British to actually listen and try and accommodate the terms
« /TO
of the IRA. As long as they had bombs going off, they were terrorists.’ Some 
British officials also acknowledged the US administration’s role in the cease-fire, 
as Caine argues:
A  lot o f work was done with the US administration more specifically in 1994.
It’s obvious the US had some influence on Irish Republicans; there are key 
figures in the US administration. I think Nancy Soderberg was one o f  the key 
players, the National Security Council, Tony Lake, people like Kennedy and 
other Congressmen had influence. They obviously have an influence with them.69
However, other cease-fires had been declared during the conflict, therefore no 
one could be then absolutely sure that this one would last.
67 Belfast Telegraph, “Talk Cliff-hanger”, 26 Aug. 1994
68 Nancy Soderberg, New York City, 14 May 2002
69 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 25 Jun. 2003
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The UUP’s immediate reaction to the IRA statement was to be very 
suspicious as Molyneaux immediately started talking about decommissioning: 
“How are they going to justify retailing the weapons of war if they have stopped 
the war? That is the question the IRA have got to answer.”70 This topic was to 
become the biggest, most controversial and unsolved issue during the peace 
process negotiation.
In the polls conducted by the Belfast Telegraph and published on 2 
September 1994, 65% of the Protestant population believed that the cease-fire 
was the outcome of a deal, and only 9% believed it was permanent.71 This point 
was an immediate concern for the UUP, as Trimble expressed in an article from 
the Belfast Telegraph: ‘one consequence is that the Unionists should not worry 
about the cease-fire as such. Peace is not a threat to us. If anything it is
77advantage.’ The mere fact that Trimble had to argue that “peace” was not a
threat to traditional unionist perspectives typified by Molyneaux’s idea of the
safety of the status quo. Thus, Trimble had to reassure his people of the fact that 
a republican step forward did not automatically imply a weakening of the 
unionist position. This point is crucial to understand the unionist attitude. They 
felt so much under threat that even peace itself had become a menace. This 
perception largely explains their reluctance to engage with the peace process in 
general and not just the US dimension of it.
The IRA’s decision to implement the cease-fire at that particular time, 
and the recognition of a US role, helped create the conditions for the UUP 
diplomatic engagement with the US.
70 Belfast Telegraph, “Molyneaux urges weapons gesture”, 31 Aug. 1994
71 Belfast Telegraph, “What Ulster People think?”, 2 Sep. 1994
72 Belfast Telegraph, “IRA’s War machine must be dismantled”, 9 Sep. 1994
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The US administration made a very measured statement highlighted the 
positive role the US strategy as facilitator played in the announcement of an IRA 
cease-fire. Myers, the White House Press Secretary, stated on the 31 August 
1994:
At the time we said that we hoped that [the visa to Gerry Adams] would 
encourage the peace process, (...)  it was always with the intended purpose of a 
permanent end to the hostilities o f the IRA renouncing the use o f violence and 
moving on to a political process, to a permanent and negotiated settlement. And 
that’s in effect what happened today. ( ...)  We think we’ve taken steps that we 
hope would facilitate the process and w e’re very pleased with the result today.
(...)  And I think that the President believes that’s this is a very significant step.
It’s a watershed, as the statement says, in a very old and very stubborn conflict.73
This new attitude was also unavoidable since the US administration was 
intent on building its own agenda as the phone call from A1 Gore to Adams on 2 
October 1994 or more importantly Adams’ invitation to the White House for St 
Patrick’s Day, 1995, demonstrated.74
IV-ST PATRICK’S DAY CELEBRATION AT THE WHITE 
HOUSE, MARCH 1995
The progressive inclusion of Sinn Fein logically led, at least initially, to 
the de-escalation of IRA violence. Republicans always previously argued that the 
use of weapons was necessary since Sinn Fein did not have access to 
negotiations even if they had a democratic representation through elected MPs
73 Federal information Service Systems, White House Briefing, 31 Aug. 1994
74 International Herald Tribune, “U.S., Ending Ban, Will Talk With Sinn Fein”, 4 Oct. 1994
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such as Gerry Adams.75 Unionists were apprehensive about a potential secret 
deal involving the IRA, the US and Irish governments. Dick Spring, Irish 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, had to publicly deny any secret pact with the IRA 
and asked Unionists to support the peace process.76 So to Unionists, the “IRA
• 77[had] to say that it [was] permanent” otherwise the negotiations would take 
place under the lurking spectrum of violence, which from the Unionists 
perspective meant that there would be no negotiation at all. Unionists also argued 
that the cease-fire should not generate rewards for the IRA as they should never 
have launched an armed campaign. Donaldson, then Honorary Secretary of the 
UUP, in a Belfast Telegraph article entitled “UUP Chief greets truce”, declared: 
“the party would make it absolutely clear that there can be no reward in terms of 
political concessions being an end to violence.”78 It is worth noting that the title 
of this article does not mention a “cease-fire” but a “truce”, whereas the IRA had 
declared a “complete cessation of violence”.
The UUP did not perceive it this way and were very cautious about the 
meaning of the IRA statement. The use of this term implies a minimisation of the 
IRA statement.
75 Rita O’Hare, Sinn Fein Headquarters, Dublin, 4 Sep. 2003. It is also worth mentioning that 
Adams was not an MP anymore having lost his seat during the 1992 election.
76 Belfast Telegraph, “Back the peace process, Spring urges Unionists”, 1 Sep. 1994
77 Belfast Telegraphy Jim Nicholson quoted in “Premiers divided over what the IRA really 
means”, 1 Sep. 1994
78 Belfast Telegraph, “UUP chief greets truce”, 31 Aug. 1994
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The end of the ban on official US contacts with Sinn Fein took place with 
A1 Gore’s phone call to Adams on 2 October 1994. This clearly contradicted the 
UUP position as the White House justified the lifting of the ban ‘to reward Mr. 
Adams for his role in arranging the cease-fire announced by the IRA on Aug.
70
31’. American officials’ approach demonstrates the lack of influence that 
Unionists had over the White House and the lack of understanding of the US 
administration’s motivations. Ken Maginnis declared: “the phone call was the 
result of intense pressure from the Irish-American lobby and not the result of a 
softening of the US policy”. Maginnis’ argument highlights somewhat of a shift 
in UUP leadership attitude, making a distinction between the US administration 
and the Irish-American lobby, and presenting the US administration as a victim 
rather than a “perpetrator”. This distinction was necessary for the UUP to justify 
the maintenance of their contacts with the White House. This demonstrates the 
limited capacity to manoeuvre for the UUP, which had to accept certain facts on 
the ground and interpret them in a positive light for their own supporters. Thus, 
instead of being officially furious and boycotting the US invitation as they did 
after the first Adams visa, the UUP sent a delegation lead by Ken Maginnis who 
discussed the issue with A1 Gore. Thus, the US administration played a 
diplomatic game as the Sinn Fein leader receives a phone call and the UUP a 
meeting, as counter-balance and to keep them in the process. Nonetheless, the 
UUP did accept the invitation and so were drawn, even in a limited way, into the 
process.
79 International Herald Tribune, “U.S., Ending Ban, Will Talk With Sinn Fein”, 4 Oct. 1994
80 Belfast Telegraph, “Loyalists on cease-fire knife-edge”, 4 Oct. 1994
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During the week of the White House visit, Ken Maginnis agreed to 
appear on the Larry King Live show on CNN along with Gerry Adams, as long as 
there would not be any direct debate (O’Clery, 1996, p.176). This point has often 
been seen as a media victory for the Sinn Fein leader who appeared very relaxed 
and full of confidence facing a rather nervous, aggressive adversary. Thus, 
Adams was seen as a peacemaker, and Maginnis, because of his refusal to 
directly speak to Adams and to shake hands, reinforced the US prejudice toward 
Unionists (O’Clery, 1996, p. 176).
Nevertheless, the Belfast Telegraph analysis of the debate did not regard 
it as a failure:
Combined with Adams’ assertions that it is “time to put out the hand of 
friendship and shake hands and move forward”, this initial “don’t-come-near- 
me” stance adopted by Maginnis may have been a mistake in terms o f how an 
American audience might have judged the intriguing encounter. ( ...)  The Sinn 
Fein leader’s constant refrain that he is looking forward rather than at the past, 
may have had an effect on an American audience but Maginnis’ constant 
questioning and Adams’ answers during the debate will almost certainly have 
given the States pause for thought.81
81 Belfast Telegraph, “Adams ducks and dives”, 5 Oct. 1994
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It is also important to recall what a significant step it was for a senior 
UUP figure to be on the same show as Adams and the strong pressure that 
Maginnis faced, knowing the show would be broadcast in Ireland but not on 
British public television.
Firstly, such a television show would have been unthinkable in Northern 
Ireland even if Adams had not been banned from the British media. Secondly and 
more importantly, Maginnis’ attitude had to correspond to the unionist 
community expectations, as they were the ones voting for his party rather than to 
the American audience. Adams was also in the same situation but the huge 
difference was that he was comforted in his strategy of going stateside due to the 
big support that the Irish Nationalist cause benefited from in the US.
One of the major difficulties for US politicians was the lack of 
understanding of the Unionists’ behaviour. This can be seen in their reaction to 
the framework documents published in February 1995. From the UUP 
standpoint, the documents were unacceptable as they ‘undermined the principle 
of consent’, ‘once again Dublin ducked the issue of Articles 2 and 3’, ‘the 
proposal of a North/South body would be an embryonic all-Ireland government’ 
and finally ‘the Northern Ireland assembly would become subservient to 
Dublin’83. ‘By April, the UUP would not accept the Joint Framework Documents 
even as a basis for negotiations’ (Major, 1999, p.467). In doing so, they were 
once again seen as the trouble-makers especially since Major stated that they
82 Section 31 o f the Irish 1960 Broadcasting Authority Act was lifted in January 1994 (Wilson, 
July 1997), but the 1988 British broadcasting ban on Sinn F6in was lifted following the IRA 
ceasefire at the end o f August 1994 (Cunningham, 2000, p.93).
83 Ulster Unionist Information Institute, “Response to the Framework Document”, May 1995
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could not find major substantial points of disagreement and therefore ‘their 
objections (...) were centred on the tone and use of what they styled ‘green’ 
language or ‘Hume-speak’ (1999, p.468). The US administration welcomed the 
Framework Documents, Clinton stating: ‘the framework document opened the 
way for “all parties to have a dialogue on the future of Northern Ireland.’”84
John Major depicts the UUP and Sinn Fein reactions: ‘Though Sinn Fein 
would have great difficulty with the Framework Documents, Gerry Adams had 
the wit to welcome them, so as to drive deeper the wedge between Unionists and 
the government’ (1999, p.467). The Sinn Fein leader continued his party’s 
progress with the official invitation to attend the Saint Patrick’s Day celebration 
on 17 March 1995 at the White House to meet with Bill Clinton. Unionists 
boycotted the White House celebration due to Adams’ presence. Gary 
McMichael from the UDP, affiliated to the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), 
was the only unionist representative present at the event. This was possible 
because loyalists could take a less hard-line position on this issue. They were 
affiliated to paramilitaries and they did not have a very large popular 
constituency.
An illustrative example is the comment in a PUP article dealing with a 
Loyalist delegation to the US in February 1995, ‘Irish-Americans discovered 
[...] people who could articulate a Unionist philosophy and not use the word
or t
“no”’ . This “freedom” certainly raised their status in the United States where 
they had greater possibilities to make speeches or express pro-US statements
84 Belfast Telegraph, “US politicians in chorus of approval”, 23 Feb. 1995
85 Combat, “Loyalist visit to the U.S.A.”, Feb. 1995.
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without taking much of a political risk. As already mentioned above and 
confirmed by William McGimpsey, cousins of the McGimpseys who immigrated 
to the US about two decades ago, “[loyalists] were fabulous. All hostility totally 
dissolved. They were the first ones. That changed the US opinion. They listened, 
that was very effective.’86 McGimpsey overlooks the fact that, unlike the UUP, 
Loyalists had a limited electoral base. This allowed them to adopt a more flexible 
strategy, in accordance with American officials’ expectations. Even though they 
were also taking risks, loyalist parties affiliated to paramilitaries had less to lose 
than traditional unionist parties and a lot to gain in coming to America.
The symbolism of the St Patrick’s Day celebration was more important 
than the meeting with Clinton since Adams had already been officially invited to 
the White House and met with the President on 6 December 1994 (Thompson, 
2000, p. 178). The UUP reasons for not joining the celebration were made clear 
by Jim Wilson, then Party Secretary: “In any case, our policy on meeting Sinn 
Fein is quite clear. We do not accept invitations to participate in meetings or 
contribute on the media in circumstances where members of Sinn Fein are 
sharing a platform or a studio or in a situation involving dialogue with them.” 7
Mayhew was at the White House in early March to try and convince the
on
US officials to cancel the invitation. John Major also made an attempt at
« • • o nshowing British disapproval of US officials talking to Sinn Fein.
86 William McGimpsey, New York, 21 Mar. 2002
87 Belfast Telegraph, “Clinton given cold shoulder by Unionists”, 17 Mar. 1995
88 Belfast Telegraph, “Adams denies deal for fund-raising visit”, 11 Mar. 1995
89 Belfast Telegraph, “Prime Minister sends secret letter to Clinton”, 13 Mar. 1995 
Belfast Telegraph, “Why Peace must work for a beleaguered Bill Clinton”, 22 May 1995
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It was a significant victory for Adams to be invited to the White House on 
such a symbolic day and a disaster for Unionists and London whose diplomatic 
efforts had been vain.
In such a context, the UUP could not afford to ignore the US anymore, as 
once again London had been powerless to stop a US decision. The UUP had 
ultimately only excluded itself. Clinton shook hands with Adams on St Patrick’s 
Day without having officially met any Ulster Unionist representatives first. In 
spite of repeated attempts by the US administration to contact Ulster Unionists, 
as Soderberg argued: ‘we just kept calling’, their reaction was of little 
importance as they were refusing to engage.90 The UUP may also have been 
influenced by the reaction within Northern Ireland to Ken Maginnis appearance 
on CNN with Adams. There was little negative reaction from the UUP grassroots 
to Maginnis’ decision. Rather it reinforced the general pressure on the UUP to 
engage with the US. Thus, they were responsible for their political 
marginalisation. This certainly explains their decision to attend the economic 
conference in Washington, with the consequences of sharing the same (though 
huge) space with Sinn Fein representatives on 25 May 1995 about two months 
after the St Patrick’s day event.
90 Nancy Soderberg, New York City, 14 May 2002
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V- ECONOMIC CONFERENCE, WASHINGTON DC, MAY 
1995
Conor O’Clery argues that, the organisation of the Washington DC 
economic conference was ‘a great mechanism for bringing everybody in the 
same room.’91 The presence of all the parties involved in the conflict in the same 
venue in Washington was unprecedented in the history of the Northern Ireland 
troubles.
The issue of US economic investment was signalled as early as December
1994 when Commerce Secretary Ron Brown made the first visit by a White 
House cabinet official to Northern Ireland to attend an economic conference 
organised by the British government and to ‘identify concrete new opportunities 
for increased business link between the US and Northern Ireland ’ (Thompson, 
2000, p. 177). The British authorities refusal to allow Sinn Fein’s participation, 
considerably reduced the number of American investors attending the conference 
and consequently limited its impact. This also clearly indicated the inevitable 
connections between political and economic spheres even when Clinton was 
emphasising the economic aspect.
A third party involvement can either be advisory, limited to offering 
suggestions or directive as it uses its leverage to impose some measures to reach 
an agreement (Rubin, 1981, p. 14-15). The US strategy was clearly advisory at 
this time as its presence was designed to facilitate discussion between the parties
not to impose a specific solution. Nothing else was possible in any case
91 Conor O’Clery, New York City, 10 May 2002
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especially with the British and the Unionists who already had difficulties with the 
US involvement. Soderberg said about the role of economics in the peace 
process: ‘to make it work on the ground you have to focus on the job. The one 
thing that everybody values around in Northern Ireland, they need to bring jobs 
so you have to be able to talk to both sides.’92 In organising this conference in 
Washington, the American administration used their economic leverage to 
introduce political issues and provided a neutral space that, for the first time, 
took the Northern Ireland question outside the British and Irish context.
Rita O’Hare argued: ‘[Unionists] finally attended it’ when they saw that 
pressure on the US government to prevent access by Sinn Fein was in vain.93 
Such an attitude underlines the changes in the UUP strategy; the “boycott” was 
not working as they were constantly left outside and this weakened their position. 
Moreover, it was another confirmation of their lack of leverage on the US 
administration, even with British support. Changes in the UUP strategy were not 
internally driven but were forced by the external context. They did not change 
deliberately and did not have a positive or pro-active strategy of their own. They 
simply felt they had no choice but to engage.
The use of economic tools as a political device had already been used in 
the Northern Ireland case by two previous American administrations. Jimmy 
Carter promised financial assistance to any progress toward peace in Northern 
Ireland during his famous statement on 30 August 1977. ‘It is still true that a 
peaceful settlement would (...) enhance the prospects for increased
92 Nancy Soderberg, New York City, 14 May 2002
93 Rita O’Hare, Sinn Fein Headquarters, Dublin, 4 Sep. 2003
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investments.’94 The proposal did not really bear fruit as no agreement took place 
in the aftermath. Reagan welcomed the signature of the AIA by signing the 
congressional resolution granting 50 million dollars financial assistance for both 
parts of Ireland through the International Fund for Ireland (Guelke, 1996, p.532). 
The post-AIA financial contribution did not encourage the parties and Unionists 
in particular into accepting the agreement as they strongly rejected it. The 
difference with Clinton’s approach is in the organisation of a conference that 
brought politicians and investors together and provided a forum where potential 
projects could be discussed. This was unprecedented. It was a significant 
diplomatic tool for the Americans to show that their leverage and influence could 
be positive. Clinton stated: ‘There must be a Peace dividend in Northern Ireland 
and the border counties so that everyone is convinced that the future belongs to 
those who build, not those who destroy.’95 It also forced Unionists into 
participating, as they wanted to represent their community and encourage 
investment in Unionist areas.
Senator George Mitchell was appointed as “Adviser to the President and 
Secretary of State for Economic Initiatives in Ireland and Northern Ireland” on 1 
December 1994 (O’Grady, 1997, p.5). Soderberg’s words confirm the ambiguity 
of Mitchell’s role from day one, ‘I worked out the terms of his appointment, 
which was economic although we all knew that was ambiguous.’96
94 Extract from the Presidential speech on 30 August 1977
95 United States Information Service, US Embassy, London, Clinton Says “Peace Dividend” 
needed in Northern Ireland”, address to the conference on trade in Ireland, 25 May 1995, 
Washington DC, 26 May 1995
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Despite the probable sincerity of some US officials when insisting that 
nothing was planned in advance,97 as diplomacy requires flexibility and 
adaptability, the intention of making Mitchell play a bigger role was already 
existent. The mixture of politics and economics is even more flagrant in 
Clinton’s speech, when he praised the Joint Framework Documents even though 
the Unionist parties attending still opposed them: ‘With the Joint Framework 
Document, [Prime Minister Major and Bruton] are paving the way for a new and 
hopeful era of reconciliation.’98
The first meeting and handshake between Mayhew and Adams took place 
during the conference. It created a scandal and fury among Unionists and, 
according to Major, ‘forced Molyneaux to withdraw’ (1999, p.468).99 Molyneaux 
denied it, stating: ‘it was not really a situation where we were going to negotiate. 
It was a kind of high profile road show’ insisting on the lack of importance on 
the diplomatic matter.100 Major’s argument insinuates that the American 
approach pushed Unionists out. The handshake between Mayhew and Adams 
was a further step in the international acknowledgement of Sinn Féin as a key 
player in the Northern Ireland peace process (even though this handshake would 
never had occurred without Major’s reluctant agreement).
96 Nancy Soderberg, New York City, 14 May 2002
97 Private interview
98 Official Text, 26 May 1995, United States Information Service, US Embassy London
99 It is worth noting, as Major eludes it, that Mayhew also met with Loyalist representatives for 
the first time during this conference and therefore played the card o f inclusive approach in the 
name o f the British government.
100 Lord Molyneaux, Westminster, 10 Feb. 2004
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The meeting and handshake was discussed in newspapers as early as 17 
May in the Belfast Telegraph with an article entitled: “Mayhew to meet 
Adams”.101 So, Unionists were not taken by surprise. Even so, the announcement 
by Sir Patrick of his intention to meet with Adams was viewed as such when 
Ulster Unionists along with the SDLP ‘condemned Sir Patrick for announcing his 
decision to invite the Sinn Fein party leader to meet him in a press statement 
released just minutes after members of both parties met the Prime Minister in 
London’ the previous week.102
Nevertheless, the announcement was made a week before the conference. 
Unionists were informed and had to make their own decision. Thus, the party 
leaders decided to boycott, but could not present it as a reaction to a sudden or 
unexpected US or British action. Even though Molyneaux like Paisley ‘were the 
only two main party leaders in the province this week after they both decided to 
boycott the Washington investment conference’, 103 their delegates including 
Peter Robinson, DUP deputy leader and UUP members Jeffrey Donaldson and 
MEP Jim Nicholson attended the conference. This demonstrates the restricted 
possibilities of avoiding contact with the American administration and the near 
impossibility of completely ignoring the event, as even the DUP sent delegates.
101 Belfast Telegraph, Mayhew to meet Adams, 17 May 1995, also see, Belfast Telegraph, 
“Adams tribute to US supporters”, 22 May 1995 and Belfast Telegraph, “Hand-shake all round”,
23 May 1995
102 Belfast Telegraph, “Ulster Unionists and SDLP accuse Ministers o f sabotage”, 25 May 1995
103 Belfast Telegraph, “DUP pushes forum plans”, 22 May 1995
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There were indeed “some speculations that the UUP would not attend due 
to Gerry Adams presence but they declared that it was too important to be 
heard.”104
Molyneaux had already met with some difficulties within his party and 
had been severely questioned after the publication of the Framework Document 
in February 1995 ‘for his critics, both within and beyond the UUP, the 
documents were evidence of the limitations of Molyneaux’s strategy of 
influencing events from behind the scene at Westminster (Morrow, 2000, p.28), 
His resignation in August 1995 led to the organisation of internal elections and 
the victory of the least expected candidate: David Trimble, whose choice 
appeared to have considerably transformed the UUP strategy with the US, as will 
be discussed in the next chapter.
CONCLUSION
The fact that the UUP remained fixed to their traditional position on 
external mediation during the first one and a half years of Clinton’s first term is 
partly justified by their unwillingness to deal with what they saw as a pro­
nationalist administration and the apparent inactivity of the new US 
administration on Northern Ireland affairs. This latter point obviously ignores the 
shuttle diplomacy and the appointment of people who would later become key 
actors in their Northern Ireland policy such as Nancy Soderberg, or Jean 
Kennedy Smith as Ambassador to Dublin. Nevertheless, if such moves were
104 Belfast Telegraph, “Unionist Team for Clinton economy talks”, 6 May 1995
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retrospectively highly significant, they tended to be perceived initially by 
Unionists as minor decisions and were certainly seen as favours to the Irish- 
American community. Despite the wider public discourse and the high profile 
involvement of Irish-Americans with links to Clinton such as Niall O’Dowd and 
Bruce Morrison, the UUP saw no room for a positive US involvement and did 
not really expect one in any case.
The granting of the first visa to Gerry Adams appears to be a turning 
point, and it prompted a sudden and very prominent discourse by Unionists about 
the US position, and the Belfast Telegraph reflected this. Unionists saw the visa 
decision as the ultimate proof of a US pro-nationalist agenda. Gerry Adams was 
acclaimed in America and this trip was seen as a huge media success for Sinn 
Fein. Unionists had been invited but refused to attend the conference. Therefore, 
they remained out of the picture.
Adams’ two-day trip to New York triggered the idea that a counter­
offensive was necessary for two main reasons. First, the British had proved 
incapable of keeping the US out of the Northern Ireland conflict. Unionists had 
limited choices and at least some in the UUP understood that they needed to 
engage with the US to counterbalance nationalist activity. The UUP engagement 
with the US was a reaction to Sinn Fein and not a deliberate or pro-active 
initiative emanating from the party. Second, the UUP’s American strategy was 
not necessarily a reflection of a more moderate position but rather a pragmatic 
recognition of the fact that the US administration would engage in Northern 
Ireland whether Unionists agreed with it or not. The UUP had two choices. They 
could either refuse to engage systematically or boycott any US action for peace
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and be simply ignored, as the US could just acknowledge London as the 
sovereign representative of the British community in Northern Ireland. For the 
reason discussed in chapter one and because the British government had failed to 
block the Adams visa, the UUP were very reluctant to trust London to play a role 
for them. Alternatively, the UUP could engage and try to influence the US 
administration, via dialogue.
The weakness of a strategy of boycott or reliance on the British 
Government became even more obvious as the US involvement developed. The 
failure to prevent Sinn Fein invitations to the White House, the Economic 
conference, the warm US welcome for the cease-fire and the peace process in 
general despite UUP reservations convinced Senior Figures in the UUP that 
whatever the electoral risk or internal opposition, they had to engage with the US 
if only from a defensive position. However, even at this time, there is no 
evidence of any senior voices in the UUP who saw any positive role for US 
mediation. There is no evidence that the UUP perceived this as a means of 
breaking a political stalemate or solving the conflict. US mediation was a threat 
that needed to be countered by engaging with it.
This period also indicates the usefulness of American leverage. The UUP 
certainly did not see the US as a neutral mediator. Had the US given in to British 
pressure on the Adams visa and the White House invitation or their welcome for 
the IRA cease-fire, then the UUP would have felt little pressure to engage. By 
holding to their position the Clinton team managed to nudge the UUP towards 
engagement.
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If some party representatives and members were aware of the dilemma 
under Molyneaux’s leadership, as the leader made some trips to the US, he still 
retained his integrationist position relying heavily on his connections at 
Westminster. The choice to actively engage became much more obvious with 
Trimble’s election as the new leader and this will be analysed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CLINTON’S FIRST TERM: THE IMPACT OF 
TRIMBLE’S ELECTION ON UUP STRATEGY 
TOWARDS US INVOLVEMENT
INTRODUCTION
The change of leader within a party is often associated with a change of 
trajectory or a renewal of strategy. Therefore, the first question raised in this 
chapter is about the impact of Trimble’s election as UUP leader on the UUP-US 
relationship. Did Trimble’s election contribute to the adoption of a much more 
pragmatic approach and a more active and less reactionary engagement with the 
US? If it is so, did the UUP come to regard the US involvement as offering the 
possibility to extend their influence, perceiving this involvement as potentially 
positive?
This chapter examines five farther key events in the UUP-US 
relationship: David Trimble’s election as new UUP leader; the creation of the 
UUP Northern American Bureau; Clinton’s first trip to Northern Ireland; George 
Mitchell’s report on Decommissioning; and Mitchell’s appointment as Chairman 
of the talks.
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Collectively these events can allow us to examine how the UUP 
responded to the intensification of the US engagement up to the start of formal 
negotiations in 1996.
I-DAVID TRIMBLE’S ELECTION AS LEADER OF THE UUP, 
THE IMPORTANCE OF A NEW LEADERSHIP IN 
NEGOTIATION PROGRESS
David Trimble was elected as the new leader of the UUP in September 
1995, facing during the last round of voting, the well known John Taylor and 
winning by 466 votes to 333 (McDonald, 2000, p. 156). Major wrote in his 
biography “none of his fellow MPs had voted for him” (1999, p. 468). Within the 
UUP, Maginnis was aghast at the result even though he preferred Trimble to 
Taylor as a leader. Chris McGimpsey was appalled: “my first reaction to his 
victory was deep disappointment and concern. Trimble had a lot of friends in the 
loony right” (McDonald, 2000, p. 157). The reactions to the election of a former 
Vanguard Movement member, with the reputation of being a hard-liner, (a 
reputation that Trimble appeared to have cultivated himself by going to 
Drumcree during the summer of 1995 and walking hand in hand with Ian 
Paisley) were quite negative. Trimble also had the support of some loyalists 
including Billy Wright, the notorious Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) leader. 
The Belfast Telegraph depicted him as the “loyalist champion” thanks to his 
performance in Drumcree.1 This hard-line reputation along with his support for 
the Orange Order during the 1995 Drumcree march triggered alarmed reactions 
among the British and Irish governments. The headlines of articles covering 
Trimble’s victory reflect the general atmosphere; for instance, in the Belfast
1 Belfast Telegraph, “Portrait o f Trimble”, 7 Sep. 1995
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Telegraph, “Trimble shock victor in the Unionist ballot.”2 Jonathan Caine’s 
words echo the feeling of panic that the election generated among some parts of 
the administration in Northern Ireland:
The Friday evening when he was elected I personally raised a glass and went 
back to Northern Ireland on Monday and was told by one o f the ministers that 
he even choked on his corn flakes on Saturday morning. This shows the horror 
that the fact that David had been elected leader within the Northern Ireland 
Office. It seems crazy these days. It was like, this is the end of any hope for the 
peace process.3
Retrospectively, during the interviews conducted for this project, 
reactions have been, in their great majority, very positive about Trimble’s role. 
Most respondents also said that Molyneaux did not have the personality to lead 
the negotiations at an international level, being foremost a local politician with 
no international focus. Molyneaux himself admitted that his perception of 
politics greatly differed from what the US administration expected, arguing:
During the trips [UUP members] would not meet the leading figures, so it was 
not profitable. They shook hands with the president but there was no solid 
diplomacy. I did not prevent anybody going but I am not a socialite and it does 
not bring solid achievement.4
Nancy Soderberg confirms this retrospective perception: ‘it really took 
the election of David Trimble to have a partner.’5 Niall O’Dowd, even though he 
was never well acquainted with the UUP leader, stated: ‘I think he’s an
2 Belfast Telegraph, “Trimble shock victor in the Unionist ballot”, 9 Sep. 1995
3 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 25 Jun. 2003
4 Lord Molyneaux, Westminster, 10 Feb. 2004
5 Nancy Soderberg, New York, 14 May 2002
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interesting political figure and I think throughout this period, people, including 
myself, underestimated him.6 Academics such as Arthur also considered 
Trimble’s election as a positive turning point in the peace process. ‘It was not 
until David Trimble became leader in 1995 that Ulster Unionism displayed a 
similar vision and a willingness to take risks’ (Arthur, 2000, p. 110).7
The renewal of leadership in the context of the peace process can provide 
the opportunity to renew dialogue and boost interactions between key players. 
The change of leadership benefited the US administration in spite of the right 
wing reputation of the new leader. The National Security Council perception of 
the situation, as set out by Soderberg, was that prior to the Trimble election, ‘The 
problem was at that point, there was no leadership in the Unionist community,
Q ,
Molyneaux (...) just would not engage.’ This point raises two fundamental 
arguments. First, it emphasises the significance of the leader and his reputation in 
negotiations. Second, it also stresses the importance of the leader’s strategy.
A-New leadership, importance in negotiation and impact in the 
launching of a new strategy
A change of leadership can boost negotiations and some major successes 
like De Klerk’s replacement of Botha in South Africa are precedents (Zartman, 
1995, p. 16). However, in the Unionist case, Trimble’s coming to power with
6 Niall O’Dowd, New York, 13 May 2002
7 Apart from Trimble himself, the only UUP representative who insisted on Molyneaux’s primary 
role in the visits to America was Jeffrey Donaldson who did not mention Trimble’s contribution 
once on that matter. It is worth mentioning that the interview with Donaldson took place on 15 
April 2003, only two months before his decision to leave the UUP whip along with Burnside and 
Smyth.
8 Nancy Soderberg, New York City, 14 May 2002
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such a negative reputation made him seem the worse possible choice for the UUP 
and was consequently interpreted as a bad omen for the peace process. In reality, 
such a negative image was to Trimble’s advantage as he was expected to take 
hard-nosed decisions or positions. Therefore, any step forward or 
accommodative policy would be welcomed as a proof of the new leader’s 
goodwill. Thus, no actor involved in the conflict expected much from him; this 
gave him the advantage of surprise. Trimble offered a more pragmatic and 
rational image of Unionism in spite of some recurrent blunders.9 Major confirms 
the surprise effect when he argues that ‘Trimble was proving to be a more 
flexible and adept leader than we had imagined’ (1999, p. 480). This new 
approach was obvious through different elements.
First, Trimble proposed to the DUP that they seek a common position 
immediately after his election. This reveals a greater awareness that the Unionist 
community were weakened through division while facing a more and more 
cohesive nationalist community. The discord grew up during the 1990s and was 
reported in the newspapers, such as the Belfast Telegraph, “Stop bickering 
leaders told”.10 The first meeting between Trimble and Paisley took place on 18 
September 1995 when Trimble proposed that they stopped attacking each other.11 
Trimble went even further suggesting to Paisley an eventual fusion of both 
parties. Paisley unsurprisingly rejected the proposal saying there was too big of a 
gap between the parties. Paisley added that he was kingmaker because Trimble
9 Among the several remarks that the UUP leader made that created a scandal, David Trimble 
declared in March 2002 that Ireland was a “pathetic sectarian state”. He subsequently refused to 
apologise. This attitude can appear nonsensical at first; yet, it also deals with the requirements of 
the voters and the counter-attack to DUP accusation of “selling out” the Union.
10 Belfast Telegraph, “Stop bickering leaders told”, 2 Aug. 1994, also, “Orange order castigates 
Unionists for personal attacks”, 2 Aug. 1994, “Paramilitaries rap Unionists for “Bickering””, 1 
Aug. 1994, “Stop being Negative, Leaders told”, 4 Aug. 1994, “Unionists urged to form a united 
body”, 11 Aug. 1994
11 Belfast Telegraph, “Let’s be friends, says Trimble”, 18 Sep. 1995
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was the only candidate associated with him.12 The new leader sought to be 
portrayed as someone who forgets old divisions for the sake of the Unionist 
community. Paisley’s party could therefore be perceived as the destabilising 
figure whose selfish electoral interest is prioritised over the concerns of the 
community.
Secondly, Trimble had an historic meeting with Irish Prime Minister, 
John Bruton, in Dublin to ask for clarification about the Republic of Ireland’s 
position on decommissioning. His attitude, that the DUP heavily criticised, 
marked a new approach in the relationship between the UUP and the Irish 
government. Trimble’s attitude demonstrated his willingness to engage. It also 
symbolises his rupture with the traditional “heads in the sand type of leader” to
13quote Ken Maginnis. However, Trimble kept some traditional approach as he 
declared about the twin-track approach on 11 November 1995: “We certainly 
would not have any contact with the Irish government or Sinn Fein.”14
Finally and more importantly with regard to this study but in keeping with 
the above moves, Trimble proved to be aware of the USA’s increasing influence 
in the peace process. As King argued ‘David Trimble realised that Dublin and 
Washington, which were traditionally hostile, could be used to have influence on 
Sinn Fein and the SDLP.’15 As discussed in chapter one, this approach is 
fundamental as mediators are accepted only if they are seen as being capable of 
bringing benefits (Zartman & Touval, 1997, p.451). Instead of passively 
witnessing nationalist activities in the US and avoiding involvement, Trimble
12 Belfast Telegraph, “Paisley rebuffs Trimble “merger””, 11 Sep. 1995
13 Lord Maginnis, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 6 Dec. 2002
14 Belfast Telegraph, “We only meet British- Trimble”, 10 Nov. 1995
15 Steven King, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 23 Oct. 2003
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(even though obviously not alone) put forward the idea that the UUP could use 
some US connections as a means of putting indirect pressure on Nationalists and 
more specifically on Republicans. Trimble argued: ‘We thought that we should 
take an interest and our primary interest was to try to make the US administration 
and President Clinton himself conscious of the fact that there was another side. 
So, the object was to get a real balance.’16 Instead of only accepting the US 
involvement because it was unavoidable, the leader chose to adopt a positive 
attitude in underlining potential advantages largely ignored until then.
As seen in chapter one, a partial mediator can contribute to some 
influence as it can put pressure on its closest ally (Touval & Zartman, 1985, 
p.257). David Trimble demonstrated his willingness to meet with the American 
administration soon after his election. The new leader was reported to be
expecting an invitation from the White House, in the Belfast Telegraph on 11
1 7 *September 1995. Trimble commented:
I was aware when I became Leader that Molyneaux had been left with the strong 
impression that he’d been promised the next time he went he would get the 
president. So, when I was setting up the first visit I made as party leader and 
speaking before hand to the US administration, they were offering a meeting 
with the Vice-President. I “said no wait a minute, Jim Molyneaux was promised 
and I therefore insist.. . 18
This determination to engage did not reflect compromises on core issues of 
substance. Trimble was willing to present his position as Lord Laird quoted him:
16 David Trimble, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 8 Apr. 2004
17 Belfast Telegraph, “US political traffic grows”, 11 Sep. 1995
18 David Trimble, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 8 Apr. 2004
170
Look we are not going back, we are not neglecting the facts, we are not leaving 
the ring, everybody has got an argument, and we are going to argue with them.
We’ve got a very good case, we are going to take it everywhere what we need is 
self-confidence to take it anywhere.19
This new attitude of accepting dialogue with the US but like a fight rather 
than as a search for compromise is visible in the trips that Trimble made in the 
USA during Clinton’s first presidency, starting with the first one in November 
1995. As Soderberg expressed it, “[Trimble] was certainly very, very sceptical 
but he would at least engage and that was what turned it around.”
B-Trimble’s first meetings with American Representatives
1. The US approach o f the new leader, fact-finding mission?
The organisation of Ambassador Crowe21 and Nancy Soderberg’s two- 
day trip to Northern Ireland on 3 October 1995, in other words, less than a month 
after Trimble’s election, suggests a US desire to engage as soon as possible with 
Trimble. This trip was officially meant to break the deadlock over the weapons 
issue22 but was also an opportunity to meet with the new leader. It can be 
interpreted as a “fact finding mission” to find out more about Trimble. It is also 
worth noting that Trimble met with Soderberg and Crowe whereas Paisley
* 23declined the invitation, claiming he had an engagement in Cardiff.
19 Lord Laird, Holywood road, Belfast, 14 Mar. 2003
20 Nancy Soderberg, New York City, 14 May 2002
21 Ambassador Crowe was appointed on 13 May 1994 to replace Ambassador Seitz at St James’ 
Court
22 Belfast Telegraph, “Clinton’s Team bids to break Deadlock”, 3 Oct. 1995
23 Belfast Telegraph, “Clinton’s Team bids to break Deadlock”, 3 Oct. 1995
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Whereas Trimble asked Clinton to express a clear position on 
decommissioning, DUP deputy leader, Robinson declared that the White House 
interference annoyed Unionists.24 This point underlines the widening gap 
between the UUP's new strategy and the DUP’s more traditional approach. 
Instead of understanding the US involvement as inevitable and trying to make the 
best of it, the DUP stubbornly kept on resisting the US involvement seeing 
dialogue as synonym to compromise, and articulating the “no surrender” spirit.
2. Trimble: First trip to America as leader
Trimble made his first official visit to Washington DC in November 1995. 
The new leader’s position was complex. First, he had to justify his going to the 
USA to a sceptical party and constituency. He had to communicate with the US 
administration but also with deeply unwelcoming Irish-American representatives. 
As Tony Culley-Foster argues: ‘The Americans were ignorant of the Ulster 
Unionists and the Protestant community. Their vision was Ian Paisley. (...) On 
the International stage, the face of Unionism was Paisley.’25 Trimble also had to 
show an alternative face of Unionism to Paisley’s fundamentalism.
Thus, this trip in terms of public relations was a very sensitive exercise 
for Trimble. Trimble’s lack of any previous experience in international politics 
reinforced the intricacy of his task. However, according to Tony Culley-Foster, 
Mairead Keane and Rita O’Hare, both successively responsible for the “Friends 
of Sinn Fein” Washington and then New York office, he seems to have learnt
24 Belfast Telegraph, “Trimble puts challenge to White House, 4 Oct. 1995
25 Tony Culley-Foster, Jury’s Doyle Hotel, Washington DC, 14 Mar. 2002
172
quickly.26 During this first visit, Trimble had to reflect the unionist community’s 
hostility to US involvement. Culley-Foster claimed that the first message that the 
new leader intended to deliver in coming to Washington was that the US 
administration had to remain outside Northern Ireland:
In fact, David Trimble had come to tell the Americans that they were in charge of 
their own destiny. (...)  His reaction was very threatening (...). Unionists had to 
know what they had to say, David Trimble was not used to the American approach.
David Trimble’s strategy was to come here to say that Ulster Unionists were not 
afraid of the US and the Irish-Americans.27
This message is significant as it reveals that, despite Trimble’s awareness 
that US involvement would not end, he believed that his duty as a Unionist 
representative should reflect his community’s stance. Thus, instead of 
interpreting Trimble’s behaviour as a sign of Unionist misunderstanding of their 
capacity to prevent US intervention, it could be simply a sign of Trimble’s initial 
limited room to manoeuvre as he faced his community’s deeply rooted fear of 
external intervention.
The publication of an advertisement in the New York Times entitled “A 
Welcome to David Trimble, The David Duke of Ireland” (a reference to the 
leader of the Ku Klux Klan), may also have justified his initial aggressive 
approach. The Irish-American Unity Conference, one of whose members was 
Niall O’Dowd, paid for its publication.28 However, David Trimble diplomatically 
reacted to the ad stating: “it does not reflect the real desire for dialogue we see
26 Tony Culley-Foster, telephone interview, 24 Apr. 2002, Mairead Keane, Sinn F6in 
Headquarters, Dublin, 4 Sep. 2002, Rita O’Hare, Sinn Fein Headquarters, Dublin, 4 Sep. 2002
27 Tony Culley Foster, Jury’s Doyle Hotel, Washington, 14 Mar.2002
28 New York Times, opened page advertising, “A Welcome to David Trimble, the David Duke of 
Ireland”, 1 Nov. 1995
173
from the invitations to speak and to debate that we have received from Irish- 
Americans groups across the country.”29
The hostility was also clear during his meeting with the International 
Relations Committee on Capitol Hill as recalled by Republican Congressman for 
Rhode Island, Peter King:
Every one o f us, when we met Trimble, we congratulated his selection, ( ...)  having 
said that, it was the most unpleasant, not productive meeting ever held. Trimble was 
incapable o f any social graces, any interaction. He was there basically to lecture. I 
think he believed all that propaganda, all Irish-Americans had this romantic view of 
Ireland and he was going to straighten this up.30
Trimble’s prejudice against the US representatives was also due to their lack of 
interest in the unionist position on the conflict. O’Dowd confirmed it:
I wasn’t that interested in the British government or Unionists (...) . We knew we 
wouldn’t have much influence on them. We were totally focused on the White 
House and Sinn Fein and trying to create that dynamic.31
The UUP team had to face political “enemies”. Among them were Peter 
King and Ben Gilman, both very close to Gerry Adams, and Senator Kennedy’s 
nephew, Congressman Joe Kennedy (RI). Trimble did not count many supporters 
or at least sympathisers in the room. Trimble reacted the way the Unionist 
community expected him to respond: he refused to adopt a compromising stance.
29 Belfast Telegraph, “Klan jibe enrages Unionists”, 31 Oct. 1995
30 Peter King, Capitol Hill, 20 Apr. 2002
31 Niall O’Dowd, New York, 13 May 2002
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The next part of the interview with Peter King is even more telling as the 
congressman compares Trimble’s attitude to David Ervine’s.
I remember, at one stage, Jim Walsh, who really had not been involved in the 
Irish issue that long. Jim was a very nice guy. He was appointed chairman o f the 
Friends for Ireland Committee by the Speaker. Jimmy had asked for it. Yes, 
Gilman had a rough time with Trimble and I had a rough time with Trimble and 
Joe Kennedy and others, Jim would be considered maybe as more conciliatory.
Walsh tried to put peace to it. My best recollection o f the question was: “Mr 
Trimble, we all know, how complex the situation is and how difficult it could be 
to find common ground but is it safe to say that all politicians should avoid what 
could indicate a religious bias, religious attack? Do you agree with that?” 
Trimble’s answer was “no”. Trimble was trying to make it as an intellectual point 
and not a religious issue. But what he just said was no to Walsh. Whatever he 
said after, nobody listened to it. If you would have a loyalist over like David 
Ervine, I suppose much less educated than Trimble, I suppose more prone to 
support terrorism, Ervine would have taken that question and he would have won 
everybody in the room and said o f course there’s no room for religious hatred.32
King’s comparison between Trimble and Ervine displays the UUP’s 
difficulty to convey the subtleties of Northern Ireland politics to the US 
representatives. First, King made no allowance for the enormous disparity 
between the two men in terms of electoral influence. David Trimble could 
jeopardise his image in the eyes of his electorate and party supporters.
The toughness of the meeting also underlines the fundamental lack of 
comprehension between Irish-American representatives and Unionists on 
political style as Unionists have always engaged in confrontational politics rather
32 Peter King, Capitol Hill, 20 Apr. 2002
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than accommodative ones. For Unionists, dialogue is not necessary, or if it is, it 
is a weapon and not a diplomatic tool. For instance, O’Clery, describing 
Molyneaux’s reaction during his first meeting with Ted Kennedy, stated that: 
‘Jim Molyneaux came in 1994. He first met Ted Kennedy. The Senator asked 
him: “What can I do for you?” J. Molyneaux was very surprised because he 
expected tension and aggressivity. This is not the way it works [in the US].’ As 
a Northern Irish official argued, in coming to the US, Trimble ‘realised that here, 
in the US, politics was a performance act.’34
The Sunday Tribune reported this first trip under the title of “Trimble 
defiant after US clash”, saying that the Unionist team did not make any friends 
on Capitol Hill due to this aggressive behaviour.35 Trimble was also reported to 
say that US involvement “complicate [d] life” but acknowledged that there was 
no possible turning back and that the US “d[id] have a role” to play due to the 
way “some Irish-Americans have behaved in terms of supporting, financially and
OfC ,  ,  ,
militarily, terrorism in Northern Ireland.” It is worth noting that Trimble 
considered that the US necessity to be involved laid with their indirect 
responsibility for political violence not their possible role as mediator. The US 
government was perceived as having a debt towards the Northern Ireland 
population, however it did allow for the possibility that the UUP could be 
influential and alter US attitudes. Regardless of Trimble’s personal thoughts, this 
argument directly targeted the unionist community. As Steven King argued ‘he 
had in a sense to establish his credibility with his domestic audience. He was 
going to a place, which was a hostile one in the Unionist mind, so he had to find
33 Conor O’Clery, New York City, 10 May 2002
34 Private Interview with Northern Irish Official
35 Sunday Tribune, “Trimble defiant after US clash”, 5 Nov. 1995
36 Sunday Tribune, “Trimble defiant after US clash”, 5 Nov. 1995
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a way to make it acceptable.’37 Trimble used a negative but striking argument to 
turn it to his advantage. Another statement reported in the article confirms this 
strategy: “We want that influence exerted in positive ways and that won’t happen 
if we don’t engage in discussions with the administration.”38 Thus, Trimble 
introduced the idea to his own community that Unionists had no choice but to 
engage. Firstly, the UUP had to neutralise or to dilute the nationalist influence in 
the USA and secondly, they had to obtain the support they deserved from the US 
administration due to the US indirect responsibility for political violence, as the 
UUP saw it.
This first unpleasant trip did not stop Trimble. He was to become a 
regular visitor to Washington during the peace process. Trimble even chose to 
come to the Saint Patrick’s Day celebration at the White House in March 1996 
(the first UUP leader to do so), where he brought a pair of Linen Pyjamas for 
Clinton and the first lady as a typical present from Northern Ireland. Donaldson
T Q
stated: “it beats a bowl of Shamrock any day.” This statement reflects certain 
unionist self-confidence, never seen before in any statement and underlines the 
changes in the UUP attitude under Trimble’s leadership. The fact that the UUP 
delegation came to the White House on such a symbolic day for the Irish 
community also demonstrated the evolution of the UUP’s strategy since what 
they did in 1996 would have been unthinkable in 1995. It is worth noting that 
Adams, despite being in America, was not invited to the White House reception 
due to the Canary Wharf bombing in February 1996.
37 Dr. Steven King, interview, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 23 Oct. 2003
38 Sunday Tribune, “Trimble defiant after US clash”, 5 Nov. 1995
39 Belfast Telegraph, “Leaders share jovial encounter", 21 Mar. 1996
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Therefore the dilemma of sharing the same space with the Sinn Fein 
leader did not exist. This certainly facilitated Trimble’s decision to attend.
II-THE UUP NORTHERN AMERICAN OFFICE, A 
SYMBOLIC STEP FORWARD?
The UUP office in Washington was not Trimble’s idea. The decision to 
open it was made under Jim Molyneaux’s leadership. David Trimble 
acknowledged that ‘the basis of that had actually been laid in the year before I 
became leader.’40 However, the office came into being in October 1995. Thus, it 
is often associated with the changes that took place in the UUP-US relationship 
following Trimble’s election and is certainly worth examining in that context.
The office was said to have been created in reaction to the opening of the 
Sinn Fein office in Washington DC (O’Hanlon, 1999, p. 226). Trimble was very 
clear on its function: “we are not going to be a major player there in terms of 
trying to exercise influence and we are not trying to. Our operation is just a “me 
too” sort of thing, pointing out to people when you think of this issue think of us 
as well” (Birney & O’Neill, 1997, p.247). However, Tony Culley-Foster stated 
that he found it difficult to convince Molyneaux in January 1995 when he made 
the offer to donate an office space to the UUP:
Molyneaux is an extreme right wing conservative Unionist. He is very suspicious 
o f the US involvement. Plenty o f people at all levels were against the Unionist 
and British positions. Unionists felt besieged. The first month o f 1995, I had a
40 David Trimble, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 8 Apr. 2004
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dinner with Jim Molyneaux. It was the first meeting with the UUP. Molyneaux 
had difficulties articulating good responses. The only answer was to maintain the 
Union. There was no other answer regarding Northern Ireland. The question was 
how to provide the possibility to Bill Clinton to engage in dialogue. Molyneaux 
had the power to make a decision but the USA would have been involved 
anyway. So, better take a position.41
Culley-Foster’s words underline that this office was an American 
initiative and that the international context by and large forced the UUP into 
accepting the offer. The party had no initial intention of opening it. Nevertheless, 
Donaldson declared: ‘That was my proposal that we establish a bureau in 
Washington and with the help of some sympathetic American businessmen we 
were able to establish the bureau.’42 Johnston also stated that: ‘[Donaldson] was 
behind the setting up of the Washington office.’43 This obviously contradicts the 
idea of the office being an American initiative. However, an analysis of the 
initial unionist behaviour toward US involvement tends to support the view that 
the US administration, through Culley-Foster as intermediary, was the instigator 
rather than the UUP. Such a fact does not deny Donaldson’s active support in its 
establishment.
According to Anne Smith, the party representative in Washington, some 
party members regarded the project as useless given that they perceived the US 
as Nationalist supporters.44
41 Tony Culley Foster, Jury’s Doyle Hotel, Washington, 14 Mar. 2002, about the information in 
terms of date and the setting o f the office see Ulster Review, “Unionism Goes Stateside, Anne 
Smith reflects on the last visit to America by David Trimble”, Spring 1996.
42 Jeffrey Donaldson, UUP Office, Lisburn, 15 Apr. 2003
43 Paul Johnston, British Consulate General, New York City, 8 Feb. 2002
44 Anne Smith, St Regis Hotel, Washington, 18 Apr. 2002
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Thus, its creation was interpreted as a symbolic UUP acknowledgement 
of a potentially helpful American role. As Soderberg argues, ‘the opening of the 
office is a recognition that (...) DC was worth engaging, we saw it as very 
positive action. Had they not, we still would have been talking to them, reaching 
them. Yet, the fact that they were doing that indicated they wanted to talk 
back.’45 Donaldson confirms Soderberg’s point: “Our investment in the bureau 
was an indication to the US administration that we were taking them seriously in 
terms of their interest, you know, in the Northern Ireland peace process.”46
The party’s restricted budget, £105,000 per year in 1995, limited the 
office’s potential.47 The prospect of securing funding in the US was certainly not 
as high as for Sinn Fein. Therefore they could not afford a team of lobbyists with 
an office near Capitol Hill. Besides, Anne Smith only worked (and still does) one 
day per week for the UUP, which made it very difficult to compete with the Sinn 
Fein office. As Bill McGimpsey states: “There was no real perception, no real 
reaction. It was not a big deal and it had very little impact. But it was the 
manifestation of the UUP change so it was important to implement it.”48 The US 
media hardly covered its inauguration.
According to Anne Smith, the UUP North American office strategy was 
to focus their efforts on the “Hill”.49 The very modest budget of the UUP did not 
give much opportunity to widen the field of work. Besides, their competency in 
lobbying Capitol Hill has been questioned. Soderberg maintained that ‘Unionists
45 Nancy Soderberg, New York City, 14 May 2002
46 Jeffrey Donaldson, UUP Office, Lisburn, 15 Apr. 2003
47 Tony Culley Foster, Jury’s Doyle Hotel, 14 Mar. 2002
48 William McGimpsey, New York City, 21 Mar. 2002
49 Anne Smith, Jury’s Doyle Hotel, Washington DC, 14 Mar. 2002
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never knew how to lobby the Hill.’50 However, it is difficult to imagine how one 
person who works for the UUP only one day per week in the outskirts of 
Washington can compete with the lobbying capacity of Sinn Fein.
A Northern Irish civil servant declared:
It was very difficult with the background. They need a professional 
representation with experts in lobbying and very intensive. They should be 
located here. The UUP made a start but they need a full time team. Anne is in an 
impossible position. It is back in the party headquarters. Sinn Fein closed its 
office in Washington DC, the SDLP does not have any representation. No party 
has enough money.51
Anne Smith acknowledged those difficulties: ‘we don’t have a pool of 
articulate people. There is not enough funding and so there is no apparent ability. 
We receive invitation for David Trimble from everywhere. The problem is that 
you can’t do that once. It has to be constant.’52 Anne Smith was very clear about 
her limitations, ‘I lobby the congress and the administration but they are not 
going to do anything for us. Sometimes, some of them have a Scotch-Irish 
ancestry, we recognise them because of their names and the location of their
c - i
ancestors.’ Smith refused to provide names of supporters, so did Laird. Paul 
Johnston, Head of the Northern Ireland Section in the British Information 
Service (BIS) at the British Consulate General in New York, declared: ‘no 
politician would describe himself as Unionist. Some congressmen were more 
sympathetic because some were against negotiating with the terrorists.’54 This
50 Nancy Soderberg, New York City, 14 May 2002
51 Northern Irish Civil Servant, Private Interview
52 Anne Smith, St Regis Hotel, Washington DC, 20 Apr. 2002
53 Anne Smith, St Regis Hotel, Washington DC, 20 Apr. 2002
54 Paul Johnston, British Consulate General, New York City, 8 Feb. 2002
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point underlines the very limited practical effect of the office and its fairly 
limited potential support on the US political stage.
Nevertheless, Anne Smith played an important role in organising UUP 
leaders’ trips to the USA and organising receptions in their honour. Such an 
organisation was significant as it was previously non-existent and revealed the 
UUP’s adoption of a somewhat more active strategy toward US involvement. 
But as Soderberg underlined: ‘Anne was not someone on the level of Trimble 
(...). The real conversation was directly with Trimble on the phone.’55
Despite the dialogue being directly established with Trimble himself, the 
UUP leader certainly played an active role in maintaining the office in 
Washington as a symbolic and diplomatic tool. Irish-Americans generally 
appreciated Anne Smith, even the most ideologically hostile to Ulster Unionists, 
such as Peter King who said: ‘[she] puts a pleasant face to Unionism’.55 Besides, 
the opening of the office played a role in convincing the unionist community to 
accept the US involvement as Steven King argued ‘once it was there it had to be
• • • S7accepted and it therefore changed the Unionist position’.
Trimble as a new leader was not particularly popular among Irish- 
Americans. However, Soderberg clearly underlined that her meetings with him 
were very constructive as ‘he was actually quite easy to deal with, he has a good 
sense of humour, smart, putting ideas down. [Unionists] were, from a political 
standpoint, clearly nervous about what this all meant. They were clearly
55 Nancy Soderberg, New York City, 14 May 2002
56 Peter King, Capitol Hill, 20 Apr. 2002
57 Dr. Steven King, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 23 Oct. 2003
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suspicious about us and Gerry Adams and made it clear that they did not want to 
go quickly.’58
The UUP had elected Trimble as new leader therefore the US had to 
accommodate him. This point is crucial because as soon as the UUP started 
engaging, the US had to take them into account. The “empty chair” strategy did 
not offer this advantage. Thus, their engagement became more active. It resulted 
in an increase in their level of influence in the peace process as elements of 
Clinton’s first trip to Northern Ireland indicate it. Indeed, this trip can be 
interpreted as a turning point in the US administration’s relationship with the 
UUP.
III-CLINTON’S FIRST TRIP TO NORTHERN IRELAND
Despite ‘one American president in four [having] traced his roots to 
Ulster, (...) Clinton was the first sitting president ever to set foot in Northern 
Ireland (...).,59 Its meaning was not purely historical. It was also a decisive 
moment in the relationship between the US administration and the UUP. 
Moreover, the trip was also significant in introducing former Senator Mitchell as 
Head of the International Independent Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) 
in charge of writing a report about the benefits of a potential twin-track strategy 
to start all-inclusive negotiations. The media also extensively covered the 
journey.
58 Nancy Soderberg, New York City, 14 May 2002
59 International Herald Tribune, “Clinton Exhorts Ulster To Drop ‘Old Grudges’”, 1 Dec. 1995
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The Belfast Telegraph printed a daily special edition exclusively 
reporting the whole presidential stay. Derry Guild Hall Press published a book in 
1997 narrating the major moments of the journey.
The impact of the trip on the UUP strategy and mostly on Trimble’s 
position has received very little coverage. As a result, the opening goal of this 
analysis is to demonstrate how and to what extent the President’s first trip 
contributed to the UUP leadership’s greater acceptance of a formal relationship 
with the White House. The second objective is to analyse the visit’s impact on 
the adoption of twin-track strategy, and the choice of George Mitchell as head of 
the commission, this being finally agreed when Clinton was just hours away 
from arriving in London.
A-Clinton’s visit’s impact on the Ulster Unionist Party
Clinton’s first visit to Northern Ireland was not unanimously regarded as 
a success. The Wall Street Journal Europe proclaimed it useless, in relation to a 
positive contribution to the Northern Ireland peace process.60 An article in 
Fortnight magazine put Clinton’s speeches in the Middle East in parallel with the 
ones given in Northern Ireland and insisted on the similarity of the clichés used 
on both occasions revealing Clinton’s very constrained potential input to the 
province.61 These opinions partly resulted from the media frenzy depicting Bill 
Clinton as the only “saviour” of a peace process that the decommissioning issue
60 The Wall Street Journal Europe, “Clinton Can’t Bring Peace to Northern Ireland”, 30 
Nov. 1995
61 Fortnight, “No use relying on Uncle Bill”, Jan. 1996, p. 19-20
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had deeply endangered.62 The US administration felt profoundly concerned about 
it. Soderberg argued: “White House Officials were somewhat dismayed by the 
increasingly melodramatic rhetoric which portrayed Mr. Clinton’s visit as a last 
ditch effort to “save” the process.”63 This was not the intention of the US 
President’s visit as it is an impossible challenge for any third party involvement. 
Nevertheless, the mere fact of Clinton’s presence could be and had been a boost 
when people seemed discouraged by the lack of progress. One of the American 
administration’s aims in coming was to demonstrate the sincerity and even- 
handedness of its engagement, regardless of the speculation about the benefits to 
Clinton as the US presidential election was scheduled for the following year.
Clinton achieved some success. David Ervine expressed: ‘he left with 
more friends than he had when he came here.’64 These friends were necessarily 
made on the unionist side since the huge majority of the nationalist community 
supported Clinton’s involvement. The attitude that the US administration adopted 
after Trimble’s election along with the UUP’s more active engagement made 
such progress possible. In fact, the US administration had decided to turn its 
interest toward Unionists without much success under Molyneaux’s leadership. 
Soderberg argued ‘after the visa issue we were very conscious of the fact that 
Unionists were suspicious of it so we thought to proactively return to them. And 
the British encouraged us to do that. The problem was at that point, there was no 
leadership in the Unionist community.’65
62 The pressure was also coming from Capitol Hill as a letter, on 19 September 1995, exhorted 
the President to help maintain the process, ‘Mr President, it was your leadership which moved the 
parties forward at previous setbacks in the Irish peace process. Be assured of our bipartisan 
support of your efforts.’ Thirty representatives including major Irish-American figures like Peter 
King, Richard Neil and Ben Gilman signed it. Thus, Irish-Americans may have played a strong 
role in influencing the media to depict the President as the unique recourse.
63 Fortnight, “Constructive Engagement”, Dec. 1995
64 David Ervine, Stormont, 15 May 2000
65 Nancy Soderberg, New York City, 14 May 2002
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Trimble’s election became an opportunity for the US to show that they 
were even-handed and therefore an honest broker. Clinton had to persuade the 
UUP leadership that they were making the right choice in engaging. The DUP 
would indubitably retain their position as the DUP six page letter admonishing 
the US administration’s Irish policy, given to Gore during Paisley’s visit to the 
US shows.66 Trimble also had to assist the US in persuading unionist voters of 
the potentially constructive outcome of this engagement. Unionists’ suspicion of 
anything outside their community is profoundly rooted in their history that 
shaped this “behind the barricade mentality.” A Northern Irish civil servant 
reported a very evocative example:
There was a debate Belfast City council in December 1995 on whether [Clinton] 
should be allowed to switch on the Christmas tree lights. Some people were
against it. This was a tremendous publicity that any country would have prayed
for. No, not in Northern Ireland. (...) It was thought that it might be a privilege 
given to the US president.67
Barry White’s personal experience summarises the impact of the trip on 
the Unionist community: ‘Unionists did not really want to have him there
because they felt he was coming on behalf of the Republicans. My father is a
typical Unionist, not hard-line, moderate Unionist, by the end of the trip he was 
Bill Clinton’s biggest fan.’68
Beside the success of his speeches that touched both communities, 
Clinton used the trip to particularly appeal to Unionists. Soderberg described: 
‘whatever treatment we would give to the Irish, we would make sure that
66 Belfast Telegraph, “DUP slams US Irish Policy”, 27 Oct. 1995
67 Private Interview with Northern Irish Official
68 Barry White, Westminster, 14 Feb. 2003
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Unionists got one more. We really bothered to make sure they knew that they 
were getting engaged at a higher level.’69 Soderberg’s words reflect the US 
understanding of the Unionists refusal to agree to being treated on the same level 
as Republicans. Thus, a slightly better, but symbolically significant, treatment 
than Republicans rewarded the UUP’s desire to engage. Steven King confirmed 
the American strategy: ‘Once the visa issue was out of the way, there was a 
conscious effort to build communication. We were granted a higher position than 
others, like when Clinton travelled to Northern Ireland, he met with Gerry 
Adams on Falls Road but David Trimble was travelling in the President’s car.’70 
Trimble’s presence in the presidential limousine up to the Europa Hotel 
conferred some credence on the new leader, symbolically demonstrated the 
importance of the unionist community support in the peace process, and 
contributed to a greater international focus by the UUP. This event was also 
covered in the Belfast Telegraph as being a significant gesture from the US 
administration, quoting Trimble: “It is appropriate for the President to 
acknowledge the Ulster Unionists, Northern Ireland largest party, this way.”71
Contrary to the UUP leadership, Robinson expressed strong resentment 
vis a vis the Presidential visit. Robinson declared in the Belfast Telegraph:
We have the President arranging what at this moment in time is something like a 
NORAID tour going round all the nationalist areas he can find. ( ...)  If [the 
meetings] are arranged with Sinn Fein, we will not be present. If the President 
wants to meet with the leader of our party in a private setting, I’m sure that could 
be arranged.72
69 Nancy Soderberg, New York City, 14 May 2002
70 Dr. Steven King, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 23 Oct. 2003
71 Belfast Telegraph, “Trimble Hitches on Presidential Limo”, 1 Dec. 1995
72 Belfast Telegraph, “DUP gives Clinton tough advice”, 16 Oct. 1995
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Thus, if the US wanted to touch a part of the Unionist political 
community they had to find some kind of arrangement with the UUP as the DUP 
would always show more reluctance to it. This certainly explains the US 
delegation’s gesture in offering a ride to the UUP leader. It was also an 
indication of the potential reward that would be conferred on those who engaged.
The evolution in public opinion can influence a leader’s shift from one 
position to the other (Hauss, 2001, p.45). Thus, the fact that 67% of the 
Protestant population thought that ‘Clinton’s efforts have been moving the peace 
process forward’ was significant. Clinton’s trip made the US involvement more 
acceptable to the unionist population and consequently helped the UUP 
leadership openly collaborate, if not fully, with the US administration. As 
Hazleton expresses it, ‘following Clinton’s 1995 Christmas visit to Belfast, 
Protestants, outside Ian Paisley’s hard-line Democratic Unionist Party, were 
willing to concede greater impartiality on Washington’s part’ (2000, p. 115). The 
DUP strategy remained unchanged as an article in the Protestant Telegraph 
published in January 1996 entitled “Clinton faced with the truth” shows. The 
article is an account of the meeting between Rev. Paisley and Clinton during the 
President’s first trip to Northern Ireland. Once again, the American President is 
placed in a position of ignorance and needs to listen to Rev. Paisley’s message.74
73 Belfast Telegraph, “Clinton scores huge success for peace visit, opinions on the future, policing 
and the Clintons”, 18 Jan. 1996
74 Protestant Telegraph, “DUP delegation take Ulster’s case to the USA” May 1994 
Protestant Telegraph, “Clinton faced with the truth”, Jan. 1996
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B-The Presidential visit, the twin-track initiative and Mitchell’s 
second role
A key aspect of the visit was the official American support for the 
adoption of the twin-track initiative. The problem of decommissioning had been 
a delicate issue since the implementation of the cease-fires in 1994. Unionists 
along with the British government did not want any talks prior to paramilitary 
disarmament. ‘Mr. Trimble said that he would never agree to take part in talks 
until the Irish Republican Army had agreed to start giving up the weapons.’75 On 
the Republican side, decommissioning prior to any agreement was out of 
question.
Interestingly enough, Trimble declared that the “US [could not] remain
neutral” on the decommissioning issue, asking the President to pressurise
* * 1 (\ • *Republicans to decommission. First, Trimble implicitly acknowledged US 
fairness. Secondly, his strategy was to take advantage of this “neutrality” to ask 
the US President to back the UUP in its bid for IRA decommissioning. Trimble 
appeared to try and take advantage of the willingness of the US to be an honest 
broker. This new attitude was in contrast to the UUP traditional position and 
widened the gap between the UUP and the DUP. It also demonstrated the UUP 
willingness to adopt a much more active attitude vis a vis US involvement.
75 International Herald Tribune, “Clinton Exhorts Ulster To Drop ‘Old Grudges’”, 1 Dec. 1995
76 Belfast Telegraph, “Pressurise Sinn Féin”, 6 Oct. 1995
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Decommissioning also represented a major disagreement between 
London and Dublin. Bruton came to London to strike a deal with Major. Both 
Prime Ministers made a Joint Statement at 10 pm to announce their support for a 
twin-track approach and the creation of the IICD and the designation of George 
Mitchell to chair it and submit a report on the issue by mid-January (Major, 
1999, p.483). The Irish and British governments seemed to have used Clinton’s 
visit to make a declaration that could have been rejected in a different context. 
So, the presidential trip put pressure on both governments but especially on 
London who had been holding out for decommissioning prior to talks. As Caine 
argues, ‘if Clinton was coming over, to put his weight behind the peace process, 
it is quite useful to produce evidence that you are moving rather than show the 
static aspect. So, the timing of the twin track approach is not entirely
» 77coincidental. There is no reason for them not to take advantage of the boost.’
Clinton announced his support for the twin-track approach. By doing so, 
the US President underlined his support for the governments’ line and put 
pressure on local actors. It is worth remembering that ‘the conservative 
government was rapidly losing its majority’ and was therefore more vulnerable 
to the Unionists’ position ‘as the potential leverage of the Unionists was growing 
in proportion’ (Morrow, 2000, p.29). In this regard, Clinton also appealed to the
• • * 78IRA exhorting it to accept the twin-track.
George Mitchell’s appointment to chair the IICD was crucial. Mitchell 
was previously well known as Clinton’s Economic Special Adviser on Ireland. 
He also organised the Economic Conference that took place in Washington in
77 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 20 Oct. 2003
78 Belfast Telegraph, “Clinton Plea to IRA, Take twin-track, urges President”, 29 Nov. 1995
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May 1995 as described in chapter three. If the choice was a symbolic gesture to 
express gratitude to Clinton for his help, it may also have guaranteed a positive 
report about the twin-track, which would almost certainly be supported by the 
three governments. In addition, it could introduce a future special envoy, 
appointed by the two concerned sovereign governments and therefore be more 
acceptable, or at least less objectionable, to reluctant Unionists. Nevertheless, 
Dermott Nesbitt argued ‘The unionist population was very sceptical of George 
Mitchell being appointed.’79
IV-MITCHELL’S REPORT ON DECOMMISSIONING
If Sinn Fein had not been allowed to take part in negotiations without the 
IRA decommissioning, the talks would have been obviously non-inclusive and 
would almost certainly have failed. It would consequently have increased the 
probability of a return to violence.
The remaining Ulster Unionists fear of international intrusion was chiefly 
linked to the nomination of Senator Mitchell to chair the IICD. The presence of 
two other foreign representatives, John De Chastelain, a Canadian General and 
Harri Holkeri, a former Finish Prime Minister was meant to balance the US 
involvement. An American official confirmed it: ‘Mitchell was appointed to 
write stuff on decommissioning in Fall 1995 just before Clinton’s first trip to 
Northern Ireland, they appointed De Chastelain and Holkeri as a sign of fairness
79 Dermott Nesbitt (UUP), Stormont, 16 Mar. 2000
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towards Unionists.’ Dublin and London anticipated the difficulty in obtaining 
the Unionists’ agreement for an American representative even if officially in an 
“independent commission”. More importantly, Mitchell’s nomination sounded 
like a reminder of Clinton’s promise to send a special envoy. From a unionist 
standpoint, his previous appointment as Clinton’s economic advisor on Ireland 
seriously reduced his neutrality.
When Mitchell’s report on decommissioning was released on 24 January
1996 (Cunningham, 2001, p. 98), its “stark point” was that “success in the peace
process cannot be achieved solely by reference to the decommissioning of 
8 1 *arms”. This statement was instrumental regarding the way the peace process 
had to be conducted in order to survive. The document also offered an alternative 
to both sides’ demands and re-affirmed the twin track approach as the only viable 
solution:
The parties should consider an approach under which some decommissioning 
would take place during the process of all-party negotiations, rather than before 
or after as the parties now urge. (...) If the peace process is to move forward, the 
current impasse must be overcome. While both sides have been adamant in their 
positions, both have repeatedly expressed the desire to move forward. This 
approach provides them that opportunity.82
Trimble expressed reservations about the content of the report: “I don’t 
know whether the report has changed anything” but the UUP did not reject it as
O'! ,
the DUP did. Trimble in the same article said that decommissioning was not
80 Private interview with US Official
81IICD Report, para. 51
82IICD Report, para. 34
83 Belfast Telegraph, “Trimble condemns the Republic over documents ‘leaks’”, 24 Jan. 1996
192
only a “verbal commitment” but also an “action”. Trimble could indeed refer to 
the second principle biding the parties to demonstrate ‘absolute commitment’ (...) 
to the total disarmament of all party paramilitary organisations’ . Nonetheless, 
‘that commitment does not include decommissioning prior to such 
negotiations.’85 This statement implied that decommissioning was not a 
prerequisite but also did not prevent decommissioning prior to negotiations even 
if there was little chance of seeing any weapon handed over prior to talks. So, 
although the UUP said that ‘it would be “unthinkable” to simply abandon the 
requirement for decommissioning before all-party talks’ they also expressed their
• • • • satisfaction at the prospect of elections prior to negotiations.
A key question is why the UUP finally agreed to start the negotiations 
without the IRA having given up a single weapon, renouncing one of their 
fundamental principles?
As Barry White argues, ‘I think it is typical David Trimble pragmatism. 
They say that politics is the art of the possible. You have to do what is possible 
(...). I understand it was basically that [decommissioning] was not going to 
happen.’87 Maginnis’ argument also confirms this point: ‘you try to get an 
agreement, if there is something that is the best you can deliver you then can’t
turn around and walk away from it and say if we had had better we might have
8 8negotiated something more valuable.’
84IICD Report, paragraph 20, principle b.
85 IICD Report, paragraph 25.
86 Belfast Telegraph, “Nationalists warm to proposals”, 24 Jan. 1996
87 Barry White, Westminster, 14 Feb. 2003
88 Lord Maginnis, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 6 Dec. 2002
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Another crucial point in the IICD report was the positive view of 
elections. ‘Elections held in accordance with democratic principles express and 
reflect the popular will. If it were broadly acceptable, with an appropriate 
mandate, and within the three-strand structure, an elective process could 
contribute to the building of confidence.’89 Trimble argued that if the UUP 
accepted the report ‘that was because Mitchell also opened the door to something 
else that we wanted. And that was, that the talks negotiation would be founded 
on an electoral mandate and we had put that to Mitchell. It was not reflected as 
strongly in the Mitchell’s report as we thought it was going to be but it did 
provide the basis for the British government which had announced that there 
would be an election to Northern Ireland’90
The recommendation of elections as a positive measure to build 
confidence between parties was a proposition that Trimble had made in 
September 1995 to defy Sinn Fein. Besides, if they obtained representatives, Sinn 
Fein would hold a mandate that would allow Ulster Unionists to engage in talks, 
at least indirectly, with them.91 This was certainly a tactic, but seeing it as 
another delaying move device by Unionists, Nationalists utterly opposed the 
idea. Pat Doherty, then Sinn Fein Vice-President declared: “Such a proposal 
outlined by Mr Trimble cannot bring peace. What is required is a new democratic 
accommodation involving all the people of Ireland.” Tommy Gallagher, then 
the SDLP constituency representative for Fermanagh and South Tyrone, stated 
about the proposal of an elected assembly: “The immediacy [to advance peace]
89 IICD Report, para. n. 56
90 David Trimble, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 8 Apr. 2004
91 Belfast Telegraph, “Trimble proposes SF talks in an Assembly”, 23 Sep. 1995
92 Belfast Telegraph, “Sinn Fein ‘no’ to assembly”, 2 Nov. 1995
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should not be distracted from by silly tactical games.” John Major endorsed the 
idea of elections prior to the beginning of the peace talks. This position was 
immediately conceived as a sign of favouring Unionists. An article in the Belfast 
Telegraph says that Major had to reassure Irish Prime Minister Bruton and John 
Hume on that point.94 Cunningham suggested that Major’s moves in favour of 
elections was certainly motivated by the hope to see Unionists move forward 
(2001, p.98).
The new UUP leadership was aware of the impossibility of defending the 
status quo. It also appears to be a game of calculation. Trimble obtained a 
mention of the possibility of an election in Mitchell’s report. In that context, 
Clinton played a constructive role in backing Major about the election and 
indirectly putting pressure on the Nationalists to accept it, as Trimble would need 
a “popular mandate” to remain in the negotiations.93 Michael Ancram, Northern 
Ireland Office (NIO) minister, meeting the US President at the White House said 
that if elections were organised, Unionists could accept talks prior to 
decommissioning.96 Thus, the White House backed Trimble. This success from 
an Ulster Unionist perspective also represented the fruit of the UUP’s active 
engagement in the negotiation and their possible effectiveness. The US was no 
longer simply seen as a threat by the UUP but in some regards at least a possible 
vehicle to pressurise Sinn Fein.
Not only did the DUP reject the report but they also expressed opposition 
to the setting up of an independent international commission, to check the hand
93 Belfast Telegraph, “Assembly calls a tactic: SDLP”, 7 Nov. 1995
94 Belfast Telegraph, “Major seeks way to salvage plan for forum”, 25 Jan. 1996
95 Belfast Telegraph, “Clinton throws weight behind election proposal”, 31 Jan. 1996
96 Belfast Telegraph, “Clinton throws weight behind election proposal”, 31 Jan. 1996
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over and destruction of weapons. Paisley viewed the creation of the commission 
as internationalising “an issue which is at the very heart of the British 
government’s sovereign jurisdiction and its recommendations were always going 
to be used as a stick with which to beat those who do not accept the legitimacy of 
Sinn Fein/IRA.”97 Thus, the DUP clearly announced its rejection of any peace 
talks since, as underlined in Mitchell’s report, the paramilitaries would not 
decommission prior to the beginning of the negotiations.
An explosion in the business area of Canary Wharf in London on 9 
February 1996 put an end to one and a half years of IRA cease-fire. Major’s 
government received the blame for slowing down the pre-negotiation. The 
British government appeared to have been willing to go for what could be called 
the “isolation tactic” which meant to ostracise Sinn Fein as long as possible. On 
the other hand, the White House decided to keep close contact with Gerry Adams 
who was allowed in the US for the 1996 St Patrick’s Day, despite the resumption 
of the IRA campaign.
The UUP did not need to fear any controversy about their participation as 
Sinn Fein was excluded. Still, Sinn Fein’s absence was likely to imperil the talks. 
The party scored 15.7% in the Forum election on 30 May 1996. It was Sinn 
Fein’s best result ever obtained (O’Clery, 1996, p.243, Major, 1999, p.490). Such 
an electoral outcome reinforced the dilemma that their exclusion from the talks 
had engendered. It raised the democratic question, of 15.7% of the Northern Irish 
voting population not being represented in the peace talks making Sinn Fein’s 
absence even more critical than in 1974. Such a situation would inevitably lead 
to a questioning of the validity of an eventual agreement if one was achieved. As
97 Belfast Telegraph, “No talks until guns handover”, 24 Jan. 1996
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a result, parallel negotiations with Sinn Fein were necessary to reintegrate them 
into the peace process.
V-MITCHELL’S APPOINTMENT AS CHAIRMAN OF THE 
TALKS
This period saw the effective introduction of an international third-party 
in the peace talks, with Mitchell’s appointment as chairman for the negotiations. 
Dublin and London jointly appointed Mitchell as chairman of the talks providing 
the legitimacy that any case involving a third-party requires as discussed in 
chapter one. Yet, despite the UUP greater engagement with the Americans, they 
were still extremely suspicious regarding US intentions. This appointment was 
viewed as a sign of American interference at a time when the UUP relations with 
the White House were tense due to Clinton’s refusal to suspend official 
diplomatic links with Sinn Fein despite Trimble’s request.98 As Major perceived 
it, they saw Clinton’s administration as susceptible to being easily influenced by 
Irish-American pressure (Major, 1999, p.483). In addition, Unionists may have 
perceived the Irish-American pressure on the US administration as even greater 
since Clinton was then running for a second term.
One American official claimcd that ‘the team was separated from the US 
government. They were appointed independently, they had no relation and no 
reports were sent. The US government was informed by the Republic of Ireland, 
Great Britain, the loyalists but not them.’99 However, MacGinty’s argument that 
‘George Mitchell’s position as chair of the multi-party talks also means that the
98 Belfast Telegraph, “Envoy throws doubt on Clinton and Adams talks”, 12 Feb. 1996 
Belfast Telegraph, “Clinton Stands by Adams”, 13 Feb. 1996
99 Private interview with US official
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White House has a direct line of communication to the heart of the Northern Irish 
talks’ is practically unchallengeable (1997, p. 14). It was clearly vital to 
Mitchell’s team to be deemed independent to emphasize the fairness of their 
suggestions. As Caine argues ‘given the circumstances and given who they were, 
it was in their interest to operate in such a way that they showed 
independence.’100 Still, the presence of David Pozorski, a State Department 
official, in Mitchell’s team leads to questions about its absolute independence 
from the US administration (De Chastelain, 1999, p.439). However, even if the 
American official is certainly right in stating that the team never transmitted any 
official report to the White House, it is implausible that Mitchell did not keep 
Clinton informed on a regular basis. It even seems to be one of the aspects that 
encouraged Mitchell’s appointment as chairman, as Caine argues that ‘having an 
American who was in a direct line with the President would be useful’.101 Even 
Ulster Unionists knew it, as Donaldson argued that ‘undoubtedly, with Senator 
Mitchell chairing the talk-process, (...) he was the direct connection with the US 
administration.’102
Thus, Mitchell’s appointment produced two distinct attitudes in the 
Unionist political community. The UUP kept silent with the notable exception of 
the then deputy leader John Taylor who said that to appoint a Serbian-American 
to lead the talks about the future of Croatia would be the same (Mitchell, 1999, p. 
47). The DUP and the UKUP rejected the appointment (Mitchell, 1999, p. 46- 
47). The UUP suspicion was based on three main factors. Steven King mentioned 
the first one, ‘we did not know him. We only had his CV which presented him as
100 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 20 Oct. 2003
101 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 20 Oct. 2003
102 Jeffrey Donaldson, UUP Office, Lisburn, 15 Apr. 2003
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a democratic liberal which did not seem very positive to us.’103 This statement is 
exaggerated as Mitchell had made several trips to Northern Ireland prior to this 
appointment, first as economic advisor and second as head of the commission on 
decommissioning. Thus, the UUP knew Mitchell. The dilemma was, as Nesbitt 
argues, that ‘the Unionist population was sceptical about George Mitchell getting 
involved, they did not want him at all and they did not want the international 
opinion involved.’104 Secondly, the UUP feared the extent of Mitchell’s power as 
chairman of the negotiation. And thirdly, they worried about the Irish-American 
influence through the White House connections with Mitchell’s team.
Nevertheless, among the ten parties that had representation in the Forum, 
seven were in favour of George Mitchell, two, the UKUP and the DUP, were 
against and the UUP made no statement (Mitchell, 1999, p. 47). Trimble’s 
silence actually saved George Mitchell. If Trimble had joined McCartney and 
Paisley, Mitchell would have had to leave, but as having been appointed by 
Dublin and London, this would certainly have led to the collapse of the peace 
process. Trimble did not want the blame to be put on the Unionist community 
(Mitchell, 1999, p.47). Thus, political requirements led the UUP to accept 
Mitchell as chairman of strand two of the talks. As Steven King argued, they 
agreed with his role once they had ‘watered down his position to the extent that it 
did not matter very much whether he chaired or not.’105 Two articles in the 
Belfast Telegraph reflect King’s views. One article reports that ‘Mr. Trimble 
claimed a negotiating victory, saying he had deprived Mr. Mitchell of the role of 
political “supremo” at the talks’ another article the following week reports that
103 Dr. Steven King, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 23 Oct. 2003
104 Dermott Nesbitt, Stormont, 16 Mar. 2000
105 Dr. Steven King, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 23 Oct. 2003
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the ‘UUP seek to dilute Mitchell’s power.’ 106 The second article contradicts the 
first as Trimble had not managed to diminish Mitchell’s power by June 19th. An 
allusion is also made in another article from the Belfast Telegraph stating that 
Clinton ‘remained optimistic about the multi-party negotiations on Northern 
Ireland despite efforts to diminish the chairmanship role of George Mitchell.’107
Mitchell himself explains that Trimble did not want him to establish the 
agenda and was against granting him power to establish strategies and write 
reports (Mitchell, 1999, p.47). The agreement or disagreement on Mitchell’s 
chairmanship within the unionist political community highlights the division 
within unionism. Trimble tried to find a profitable solution without necessarily 
being more moderate in his personal convictions. An American official described 
him: ‘Trimble is more complicated, he’s an extreme hard-liner but he had to 
make some decisions at some point. He did it.’108 Paisley represented, along with 
McCartney, a traditional Unionism based on the fear of the selling out of the 
Union. Both parties played on the primal panic within the unionist community to 
block the peace process like Rev. McCrea shouting at Trimble in front of the 
camera: “Ulster is not for sale” (McDonald, 2000, p. 169).
Both sides of Unionism knew that Mitchell’s departure would 
automatically cause the collapse of the process not only because of Mitchell’s 
status but also as Caine argues: ‘finding a chairman for Strand 2 was just 
incredibly difficult.’109
106 Belfast Telegraph, “DUP fights on as Mitchell takes the Chair”, 12 Jun. 1996 
Belfast Telegraph, “Trimble in talks battle”, 19 Jun. 1996
107 Belfast Telegraph, “Trimble calls off America visit”, 14 Jun. 1996
108 Private interview
109 Jonathan Caine, interview at Westminster, 20 Oct. 2003
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The row over his nomination lasted until and even beyond the official 
beginning of the talks on 10 June 1996. Even though the talks started on that 
date, very little progress was made as the acceptance of Mitchell as a chairman 
took time. And then he left to assist Clinton in his campaign against Bob Dole.110 
Mitchell’s role effectively started after Clinton’s second election therefore the 
way he handled his duty will be analysed in the following chapter.
CONCLUSION
The UUP appeared to have evolved their position in this period, 
displaying a progressive realisation that they would not be able to block or ignore 
the US administration as a third party. When elected leader of the UUP, Trimble 
was seen as a hard-liner but this reputation had a positive impact on his strategy. 
The US, British and Irish governments welcomed any potentially “conciliatory” 
decision he made since he was not expected to be so “flexible”.
Nevertheless, the gradual engagement with the US, demonstrated by 
decisions, such as the creation of the Northern American office or Trimble’s 
willingness to visit Washington almost immediately after his election, does not 
mean that reluctance to accepting US involvement had vanished. Therefore, the 
first Clinton presidency represents a gradual acceptance of the US playing a role 
in the peace process and some realisation that they could use it to their own 
benefit. It was not an easy journey and even if Ulster Unionists demonstrated a 
much more diplomatic attitude in some major events covered in this chapter, they
110 Mitchell George (1999), Making Peace, pp- 76-83
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also, from time to time, came back to their traditional position, that is to say, 
boycott or protest.
Chapter four outlined a number of events where the US established their 
strong wish to be involved despite British reluctance and pressure. When the 
UUP responded by accepting a US role, however reluctantly, the Clinton team 
sought to re-assure them of their neutrality. Trimble’s welcome to Washington, 
some of Clinton’s activities during his first visit to Northern Ireland and the US 
support for twin-tack decommissioning and elections intended to persuade the 
UUP of their neutrality. Ultimately there is evidence of a more positive UUP 
engagement. They went beyond simply seeking to limit US involvement and 
sought to use the US to pressurise Sinn Fein and the IRA.
Nonetheless, the US still took some decisions that the UUP resented or 
rejected. The most obvious case at the end of Clinton’s first term is the UUP 
reaction to Mitchell’s appointment as chairman of the negotiations. Their official 
silence masked serious efforts to diminish Mitchell’s role within the talks. Yet, 
they accepted his remaining as chairman and were the only major Unionist party 
to do so.
The more active Unionist involvement was based on a new pragmatic 
approach that the rejection of a mediator would weaken their position. Mitchell’s 
role as a mediator was fully legitimate as jointly guaranteed by the United 
Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. The US backed Mitchell providing him 
with necessary leverage to secure his position as chairman. Thus, from a UUP 
standpoint, rejection was foolish and negative. This was a period of growing
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acceptance by the UUP of a new international engagement that had been avoided 
for so long, and which had, prior to this, always been perceived as inevitably 
against Unionists’ interests. Resistance to US mediation remained but now it was 
balanced with aspects of more balanced engagement.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CLINTON’S SECOND TERM: THE US-UUP 
RELATIONSHIP IN THE CONTEXT OF MEDIATION
INTRODUCTION
Bill Clinton’s first term saw the progressive development of US 
involvement in the Northern Ireland peace process and its growing acceptance as 
a legitimate third party. His second term highlighted two main aspects of conflict 
mediation: firstly, participation in and contribution to the peace process through 
Senator Mitchell as chairman of the negotiations, complemented by Clinton’s 
personal interventions and secondly, the monitoring of the implementation of the 
agreement.
While Clinton’s second term began in January 1997 no real progress was 
made in terms of negotiation until after Blair’s victory at the May 1997 General 
Election, and the renewal of the IRA cease-fire in July 1997 which allowed Sinn 
Féin to re-enter the negotiations. Sinn Féin’s involvement triggered the launch of 
real inclusive talks.
According to Chester Crocker and Fen Osier Hampson, a potential third 
party can contribute to the resolution of a conflict in two ways. First, the third 
party can intervene ‘through direct action and diplomatic initiatives’ (1996, 
p.56). As Hazelton pointed out: ‘in Northern Ireland, the British and Irish
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governments jointly assumed the responsibility for this role, allowing the Clinton 
administration to intervene only on selected areas and/or as a last recourse’ 
(2000, p. 118).
The “third party” in Northern Ireland had the peculiarity to be actually 
composed to some extent of three governments, London, Dublin and to a lesser 
extent Washington DC. All three governments were contested in this role. The 
British government did not accept that their position was one of an interested 
actor, but portrayed themselves as a neutral mediator, whereas Northern Irish 
politicians from both sides clearly saw them as an actor and not as a possibly 
neutral intermediary. The Irish government’s role was still a sensitive issue for 
Unionists who had struggled against it having any right to have a say in Northern 
Ireland’s internal affairs. Indeed, while the Irish government always claimed to 
act in everyone’s best interest, Fianna Fail governments in particular also saw 
themselves as defenders of nationalist interests. Finally, the US government was 
the real external actor but, as explored in chapter four, its pro-nationalist 
reputation had generated hostilities among Unionists of all shades.
The second role for a third party that Chester Crocker and Fen Osier 
Hampson advocate is to define ‘the parameters of tolerable behaviour and 
legitimise the principles by which settlement and membership in the global 
system can be achieved’ (1996, p.56). As Hazleton rightly argues, ‘it was in this 
area that Clinton administration concentrated most of its efforts’ (2000, p. 118).
This chapter’s main focus is to analyse the evolution of the interaction 
between the UUP and the US administration focusing on both Mitchell’s and
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Clinton’s roles during the talks and after the agreement. It will examine how the 
UUP sought to take advantage of their relatively “cordial” relationship with the 
US once they were tolerated as a third party.
In particular, why did the UUP accept the US role as mediator whereas 
the DUP and the UKUP decided to bluntly reject it? Why did they decide to 
remain in the talks despite the DUP and UKUP walking out, knowing that they 
risked greater electoral threat within their own community? To what extent did 
the USA’s potential leverage, once their official impartiality was observed, 
influence the UUP decision to stay and sign the agreement? On a wider debate of 
international mediation, to what extent does leverage promote success?
These questions will be addressed in this time period by an examination 
of six main events: Bill Clinton’s re-election in November 1996; Labour’s 
victory in Britain during the May 1997 general elections; the July 1997 IRA 
cease-fire and Sinn Fein entering the talks; the Good Friday Agreement and the 
American influence; Clinton’s visit to Northern Ireland in September 1998; and 
finally, Mitchell’s return to negotiations in September 1999.
206
I- THE UUP AND THE US ADMINISTRATION UNTIL SINN 
FEIN’S INCLUSION IN THE TALKS
A- Clinton re-election, November 1996
Clinton’s re-election generated extensive media coverage in the Belfast 
Telegraph in sharp contrast to the coverage of the first election. As examined in 
chapter three, Clinton’s first victory did not provoke much of a reaction within 
the unionist political community in general and almost none from the UUP. The 
greater coverage indicates the changes that occurred between November 1992 
and November 1996, as perceived by a unionist daily newspaper. Clinton’s re- 
election also ensured the continuation of a US role in the peace process in 
Northern Ireland, since it could have been pushed aside in the aftermath of a 
Dole victory. Mitchell’s position as chairperson would have been considerably 
weakened if not undermined. Mitchell himself assured the Irish public that 
Clinton would remain strongly involved in the Northern Ireland issue if he won 
the elections.1
The DUP and UKUP re-affirmed their position on the US President. Peter 
Robinson, DUP deputy leader, had even called the US President, “the White 
House groper” (McKay, 2000, p. 18). More crucially, despite the impression that 
Clinton had convinced a majority of Unionists of his fairness during the 1995 trip 
to the province, this perception had faded away.
1 Irish Times, “North still Clinton priority says Mitchell”, 1 Nov. 1996
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Original suspicion returned, articulated around the IRA break of cease­
fire and Clinton’s refusal to suspend diplomatic contacts with Sinn Fein leaders. 
‘The White House [...] quashed reports from London that Mr. Adams was being 
denied a visa to return to the US. Clinton administration officials have continued 
to talk to Mr. Adams, even after the first IRA bomb [9 February 1996].’2 As 
McDonald states, this situation made ‘the White House closer to Sinn Fein than 
the Irish Government, which had blocked more official meetings with Adams 
until the IRA cease-fire was restored’ (2000, p. 167).
In an article entitled “Unionists trust no other Leader”, the Sunday Times
reported the result of a survey conducted among 100 delegates at the Ulster
# # 'l _
Unionist Party Conference in October 1996. ‘Although David Trimble, the party
leader, claimed that American policy-makers were now taking Unionist concerns
on board, delegates appeared unimpressed, with 80% saying they did not trust
President Bill Clinton.’4 This survey occurred three weeks prior to the US
presidential election and displayed the interviewees’ lack of enthusiasm for his
re-election. David Trimble was unable to convince active party members of US
even-handedness.
At that stage of the electoral campaign, Clinton was likely to be re­
elected as ‘Dole [was] so far behind in the polls’.5 Edmund Curran, then Belfast
Telegraph editor, asked in an article entitled, “Where do we stand?”, ‘if, as 
expected, President Clinton is re-elected to the White House for another four 
years, what will it mean to Northern Ireland?’ This article is interesting for two
2 The Wall Street Journal Europe, Who can deliver?, IRA Bombings Create Quandary for Adams 
And Irish Peace Process, 20 Feb. ! 996
3 Sunday Times, “Unionists trust no other leader”, 20 Oct. 1996
A Sunday Times, “Unionists trust no other leader”, 20 Oct. 1996
5 Daily Telegraph, “Dole tries to deliver Clinton knock out”, 7 Oct. 1996
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reasons. First, Curran wrote it from Washington. It means that a major unionist 
paper considered that the US involvement justified the expense of someone 
covering the story from the USA. It was in sharp contrast to the relative apathy 
that Clinton’s 1992 victory had generated in unionist newspapers. Secondly, the 
author insisted that ‘Clinton’s re-election [was] vital to Ulster and the Peace 
Process.’ 6 Such a position diverged from the tone of the limited 1992 coverage 
which reflected unionist worries about a Clinton administration potential 
intervention.7
Clinton’s victory was expected. However, the Irish-American vote was 
not a high profile part of the second electoral campaign. Despite Thompson’s 
account of the creation of “the Irish-Americans for a Democratic Victory” to 
support Clinton’s re-election and to ensure the continuation of the Irish agenda 
(2000, p .191), articles published during the 1996 election campaign highlighted 
the lower profile of the Northern Ireland issue. Mitchell himself declared that ‘it 
[was] not a major factor in the American presidential campaign.’8 Mitchell had 
flown back to the US to help Clinton during the last stage of his campaign 
(Mitchell, 1999, pp.76-83).9 Edmund Curran corroborated Mitchell’s statement 
indicating that ‘not surprisingly, Northern Ireland is not an issue in this 
election.’10 This is not surprising in many respects. The US was already involved 
in Northern Ireland and Clinton was clearly going to stay involved if re-elected. 
This was widely accepted and Irish-American organisations did not need to
6 Belfast Telegraph, “Where do we stand?”, 5 Nov. 1996
7 See Belfast Telegraph, “Ulster View Raises fear on Clinton”, 4 Nov. 1992, Belfast Telegraph, 
““Hands o ff ’, Paisley warns Clinton”, 4 Nov. 1992
8 Irish Times, “North still Clinton priority says Mitchell”, 1 Nov. 1996
9 Daily Telegraph, “Dole tries to deliver Clinton knock out”, 7 Oct. 1996, ‘Mr Clinton looked for 
help from George Mitchell, his Northern Ireland envoy. Mr Mitchell played being Mr Dole in 
practice debates, preparing Mr Clinton for what Democrats expect will be a combative 
performance from the Republican challenger.
0Belfast Telegraph, “Where do we stand?”, 5 Nov. 1996
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lobby for it. Furthermore, Clinton did not require an ethno-electoral base to 
ensure victory in major states as he already had it. America had a strong 
economy. Therefore Clinton had proven his capacity as a leader to his supporters. 
His charisma led him to win the election but the Democratic Party lost the 
majority in Congress.11 Nonetheless, Clinton’s record secured him an even larger 
percentage of the Irish-American vote than he had achieved in 1992.
Furthermore, Lake stated in a speech three weeks before the election that: 
‘President Clinton remained firmly committed to helping Northern Ireland claim 
its future rather than its past.’12 Among other statements on the issue, A1 Gore 
was reported on 19 November 1996 to have ‘promised that Clinton’s 
administration would continue to play “a strong role” along the path of peace’.13 
In addition, Lake argued “the [talks] will succeed most fully if all the parties- 
including Sinn Fein - are sitting at the same table. That is the firm belief of the 
British and Irish governments. It is also the firm belief of the United States.”14
Anti-peace process UUP members still nurtured strong suspicions on the 
US president’s real intention. Willie Ross declared that ‘[they] just saw him as a 
guy who was trying to get re-elected using the Irish situation and the Northern 
Irish for his own political benefit.’15 Ross’ stance is very close to Vance’s 
standpoint that ‘the media were entirely directed at informing the domestic
" Belfast Telegraph, “Charisma Tops Poll”, 6 Nov. 1996
12 The White House, Office o f  the Press Secretary, 8 Oct. 1996, Anthony Lake Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs remarks to the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 
Georgetown University, Washington D.C.
13 Belfast Telegraph, “Voice o f America, Gore’s anger: IRA’s ceasefire Breach was an outrage”,
19 Nov. 1996
14 The White House, Office o f  the Press Secretary, 8 Oct. 1996, Anthony Lake Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs remarks to the Institute for the Study o f Diplomacy, 
Georgetown University, Washington D.C.
15 William Ross, Europa Hotel, Belfast, 2 Feb. 2004
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audience in the USA that Northern Ireland was a great foreign policy victory for 
president Clinton.’16
On the pro-peace process side, Trimble, Donaldson and Molyneaux flew 
to Washington at the beginning of December to discuss the Northern Ireland 
issue with Vice-President Gore and Tony Lake.17 The US administration 
reportedly used this trip to persuade Trimble to accept “inclusive talks” which 
meant that the US intended to keep focused on their initial agenda despite the 
IRA being active again since February 1996.18 Even so, this trip also emphasises 
the great changes in the Ulster Unionists’ attitude. Trimble flew stateside less 
than a month after Clinton’s re-election, confirming Ulster Unionist interest in 
dynamically engaging with the US administration. Jeffrey Donaldson stated in 
the Belfast Telegraph: “we welcome this early opportunity to put our viewpoint 
to the new Clinton’s administration on the current political situation in Northern 
Ireland.”19 Likewise, Trimble’s declaration that “the US approach to the peace 
process was sound” deeply contrasted with the UUP initial approach on the US
-}A _ __
involvement. The Belfast Telegraph news that the ‘UUP delegation [hoped] to 
be the first from Northern Ireland to meet the President since his re-election’ 
expresses the dramatic shift in the UUP’s US strategy.21 Trimble even praised 
‘President Bill Clinton's envoy, former Senator George Mitchell’.22
16 David Vance, Stormont Castle, 15 May 2000
17 Financial Times, “Trimble calls for ‘inclusive’ talks”, 5 Dec. 1996
13 Financial Times, “Trimble calls for ‘inclusive’ talks”, 5 Dec. 1996
19 Belfast Telegraph, “Clinton to get Ulster Briefing”, 30 Nov. 1996
20 Belfast Telegraph, “Clinton to get Ulster Briefing”, 30 Nov. 1996
21 Belfast Telegraph, “Clinton to get Ulster Briefing”, 30 Nov. 1996
12 Belfast Telegraph, "Where do we stand?”, 5 Nov, 1996
Belfast Telegraph, “Tip for the Top, the White House pundits point to Mitchell”, 7 Nov. 1996
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When Clinton was re-elected, continued unionist hostility could be 
observed. But, among some elite in the UUP and in the Belfast Telegraph, signs 
of a much greater acceptance of the reality of the US role were visible.
The changes in the new administration were officially announced on 7 
December 1996. According to the Daily Telegraph, ‘Mr Clinton [had] not picked 
a new team, but [had] essentially re-shuffled the old faces.’23 Still, Lake and 
Soderberg’s departure was a big change since they were the US administration’s 
most active members on the Northern Ireland issue. As discussed in the previous 
chapters, Soderberg had been instrumental in influencing the President to make 
the decision to grant the visa to Adams. She was also known for her strong links 
with Hume.
Sandy Berger moved ‘from number two at the NSC to the top spot.’24 
Even if Berger had been depicted as the “real chief of Foreign Policy” 
(Thompson, 2001, p. 192), he seemed to have played a minor part in Northern 
Ireland affairs. He is for example very seldom mentioned with regard to Northern 
Ireland in British and Irish newspapers during his time at the head of the NSC. 
His role seems to contrast with the ones that Lake and Soderberg played in 
creating the favourable context for the US involvement. Berger did not need to 
do what his predecessors had done. Thompson provides another plausible 
explanation by stating that, to Berger, the Northern Ireland issue was ‘going
nowhere’ even though he kept on being constantly informed by Mitchell about
the evolution of the situation (2000, p. 193).
23 Daily Telegraph, “Clinton seems to wilt under prospect”, 7 Dec. 1996
24 Daily Telegraph, “Clinton seems to wilt under prospect”, 7 Dec. 1996
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The fact that no other unfamiliar official was appointed was certainly 
reassuring for still highly suspicious Ulster Unionists. Besides, and more 
crucially, it also indicates a shift in the US administration Irish policy. With 
Mitchell remaining chairperson of the talks, the US administration could deal 
with the peace process in Northern Ireland itself rather than at the White House, 
as was the case during the previous four years. The UUP and the British 
government’s greater flexibility vis a vis the US position within the peace 
process certainly helped this shift.
Despite their potential strong leverage, the US possibilities were 
considerably limited until May 1997 showing that leverage is not enough. 
Mitchell argued that Unionists absolutely wanted decommissioning to be 
completed before starting the negotiations (1999, p.88). The disagreement over 
decommissioning led to a stall in the talks as the Major government’s tiny 
majority in the parliament conferred the UUP with the power to ‘bring his 
government down by joining the opposition at anytime’ (Mitchell, 1999,, p.88). 
During a second interview, Caine confirmed it arguing that ‘obviously between 
1992 and 1997 the UUP would be quite important because of the small 
Conservative majority.’25
Ulster Unionist influence on Major’s government is also highlighted in 
contemporary newspaper headlines, such as the conservative Daily Telegraph's 
heading “Unionist threat to topple Major” and “Major saves himself with Ulster 
deal.” Ross reinforces it adding that ‘[Ulster Unionists] votes were not going to
25 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 21 Oct. 2003
26 Daily Telegraph, “Unionist threat to topple Major”, 18 Nov. 1996 
Daily Telegraph, “Major saves himself with Ulster deal”, 24 Nov. 1996
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27 *be free.’ Nevertheless, Caine tried to minimise it claiming that ‘a number of 
people [had] over exaggerated the importance that the UUP had on John Major’s 
policy,’ and arguing that in spite of this narrow majority ‘John Major still went 
ahead with the Downing Street Declaration and the Framework Documents.’28 
Caine does not mention that Molyneaux actually supported the Downing Street 
Declaration. Besides, if Caine’s viewpoint is reasonable, it does not consider the 
fact that, by January 1997, the British General Election was only four months 
away and Blair’s victory was highly probable. Trimble declared as early as 
December 1996 that ‘a Labour victory in next year’s general election would not 
materially affect the Northern Ireland peace process.’29 Such a declaration 
suggests the very restricted influence that Major’s government had over the 
actors in the peace process. It also indicates that the UUP leader was at least 
ready to face the reality that the Labour Party would win.
Mitchell says that it took four months to prepare the agenda for the talks 
indicating the difficulty in obtaining a consensus (1999, p.84). Mitchell’s portrait 
of his task as chairman is an example of the limited possibilities for US action in 
the slow and very difficult progress of the talks until Blair’s election. This point 
along with the fact that Dublin and a much weakened British government were in 
charge of diplomatic initiatives seriously endangered the peace process. Sean 
Neeson highlights this: ‘the first year of the talks was totally frustrating, 1996-97, 
there was discussion over standing orders and things like that, that went on, 
dragged on, for many, many months.’30
27 William Ross, Europa Hotel, Belfast, 2 Feb. 2004
28 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 21 Oct. 2003
29 Financial Times, “Trimble calls for 'inclusive' talks”, 5 Dec. 1996
30 Sean Neeson, AP Headquarters, Belfast, 9 Jul. 2003
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A US official even goes further: ‘Tony Blair’s election with a landslide 
victory against John Major changed the political landscape. (...) Important 
evidence is the fact that since March 1997 there was no more talks. Major’s 
possibilities were limited because of his lack of majority,’ adding that ‘the huge 
majority gave Blair the possibility to do more or less what he wanted. He might 
have been able to implement a certain amount of reforms without the Unionists’ 
agreement. Unionists knew it and accelerated the peace process since they did 
not want to see some disadvantaged reforms implemented.’31
‘The Northern Ireland Forum for Political Dialogue was suspended by the 
Government [on March 10th] until after the general election.’32 Thus, inertia in 
the talks marked the first six months of Clinton’s second term. It demonstrates 
that despite its strong leverage, the US was powerless in a situation where the 
British government itself was incapable of ensuring the progress of the talks. It 
indicates the necessity for the third party to obtain the active support of all major 
actors engaged or else the mediator’s capacity is seriously limited. Blair’s victory 
appears to have had a major impact on their resumption, in some changes in the 
US position and also the UUP strategy, as discussed in the next section.
B- Blair’s victory and its impact on the UUP-US relationship
Trimble declared ‘We were comfortable with the incoming Labour 
government. The fact that it had a better relationship with Washington was not 
really something that entered too much into account in our vision.’33
31 Private Interview with US official
32 Daily Telegraph, “Ulster forum put on hold”, 11 Mar. 1997
33 David Trimble, UUP Headquarters, 8 Apr. 2004
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However, the majority of respondents interviewed for this dissertation 
identified Blair’s election with a ‘majority of 179 seats’ (Arthur, 2000, p. 246) as 
a momentum for change in the Northern Ireland peace talks. Thus, the goal of 
this subdivision is to examine to what extent the change of government 
facilitated the US role and therefore influenced the UUP strategy. A brief 
discussion on the Ulster Unionists’ perception of the new Labour government is 
necessary to gauge its impact on the potential role of the US at this time.
1-Ulster Unionists and the new Labour government
Thompson’s argument that Blair shared the same viewpoint as his 
predecessor is valid (2000, p. 194). The Labour party policy evolved from a 
policy of a united Ireland by consent towards a much more pro-constitutional 
status quo position during Blair’s time in the shadow cabinet. This evolution is 
confirmed in an article in the Daily Telegraph reporting that ‘Tony Blair, the 
Labour leader, indicated [on 13 December 1996] that his party had finally 
abandoned its Northern Ireland policy of encouraging “unity by consent” in 
favour of abiding by the wishes of the majority in Ulster.’34 Major’s words 
reflect this consensual approach of both governments: ‘Coming into the 
government, [Blair] promised a continuity of approach, and he stood by all the 
agreements we had made’ (1999, p. 493). According to Trimble, ‘on the consent 
principle Blair was stronger than Major, on decommissioning Blair was weaker 
than Major.’35 Thus, the changes were not ideological but rather strategic.
34 Daily Telegraph, “Blair's speech signals a shift to 'majority consent' Ulster policy”, 14 Dec. 
1996
35 David Trimble, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 8 Apr, 2004
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Blair’s huge majority at Westminster, as an American official argued, 
‘gave [him] the possibility to do more or less what he wanted. He might have 
been able to implement a certain amount of reforms without the agreement of the
* • 36 *Unionists.’ Even if the US official declaration is somewhat exaggerated, Blair 
did not endure the Unionists’ pressure as much as Major (especially by the end of 
his term) did.
The Unionists’ reaction to Blair’s victory varied. Ross argued that this 
victory ‘was wholly detrimental to the Unionist position.’37 As discussed in 
chapter one, Unionists traditionally have distrusted the British government’s 
intentions in Northern Ireland. One US official’s words confirmed this 
perception: ‘there was a strong distrust between the Unionists and the British.’38 
David Vance’s words summarise the Unionists’ general approach: ‘the 
conservative administration, predominantly Thatcher’s administration, did take a 
slightly tougher approach in relation to trying to defeat the terrorists.’39 Thus, 
Unionists traditionally perceived the Conservative Party as more sympathetic to 
their position than the Labour party albeit, as Vance recalled it, ‘that is not to 
forget that the process of appeasing terrorists began then. And Tony Blair has 
followed on that dishonourable process of appeasement. So, what has to be 
remembered in that British policy? Britain does not have any friend only 
interests.’40 Thus, from a Unionist standpoint, the Conservative or Labour 
parties’ positions regarding Northern Ireland were not that different. As 
Maginnis argued ‘I don’t think it matters which government it is now. We’ve
36 Private Interview with US official
37 William Ross, Europa Hotel, Belfast, 2 Feb. 2004
38 Private Interview with US official
39 David Vance, Stormont Castle, 15 May 2000
40 David Vance, Stormont Castle, 15 May 2000
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stopped being naive and believing that because people tell us things that they are 
naturally true. We’re having to negotiate and to put safeguard. We’ve learnt how 
to negotiate.’41
McDonald says that Trimble made a risky choice in attending the Labour 
annual conference in Blackpool on 2 October 1996 where he gave a well- 
regarded speech detaching himself from his reputation of being a hard-liner. This 
participation, the first by a UUP member in twenty years, broke with the 
traditional relationship with the conservative party and led to the beginning of a 
new relationship with the Labour Party (2000, p. 175). Trimble confirmed it: 
‘With regard to the incoming Blair administration, we had had quite a lot of 
contacts with Blair in the run up to the 1997 election and we were quite 
comfortable with him and his approach (...). Blair was absolutely clear and 
immovable on what people call the consent principle.’42 The UUP strategy 
demonstrated strong pragmatism as they anticipated the Labour Party victory. 
McGimspey argued, “I knew that Labour would be in government within six 
months and I thought that Trimble should go to Blackpool” (McDonald, 2000, 
p. 175). Thus, contrary to the traditional Unionist attitude, the UUP leadership 
crucially demonstrated their pragmatism if not new friendship with a potential 
Labour government, as no other option was available.
A Labour government could actually benefit Unionists. Their virtual 
influence over the Tories was also a source of strong pressure as they were 
expected to use their power over them and obtain what they wanted. An
41 Lord Maginnis, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 6 Dec. 2002
42 David Trimble, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 8 Apr. 2004
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illustration of this pressure is visible in Willie Ross’ critical analysis of Trimble’s 
attitude toward the conservative government.
Whenever he came to the office as leader in September 1995, the government of  
John Major at that time was waiting two years, two parliamentary years before 
the next general election. He could not really have survived that without the good 
will of Ulster Unionists votes in the commons.[...] Unfortunately, within a matter 
of weeks, two or three weeks, David Trimble said that he wanted an election in 
the Northern Ireland assembly so that he could talk to Sinn Fein. As soon as the 
government heard that they said “we are now off the hook”, then they would talk 
for a year and at that time the general election would be over. David Trimble 
walked straight into the trap.43
Willie Ross omits that despite the Unionists’ potential leverage over 
Major, it could not lead anywhere as the suspension of the talks in March 1996 
demonstrated. Unionists’ leverage could just act negatively to collapse the talks. 
They could not achieve positive measures.
Tony Blair’s election as the new Prime Minister may also have acted to 
break with the routine of the situation that lead to the stalemate, and boost 
negotiations (Zartman, 1995, p. 16). The interesting point during that period of 
time is the UUP attitude. Indeed, the UUP would have traditionally welcomed a 
stalled process as their only motivation was to preserve the status quo and the 
collapse of the talks might have this effect. It seems that Trimble came to the 
conclusion that the Labour Party despite their more pragmatic relationship with 
Unionists would not allow the status quo to continue. This was clearly visible in 
their wish to see the restoration of an IRA cease-fire. They were also a new
43 William Ross, Europa Hotel, Belfast, 2 Feb. 2004
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reforming government. As Sean Neeson rightly argues ‘once the Labour came 
into power, it was a new impetus, fresh blood.’44 The UUP knew they could not 
prevent all reforms and walking away or adopting a negative attitude would only 
weaken their position with the new government. Ultimately, as with the crucial 
US involvement the UUP had little choice but to continue with a policy of active 
engagement. Moreover, it could also bring them some benefits as shall be 
demonstrated in the next subdivision.
2- The Ulster Unionist Party and the new Anglo-American relationship
The new Blair-Clinton relationship was not necessarily seen as a threat to 
Unionists’ interests as the new government was in a stronger position to 
influence the White House into pressuring Irish Republicans. One possible 
indication of the Labour government’s better position was Clinton’s direct 
address to Irish Republicans in a speech at Westminster in May 1997: “You can’t 
say we’ll talk and shoot. We’ll talk when we’re happy and shoot when we’re 
not.”45 r
Moreover, as regularly mentioned, the UUP knew that the US 
involvement was inevitable. The change of government reinforced this reality. 
Clinton and Blair had a cordial relationship.
44 Sean Neeson, AP Headquarters, Belfast, 9 Jul. 2003
45 Daily Telegraph, “Clinton and Blair forge new partnership”, 30 May 1997
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Arthur clearly indicates Clinton’s greater personal involvement in the 
Northern Ireland issue: ‘no sooner had Blair become Prime Minister than he 
received a call from President Clinton at 4 a.m. on 2 May with a request for fresh 
negotiations on Ireland’ (2000, p.246).
The Labour Party’s coming to power after four years of the US 
administration’s progressive involvement and four years of witnessing the 
quarrels with the Tories certainly represented a serious advantage for Blair. The 
shift is symbolically illustrated in a quotation by first Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland Mo Mowlam, in her book, Momentum: ‘Now, at an important 
moment in the talks process, the British, Irish and US governments stood 
together, shoulder to shoulder on the road to peace in Northern Ireland’ (2002, 
p.204). It emphasised the closer collaboration between the three governments 
instilling greater leverage among the circle of “mediators”.
Mowlam’s visit to Washington at the end of May 1997 was not only 
another sign of the British Government’s greater acknowledgement of the 
importance of the US role in the negotiations, but also a reminder that the US 
should cooperate as well. Indeed, Mowlam’s key objective was to ask the US 
administration to assist the British government in obtaining an IRA 
announcement of a new cease-fire, to re-integrate Sinn Fein as the talks were 
supposed to resume at the beginning of June 1997. Mowlam declared: “Any 
assistance we get to move Sinn Fein and the peace process would be very much 
appreciated.”46
46 Belfast Telegraph, “Emotional Mo Faces US Visit”, 23 May 1997
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Barry White argued that the UUP had rather cordial relationships with the 
Labour Party prior to Blair’s victory -‘David Trimble and John Major did not 
have as strong a relationship as David Trimble and Tony Blair.’47 Donaldson 
confirmed that the UUP saw some advantages in the situation: ‘Tony Blair and 
Bill Clinton had a good relationship and I think that helped to improve the US 
administration’s attitude toward the Northern Ireland peace process.’48
Therefore, although the election of a Labour government might have been 
expected to heighten unionist fears and lead to a crisis, this did not happen. The 
UUP saw no other option apart from an engagement and some in the UUP, such 
as Trimble and Donaldson, hoped that an improved Anglo-American relationship 
would result in greater US pressure on Sinn Fein and the IRA. Again the UUP 
assumed that the US could be moved toward a position more supportive of their 
interests. No longer was the US simply assumed to be a threat.
I
C- The IRA cease-fire and Sinn Fein entering the talks
The three governments presented a common front at the time of the 
second IRA cease-fire. A British official declared that Blair “[felt] the 
atmospherics in relation to the Irish government, the American government and 
the other parties [were] good” and added that the British Prime Minister “counted 
the support of the US President, Bill Clinton [...] to be a crucial factor in the 
international pressure which could bring about a cease-fire.”49
47 Barry White, Westminster, 14 Feb. 2003
48 Jeffrey Donaldson, UUP Office, Lisburn, 15 Apr. 2003
49 Jeffrey Donaldson, UUP Office, Lisburn, 15 Apr. 2003
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No shade of Unionism welcomed the cease-fire. Their position was 
naturally the reflection of the strategy they had launched since the beginning of 
the peace talks. This cease-fire certainly resulted in an increasing gap between 
pragmatic and hard-line streams of Unionism. It also contributed to the UUP’s 
deeper isolation from the rest of the unionist community.
Mo Mowlam used a more conciliatory approach than her predecessor 
organising two meetings with Sinn Fein, one on 21, and the other on 28 May
1997 (Thompson, 2001, p. 194). Moreover, Mowlam’s firmness in putting 
pressure on the actors to find an alternative to the deadlock on decommissioning 
seemed to have pushed Ulster Unionists into a more conciliatory approach. An 
internal UUP document entitled “Pathways to Peace” dated 4 March 1997 
stipulated that ‘to tolerate [Sinn Fein/IRA] presence [in the talks could] also be 
interpreted as tolerating their actions.’50 Still in the same document, the author 
(anonymous) does not mention decommissioning but just that ‘Unionists hope 
that there will be an opportunity to explore the views recently expressed by John 
Hume and others, that the talks can continue without Sinn Fein/IRA.’51 This 
statement of position within the party reflects the UUP’s total opposition to Sinn 
Fein’s presence at the negotiation table. In that sense, the issue was not about a 
timing of decommissioning, but an absolute rejection of negotiating with 
“terrorists”. Decommissioning was not the sole reason for the UUP opposition to 
‘inclusive talks’. Nevertheless, this document was written when the talks were 
about to be suspended, therefore, when discussions were leading nowhere.
50 Ulster Unionist Party, “Pathways to Peace within the Union”, 4 Mar. 1997
51 Ulster Unionist Party, “Pathways to Peace within the Union”, 4 Mar. 1997
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Once the Labour government took power and announced that it would 
seek to proceed on the basis of including Sinn Fein within the talks, the UUP 
position shifted. This is at least what transpires from Trimble’s official 
declaration about UUP expectations from Republicans. In an interview given to 
BBC radio on 25 June 1997, Trimble stated: “Our view is that there has to be 
substantial decommissioning of weapons immediately after entry into talks, that 
is before entry into substantive negotiations.”52 This declaration suggests that the 
UUP was officially ready to let Sinn Fein join the talks in exchange for a 
demonstration of IRA good will. This was a clear shift from their previous 
rejection of any Sinn Fein involvement.
As Mowlam describes it, the IRA cease-fire triggered the announcement 
by the DUP and the UKUP that ‘they were going to pull out of the talks’ (2002, 
p. 114) leaving the UUP alone to follow them or not. The cease-fire declaration 
therefore accentuated the existing division and defined every one’s role in the 
peace process. Indeed, as discussed in chapter one, according to Zartman, each 
actor adopts a specific position within negotiations (1995, p. 18). If Zartman’s 
framework is applied to the Northern Ireland peace process, the DUP and UKUP 
form the group of destabilisers within the Unionist community as ‘they are 
against every proposal and want to see the problem settled (...) in a context of 
will and power rather than compromise’ (1995, p. 18). Opposite to them, were the 
UUP and PUP which can be portrayed as the stabilisers as they ‘search for an 
agreement at any price to avoid the consequences of a non-settlement’ (1995, 
p. 18). The term “any price” has to be carefully taken in the context of the UUP 
and PUP as the UUP would certainly not have stayed under any condition but 
their position as stabilisers was based on their realisation that their choices were
52 The Independent, “Unionists query new peace plan”, 25 Jun. 1997
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clearly limited and that they certainly really wanted to avoid the “consequences 
of a non-settlement” which would have served the UKUP and the DUP’s 
interests within the Unionists community. Indeed, if the UUP was primarily 
hesitant, the PUP demonstrated huge support for the talks and was perhaps 
critical in Trimble’s decision to stay. Ervine stated that “every time Unionism 
runs from the talks table it runs to a worse circumstance” adding that “no one 
will defend the right of unionists better than a unionist.”53
As expected, the DUP reacted aggressively, delighted to see the prospect 
of the end of the talks. Robinson declared on 19 July 1997: “I think the certainty 
is that the talks process is all but over” adding that “if Sinn Fein/IRA are injected 
into the talks process, it’s certain that there will be no unionist sitting around that 
table with them.”54 This statement demonstrates that the DUP expected their 
walking out to provoke the collapse of the talks. They also certainly expected the 
UUP to quit too. But Trimble declared on the 21 July: “we are not going to walk 
out, but we’ll continue to try and find an agreement.”55 If Robinson was right in 
declaring that “the talks could not go on without Unionists”56, they could go on 
without the DUP.
Blair and Ahem had welcomed the cease-fire as a new possibility to boost 
the talks. ‘In Washington, President Bill Clinton hailed the announcement as a 
moment of great possibility, and said: “On the basis of this cease-fire, 
implemented unequivocally, my administration will work with Sinn Fein as with 
the other political parties.’” 57
53 Belfast Telegraph, “Unionists must talk warns, PUP”, 21 Jul. 1997
Belfast Telegraph, “PM welcomes end to violence”, 19 Jul. 1997
55 Belfast Telegraph, “We Won’t Quit Talks”, 21 Jul. 1997
56 Belfast Telegraph, “Crunch talks as the arms debate rages”, 21 Jul. 1997
^T he  Observer, “Cease-fire: in Ireland braces itself for Peace”, 20 Jul. 1997
225
McCurry, the White House Press Secretary, stated:
We hope and believe that this is the moment of opportunity. ( ...)  At the same time, 
the President has been quite clear in saying that the institution o f the cease-fire 
should be permanent and unequivocal. ( ...)  We laud those unionists and loyalists 
elements that have been refrained from violence on themselves over these many 
months. And we hope that restraint will continue to adhere.’58
It is worth noting that journalists asked two questions directly referring to 
Unionists’ reactions to the new cease-fire and the role that the US administration 
intended play toward the Unionist community. No such questions were asked 
during the briefing of the White House on 31 Aug. 1994, and unionists were 
then called Protestants.59 Such an attitude suggests a noticeable improvement of 
knowledge of Ulster Unionism in the US certainly due to the UUP agreement to 
engage with the US administration and their efforts to bring their case to the 
other side of the Atlantic Ocean.
t
All the attention was on Trimble and the UUP after the DUP and 
UKUP’s departure. The UUP leadership’s decision to remain in the talks needs 
to be placed in the context of that time. First, the UUP was then by far the 
biggest Unionist party. They had won 10 seats at the last Westminster election 
whereas the DUP only had two.60 The Belfast Telegraph argued that: ‘two of the 
unionist parties, representing about 18% at the general election have walked out, 
but so long as the UUP, with 28%, remains, the peace process can continue in
58 White House Press Secretary, Micheál McCurry, Holds Regular News Briefing, 21 Jul. 1997
59 See Ch. 3, p. 139
60 Belfast Telegraph, “Ulster’s new MPs”, 3 May 1997
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some form.’61 Indeed, the UUP had won l/3rd of the seats during the local 
elections on 21 May. As Mitchell argued, it was a positive event as the UUP 
accepted him as the chairman of strand two and also the preliminary agenda 
(Mitchell, 1999, p. 104). Thus, the UUP benefited from a popular mandate that 
provided legitimacy for their remaining in the process.
However, as Mowlam argued: the DUP walk-out ‘would clearly make 
things worse for David Trimble and the Ulster Unionist Party. He would be 
facing Sinn Fein without a united front of unionism and, whatever he did, 
[Paisley] and [McCartney] would snipe at him viciously’ (2002, p. 115). 
Nevertheless, this isolated position was both advantageous and inconvenient. 
Trimble could use his precarious situation to gain a more conciliatory attitude to 
the unionist position from others. He could also play on his instrumental position 
to make demands and consequently reinforce his level of leverage. Ulster 
Unionists had not decided to remain in the talks to be conciliatory but to ensure 
the representation of the unionist position to maximise the benefits from the 
process, and because they thought they had no choice. This was the case as soon 
as the IRA announced the cease-fire as ‘Blair came under pressure from Ulster 
Unionist leader David Trimble to toughen up the British and Irish governments’ 
proposals requiring the hand over of the IRA weapons during the all-party talks 
due to start on 15 September, or face a walkout by his party capable of wrecking 
the talks’62. The UUP boycott of the talks for two days when they resumed on the 
15 September illustrates it (Thompson, 2001, p .197).
61 Belfast Telegraph, “Staying put at Stormont; Peace train: A chance to test Sinn F6in”, 24 
Jul. 1997
62 The Observer, “Cease-fire: in Ireland braces itself for Peace”, 20 Jul. 1997
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Trimble’s “tactic” was also, at least officially, to pressure the other actors 
and especially to persuade the British government to exclude Sinn Fein from the 
negotiations and the US to support such a move or at least not oppose it. The 
DUP and UKUP, as they had walked, did not have any means of pressuring the 
government. These changes in the Unionists strategy were also clarified in the 
Belfast Telegraph:
The most hopeful sign that all is not lost, however, is Mr Trimble’s comment: “We 
are not in the mode of walking out.” Others have done so, or are on the starting 
blocks, and on past performance the UUP would have been part of a mass boycott.
Times have changed, however, and there is an acceptance in Glengall Street that 
there is a wider audience judging its reaction to what appears to the outside world 
to be a Sinn Fein change o f heart. Whatever Unionists may think of the permanence 
o f the IRA cease-fire, they have to avoid the accusations o f intransigence that 
would surely follow a collapse o f the talks process.*3
Trimble’s wider audience presumably includes the USA. A walkout 
would not be understood outside the Unionist community. After the failure of 
the AIA, the UUP was strategically pre-disposed to remain at talks if possible. 
The US dimension increased the cost of walking-out. Trimble argued, “we are 
not prepared to tolerate Sinn Fein being portrayed as a party of peace and 
Unionists as a problem.” He added that “the truth is that Unionists are genuine 
democrats, but if they are outside the process that truth will not be recognised.’64
63 Belfast Telegraph, “Time for leadership; Tactical moves: Bilateral talks may be the way 
forward for Trimble”, 22 Jul. 1997
64 Belfast Telegraph, “Unionists go in”, 17 Sep. 1997
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Trimble’s words were still impregnated in the unionist traditional 
rhetoric: “ we are not going to run away from [Sinn Fein]. We are not there to 
negotiate with them but to confront them.”65 It is also important to notice that 
Ulster Unionists refused to have direct contacts with Sinn Fein members, with 
Mitchell playing the intermediary between both parties (Mitchell, 1999, p. 123). 
The UUP strategy at the beginning of the talks was clearly meant to obtain Sinn 
Fein’s expulsion as reported in the Belfast Telegraph.66
However, the British government followed a different agenda 
demonstrating the Unionists lack of leverage on Blair. They continued their 
conciliatory approach in announcing the reduction of the number of troops in 
Northern Ireland on 28 July 1997 with White House backing.67 The reduction of 
the troops can be viewed as a reward for the cease-fire. This attitude contrasts 
with the former Conservative approach that the cease-fire was a duty not a 
privilege. Moreover, Blair was about to meet Adams at Downing Street and 
envisaged shaking hands with him, which was a gesture of the highest value in 
terms of Adams’ acknowledgement as a politician.68
Equally crucial, the US administration announced that the IRA was no 
longer on the list of terrorist organisations at the beginning of October 1997. 
Such a decision generated fury among the UUP. ‘Ken Maginnis, the Ulster 
Unionist party security spokesman, accused the Clinton administration of being
65 Belfast Telegraph, “Unionists go in”, 17 Sep. 1997
66 Belfast Telegraph, “Trimble to Face Adams, Date is fixed for clash on IRA links”, 19 Sep.
1997
Belfast Telegraph, “Stormont showdown, Ulster Unionists in bid to have Adams ejected from 
talks”, 23 Sep. 1997
Belfast Telegraph, “Lack o f Proof means Sinn Fein stays”, 25 Sep. 1997 
Belfast Telegraph, “Trimble accuses Mo over Talks", 25 Sep. 1997
67 The Independent, “Troop levels reduced on Ulster streets”, 29 Jul. 1997
m Sunday Time, “Blair set to meet Adams for Ulster talks boost”, 5 Oct. 1997
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“slow to learn”, saying it had been caught out and embarrassed by the ending of 
the last IRA cease-fire, in February 1996.’69 The fact that the official 
announcement took place a day after Trimble’s visit to the US also demonstrates 
the limited influence that the UUP had in the USA. Moreover, the US would 
never have made such a decision without the British government’s consent. The 
British and US governments seem to have prepared a context that made Sinn 
Fein exclusion implausible. It consequently reduced the UUP room to 
manoeuvre, as the DUP and UKUP were then preparing ‘for a province wide 
campaign against the process’.70 Perhaps more importantly, ‘leading Unionists, 
marshalled by Willie Ross, MP for Londonderry East and head of the party's 
executive, [were] manoeuvring against the party leader’71 accusing ‘his party of 
“retreating” on the issue of decommissioning’.72
Why then did the UUP remain in the talks? From a detractor’s viewpoint, 
Willie Ross argued that “ego” was at the origin of Trimble’s decision to stay, as 
‘he could not bring himself to admit that he may have made a mistake.’73 
However, Trimble’s options were extremely limited.
For example, his isolation within the unionist political spectrum, with 
only Alliance Party and the loyalist parties’ support, was a heavy burden, as any 
mistake could be lethal in terms of constituency support. Therefore, he needed to 
provide hints of a real progress but with indication of firmness. But Trimble
The Observer, “Blair’s dilemma: Should he shake hands with Adams?”, 12 Oct. 1997
69 Financial Time, “Anger as US drops IRA from banned terrorist list”, 9 Oct. 1997
70 Belfast Telegraph, “Unionist Row Rages”, 30 Sep. 1997
71 Financial Times, “Shaking hands all round: Trimble holds the key to Ulster peace deal”, 14 
Oct. 1997
72 Belfast Telegraph, “Unionist Row Rages”, 30 Sep. 1997
73 William Ross, Europa Hotel, Belfast, 2 Feb. 2004
230
‘[told] his colleagues, by way of reassurance, that just as the IRA’s cease-fire is 
tactical, so were the talks in which the Ulster Unionists are engaged.’74 This 
quotation of Trimble’s state of mind is crucial as it embodies the leader’s 
pragmatism. As Caine argues: ‘the history of unionist protest over the past 
twenty years has hardly been very successful. So, the other option is to get 
involved in the negotiation to get the best deal possible.’75
Besides, on the international level, as a senior British official stated it, 
Trimble “would lose the respect of world opinion if after all this hard work he 
took his bat away now.”76 In addition, if the talks collapsed the blame would be 
put on the UUP, which had positioned itself as being pro-negotiation rather than 
the DUP, which was attending the talks without supporting them from day one. 
Therefore, as Steven King argued, ‘the US impact was important in 1997 when 
the talks started and everybody was concerned about the blame game. Nobody 
wanted to be blamed for the failure. If we had been blamed the US would have 
talked to London which would then had come to see us.’77 Therefore, if the UUP 
were certainly not satisfied with the conciliatory approach that the new 
government had taken, they had no choice but to demonstrate flexibility.
In fact, at that stage of the process, David Trimble had no choice but to 
remain in the negotiation not only to keep his credibility but also to preserve 
what Unionists could still protect. Such a precarious position seems to have been 
the lot of Trimble during the negotiations, facing external and internal pressure 
up to the end of the negotiation that led to the Good Friday Agreement. The UUP
74 Financial Times, “Shaking hands all round: Trimble holds the key to Ulster peace deal”, 14 
Oct. 1997
75 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 21 Oct. 2003
76 The Observer, “Ceasefire in Ireland braces itself for Peace”, 20 Jul. 1997
77 Dr. Steven King, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 23 Oct. 2003
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clearly felt they had no choice but to remain involved. Walking away seemed the 
worse option. Their engagement at this time was still largely defensive and 
reactionary. However, there are signs of a more positive attitude to US 
mediation. A number of senior UUP figures thought that in the post-election 
context that Tony Blair may be able and willing to seek to pressure the US. They 
also hoped that an improved Anglo-American relationship might make this 
possible and see some US pressure on Sinn Fein. Nonetheless, these strategic 
hopes were tentative at this time.
II- THE SIGNATURE OF THE GFA, THE US INFLUENCE: 
AN ULSTER UNIONIST PERSPECTIVE
This section does not intend to provide a detailed account of the talks but 
focuses on the final period, running to the Agreement in April 1998. London and 
Dublin’s joint publication and, with the US official support, of the one page 
document, Proposition on Heads o f Agreement, on 12 January 1998 ‘to add some 
much needed impetus’ illustrates the unproductiveness of the discussions up to 
that point (Hennessey, 2000, p. 115).78
Besides, newspaper articles also underlined the slow progress. For 
instance, the Belfast Telegraph, on 16 December 1997, reported that ‘the SDLP 
appealed to talks chairman George Mitchell (...) to help kick-start the Stormont
• • 7Q ,negotiations’. Moreover, the Ulster Unionists’ position on the institutional
78 Daily Telegraph, “Clinton plans 'push for peace' Ulster trip”, 8 Feb. 1998 ‘American support 
for the outline settlement now being discussed by parties at the talks would not be deflected even 
if the republicans pulled out, he said, adding that there would be “no way back.’”
79 Belfast Telegraph, “Mitchell Faces New Talks Push”, 16 Dec. 1997 and also Belfast Telegraph, 
“Mitchell in pledge to back talks”, 17 Dec. 1997
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future of the province still strongly diverged from the SDLP as late as April, as 
summarised in the Daily Telegraph'.
The Ulster Unionists and SDLP could not agree on how an Ulster assembly 
should operate. David Trimble, the UUP leader, was pushing for a committee- 
style body with minimalist powers that would restrict Sinn F6in’s impact while 
Mr Hume advocated a cabinet-style model exercising collective responsibility 
on the Westminster model. There was also disagreement on the proposed 
make-up of cross-border institutions. The UUP said it wanted limited contact 
with the Republic but the SDLP and Sinn F6in argued for north-south 
structures rooted in an inter-governmental council made up o f ministers in 
Belfast and Dublin.80
This extract dates back to 1 April 1998, eight days before the talks’ 
deadline. The two positions described above were then utterly irreconcilable. 
However, Trimble’s team signed the Good Friday Agreement nine days later.
The agreement contained the formation of a local government with a First 
Minister as chief of the Executive branch jointly holding office with a Deputy 
First Minister from the minority to create a balance of power. Ministerial posts 
are proportionally attributed to parties. 81 The accord also creates a North-South 
Ministerial council to discuss subjects of common interest between Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland and cross-border authorities in a limited 
number of areas.82
80 Daily Telegraph, “Blair acts over Ulster impasse”, 1 Apr. 1998
81 Belfast Agreement, Strand I, Art. 15 and 16
82 Belfast Agreement, Strand II, Art. 1 and 2
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Therefore, in spite of the effective replacement of the AIA, the 
affirmation of the principle of consent to constitutional change and the 
amendment of articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution, the type of institutions 
implemented were close to the nationalist aspirations. Why then did the UUP 
finally sign it?
The UUP justified its support for the agreement in a pamphlet entitled 
“Understanding the Agreement” published in May 1998 aimed at convincing the 
Unionist electorate to vote “yes” at the referendum. The pamphlet insisted that 
the inclusion of the principle of majority consent to constitutional change made 
the Union more secure. It also highlighted the amendment of articles two and 
three of the Irish constitution, arguing that ‘the UUP has persuaded the Republic 
to change [them] in such a way as to remove the territorial claim.’83 It claimed 
that there was an effective Unionist veto over the North and South Council 
‘because all decisions must be by agreement.’ It also argued that the GFA 
represented the effective overthrow of the Framework documents and of the 
AIA. The GFA also dealt with the issue of decommissioning which is ‘to get 
under way during the summer and be finished by May 2000’. It also insisted on 
the importance of the British-Irish Council as ‘it locks Northern Ireland into a 
British isles framework.’ It says that the existence of a Unionist veto in the 
assembly ensures Unionists have a say on every decision but omits to mention 
that the system also ensures a minority veto. Ultimately, it highlights Tony 
Blair’s letter to Trimble in which he assured ‘that if the provisions [that all 
parties are committed to “non violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic 
means”] in the Agreement are not strong enough he will introduce the necessary
83 UUP Publication, “Understanding the Agreement, an Ulster Unionist Perspective”, May 1998
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legislation’, emphasising the idea that ‘the UUP will not serve in the Executive 
Committee with any party which is not genuinely committed to peace.’
The description of the advantages that the Agreement would bring for 
Unionists is based on the interpretation that Unionists can block every institution 
whenever they want to, and to retreat from their position if they are dissatisfied. 
This point is highly significant as it demonstrates that the UUP had to defend 
their involvement in the peace process by arguing that it gave them the 
opportunity to hinder any unsatisfactory progress. There was very little 
promotion of the idea that the agreement could be more positive or that it brought 
“peace” to Northern Ireland. Some Ulster Unionists, such as Lord Laird did 
argue that ‘the organisation that actually set [them] free is the Belfast 
Agreement,’ and remain convinced that it was the best deal that they could get. 
However, other interviewees, generally doubtful about or opposed to the 
agreement, argued a combination of exhaustion, pressure from the British, Irish 
and above all from Clinton and Mitchell led to the signing of the GFA. This is 
the case for Donaldson, saying that:
I was there on the day. I know about the phone calls that were made by Bill 
Clinton. I think he did put pressure. George Mitchell put enormous pressure.
( ...) . He needed an answer from the UUP. But it was the pressure ( ...)  and the 
party signed up to a flawed agreement which hasn’t worked in the sense that we 
are in a situation where there is continuing political instability and political 
institutions have now been suspended on four occasions.85
84 Lord Laird, Offices Holy wood road, Belfast, 14 Mar. 2003
85 Jeffrey Donaldson, UUP Lisburn Office, 15 Apr. 2003
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A- Ulster Unionist negotiating team by the end of 1997: an 
increasing isolation
The UUP were not optimistic about the prospect for the negotiations due 
to resume at the beginning of January 1998. Donaldson declared in December, “I 
will be urging the party leader to revisit the whole question of our continued 
participation in these talks in circumstances in which it is obvious that the 
process is completely over-shadowed by daily concessions to the IRA”.86 Then, 
Four UUP MPs out of ten, William Ross, William Thompson, Roy Beggs and 
Clifford Forsyth ‘withdrew support for the party’s participation in the Stormont 
talks’ on 22 December 1997 increasing Trimble’s isolation within the party.87 
The withdrawal of support by these four MPs also meant that 40% of the UUP 
MPs were then against the agreement. This figure added to the DUP and UKUP 
withdrawal emphasised Trimble’s increasing isolation.
The death of Billy Wright on 27 December 1997 also undermined 
Trimble’s position. His assassination in the Maze Prison endangered the peace 
process, as the prisoners whose opinion is highly influential in the PUP and then 
UDP were about to withdraw their support from the peace process.
“[Trimble] was under a lot of pressure but he needed to keep the smaller 
loyalist parties in the talks, so that he could say he still had the support of a 
majority of Unionist voters” (Mowlam, p. 182-83). The withdrawal of support 
from four of his MPs accentuated his dependence on the small parties.
86 Belfast Telegraph, “New Pressure for Trimble over Talks”, 19 Dec. 1997
87 Belfast Telegraph, “UUP Rebels in Talks Threat”, 22 Dec. 1997
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David Trimble, Lord Maginnis and John Taylor’s visit to the UVF 
detainees on 6 January 1998 at the Maze Prison speaks for itself.88 Without the 
PUP and UDP leaders continued support for the UUP, David Trimble would 
have lacked the necessary assistance to reach an agreement.
Trimble’s increasingly contested position was a problem for the 
negotiations that, as Zartman argues, ‘require recognised leaders on each side 
who are capable of making and holding an agreement and also capable of talking 
both forward to each other and backward to their followers’ (1995, p. 19).
The wave of violence that followed Billy Wright’s death and the 
temporary exclusion of the UDP and Sinn Fein because of alleged breaches of 
the UFF and IRA cease-fires practically obstructed the talks in January and 
February.89 The UUP threatened to quit if Sinn Fein were re-admitted to the 
talks. Trimble argued: “because we have prevented them from using the talks the 
way they wanted, they are now venting their spleen on our constituencies and our 
towns. There can be no question now of their returning to the talks. I will make 
that clear to the Prime Minister when I meet him over the course of this week.” 
Trimble added that Tony Blair would “have brought this process to an end” if 
Sinn Fein were re-admitted.90 Sinn Fein implied a potential return to violence if 
they were not re-admitted to the talks. Adams argued that a peace process “which
88 Belfast Telegraph, “Trimble bid to win over Maze”, 6 Jan. 1998, it is worth noting that 
Trimble’s controversial action found some legitimacy in the fact that Mo Mowlam herself visited 
the paramilitary prisoners on both sides on 9 January 1998. Her visit was also heavily criticised 
by the UKUP, the DUP and the “rebel” faction from the UUP. The Secretary o f State’s action 
was a focus for the media and certainly alleviated the pressure on Trimble. See, Belfast 
Telegraph, “Mo Gets Set For Maze”, 8 Jan. 1998
89 Daily Telegraph, “Loyalist group has to quit talks”, 27 Jan. 1998
90 Daily Telegraph, “Unionist threaten to quit talks”, 24 Feb. 1998
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excludes Sinn Féin cannot deliver the inclusive and broadly based workable 
agreement which is necessary to end the cycle of conflict and violence.”91
Thus, the peace process had reached a stalemate and required “external 
intervention” and new suggestions to progress. The term “external intervention” 
included the British and Irish governments who also played a major role in 
intervening in the final week of the talks on some actors’ request. As Neeson 
describes: ‘John [Alderdice] made a famous speech and asked Blair “get here and 
get here quickly” so it was Blair’s intervention and Bertie Ahern’s intervention 
was probably the most influential thing that happened this week.’92 Furthermore, 
Neeson argued: ‘Clinton played a very particular role as well.’93 Most Unionist 
interviewees, pro or anti-agreement, affirmed that Mitchell and Clinton also 
played a major role in the signing of the agreement.
B- Mitchell and Clinton’s relations with the Ulster Unionist team
The interpretation of the US participation greatly diverges according to 
the interviewee’s position on the agreement.
The more the interviewee is against the agreement the more he will insist 
on the strong US pressure on Trimble’s team. The pro-agreement interviewees 
would tend to minimise or perhaps simply not exaggerate the US contribution,
91 Daily Telegraph, “Mitchell warns o f more bloodshed”, 19 Feb. 1998
92 Sean Neeson, AP Headquarters, Belfast, 9 Jul. 2003
93 Sean Neeson, AP Headquarters, Belfast, 9 Jul. 2003
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though usually positively acknowledging their participation. Such an analysis is 
obviously linked to the interviewees’ attitude to Trimble and his team.
1- Mitchell’s pressure on the Ulster Unionist team
‘Three years after President Clinton gave [Mitchell] a six-month 
assignment here,’94 all actors involved certainly knew him very well as, once the 
mediator gets involved, he ‘operates in a complex arena of interdependent 
relations’ (Bercovitch, 1992, p.25). As Hopmann simply puts it, the mediator’s 
role is to help reach an agreement (1996, p.227). Therefore, Mitchell 
unsurprisingly strongly encouraged the actors to sign the agreement on 10 April 
1998.
The mediator can play an advisory or directive role (Rubin, 1981, p. 14, 
Rubin, Pruitt and Kim, 1994, p.201). Although the nuance between the two 
notions can be indistinguishable in practice, there is a huge difference between 
strongly suggesting and forcing the signing of an agreement. The diverging 
opinions expressed during the interviewing process are often based on the nature 
of Mitchell’s role during the negotiations.
Beyond the significance of The Propositions on Heads o f Agreement that, 
according to Trimble, the UUP accepted “as the basis for a subsequent 
negotiation and discussion”95, Mitchell’s announcement on 25 March 1998 that
9,1 Portland Press Herald (Maine), “D-Day closes in for Mitchell, Northern Ireland Peace 
Process", 29 Mar. 1998
95National Press Club Morning Newsmaker, David Trimble, Leader o f Northern Ireland’s Ulster 
Unionist Party, 17 Mar. 1998
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the deadline for the talks was 9 April 1998 was important in bringing focus to the 
final phase of the negotiations. According to Rubin, Pruitt and Kim, a deadline 
should be imposed to increase the pressure on the participants and can accelerate 
the progress toward an agreement (1994, p.206). Mitchell also retrospectively 
acknowledged its efficiency in arguing that, its ‘existence (...) could not 
guarantee a success but it made success possible’ (1999, p.l 138). However, Blair 
had already imposed a deadline for the end of the talks of May 1998 at the 
beginning of his premiership. As Mowlam describes it, it showed ‘[they] were 
serious and wouldn’t allow the talks to be strung out indefinitely’ (2002, p. 110). 
Contrary to Willie Ross’ affirmation that ‘[Mitchell] came down, he said, “look I 
am going off for Easter, this thing has got to be sorted out in a short period of 
time,” Mitchell did not impose this deadline but supplied a more accurate date. It 
was suggested and agreed among the negotiating teams. Trimble indicated it in 
an interview in Washington on 18 March 1998: “we agreed a few weeks ago that 
we would try to accelerate the negotiations, and we set Easter as the target; the 
target is actually Easter.”96 In any case, if Mitchell had really imposed a date as 
Ross suggested it, then the difference would have been a matter of weeks with 
Blair’s deadline. It certainly put pressure on the participants and perhaps 
accelerated the signing of the agreement, but they were free to reject it as 
‘whether the parties lead or are led to lead decision to stop fighting and on what 
terms belongs to them’ (Crocker, Hampson and Aall, 1999, p.54).
From the UUP perspective, their negotiating team could not go beyond 
the deadline as they had agreed with it and the three governments supported it. 
Moreover, if, as Arthur argues, the UUP isolation within the Unionist community 
explains the UUP team’s hesitation during the peace process (1999, p.481),
96 National Press Club Morning Newsmaker, David Trimble, Leader o f Northern Ireland’s Ulster
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Trimble may paradoxically have been satisfied with the deadline. His team’s 
increasing isolation was not playing in the Ulster Unionists’ favour as they were 
facing a united Nationalist front. So, if Trimble played the game of threatening to 
walk out of the talks, his position could have been further weakened in the wider 
Unionist community. He would have actually had more to gain in getting an 
agreement settled on time.
One of the primary goals of a mediator is to gain the trust of all actors 
involved in the process (Rubin, 1981, p.36, Zartman, 1995, p.23). Mitchell seems 
to have managed to win the respect of the Unionists who had remained in the 
process in spite the huge controversy that his appointment triggered. Conor 
O’Clery argued: ‘Unionists quickly realised that George Mitchell was a very 
serious politician and that he would never agree with a decision unacceptable for 
the Unionists.’97 A Northern Irish civil servant confirms O’Clery’s viewpoint 
arguing that due to ‘George Mitchell’s personal integrity, his endless patience, he 
gradually got [Unionists] into acceptance.’98 Anti-agreement Unionist political 
figures unsurprisingly attacked his personality and presence within the talks. 
Vance argued that: ‘Senator Mitchell [had] created a disaster; he [had] not 
consulted parties such as [his] and was disconnected from a large part of the 
Unionists.’99 In this present case, it is worth noting that as a UKUP member, 
Vance disregards that his party put itself in the situation of being out of reach as 
they deliberately walked out. Nevertheless, Vance is right in arguing that 
Mitchell was not in touch with a part of the Unionist political community but the 
fault lies on the Unionist parties refusing to engage rather than Mitchell, who, as
Unionist Party, 17 Mar. 1998
97 Conor O’Clery, New York, 10 May 2002
98 Private Interview, Northern Irish Civil Servant
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a mediator, could not force them into establishing dialogue. As Mitchell argued 
himself in his book, Making Peace, if the UKUP and the DUP had remained 
involved, it would have been impossible to reach an agreement (1999, p .110). 
From an anti-agreement viewpoint, this can underline the level of pressure that 
the pro-agreement parties and especially the UUP faced but it also highlights the 
responsibility of the UKUP and DUP’s decision to leave the talks.
The members of the UUP who opposed the nature of the agreement such 
as Beggs who declared that ‘there was no way to support an agreement so open 
to interpretation on both sides’100 or Jeffrey Donaldson, who walked out of the 
negotiations at the last minute and who left the party in January 2004, do not 
openly criticise Mitchell’s personality. On that matter, Beggs provides a very 
diplomatic analysis, arguing: ‘[Mitchell] always impressed my colleagues and 
me as a very genuine and sincere man. Unfortunately, there never has been a 
proper understanding of the worst elements in Republicanism.’101 Thus, the MP, 
who remained in the UUP, insists that Mitchell’s efforts were genuine, but his 
misunderstanding of Republicanism’s most extremist elements prevented 
Mitchell from playing an efficient role from a Unionist standpoint.
The pro-agreement Loyalists such as David Ervine were very enthusiastic 
about Mitchell, saying that the agreement had been reached ‘thanks to the talent 
and the integrity of George Mitchell.’102
Such a declaration seems natural from the PUP whose inclusion in the 
talks was brought about by the inclusive strategy that the US strongly advocated.
99 David Vance, Stormont Castle, 15 May 2000
100 Roy Beggs, UUP office, Lame, 30 Jan. 2004
101 Roy Beggs, UUP office, Lame, 30 Jan. 2004
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UUP members who fully supported the agreement have a more nuanced opinion. 
Lord Maginnis expressed the view that Mitchell ‘was a good humoured, patient 
individual (...) he was very balanced.’103 He added a very important point that 
depicted the Unionist general belief: ‘there is nobody in this world (...) who 
would be totally acceptable to our side’104 in other words nobody would have 
been suitable. Therefore, a part of the Unionist political leadership would always 
find something wrong, whether it was Mitchell or not, because, as Beggs argues 
‘[Unionists] don’t want any interference’ though acknowledging ‘the valuable 
contribution that has been made to Northern Ireland through the massive funds to 
support the peace building and we acknowledge the contribution by the 
International Fund for Ireland.’ 105 It is worth noting that Unionists initially 
opposed the creation of the Fund in 1985, but no longer opposed it in any 
significant way.
Beyond the generally positive comments about Mitchell’s personality, 
Unionists are often divided on the role that Mitchell played during the final week 
and more crucially the last hours prior to the signing of the agreement. Ervine’s 
standpoint that ‘there would not have been any agreement without him’106 is also 
shared, though, from a different perspective, by anti-agreement Unionists arguing 
that Mitchell turned out to be a strong source of pressure. Willie Ross argued: ‘ I 
was told at one stage that [Mitchell] gave Trimble fifteen minutes to make up his 
mind.’107
103 David Ervine, Stormont, 15 May 2000
103 Lord Maginnis, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 6 Dec. 2002
104 Lord Maginnis, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 6 Dec. 2002
105 Roy Beggs, UUP office, Lame, 30 Jan. 2004
m  David Ervine, Stormont, 15 May 2000
107 William Ross, Europa Hotel, Belfast, 2 Feb. 2004
243
Jeffrey Donaldson confirms this viewpoint as he saw the US pressure as 
a major factor in the signing of the Belfast Agreement, arguing: T was there on 
the day (...) George Mitchell put enormous pressure. He basically gave David 
Trimble an ultimatum in the mid-afternoon that he was going to convene the 
parlies to decide on the agreement.’108 Mitchell’s pressure was expected since his 
role was to persuade the actors to sign the agreement. Caine confirmed it when 
stating: ‘that was of the role of George Mitchell to try and facilitate the 
agreement. It does not surprise me that the pressure was enormous.’109
Furthermore, Donaldson omits the fact that Mitchell presented a draft on 
Tuesday prior to the signing of the agreement. Steven King argues ‘the 
governments gave their document, presented to us as Mitchell’s document.’110 
This point is confirmed in the Daily Telegraph, reporting that ‘George Mitchell, 
the Northern Ireland talks chairman, finally issued his draft outline of an Ulster 
settlement at midnight last night despite major differences between unionist and 
nationalist negotiators over keys aspects of the proposed deal.’111 The article 
mentions that two texts by British and Irish governments were included in 
Mitchell’s document. It also mentions that one of the biggest disagreements 
related to the type of cross-border bodies to be set up. For that matter, Steven 
King affirms: ‘[Mitchell] was helpful in the sense that he realised that David 
Trimble could not sell it and informed the Prime Ministers about it.’1'2 Trimble 
corroborates this:
108 Jeffrey Donaldson, UUP Office, Lisburn, 15 Apr. 2003
109 Jonathan Caine, Westminster, 21 Oct. 2003
110 Dr. Steven King, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 23 Oct. 2003
111 Daily Telegraph, “Mitchell outlines the split on Ulster”, 7 Apr. 1998
112 Dr. Steven K ing,, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 23 Oct. 2003
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What I was most critical of were bits o f this report which were dealing with cross 
border relations, relations between Britain and Ireland where he had been given a 
paper which he was told was the agreed position of the British and Irish 
governments and my astonishment when I saw it was on a Monday afternoon 
after I had discussed the issue over the phone with the prime minister on Saturday 
and Sunday and having agreed with him on something quite different. ( ...)  I 
don’t blame Senator Mitchell for that, I blame primarily the Northern Ireland 
office because I told the Senator of my conversation with the Prime Minister and 
he actually had an interview with the British and Irish civil servants who said to 
him that this was the position o f  the government.113
As Zartman and Touval argue, mediation is not aimed at helping one of 
the participants to win’ as its goal is ‘to bring the parties toward an agreement 
acceptable for everybody’ (1996, p.445). In that case, Mitchell played in favour 
of Unionists in arguing their case and demonstrating his even-handedness 
prioritising the viability of the agreement over its signing at any price. Thus, 
when Mitchell put pressure on the UUP to sign the agreement on April 10th, he 
had gained some credibility for not proposing an accord that would contradict 
Unionists’ interest. Nevertheless, Willie Ross argued that ‘David Trimble 
accepted because he had been mentally battered for a long time, he just gave 
up.’114 This statement highlights three major points. First, the pressure on 
Trimble was too intense, second and as a result, exhaustion was an important 
factor in explaining the signing of the agreement. It denies the role of other 
participants to the negotiations and UUP pro-agreements leading figures.
113 David Trimble, UUP Headquarters, 8 Apr. 2004
114 William Ross, Europa Hotel, Belfast, 2 Feb.2004
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For instance, Maginnis, who had not taken part in the negotiations, 
‘pointed out that the Agreement gave the unionist community control of its own 
destiny for the first time in twenty five years’ (Hennessey, 2000, p. 169) and even 
more crucially John Taylor’s support as Hennessey rightly argues that ‘without 
his deputy leader’s support, Trimble would have been unable to have defended 
the Agreement’ (2000, p. 169). Leonard, an American researcher at the Alliance 
Party, confirmed Hennessey’s last argument, declaring in an interview that: ‘the 
key person is John Taylor, he was a key persuader at the last minute to go for 
it.’115
Ross’ answer depicts the UUP negotiating team as completely
disconnected from the rest of the party and ignores the importance of what
Zartman calls “internal negotiations” which can be either horizontal or vertical.
As Zartman puts it, ‘the negotiating team has to negotiate with the hierarchy’, as
will be discussed further in the fifth part of this chapter (1995, p.21). Ross does
not mention as reported in the Sunday Times, that ‘the Ulster Unionist council
convincingly endorsed the Stormont agreement by a majority of 540 to 210 at its
meeting in Belfast’ on 18 April 1998.116 Ross also argued that Mitchell along
with the British and Irish governments favoured any immediate accord to a
durable one.117 This idea finds some echo in Donaldson’s words: ‘in my opinion,
we should have delayed until after Easter 1998 and sorted out the remaining
problems in the agreement. And if we had done that, this agreement might have 
118worked.’ Donaldson’s standpoint changes the deadline into a pistol without 
bullets. It could have been indefinitely postponed increasing the risk of the
115 Allan Leonard, Research Officer, AP Headquarters, Belfast, 9 Jul. 2003
116 Sunday Times, “Unionists say yes to peace deal”, 19 Apr. 1998
117 William Ross, Europa Hotel, Belfast, 2 Feb. 2004
IIS Jeffrey Donaldson, UUP Office, Lisburn, 15 Apr. 2003
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collapse of the talks. Besides, Donaldson ignores the schedule imperatives as 
summarized in the Portland Press Herald, ‘there’s not much flexibility in the 
April 9 deadline. An early April accord is vital if the Republic of Ireland and 
British-controlled Northern Ireland are to hold referendums on a settlement in 
late May, and for elections to a prospective Northern Ireland legislature to be 
held in June. These steps are considered essential before the usually explosive 
sectarian parade season enters full swing in July.’119
From the pro-agreement viewpoint, Mitchell’s role is not perceived as 
being that prominent. Lord Maginnis stated that ‘it’s very hard, it’s for history to 
assess (...) George Mitchell’s real contribution.’120 King argued that Mitchell ‘did 
not broker the deal. It is pretty much an Anglo-Irish deal.’121 Trimble stated:
I appealed the Prime Minister to take a direct personal involvement which he 
then did, Bertie Ahern, came up as well and actually for the last few days of the 
talks, they were conducted by Blair and Ahern with the principal parties and 
without that direct involvement o f both Blair and Ahem there would not have 
been an agreement. But that is not a criticism o f the senator’s work, because 
chairing the talks and getting to the point that we were nearly there is itself a very 
significant achievement.122
A US official’s words echo this statement: ‘the agreement bases were 
already there since the Sunningdale and the AIA showed some solutions. The 
part of the job done by Mitchell’s team was more limited than what people
119 Portland Press Herald  (Maine), “D-Day closes in for Mitchell, Northern Ireland Peace 
Process”, 29 Mar. 1998
120 Lord Maginnis, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 6 Dec. 2002
121 Dr. Steven King, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 23 Oct. 2003
122 David Trimble, UUP Head quarter, Belfast, 8 Apr. 2004
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• t 123 * *think.’ His job rather consisted, to use Hopmann’s terminology, in being a 
“process facilitator” that is to say that he ‘has no influence on the substance of 
the agreement he just makes things workable’ (1996, p.231).
Thus, Unionist politicians have a very varied opinion of Mitchell’s role in 
the signing of the GFA. The more anti-agreement elements insist on Mitchell’s 
leverage on the negotiating team, whereas the pro-agreement elements tend to 
highlight their own initiative in order to keep the credit for their achievement. 
Pro-agreement unionists do not accept that the US participation was an important 
point of pressure that led to the signing of the agreement.
Nevertheless, as discussed above, the mediator’s main role is to help 
people reach an agreement. He possesses some leverage to impel the parties into 
signing the settlement. Mitchell possessed two main tools. First, he benefited 
from his formal position in the sense that he ‘responds to the parties by shaping 
the statement or the future agreement’ (Hopmann, 1996, p239). Mitchell used his 
powers after discovering that Unionists would not accept the document circulated 
on 5 April 1998.124 Second, he could use his power of “coercion” to persuade the 
parties to sign it. As Donaldson mentioned, Mitchell used a high degree of 
pressure on David Trimble.125
How could Mitchell be so influential over the parties without any 
backing? Vance accused him of being ‘the “bras droit” of Bill Clinton.’126 
Zartman and Touval argue that ‘from the beginning the mediator’s leverage is at
123 Private Interview with US official
124 Belfast Telegraph, “Sticking Point, Mitchell’s attempt to keep talk process on track”, 6 Apr. 
1998
125 Jeffrey Donaldson, UUP Office, Lisburn, 15 Apr. 2003
126 David Vance, Stormont Castle, 15 May 2000
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the mercy of the contestants’ (1996, p.455). An illustration is Steven King’s 
words about the way the UUP ‘watered down [Mitchell’s] position to the extent 
that it did not matter very much whether he chaired or not’127 as discussed in the 
previous chapter. However, it disregards informal leverage that can become 
instrumental in the final stages of striking a deal. As Hopmann states, the choice 
of a mediator is based on two main criteria, ‘the personal skills and the weight of 
the state or organisation they represent’ (1996, p.221). Mitchell’s team, although 
being officially independent, benefited from the British, Irish and above all US 
administration support. Hopmann’s point finds some echo in Bercovitch’s 
argument that the leverage of the mediator depends on his position within his 
own country, ‘the leeway given to them in determining policies’ and very 
importantly for this thesis, on the ‘resources, capabilities and political orientation 
of their countries’ (1992, p .13). Mitchell benefited from President Clinton’s full 
backing which sensibly increased in the last crucial hours before the signing of 
the agreement.
The position of anti-Agreement Unionists towards Mitchell is clear. They 
emphasise his leverage as a means of explaining the UUP decision. Equally, it is 
clear why pro-GFA UUP would wish to minimise Mitchell’s role in this regard. 
Nonetheless, it is obvious that Mitchell played at least some role in adding to the 
pressure on the UUP to sign an agreement they were not fully satisfied with, to 
say the least. However, it is also interesting that Mitchell managed to do this 
while still maintaining good relations with the UUP. This can be partly explained 
by his strong position as Clinton’s envoy and being the appointee of the two 
governments. However, it also suggests that a skilful mediator, with a powerful 
position, can both use leverage to good effect and remain a useful mediator
127 Dr. Steven King, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 23 Oct. 2003
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between antagonistic sides, even when the UUP did not initially support his 
appointment.
2- Clinton’s influence on the UUP
Bill Clinton’s role needs to be separately analysed as he played a distinct 
part in becoming personally involved in the peace process. He intervened on 
multiple occasions showing his support for London and Dublin and therefore 
reinforcing the unity of the second level of the “third-party bloc.” Clinton had 
tremendous leverage to pressure the actors with rewards such as economic 
investments or to log blames for failure. The Sunday Times reported two days 
after the signing of the agreement that ‘Clinton may also underwrite the deal with 
a promise of £100 million of American investment in the province over the next 
five years.’128
Just as Mitchell’s level of influence over the signing of the agreement had 
generated various opinions, Clinton’s constant interest in Northern Ireland along 
with his personal involvement during the final moments prior to the signing of 
the agreement has triggered different perceptions.
UUP members have developed opinions of the US participation in the 
GFA that are not necessarily linked to their stance regarding the agreement. 
Their position on the US participation also depends on the degree of support they 
had initially shown for it. Donaldson’s position is the most illustrative one.
128 Sunday Times, “Resurrection?”, 12 Apr. 1998
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Despite being one of the strongest opponents of the GFA, his being the first co­
ordinator of the US bureau does not allow him to be publicly as judgmental as he 
may have been otherwise since it would discredit his strong advocacy of a US 
agenda.
Among the moderate or pro-agreement elements of the UUP, there are 
those who praised Clinton for his contribution to the Belfast Agreement such as 
Barry White, reflecting the Ulster Unionist Party official line, who argued that 
‘there are many people who claim credit for the agreement but the person who 
had a very key role was Clinton.’129 Other pro-agreement officials are more 
nuanced in their judgement. Steven King recognised that ‘for Clinton, it was a 
very personal involvement’130 or Maginnis argued that ‘it’s for history to assess
1 <3 1
Clinton’s real contribution.’
On the anti-agreement side, Lord Molyneaux declared that ‘[Clinton] 
genuinely wanted to help.’132 Jeffrey Donaldson argued: ‘actually I think that
overtime Bill Clinton (....) developed a very strong affection for Northern Ireland
' i i i  t f 
that was way beyond the political thing whereas Willie Ross maintained that
Clinton ‘wasn’t really interested in the Ulster Unionists. He just went along
being informed by the British government and the Nationalists north and
south.’134 Donaldson’s statement is not surprising as he was one of the most
ardent advocates of the Unionist American agenda as covered in the previous
Belfast Telegraph, “Clinton pledges £100m package”, 11 Apr. 1998
129 Barry White, Westminster, 14 Feb. 2003
130 Dr. Steven King, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 23 Oct. 2003
131 Lord Maginnis, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 6 Dec. 2002
132 Lord Molyneaux, Westminster, 10 Feb. 2004
133 Jeffrey Donaldson, UUP Office, Lisburn, 15 Apr. 2003
134 William Ross, Europa Hotel, Belfast, 2 Feb. 2004
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chapter. Ross’ perception of the situation may be accurate in the sense that 
Clinton’s engagement, as previously observed, was to back the British and Irish 
governments but Ross goes further and sees it as anti-Unionist and pro- 
Nationalist.135
However, Steven King argued that: ‘the second presidency was much 
more balanced. In terms of policy his position was clear, they were insisting on 
the principle of consent (...).’136 In fact, Clinton’s deep interest in Ireland, 
defining himself as Irish-American, certainly motivated his position in the 
conflict. This feeling does not necessarily imply a pro-Irish nationalist attitude. 
Nancy Soderberg argued: ‘[Clinton] never had a particular nationalist agenda. 
The perception was opposite so it was the perception that did shift not his 
particular position.’137 Still, King seems to be right when he perceived a shift 
between the first and second presidency regarding the US administration attitude 
vis a vis Northern Ireland, but it seems that this change of strategy has more to 
do with priorities rather than ideological considerations. The first phase was to 
convince the IRA to call a cease-fire and get Sinn Fein included within the talks. 
Once this had been done, the US President could act across a range of issues and 
actors and therefore re-balance the US approach.
A major factor in Clinton’s interventionist attitude in the Northern Ireland 
issue was the greater flexibility that the Labour government offered on the US 
level of participation in the peace process. Ulster Unionists, by and large, did not 
suffer from the renewal of “special relationship” between Downing Street and 
the White House as Trimble and his advisors had prepared themselves for the
135 William Ross, Europa Hotel, Belfast, 2 Feb. 2004
136 Dr. Steven King, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 23 Oct. 2003
137 Nancy Soderberg, New York City, 14 May 2002
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much expected 1997 Labour victory. This collaborating relationship is visible 
through contemporary articles. For example, in the conservative Sunday Times an 
article on 15 February regarding a possible trip by Adams to the USA and 
meeting with the President, suggested that ‘Tony Blair and Clinton must decide 
whether an Adams’ visit to the White House could encourage a new IRA 
ceasefire, followed by Sinn Féin’s readmission to talks, or whether Adams’s 
exclusion would help to save the peace process.’ It added that ‘London, 
Washington and Dublin have to decide between three options: encouraging 
Adams to visit America and acceding to him meeting Clinton; encouraging the 
Adams visit to America but pushing for Clinton to decline a meeting; or pushing 
for Adams to be refused entry to America.’138 Another article in the Sunday 
Times argued that ‘Tony Blair has Bill Clinton by the short and curlies and no 
Kennedy will tear these two apart. The Taoiseach has toughened up in response 
to the realisation that the Republic could not cope if Sinn Féin achieved 
hegemony in the North by displacing Hume’s party and started to foment civil 
strife on a massive scale.’139 The more left-wing newspaper, The Independent, 
also comments: ‘As the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, Taoiseach Bertie Ahem and 
President Bill Clinton were all dragged into the deepening crisis, the key words 
in Belfast appeared to be “incontrovertible evidence”.’140 Such accounts from 
both British political tendencies would have been unthinkable at the beginning of 
the US involvement. This analysis of the shift over the years is repeated in an 
article in The Independent stating that ‘every public declaration made by Mr 
Clinton, Mr Ahern and Mo Mowlam last week appeared almost as if it had been 
carefully orchestrated and jointly rehearsed. In John Major’s time acrimony
138 Sunday Times, “Adams gambles on meeting with Clinton”, 15 Feb. 1998
139 Sunday Times, “Putting our Hope in Rational Republicans”, 15 Feb. 1998
140 The Independent, “Threats throw Ulster peace into turmoil”, 14 Feb. 1998
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always lurked behind the diplomatic smiles.’141 Unionists noticed the change, as 
Dermott Nesbitt commented: ‘the US government has been another leg to the 
British and Irish governments to put the peace process forward and they worked, 
I presume, quite well because as we know in the real world of politics, 
communication is always taking place.’142 Therefore, Clinton’s involvement was 
very difficult to contravene as its legitimacy relied on the two sovereign states 
involved in the negotiations.
The fact that all parties involved in the Peace Process attended the 
celebration of the 1998 St Patrick’s Day at the White House demonstrated 
Clinton’s personal importance in the talks. To be present was also an 
acknowledgement by all actors of his role in the peace process as the 1998 St 
Patrick’s Day was an event that enabled President Clinton to pressurise ‘the 
parties to reach an agreement, injecting a sense of urgency to the negotiations. 
He has held out the prospect of U.S. economic support if they do.’143 Clinton 
used his leverage to work with the British and Irish governments and also with 
Mitchell. He used the promise of economic investments to induce Northern Irish 
leaders to sign up to an agreement. Clinton was in the shadow of Blair, Ahem 
and Mitchell whenever they had to pressurise the parties over the last hours 
before the signing.
The different accounts of the night preceding the signing of the agreement 
in the early hours of 10 April 1998 converge towards the fact that Clinton’s 
personal intervention had been instrumental in reaching the agreement.
141 The Independent, ‘A clear call to all the President's Ulstermen’, 22 Mar. 1998
142 Dermott Nesbitt, Stormont Castle, 16 Mar. 2000
143 International Herald Tribune, “For Clinton, a Personal Investment in the Success of the Ulster 
Peace Talks”, 10 Apr. 1998
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Accounts in 10 April’s newspapers underlined the fact that President 
Clinton had remained awake during the whole night.144 The Guardian affirmed 
that at 4:15 in the morning, Tony Blair made a phone call to Clinton to ask him 
to intervene and then ‘after a call from Clinton, Ulster Unionist leader David 
Trimble [accepted] reassurances given by Blair and agrees to enter the session’ 
which led to the signing of the agreement. 145 This account suggests that 
Clinton’s phone call to Trimble saved the GFA and that the US President had 
leverage over the unionist leader. The Independent repeated, though more 
explicitly, the story on 11 April reporting that ‘Tony Blair (...) had called in Mr 
Trimble for a meeting which had been incendiary. (...) But then, apparently, Mr 
Blair produced his trump card: the special relationship with Bill Clinton.146 
These reports provided the US President with a lot of credit regarding the GFA 
and are certainly exaggerated to some extent, as it is unbelievable that a simple 
phone call could have changed the UUP position so decisively. An American 
official rightly declared: ‘it had been dramatic couple of weeks and dramatic 48 
hours and I don’t think one phone call would be decisive.’147
Trimble’s version is focused on the help that Clinton granted him in 
putting pressure on the governments to obtain some reassurances:
144 Eg: The Associated Press, “Clinton works through night on Northern Ireland peace talks”, 10 
Apr. 1998
The Guardian, “The Peace Deal: ‘This agreement offers a truly historic opportunity for a new 
beginning...’; How critical minutes ticked away: Countdown/ Emotions went from hope to 
despair and back”, 11 Apr. 1998
The Independent, “Irish Peace Talks: Deal not possible without Clinton rather historical”, 11. 
Apr. 1998
The Independent, “Irish Peace Talks: Long Good Friday for men of honour”, 11 Apr. 1998
145 The Guardian, “The Peace Deal: ‘This agreement offers a truly historic opportunity for a new 
beginning ...’; How critical minutes ticked away: Countdown/ Emotions went from hope to 
despair and back”, 11 Apr. 1998
146 The Independent, “Irish Peace Talks: Long Good Friday for men of honour”, 11 Apr. 1998
147 Private Interview with US Official
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Clinton started to talk to me in general terms about what a good thing that would 
be for Northern Ireland. Just a moment I am going to tell you where we are, our 
problem is, I described what the problem was, I said there is a solution to the 
problem, I told him what the solution was, and the Prime Minister should give an 
assurance. It would useful Mr. President if  you were to tell the other parties to 
crawl back and create the space. He said we can’t change the text o f the 
agreement now, it’s all fully negotiated. ‘No but what you can do’ and I told him 
about the assurance we were seeking, and he said ‘we will do that’ and we did get 
that letter from the Prime Minister that contained those insurances, we arranged 
for the letter to be published and distributed to the parties before the final session 
of the agreement and it was hugely significant and none o f the other parties on 
that day or indeed since have denounced the letter or the contents o f that letter. I 
actually attribute that to the involvement of the president and I think that he did 
precisely what I asked him to do in terms of speaking to the other major parties, 
that’s my perspective on the final stage o f the talks.148
Neeson’s version of the situation likewise does not put any emphasis on Bill 
Clinton’s phone call as he argues:
Clinton played a very particular role as well. He says he stayed up all night. It 
was true, he did. He was on the phone with everybody and when we got the 
document on Friday morning (...) Unionists did not know what to do, Donaldson 
had walked out, others were having serious reservation as well. And then, 
around about half three or so, Mitchell decided, look we hang on here all day so 
I am calling a meeting. It was at four and at that stage Trimble rather reluctantly 
decided to buy into the whole thing.149
148 David Trimble, UUP Headquarters, 8 Apr. 2004. As a matter of record, Sinn Fein repeatedly 
denounced the letter by the Prime Minister.
149 Sean Neeson, AP Headquarters, Belfast, 9 Jul. 2003
Neeson contradicts Trimble’s description of the event. The fact that the 
letter was indeed published the next day demonstrates that Trimble knew that he 
would obtain it before he signed the agreement. Thus, his reluctance to the 
signing may not have been as strong as Neeson claimed but rather embodied a 
tactical attitude. Barry White’s reinforces the point:
It was Clinton’s intervention to Gerry Adams and Tony Blair that made the 
difference (...). As a result that helped us to get a side-letter from Tony Blair to 
David Trimble about decommissioning and so on. It counted not necessarily 
because he was the President o f  the United States, because everyone knew he 
understood the situation. It was not the case of I am that person you will do this, 
he understood the situation, his intervention was sincere, genuine, everyone 
believed that, that’s why it was so vital.’150
The pro-agreement Ulster Unionists understandably do not want Clinton’s 
importance to be overstated as their role as negotiators would be diminished. 
Therefore, it remains very difficult to know to what extent Clinton had an effect 
on the UUP decision, but it certainly is exaggerated to focus on the leverage that 
Clinton had over the UUP, as it might not have been so substantial. However, 
Clinton surely had some impact especially with his capacity to pressurise Blair. 
Yet, Trimble’s position was so delicate that his room to manoeuvre was narrow. 
He could either the sign the agreement or reject it with the probability of ending 
his political career, reinforcing the DUP position within the Unionist community 
and possibly being blamed for a return to violence in the province. Negotiators 
often make decisions on a cost-benefit calculation and in this context, it appeared 
that a post-agreement outcome was more beneficial than the collapse of the talks. 
Clinton certainly reinforced this view with the UUP. It is also clear that pro-GFA
150 Barry White, Westminster, 14 Feb. 2003
257
do not present the final days as them fighting against a US threat. The US role is 
either minimised or the UUP focus on their successful efforts to persuade Clinton 
and Mitchell to take their views on board and go back to the Nationalists and/ or 
the governments.
Clinton’s role has been effective and did not stop at the moment of the 
signing of the GFA. Mitchell stated that “It’s a significant accomplishment but I 
don’t think anyone should be under the illusion that the problems of Northern 
Ireland have been solved with this act,” he said. “There’s a long way to go.”151
One of the crucial questions in the aftermath of the signing of an 
agreement is ‘how to disengage from a mediating role without endangering the 
carefully brokered settlement?’(Zartman & Touval, 1997, p. 459). In that respect, 
the US remained involved in the particularly sensitive phase of implementation 
of the agreement, to monitor the progress and help consolidate it. The UUP kept 
on collaborating with Clinton and then had to cope with Mitchell’s return during 
the 1999 review of the agreement as it will be studied in the final part of this 
chapter.
V- MONITORING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
AGREEMENT: UNIONISTS’ PERCEPTION OF THE US 
ROLE
Most of the literature on the Northern Ireland peace process and the US 
involvement stopped at the signature of the GFA ignoring the active role that the 
US administration - especially Bill Clinton and George Mitchell - carried on
151 Sunday Times, “Resurrection?”, 12 Apr. 1998
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playing in its aftermath. This last part attempts at addressing this point within the 
Ulster Unionist-US relationship context.
The implementation of the agreement is the final phase of the peace 
process (Sisk, 1996, p.24). This period can be long and is always critical as it is 
the empirical application of the agreement. Nevertheless, the US administration 
and Trimble’s support for the agreement did not imply that the UUP was to use 
the US card. In fact, they often rejected it.
The post-agreement relationship between the US and the pro-agreement 
Ulster Unionists will be analysed in the light of three main events, Clinton’s 
participation in the “yes” campaign, his second trip to the province in September 
1998 and Mitchell’s return at the end of 1999 to facilitate the review of the 
changes within the content of the Belfast Agreement.
A- Ulster Unionists’ rejecting of Clinton’s participation in the 
“yes” campaign
The preparation of a referendum illustrates two major points in the 
Northern Ireland case. Firstly, the political elites support for the agreement is not 
sufficient to validate its implementation. Secondly, it marks a symbolic 
democratic validation as the population took responsibility for it thus becoming 
full actors in process. On that matter, the United States put strong efforts into 
campaigning in favour of the “yes” along with the British government. The US 
were therefore siding with Nationalists of all distinctions, and the pro-agreement
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Unionists, which represented about ‘72% of the Ulster Unionist council members 
that voted for the accord.’152
Mitchell’s role as chairman of the talks was over, but Clinton remained 
actively involved in the Northern Irish peace process stating his intention of 
visiting the province to encourage the “yes” vote at the referenda by the end of 
May as early as 9 February 1998, in other words two months prior to the signing 
of the agreement153 and was also reported on several occasions afterwards.154
Contrary to the nationalists, the UUP were opposed to this offer. Trimble 
reportedly stated: “I can quite understand his desire to be away from 
Washington,” making a direct allusion to Clinton’s political difficulties at home 
with the Lewinsky scandal.155 Jim Rodgers, then UUP Deputy Lord Mayor of 
Belfast, said: “Quite clearly he is intending to come here to try to influence as 
well as interfere in our affairs and I think he has as many problems of his own in 
America.”156
Such demonstrations of hostility from the Ulster Unionists Party was 
quite unusual as, following Trimble’s election and the party strategy 
reorientation, they commonly remained cautious in public about their opinion of 
the US involvement.
152 Sunday Times, “Unionists say yes to peace deal”, 19 Apr. 1998
153 Financial Times, “Hopes rise for Clinton backing on terror”, 9 Feb. 1998
154 see: Sunday Times, “Ahem ups peace stakes”, 15 Mar. 1998, Financial Times, Clinton may 
campaign in N Ireland for peace deal, 17 Mar. 1998, The Independent, ‘Irish Peace Talks: Deal 
not possible without Clinton rather historical’, 11 Apr. 1998, Sunday Times, “Resurrection?”, 12 
Apr. 1998
155 Financial Times, “Clinton to take a tough line on terror”, 9 Feb. 1998
156Financial Times, “Clinton to take a tough line on terror”, 9 Feb. 1998
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Why did pro-agreement Unionists express such reluctance to Clinton’s 
offer as he would be campaigning for the “yes” thus on their side?
Firstly, as mentioned above, Trimble had signed the agreement with some 
hesitancy and often underlined that he would fully support it only if the IRA 
totally decommissioned. His position did not favour a total engagement in favour 
of the GFA. A UUP document entitled Implementing the Agreement and dated 
May 1998 concludes by saying: ‘Republicans must demonstrate a genuine 
commitment to peace and the only way they can do this is by decommissioning. 
Only in this context will the people of Northern Ireland be convinced that
1 c n
militant republicans have turned from violence to democracy.’ Thus, the UUP 
was campaigning on the basis of conditional support for the agreement. 
Trimble’s choice was certainly apolitical tactic designed to attract the hesitant or 
mild anti-agreement giving them some guarantee of his firmness. However, as 
much as Trimble did not have much choice but sign it, his position was clearly 
limited on the nature of the “yes” campaign that he would lead.
Secondly, ‘parties on the extreme seem to de-legitimise agreement- 
building and upset the negotiations either by trying to maintain the integrity of 
their extreme position or by trying to discredit or eliminate the negotiating 
middle’ (Zartman, 1995, p.341). As an American official argued, ‘the UKUP and 
the DUP did not want to have anything to do with the peace process. They would
1 i n
have made it impossible to get the agreement.’ Since the anti-agreement 
parties had failed to prevent its signing, they were trying to persuade the Unionist 
population to vote against it. Anti-agreement Ulster Unionists such as MPs
157 Ulster Unionist Party, Implementing the Agreement, May 1998
158 Private interview with US Official
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Willie Ross and Willie Thompson favoured the UKUP and DUP game. Thus, 
Trimble was facing intra- and inter-party struggles in the campaign for the 
GFA.159 Part of the “no” campaign strategy was designed to discredit the 
agreement by arguing that Trimble had signed it under huge pressure and US 
pressure is discussed below.
Thirdly, as Neeson argued ‘The referendum was basically Hume and 
Trimble and that is how it was perceived publicly.’160 The Nobel Peace Prize 
given to Hume and Trimble to reward them for their efforts for peace in October
1998 later reinforced this point.161 Thus, from a Unionist standpoint, it was 
difficult to distinguish anti-Trimble members within his party from the anti­
agreement activists. This point will be discussed in more detail in the subsection 
dedicated to Mitchell’s return to overview the review of the agreement by the 
end of 1999.
Fourthly, contrary to the Ulster Unionists’ general avoidance of any 
comment about the US involvement once the talks had started, the DUP strongly 
reiterated its opposition to it and used it against the UUP. For example, out of a 
total of 71 Northern Ireland Forum for Political Dialogue sessions, the DUP 
expressed criticism vis a vis the US, during twelve sessions for instance Eric 
Smyth’s declaration that ‘There is no evidence from television from America that
159 Regarding the UUP internal division, see, Belfast Telegraph, “UUP divided over Peace Deal 
Claim”, 13 Apr. 1998 and Sunday Times, “Unionists say yes to peace deal”, 19 Apr. 1998
160 Sean Neeson, AP Headquarters, Belfast, 3 Jul. 2003
161 Daily Telegraph, “World hails Ulster's Nobel duo”, 17 Oct. 1998
Daily Telegraph, “The men who put peace on the map of Ulster”, 17 Oct. 1998 
The Independent, “Nobel prize rewards courage of Ulster's architects of peace”, 17 Oct. 1998 
The Guardian, “Two loners who together helped put Ulster on the path to peace Nobel Award: 
The paths o f John Hume and David Trimble through 30 years o f the Troubles provide a 
fascinating illustration o f how Northern Ireland has been transformed. But might yesterday's prize 
make their lives more difficult?”, 17 Oct. 1998
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they are friends of the Unionist people.’162 The UUP did not even mention the 
US involvement during any session.163 Among anti-agreement UUP members, 
Molyneaux declared that ‘the US played a large part in persuading some parties 
to sign and defend the Agreement, thereby weakening those parties and 
alienating their electorate.’164 Ross stated that Clinton’s involvement in the 
campaign ‘was completely wrong, it was not his business at the end of the day. 
He was recommending something that was going to do harm to the unity of the 
United Kingdom and to do harm to the Unionist population of Northern 
Ireland.’165
Trimble’s declaration about the timing of a presidential visit corroborates 
his awareness of a sense of anti-Americanism among the Unionist community. 
“It would be better to come to celebrate a positive outcome rather than become 
embroiled in controversy beforehand.”166 Such an attitude also corresponds to the 
consciousness of the Unionist population’s traditional reluctance to external 
interference. Clinton’s possible trip in the province may have damaged the pro­
agreement support among Unionists. Trimble’s declaration in the International 
Herald Tribune reinforced this idea, “I would not want people here to feel they 
are being dictated to by some foreign power.”167
162 DUP Representative, Eric Smyth, Northern Ireland Forum for Political Dialogue, 3 Oct. 1997
163 The information was found using the keywords, United States, America, Clinton and Mitchell 
excluding Irish America. The analysis o f  the content o f the Northern Ireland Forum for Political 
Dialogue in this project as Sinn Fein never took part to the discussion and the SDLP left very 
soon after its creation, leaving it to the Unionists. Thus, the discussion took place exclusively 
between Unionists o f all political shades as the DUP and UKUP did not leave it when they 
walked out o f the talks.
164 Lord Molyneaux, Westminster, 10 Feb. 2004
165 William Ross, Europa Hotel, Belfast, 2 Feb. 2004
166 Sunday Times, “Unionists say yes to peace deal”, 19 Apr. 1998
167 Internationa! Herald Tribune, “Clinton Visit Unwelcome As Irish Prepare for Vote”, 21 Apr. 
1998
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It seems that the US administration also sensed Trimble’s potential 
difficulties as the visit was postponed until September 1998. However, the US 
President took advantage of his presence at the G8 world economic summit in 
Birmingham on 15 and 16 May 1998 to reiterate, along with Tony Blair, his 
support for peace in Northern Ireland,168 making clear that he did not want to be 
seen as interfering in a vote for the people of Ireland.169 Clinton concluded an 
interview stating:
I just want every single person in Northern Ireland and in the Irish Republic to 
know that we will support the peace process and the people who do it, and 
anybody who returns to violence we will not befriend, because this is the chance 
of our lifetimes, anyway to do this. And I hope it will not be squandered.170
Clinton re-emphasised his position in a statement made the day prior to the 
referenda:
This Friday you can turn the common tragedy of Northern Ireland’s past into a 
shared triumph for the future. (...)  As you face the future, you can count on 
America (...) . May you make the right choice for peace, for your children, for your 
future?171
Besides assisting Blair, Clinton’s second task, was to put some weight on 
the “yes” side by raising the prospect of further economic investment, which was 
an acceptable measure in both communities. ‘In a television interview with Mr
168 See: Daily Telegraph, “Clinton will join Blair's push for Ulster ’Yes’ vote”, 16 May 1998, 
Daily Telegraph, “Clinton and Blair warn voters of 'nightmare scenario'”, 18 May 1998, The 
Times, “Blair and Clinton in Ulster appeal”, 18 May 1998, Financial Time, “Blair and Clinton 
woo Ulster: Leaders say strong Yes vote would encourage surge o f inward investment”, 18 May
1998
169 Daily Telegraph, “Clinton will join Blair's push for Ulster 'Yes' vote”, 16 May 1998
170 The White House, Office o f  the Press Secretary, Statement by the President and Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, 15 May 1998.
171 White House Press Release, Statement by the President, 21 May 1998
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Blair, Mr Clinton said there would be increased US investment in Northern 
Ireland if the process continued.’172 Nonetheless, despite the improved US-UUP 
relationship, Clinton did not come to Northern Ireland. The UUP may have 
developed a more pragmatic response at times but they were still very reluctant 
to fully embrace US involvement. The UUP still saw US efforts as potentially 
threatening or at least believed their potential voters saw it that way.
The success of the “yes” side in the referendum with 71.12% of the 
Northern Ireland population in favour of the Belfast Agreement173, and the 
results of the election on 25 June 1998 comforted the UUP as the leading 
Unionist party with 28 seats out of 108 in the new assembly. However, the DUP 
won 20 seats and the UKUP 5, which made a total on 25. With anti-agreement 
Ulster Unionists added to those 25 representatives, there was a majority of anti- 
agreement Unionists in the new assembly and therefore it did not provide a good 
omen for its future work.174 This point is significant as from the beginning of the 
agreement’s implementation, a majority of Unionists sitting in the newly formed 
assembly were against it.
This situation created the necessity to maintain close scrutiny to sustain 
its validity as the anti-agreement parties refused to acknowledge the validity of 
the referendum results. Paisley declared “They spent three million to buy the 
people’s votes” and McCartney argued: “We have taken a clear majority of the 
pro-Unionist community in the face of a massive propaganda campaign.”175
172 Financial Time, “Blair and Clinton woo Ulster: Leaders say strong Yes vote would encourage 
surge o f inward investment”, IS May 1998
173 Irish Times, “The Belfast Agreement", 25 May 1998
17,1 see: www.nio.org for election results
175 The Independent, “Ireland: Leaders greet referendum verdict”, 24 May 1998
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The Omagh Bombing in August 1998 worsened the fragile political 
situation of the province reviving the huge controversy about decommissioning 
and playing to the advantage of Unionist hard-liners. Unionists demanded the 
IRA decommissioning before allowing Sinn Fein representatives to take part in
1 7the executive committee. The bombing took place two weeks before the 
Clintons’ arrival and his coming was seen in the media as an opportunity for 
Blair and Ahern to insist on the necessity to work for the implementation of the
177agreement.
B- Clinton’s Trip to the Province, September 1998
Reflecting the general belief in the aftermath of the agreement, The 
Independent declared that the GFA was ‘not an American deal, based on 
American proposals. But without America’s backstage prodding, without the 
Clinton Administration’s efforts as a “facilitator” it might never have happened
178 • ■ •at all.’ Therefore, Clinton’s visit relied not only on his position as US 
President but also on the major role he played in the signing of the agreement.
Clinton’s imminent arrival was described as London and Dublin’s
• « 1 7Qstrongest weapons of pressure over Sinn Fein and the Ulster Unionists.
176 The Observer, “Focus Ireland: a Frantic Race from Horror to Hope”, 6 Sep. 1998
177 Daily Telegraph, “Clinton tells Ulster it must not lose ‘magic o f  peace’”, 4 Sep. 1998
178 The Independent, “Irish Peace Talks: Deal not possible without Clinton”, 11 Apr. 1998
179 The Observer, “Focus Ireland: a Frantic Race from Horror to Hope”, 6 Sep. 1998
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Gerry Adams coincidentally condemned the Omagh bombing on 1 
September 1998 and Trimble was reported to be about ‘to make a dramatic 
concession on decommissioning by saying the IRA can hold on to handguns and 
other “defensive” weapons for the time being if it starts to surrender its 
stockpiles of Semtex.’l80However, Clinton’s trip in the province was not as 
spectacular as the first one, as some of his detractors strongly insisted his coming 
to Northern Ireland was linked to the Monica Lewinsky scandal.181
On the Ulster Unionist side, Trimble who, as First Minister of the 
province since July 1998, made the welcome speech to introduce the President at 
the Odyssey renewed his commitment and sent a clear message to the President 
about the Ulster Unionist position on decommissioning:
Mr President, the path ahead is for true democrats only. As First Minister and 
Leader of Northern Ireland, I can not reconcile seeking positions in Government 
with the failure to discharge responsibilities under the Agreement to dismantle 
their terrorist organisations (Trimble, 2001, p. 78).
Clinton’s journey played a catalytic role after the horror of the Omagh 
bombing as a member of the UUP expressed it, ‘if we use the image of driving 
the peace process forward, the Americans were more like a foot on the 
accelerator than a hand on the steering wheel. They were hurrying us on in a
i oo
direction we had already agreed to go.’
Clinton made a call for decommissioning during his speech at the 
Waterfront Hall: ‘Now, as you go forward, courage and reconciliation must drive
180 Daily Telegraph, “Unionists tell IRA: you can keep the guns”, 30 Aug. 1998
181 Sunday Times, “The peace broker searches for allies”, 6 Sep. 1998
m Sunday Times, “The peace broker searches for allies”, 6 Sep. 1998
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this Assembly in very specific ways: to decommission the weapons of war that 
are obsolete in Northern Ireland at peace.’183 As the Sunday Times stated the 
President’s statement ‘will have been warmly welcomed by Ulster democrats of 
all stripes.’184
Nevertheless, Clinton’s impact proved to be limited not only on the UUP 
side, as Trimble remained firm on his agenda but also, from a Unionist 
viewpoint, on the republican one. Steven King argued that ‘the US involvement 
was useful in terms of brokering the agreement but not much pressure on Sinn
toe
Fein and the IRA on the decommissioning issue.’ The stall on 
decommissioning blocked the effective implementation of the agreement and 
leading to its review by the end of 1999 with Senator Mitchell’s presence as 
facilitator.
C-Mitchell’s return as facilitator
The political situation in Northern Ireland remained deadlocked following 
Clinton’s trip but the US President remained strongly involved in the attempts at 
breaking the stalemate as London and Dublin continued to believe that the US 
could play a major role. In that sense, the UUP along with the rest of Northern 
Irish parties, had to remain under US scrutiny. Nevertheless, the momentum of 
the St Patrick’s Day celebration at the White House in March 1999 with Clinton
183 US newswire, “Remarks by President Clinton to the Northern Ireland Assembly”, 3 Sep. 1998
184 The Times, “How President has forced the pace of change”, 4 Sep. 1998
185 Dr. Steven King, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 23 Oct. 2003
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reportedly meeting Trimble and Adams to urge them into finding a solution 
remained without effect.186
Originally, the peace process had come to a standstill over the UUP 
demand that the IRA had to start handing in its weapons before Sinn Fein could 
take part in the power-sharing executive. Sinn Fein argued that IRA 
decommissioning was not a prerequisite to the party joining the executive under 
the peace agreement. Senator Mitchell had been called to chair the review of the
I 87agreement in July 1999. His role was to facilitate the reaching of a 
compromise between Sinn Fein and the UUP on decommissioning that would 
lead to the election of the first executive committee and the re-start of the 
implementation of the Agreement.
The British and Irish governments jointly appointed Mitchell as chair of 
the review but anti-GFA Unionists did not appreciate it. Molyneaux argued that
‘Mitchell’s return visit was a mistake because it highlighted the betrayal and
1 88expectations of the Belfast Agreement.’ Anti-agreement Unionists as expected 
fumed at this appointment as reported in the Daily Telegraph, Mitchell ‘was told 
he should leave Ulster for good by Cedric Wilson of the anti-agreement Northern 
Ireland Unionist Party and clashed with Robert McCartney, of the UK Unionist
186 The Independent, “We may need the Americans, but peace will still come; London, Dublin 
and Washington could force Trimble and Adams into an accommodation”, 9 Feb. 1999, The 
Guardian, “Blair, Ahem seek Clinton's aid in bid to break deadlock”, 9 Feb. 1999, Financial 
Times, “Ireland peace hopes focus on Clinton, Good Friday Agreement, UK government looks to 
President to help break deadlock when leaders visit Washington”, 4 Mar. 1999, The Independent, 
“Mowlam pins peace hopes on Clinton”, 12 Mar. 1999, The Guardian, “Clinton fixes Trimble 
and Adams talks”, 18 Mar. 1999, Sunday Times, “Hard-hitting Clinton tells Adams ‘IRA must 
end war’”, 21 Mar. 1999
187 The Independent, “Profile: George Mitchell- The man to bring peace to Ulster?; The ex- 
Senator’s patience and judgement are in demand like never before”, 18 Jul. 1999
188 Lord Molyneaux, Westminster, 10 Feb. 2004
269
Party.’189 Nevertheless, according to The Independent on 19 July 1999, Trimble 
was ‘talking cordially about “George” and making it clear he had no objection to 
his re-appearance on the scene.’190
Trimble’s comments are very positive on the role that Mitchell played:
Having a review process, having Mitchell as chairman o f the review process was 
helpful. My own take on this, I might be completely wrong but this is my 
interpretation. The fact that the initial meetings between Sinn Fein and ourselves 
chaired by G. Mitchell, which took place in Belfast, were appallingly bad, there 
were the worst meetings we ever had. Sinn Fein were simply shouting at us the 
whole time, they were just abusive in the autumn 1999. It was suggested that we 
would take sometime out before having meetings in London. Then he suggested 
that we had these meetings in hotel. We said no, we didn’t like that idea. There 
would be too much press intrusion. Lancaster house was available. I remembered 
the Winfield house had completed its renovation. The meeting then took place 
there by the end o f  the month. Once in Winfield house, the atmosphere changed 
like that. Sinn Fein who in Belfast had been very abusive, in Winfield house 
started to converse in moderate tones and the whole atmosphere was totally 
different. I said to colleagues that I thought the reason why Sinn Fein had 
changed their approach when we got into Winfield house, is that Winfield house 
was probably the only building in London that MI 5 did not bug the US almost 
certainly had it bugged and that a synopsis o f the conversation if  not the exact 
text were probably arriving on the Clinton’s desk within a day after the meeting. I 
thought that’s why the atmosphere changed, because the Republicans did not 
want Clinton to hear their normal behaviour. Now, this might completely be off
189 Daily Telegraph, “Mitchell steps back from Ulster rift”, 5 Sep. 1999
190 The Independent, “Profile: George Mitchell- The man to bring peace to Ulster?; The ex- 
Senator’s patience and judgement are in demand like never before”, 18 Jul. 1999
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the wall, it might have nothing to do with the change o f atmosphere but that’s my 
theory.191
Whatever the veracity of Trimble’s account, it is interesting that he sees a 
potential reading by Clinton of transcripts of meetings as positive from a UUP 
perspective. Trimble portrays Clinton as a source of pressure on Sinn Fein not a 
threat to Unionists or the Union.
Mitchell, as during the previous negotiations, had to work closely with 
Trimble and concentrate on producing an arrangement that the UUP leader could 
sell to his party for two reasons. First, the extremely hostile attitude of the anti­
agreement actors confirmed the impossibility of convincing them. Second, the 
fact that Trimble’s name was so closely related to the agreement meant that the 
political leader’s downfall would certainly engender its collapse as much as the 
rejection of the change within the GFA would certainly entail the end of his 
leadership. Trimble admitted as much in the Belfast Telegraph on 18 November
1999 in other words a week before the Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) vote to 
amend the UUP support for an executive.
The assimilation of Trimble’s image as the leader of the UUP to the 
success of the GFA made two distinct issues completely interdependent.
191 David Trimble, UUP Headquarters, 8 Apr. 2004
192 Belfast Telegraph, “Jump with Trimble, Mitchell tells IRA”, 18 Nov. 1999
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This interdependence could also play in Trimble’s disfavour as, as much 
as Mitchell paid attention to Trimble’s position, the former senator could use this 
leverage to make him accept a compromise that he may originally not have 
supported.
After two and a half months of negotiations, the arrangement relied on 
three main points. First, there should be the creation of an Executive exercising 
devolved powers. Second, decommissioning should be completed by May 2000 
and finally it should ‘be carried out in a manner determined by the Independent 
International Commission on Decommissioning’193
After the changes, Mitchell reportedly ‘attempted to shore up Mr 
Trimble’s position by saying decommissioning will happen.’194 Clinton made 
several interventions exhorting the IRA to decommission showing some support 
to the Unionist leader and discrediting the anti-agreement argument that the US 
had a pro-nationalist agenda.195 Such statements certainly rely on the idea that 
Trimble had advocated the American card due to the US potential influence over 
the Republican movement.
193 Belfast Telegraph, “Mitchell tells o f his hopes for future of province”, 18 Nov. 1999
194 Belfast Telegraph, “Jump with Trimble, Mitchell teils IRA”, 18 Nov. 1999
195 Belfast Telegraph, “IRA decommissioning is next step says Clinton”, 19 Nov. 1999
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Clinton also made positive statements about Trimble:
[He] has provided very strong and clear leadership. I don’t think that he would 
be doing this if he didn’t believe that ultimately all the provisions o f the Good 
Friday accord would be honoured. And I hope his party will stay with him 
because he has been absolutely pivotal to this. And it’s taken a lot o f courage for 
him to take some of the decisions that he’s taken, but because of that, we’re on 
the verge o f success.196
It is difficult to gauge the level of contribution from the US “campaign” 
to the “yes” success by a narrow 58% of the votes in the UUC.197 However, it 
can easily be argued that the effect was not essential as the UUC did not simply 
vote on the basis of Mitchell’s plan but also on the provision that Trimble would 
resign as First Minister by 12 February if decommissioning had not started by 
then. This point along with the strong support of major political figures such as 
the influential John Taylor who was able a ‘to carry a significant proportion of
|  Q O
the party with him’ certainly put more weight in the “yes” balance.
On the decommissioning matter, Ulster Unionists have been quite 
sceptical about the contribution that the US made or the level of motivation of 
the US administration into trying to persuade the paramilitaries to hand over the 
weapons. This scepticism is reflected in Trimble’s words:
There was not any serious attempt to bring it about. Diplomacy is sometimes the 
exercise o f pressure as well as persuasion. What he was saying was helpful but it
196 The Associated Press, Clinton: Northern Ireland talks making progress, 19 Nov. 1999
197 Belfast Telegraph, “It’s YES, Trimble outlines his vision of new era”, 27 Nov. 1999
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wasn’t always following through. In the summer of 1999, he said to us in form of 
an interview, that Unionists should set up the institutions, if Republicans don’t 
follow through and deliver on their obligation then they can walk away and that 
was very much in our minds when at the end of 1999 we went into devolution 
with a clear understanding that there would be decommissioning before the end 
of January and that did not happen. We proposed to walk away and that stage, we 
expected Clinton to be saying yeah they did their bit, you republicans haven’t 
done your bit, Trimble is quite right to walk away, he didn’t actually. He 
attacked us for doing that. I felt a bit soured about that although I think I have a 
fair idea about why, that goes back to Irish American political pressure.199
Trimble described what a lot of Unionists felt with Clinton not using 
greater leverage on the Republicans to obtain decommissioning. Nevertheless, it 
is interesting to notice that even six years after the signing of the GFA, Trimble 
is very nuanced in his reflections and blames Irish-Americans rather than openly 
declaring that Clinton was not willing to or could not persuade the IRA to 
decommission. While Trimble’s own views are ambiguous, it at least suggests 
that he considered that the US could play a positive role from a UUP 
perspective.
The mere fact that a UUP leader even considered that a US President 
might take their side in an argument with Sinn Fein was a significant departure 
from the UUP viewpoint at the start of the peace process and during the first 
instances of US engagement. Yet, within the pro-Agreement camp, there were 
critical voices. Trimble’s diplomacy is in sharp contrast to Lord Maginnis’ 
statement. Maginnis’ position is much more judgmental vis a vis what he
198 Belfast Telegraph, “Queuing up for a slice of history at the Front”, 27 Nov. 1999
199 David Trimble, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 8 Apr. 2004
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perceived the US ambiguous attitude on decommissioning and the Unionists’ 
position on the US agenda:
Members will recall that when President Clinton came to Northern Ireland 
amidst the euphoria of the first IRA cease-fire —  a cease-fire which we 
cautioned was a fraud —  he stated here in Belfast to the people o f Northern 
Ireland “You must stand fast against terror. You must say to those who would 
still use violence for political objectives: ‘you are the past. Your day is over. 
Violence has no place at the table of democracy and no role in the future o f this 
land’.” Yet, within two or three years, his Administration is making a decision 
that six illegal immigrants should not be deported back to Ireland. One might say 
that that is very much a domestic matter, one for the United States 
Administration and no concern whatsoever of ours.200
If the UUP members generally remained quiet on their perception of the 
US involvement, some actions were of great significance or interpreted as such. 
For instance, Trimble’s departed for Sicily during Clinton’s third trip to Northern 
Ireland in December 2000.201 Indeed, the end of Clinton’s second mandate along 
with Bush’s victory was some kind of relief for Unionists as they would not be 
under constant scrutiny. Trimble declared:
Bush does not have the same emotional involvement with the issue that Clinton 
had. That’s absolutely true. That’s not a bad thing. (.. .) I think actually a lower 
engagement and a lower profile is also a good thing. There are too many Northern 
Ireland politicians who are becoming a bit too blasé but, because there were 
getting access to the White House, they thought that they were the centre o f the 
world and that consequently things should be adjusted to fit their requirements. I
200 Lord Maginnis, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 6 Dec. 2002.
201 Private Interview, Northern Irish official, according to the interviewee, Trimble left in the 
middle o f the gathering because Clinton arrived very late and Trimble had to catch a flight for an 
official ceremony in Sicily.
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think that the more distant approach o f the Bush administration is better for that
reason.202
This feeling of relief is also underlined in Taylor’s attitude reported in the 
Daily Telegraph. ‘Even if Trimble called President Clinton a friend of Northern 
Ireland, John Taylor, deputy leader of UUP refused point-blank the idea that 
Clinton might become the new American peace envoy.
The declaration of Mister John Taylor is very loquacious, “Bill Clinton by the 
end of the day is a democrat and the democrats are controlled by the American 
Irish.’” Such a declaration is the ultimate proof that despite an active 
collaboration with the US, Unionists in general retained their initial position 
regarding the US President being somehow manipulated by the Irish-American 
lobby. Such declarations had not taken place before due to the potential 
diplomatic fallout but once the President was not in a position to pressurise the 
different political groups, the UUP made more virulent declarations. Besides, 
Bush’s election was obviously the end of an active US involvement in the peace 
process. Donaldson stated: ‘George Bush, in fairness, does not take a particularly 
detailed interest in the Northern Ireland peace Process. I think because of the 
friendship he has developed with Tony Blair, he is very much prepared to rely on 
the Prime Minister’s advice. There will continue to be an American interest but I 
think it will be a more positive interest from the Unionist perspective.’204
202 David Trimble, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 8 Apr. 2004
203 Daily Telegraph, “The Unionist don’t want President Clinton as a Ulster “peace envoy””, 26 
Dec. 2000
204 Jeffrey Donaldson, UUP Lisburn Office, 15 Apr. 2003
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American officials who actually did not necessarily see the decrease of 
the US engagement as being negative for America share this viewpoint. Indeed, 
Soderberg argued: ‘they are much less engaged, but that is ok. There’s no point. 
You don’t need to have an engagement that we had at the time, it’s good for
-i n i
Americans to step back. ’
Congressman Peter King declared: ‘There is no doubt that Northern 
Ireland or issues not directly affecting the US are going to be more secondary. 
(...) The US administration found very offensive that Gerry Adams went to 
Cuba. It was like a slap for the US. He never realised the impact. That’s up to the
906Unionists whether to take advantage of that.’
Unionists actually never did take proper advantage of Sinn Fein strategic 
mistakes. It demonstrates how much the UUP was eager to go back to a situation 
that could be similar to the one prior to Clinton’s presidency. Maginnis does not 
see any advantage in engaging with the Bush administration arguing: ‘it’s all 
very egocentric, it’s all to do with “Mr USA” rather than what’s going on in
• 907Northern Ireland or in London or whatever.’
Donaldson, despite being one of the early advocates of an American 
agenda, reflected a more traditional unionist position by 2003 saying: the USA 
should act ‘as facilitators nothing more than that (...) and I think it is the best that 
the detail of any new agreement is left to the political parties in Northern Ireland 
and the British government and of course with a role in terms of the Irish
205 Nancy Soderberg, New York, 14 May 2002
206 Peter King, Washington D.C., 20 Apr. 2002
207 Lord Maginnis, UUP Head quarter, 6 Dec. 2002
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government on those aspects of the agreement that relate to their decision.’208 
The Unionist MP’s statement strongly insinuates that in spite of the UUP quasi 
constant silence about Clinton’s administration involvement, they actually 
thought that it was too much of an interference demonstrating that they actually 
never changed their mind on the nature of this involvement and what it could 
bring.
208 Jeffrey Donaldson, UUP Lisburn Office, 15 Apr. 2003
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
This thesis raised a number of questions about the nature and evolution of 
the Ulster Unionist Party’s relationship with the US administration as an external 
mediator in the Northern Ireland peace process. The discussion in chapter one 
also highlighted key international debates of relevance to this thesis, focusing on 
identifying when an external mediator can make a difference and on the debates 
as to whether neutrality or leverage is more important in mediation. On the first 
point, the controversy continues between those in favour of preventive 
mediation, or immediate intervention and those, like Zartman, who argue that 
intervention is more efficient when the actors of the conflict have reached a 
“hurting stalemate”.
While the geo-political context of the Cold War prevented any earlier 
external intervention and thus any analysis of “preventive intervention”, the issue 
of whether a “mutual hurting stalemate” had arrived in the late 1980s, or was 
necessary is interesting in the Northern Ireland context. Did the key actors 
perceive a “mutual hurting stalemate” by the early 1990s and if yes, has it been a 
relevant factor? The discussion in chapter one suggested that the British
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government and Sinn Féin might well have seen the situation in those terms. Of 
more direct interest to this thesis is whether the UUP did so.
On the question of who can mediate, Unionists always viewed the US as 
being more sympathetic to the Irish nationalist cause, in spite of the State 
Department’s longstanding support for the British government’s position. 
Despite this reputation of partiality among Unionists, the US administration 
became involved in the issue and contributed significantly to the peace process. 
This aspect of the research fits in the international debate about the level of 
neutrality that a mediator must have. As discussed in chapter one, if one 
considers that the will to be involved in mediation is based on a “cost-benefit 
calculation”, the mediator’s neutrality can always be questioned (Zartman and 
Touval, 1996, p.451).
In the Northern Ireland case, any potential third party would have been 
seen as supporting the Nationalist side as Unionists sought to defend the status 
quo. Therefore, this dissertation is not seeking to judge the partiality or 
impartiality of the mediator but whether a mediator seen as partial by one side 
can still succeed.
The eighteen events that were used as case studies in this dissertation 
ultimately sought to answer three main questions. Firstly, why did the UUP 
engage with the US mediation effort if they perceived the US administration or 
indeed any external mediator to be opposed to their interests? Secondly, what 
was the nature of this engagement, was it just one of resistance and did it evolve 
along with the peace process to include a more positive attitude to US
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intervention? Finally, what does the relationship between the UUP and the US 
during the Northern Ireland peace process bring to the wider debate on neutrality 
and leverage and more importantly, to what extent is mediation leverage efficient 
in bringing about a successful conflict resolution? This final chapter will be 
structured around these three main questions.
I- THE UUP DECISION TO ENGAGE WITH US 
MEDIATION
Unionists paid very little attention to the 1992 US presidential election 
thinking that the repercussions on Northern Ireland would be as limited as 
Carter’s statement in August 1977. The very limited range of UUP statements 
about the US role suggests that they did not really think that Clinton’s 
administration could seriously contemplate significant involvement in Northern 
Ireland conflict resolution. If such a misunderstanding was partly based on 
Unionists’ miscalculations, especially regarding the British government’s 
capacity to prevent this involvement, the first one and a half years of Clinton’s 
first term did not provide any significant sign of a serious involvement. Such an 
attitude also explains the relatively slow UUP reaction to the undesired US 
involvement as it developed.
As discussed in chapter two, the USA has always been viewed as hostile 
to Ulster Unionism due to the strong Irish-American political activism in favour 
of a united Ireland and the absence of a pro-unionist political constituency there. 
On the inter-governmental level, Unionists traditionally felt that the Anglo-
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American “Special Relationship” would prevent any US intervention in the 
Northern Ireland situation. Nevertheless, as discussed in chapters one and three, 
the cataclysmic changes within the International System at the beginning of the 
1990s along with the initial mutual resentment between the new Democratic 
administration and the British Conservative government made US intervention 
possible. Indeed, the disequilibrium of strength between the US, being the only 
remaining super power, and the United Kingdom was in favour of a potential 
intervention. The changing international order necessarily had an impact on the 
unionist traditional position. Once the British government gave in to US pressure 
and allowed a US intervention, the Unionists’ traditional defensive position was, 
at least, seriously diminished.
The UUP became actively involved in the peace process and built a 
relationship with US representatives despite great reluctance within their own 
community. Unionists’ initial suspicion was based on three main factors. Firstly, 
any external involvement in Northern Ireland would imply a questioning of the 
constitutional and political status quo. Secondly, regarding the US in particular, 
they feared a strong Irish-American influence over the new President due to the 
significant role that the Irish-American lobby played in Bill Clinton’s election in 
1992. Thirdly, after the US administration granted the first visa to Adams, 
Unionists could not stand the idea of being treated on the same level as people 
they perceived as “terrorists”.
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One striking example is the answer by Jim Wilson about the UUP refusal 
to take part to any media event involving Sinn Féin, to explain the UUP boycott 
of the 1995 St Patrick’s Day celebration as described in chapter three.1
Unionists have always seen the conflict situation as a zero-sum game. 
They had everything to lose and Nationalists nothing through mediation. Their 
political position is often based on the perception that everyone outside the 
Northern Ireland Protestant community as being a potential enemy of Ulster. 
Therefore, their traditional strategy was to practice abstention, and seek to 
oppose any external intervention or indeed any reform pressure from London.
As described in chapters three and four, the UUP consent to cooperate 
with an American mediation was based on the simple fact that the US offer could 
not be rejected. Indeed, the US had forcibly demonstrated that the British 
government could not stop them in their desire to become involved or prevent 
them making decisions opposed by the UUP or the British Government. Among 
the eighteen case studies used for this research the failure of British Government 
attempts t limit US intervention can be seen in: the Adams’ visa case; the 
positive welcome by the US administration of the first IRA cease-fire in August 
1994; Gore’s phone call to Adams in September 1994; the establishment of an 
official diplomatic relationship between Sinn Féin and the US administration, 
underlined by the first meeting between Adams and Clinton in December 1994; 
Adams’ invitation to the White House for the 1995 St Patrick’s Day celebration; 
and the US pressure on the British government during the 1995 Washington 
Economic Conference during which the first meeting between Mayhew and
1 Belfast Telegraph, “Clinton given cold shoulder by Unionists”, 17 Mar. 1995
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Adams was organised. These are events that demonstrate strong US leverage. 
The UUP and the British government opposed all these US decisions, and yet, 
they went ahead. It was increasingly clear to the UUP that they could not rely on 
the British government to prevent US decisions which they opposed. These 
decisions would also proceed whether they engaged or not. This led to a 
progressive engagement by the UUP seeing it as the only possible strategy to 
prevent the development of a worse case scenario. Furthermore, the recent 
experience of the failed campaign against the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) from 
1985 to 1988 had weakened the tendency within the UUP to simply refuse to 
engage. As mentioned in chapter one, Ken Maginnis argued that one of the 
consequences of the AIA and the failure of the campaign that followed was ‘one
thing that Unionists were determined about was that nobody would ever again
•  •  2 make an agreement behind their backs.’
There is no evidence of any positive strategy to enlist the US in their 
support during this early period of intervention. The UUP strategy was to engage 
with the USA to limit the involvement of the Clinton administration. It was an 
entirely defensive strategy. The UUP still assumed that any US involvement 
would be negative but that they needed a relationship with the US to avoid giving 
nationalists a clear-run and because the British government had not been able or 
willing to defend their interests. Thus it is very difficult to see any evidence for 
“mutually hurting stalemate” thinking in the UUP at the beginning of the 
process. In fact, they totally opposed any mediation seeing it only as a threat. 
They did not seek mediation as a way to escape a “hurting” status quo. They 
sought rather to protect that status quo. Neither is there any evidence at this time
2 Lord Maginnis, UUP Headquarters, Belfast, 6 Dec. 2002
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that the UUP appreciated the significance of the changes in the international 
system. They largely ignored the 1992 election and the first eighteen months of 
Clinton’s term, assuming that nothing would really happen. There was certainly 
no evidence of a preparatory UUP American strategy.
The peace process may not have been successful without Unionists being 
involved but the US had enough leverage to. assimilate the Unionist position to 
the British one in the early phase and present their direct dealings with London as 
providing the necessary balance to links with Sinn Fein. As covered in chapter 
three, the US administration virtually ignored Unionists until after the first visa 
to Adams. Moreover, the UUP’s initial attempts at denouncing US engagement 
and their boycotting strategy at the beginning of Clinton’s first term turned out to 
be totally ineffective in preventing US involvement.
There are certainly other factors apart from US mediation that can explain 
the UUP engagement with the peace process more generally. However, from 
Clinton’s election until David Trimble’s election, the UUP saw the US 
involvement as a threat being constantly confirmed by US decisions.
The granting of the first visa to Gerry Adams was the turning point within 
the UUP which saw some of the then younger activists, such as Jeffrey 
Donaldson, start advocating the necessity to implement a US agenda to 
counterbalance the Nationalist viewpoint in the US.
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This advocacy was applied with the organisation of UUP lobbying trips 
to the US starting with one just after Adams’ trip in February 1994.3
The decision to implement a US strategy also coincides with the UUP 
realisation that the British government was unable to protect their interests, as 
Mayhew’s speech in Cookstown during Adams’ first trip in the US expressed: 
“We did our best”.4 The position of some UUP members demonstrates the 
perception that for some, the launch of an American agenda had become a 
necessity rather than a possibility. Nevertheless, not all leading UUP members 
felt that way and some of them, like Willie Thompson and Willie Ross, 
denounced it as useless, accentuating already existing internal ideological 
divisions within the party.5 The continuing division on the issue and hesitation 
about the creation of an American agenda clearly impacted on the time that it 
took for the UUP to effectively go Stateside.
Given this situation why did the UUP start engaging with the US? The 
analysis of this dissertation is that, like their internal engagement in the aftermath 
of the failed anti-AIA campaign, they felt they had no other choice. In this 
regard, Touval’s comment, mentioned in chapter one, that there are offers you 
cannot decline, is accurate (1992, p.232).
Beyond political factors, the US offered some possible economic 
investments that Unionists could hardly turn down, given the economic crisis that 
then existed in the province. The importance of the economic aspect was
3 Belfast Telegraph, “Unionists set up tour to counter Sinn Fein”, 3 Feb. 1994
4 Belfast Telegraph, “We did our best: Mayhew”, 2 Feb. 1994
5 Belfast Telegraph, “UUP Rebels in Talks Threat”, 22 Dec. 1997
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revealed in the UUP and DUP decision to send a delegation to the conference in 
May 1995 in Washington, in spite of Mayhew officially meeting Adams there 
behind closed doors and just two months after they boycotted the St Patrick’s 
Day events.
Consequently, it seems clear that external factors were far more important 
than internal motivation in their change of policy. The UUP’s primary 
engagement was more defensive than active as they were responding rather than 
initiating. In their early decisions to affect a US strategy there is no evidence that 
the UUP hoped to use US leverage against Irish nationalists to Unionist 
advantage. They only hoped to limit the possible damage and felt obliged to 
engage with the USA to limit nationalist influence there. This is clear in 
Trimble’s comment in the aftermath of the creation of the UUP office in 
Washington, mentioned in chapter four: “Our operation is just a “me too” sort of 
thing, pointing out to people when you think of this issue think of us as well” 
(Bimey & O’Neill, 1997, p.247).
While responses to mediation efforts are by no means the only way of 
identifying a “mutually hurting stalemate”, the early unionist engagement at least 
suggests that unionist politicians did not perceive themselves to have reached a 
hurting stalemate and certainly preferred a defence of the status quo to seeking a 
way forward based on external mediation.
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II-EVOLUTION OF THE UUP STRATEGY TOWARD US 
INVOLVEMENT
While active involvement with people seen as enemies of unionism 
could be electorally risky for the UUP, a potential engagement with the US also 
presented some possible advantages. Their main motivation was that of slowing 
down the process, as they did within Northern Ireland using the 
decommissioning issue to block the negotiations. There is some evidence 
however that, as the process developed, some UUP members ultimately believed 
that they could benefit from the US administration’s influence on Irish 
Republicans and might also benefit from a privileged position in media events 
such as the one offered to Trimble during the first presidential trip to Northern 
Ireland. Indeed, as discussed in chapter four, the ride given to Trimble in the 
Presidential limousine gave him the opportunity of having a private meeting with 
the US President, providing a local demonstration that the UUP’s position was 
taken into account by the US administration.
Despite the launch of the US agenda under Molyneaux’s UUP leadership 
with the organisation of several trips to the US and the creation of the UUP 
Northern American office, the UUP engagement clearly became more active 
after Trimble’s election as the party’s new leader. Indeed, as highlighted in 
chapter four, Trimble demonstrated a greater awareness of the importance of 
strategically engaging with the US. This attitude is based on his political 
pragmatism, a more active leadership style than Molyneaux and a lesser 
willingness to trust Westminster politics. Therefore, instead of passively 
accepting the US involvement as being unavoidable, Trimble launched a more
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active strategy. This dynamic strategy was visible right after his election in 
September 1995 as Trimble went on an official visit to the US as soon as 
November 1995.
Trimble’s election appeared to be decisive in the UUP’s active 
engagement with the US. Trimble used negative but very forceful arguments to 
convince his people of the necessity to engage as he presented it as a duty to 
neutralise or slow down the nationalist influence. Trimble appeared to have 
adopted this ambiguous strategy almost immediately after his election. For 
instance, as discussed in chapter four, Trimble stated that the US involvement 
“complicate [d] life” but the US had a part to play because of the way “some 
Irish-Americans have behaved in terms of (...) supporting terrorism”.6 Trimble 
also applied the same strategy with Mitchell’s designation to chair the peace 
talks. The UUP did not make any official declaration of support or opposition, 
but remained in the talks and tried to diminish as much as possible the role of the 
new Chairman in the negotiations. Trimble argued: “What I did achieve was to 
open up the procedures and instead of continuing on the agenda designed by the 
two governments we are now adjourned for a week, during which a committee 
will draw up fresh procedures and re-examine the agenda” (Mitchell, 1999, p. 
56-57). This tactic is also clearly visible in the way Trimble handled the 
campaign for the “yes” vote in the GFA referendum in May 1998 using the 
conditional argument of a possible Unionist withdrawal if Irish Republicans did 
not decommission.
The UUP played a much more active role with the US under Trimble’s 
leadership. Persistent DUP hostility could still be seen; for example, Paisley
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refused to meet Soderberg and Crowe in September 1995 arguing a trip to Wales 
as taking precedence and Robinson called the President’s trip to Northern Ireland 
of being a vast NORAID media campaign. However, the UUP did not make any 
overtly negative statement after Trimble’s election and actually applied the 
opposite strategy. Trimble used the US delegation trip to ask the US 
administration to clarify its position about decommissioning.7 Thus, some elites 
in the UUP clearly showed signs of a much greater acceptance of the reality of 
the US role.
It took two years for the UUP to shift from resistance to pro-active 
engagement with the US. This point is crucial as, when they started engaging 
effectively, they were taken into account. This new status was visible with the 
US responding very positively to the new UUP policy, as Soderberg, quoted in 
chapter four, declared that the administration was always making sure that 
Unionists would get a slightly better deal than Sinn Fein to keep them engaged. 
The UUP consequently gained greater control over the peace process. Indeed, if 
the UUP had not engaged with the USA in the negotiations, they would have 
been unable to exert pressure and water down Mitchell’s role as chairman of the 
negotiations within Northern Ireland. Moreover, such an engagement allowed 
Trimble to take advantage of the USA’s wish to be seen as a honest broker. 
Trimble showed some very positive attitudes towards the US. For instance, as 
described in chapter five regarding Clinton’s re-election, Trimble flew to 
Washington less than a month after Clinton’s victory and took advantage of this
6 Sunday Tribune, “Trimble Defiant after US Clash”, 5 Nov. 1995
7 Belfast Telegraph, “Clinton’s Team bids to break Deadlock”, 3 Oct. 1995
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trip to praise the role of Senator Mitchell. Nevertheless, these advantages must 
not be overstated.
Trimble’s attempts to use the US desire for ‘neutrality’ to persuade the 
US administration to pressure Sinn Féin on the decommissioning issue was 
largely unsuccessful.9 In spite of Trimble’s plea, the US administration 
maintained diplomatic relationships with Sinn Féin allowing Adams to enter the 
US after the Canary Wharf bombing in February 1996.
Moreover, as discussed in chapter five, the UUP engagement with the US 
did not prevent the US administration announcement that the IRA was no longer 
on the list of terrorist organisations at the beginning of October 1997, a day after 
Trimble’s visit to Washington.
The review of the eighteen case studies analysed in this dissertation 
demonstrates that the UUP engagement went through three stages. The first 
phase corresponds to the Unionist denunciation of the US involvement, showing 
resistance, denial and ignorance of the US will to engage until Gerry Adams’ 
first visa. Clinton’s first election (Nov. 1992) generated very little reaction by 
Unionists and no senior UUP member made any official statement, since 
Clinton’s promises had not been taken seriously. Unionists of all shades, apart 
from some members of the UUP, mostly due to Molyneaux’ being consulted, 
opposed the Downing Street Declaration (Dec. 1993). Nevertheless, the 
“détente” that the declaration showed between the British and Irish government, 
and the strong nationalist input that Major consented to was a sign that the US
8 Belfast Telegraph, “Where do we stand?”, 5 Nov. 1996
9 Belfast Telegraph, “Pressurise Sinn Féin”, 6 Oct. 1995
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administration took into account in its decision to grant the visa to Adams. The 
Unionists’ lack of support for it did not slow down the US decision.
The UUP viewed the granting of the visa to Gerry Adams (Feb. 1994) as 
a scandalous decision taken by a foreign country resolute to interfere in Northern 
Ireland. As described in chapter three, they boycotted the conference on peace 
that had been especially organised and remained cut off from the discussion. This 
was, in hindsight, viewed as a mistake and, thereafter, the UUP started changing 
its strategy, adopting a much more reactive approach and became more involved, 
as the organisation of several trips to the US following the visa case show.
The second phase corresponds to a period of reactive and negative 
engagement to try and counteract Irish nationalist influence in the USA with the 
organisation of several trips and the creation, though initially with great 
reluctance, of the UUP Northern American office.10 Their refusal to attend the St 
Patrick’s Day celebration at the White House (Mar. 1995) was expected as 
Adams had also been invited. Nevertheless, their absence was a mistake, which 
was viewed within the US as a sign of their reluctance to engage in a peace 
process. Despite their refusal to attend the St Patrick’s Day events, Unionists of 
all shades sent a delegation to the Economic Conference organised in 
Washington D.C. (May 1995). It was certainly easier to justify this to their 
constituencies. Their official attendance was also the first official demonstration 
that they could no longer ignore the US. The opening of the UUP North 
American Bureau (Oct. 1995) demonstrates the continuing difficulty for the UUP 
in engaging with the US. First, the office was only opened after being strongly
10 See Chap. 3
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solicited by the US, and secondly its role seen as purely reactive, limited to 
countering Sinn Fein.
Finally, in a third phase the UUP engaged a little more positively in order 
to gain advantages for themselves, to seek greater control of the process and the 
negotiations under Trimble’s leadership, with increased regular contact with the 
US administration. This regularity was also eased by the progressive 
involvement of George Mitchell in Northern Ireland affairs.11 David Trimble’s 
election as Leader of the UUP (Sep. 1995) led to increased engagement with the 
US, in spite of the shock that was expressed in the British political class as 
everyone, or almost everyone, saw him as a hard-liner and a sign of party 
radicalisation. Trimble turned out to be more energetic in his attempts to obtain 
benefits for the UUP from US involvement. This is seen in his account of the 
phone call on the day of the signing of the agreement as reported in chapter five.
Clinton’s first Trip to Northern Ireland (Dec. 1995) was important for 
Trimble’s new strategy as the President had to show his willingness to act as an 
honest broker which could provide greater room to manoeuvre for those inclined 
towards a proactive, rather than simply a defensive attitude to US involvement. 
The UUP did not reject Mitchell’s report on Decommissioning (Jan. 1996) as a 
sign of their greater commitment, but only because it supported (if tentatively) 
the organisation of elections that Trimble had called for. This demonstrated that a 
more active and less defensive policy could bring some payback. The UUP’s 
muted reaction to Mitchell becoming Chairman of the negotiations (Jun. 1996) 
actually saved Mitchell and the talks process.
11 See Chap. 4 and 5
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The UUP clearly did not look favourably on his appointment but 
demonstrated its readiness to cope with it at a certain price, gaining some 
positive responses and playing the game of cost-benefit calculation. The UUP 
responded more actively to Clinton’s re-election (Nov. 1996), Trimble personally 
congratulating Clinton and the UUP showing greater involvement by visiting 
Washington as soon as early December 1996 to discuss the Northern Ireland 
agenda with the US administration and complementing Mitchell’s efforts.
The UUP planned for the foreseeable Labour victory in the British 
general elections (May 1997) and ensured that their situation would not be as 
sensitive as it could have been. The disastrous relationship between Clinton and 
Major at the beginning of the first term of the US president actually worked 
against Unionists’ interest. Therefore, the renewal of the special relationship 
between Blair and Clinton turned out to be quite positive for the UUP. Blair and 
Labour in general had adopted more pro-Union position, and had a greater 
capacity to influence Clinton and launch a greater collaboration, insisting on the 
fundamental role of “majority consent”. The IRA cease-fire (Jul. 1997) is 
important within the peace process as it indicates the imminent return of Sinn 
Féin to the negotiations table. The UUP decided to remain in the talks to confront 
Sinn Féin (though not directly), but being the only major Unionist party to 
remain in the talks and believing they would obtain a better deal than if they 
walked out. The signing of the GFA (Apr. 1998) raised several points and a host 
of accusations. Nevertheless, Trimble’s version insists on the beneficial aspect of 
talking to the President to obtain a letter guaranteeing a number of substantial 
points for Unionists and therefore insinuating that Trimble had to some extent 
some influence over the US President.
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In the “yes” Campaign to the Referendum (May 1998) Trimble openly 
disagreed with Clinton’s arrival during the campaign. The rejection was typical 
of the isolationist unionist attitude which remained an important part of 
unionist’s overall position despite the greater levels of engagement. However, 
Trimble agreed with Mitchell’s return as facilitator in the review of the 
agreement (Jul.-Dec. 1999), and worked with the former Senator to obtain 
guarantees regarding US pressure on the IRA to decommission. The failure by 
the US to blame the IRA for not decommissioning by 12 February shows the 
limits of the UUP’s greater collaboration with the US.
However, at the end of the day, despite some noticeable changes in their 
relationship with the US administration, it seems that the UUP was simply 
patiently waiting for the end of Clinton’s term to show their underlying position. 
For instance, in the Daily Telegraph, ‘Even if Trimble called President Clinton a 
“friend of Northern Ireland”, John Taylor, deputy leader of UUP, rejected point- 
blank the idea that Clinton might become the new American peace envoy. Taylor 
declared in the same article: “Bill Clinton at the end of the day is a democrat and 
the democrats are controlled by the American Irish.”12 This statement was made 
when Bush had already been elected as the future President of the United States, 
so, it can reveal the UUP desire to build good bridges of communication with the 
future Republican administration but clearly demonstrates their ultimate hostility 
towards Clinton and his administration. Unionists were clearly happy not to be
• 13under scrutiny anymore, as Steven King mentioned in an interview.
12 Daily Telegraph, “The Unionists don’t want President Clinton as a Ulster “peace envoy””, 26 
Dec. 2000
13 Steven King, UUP Headquarters, 23 Oct. 2003
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Such a declaration demonstrates UUP satisfaction about the return of the 
traditional US position vis a vis Northern Ireland. Stronger evidence in this 
regard is their lack of active strategy toward the Bush administration, especially 
after September 11th and the FARC scandal in 2001. To the question of whether 
the Unionists had tried to take advantage of the post 9/11 atmosphere in Capitol 
Hill, a Northern Irish official answered:
I am surprised they haven’t. Next week, the National committee hearings start. A 
lot o f people will hear no distinction between terrorists. The psychological impact 
is profound. Unionists might not be strategic thinkers. There is a lot of the stuff 
that Unionists could react to, for instance, 09.11, the detainees in Columbia and 
the Ashcroft anti-terrorist measures. Unionists could accuse the US o f gross 
hypocrisy. Perhaps, it shows Unionists’ inability to think in strategy. That may 
say something about the way Unionists regard the USA .14
As this Northern Irish Official states, the UUP attitude vis a vis the new 
President demonstrates that a more moderate US involvement in the Northern 
Ireland political situation was welcome. Moreover, it also demonstrates that the 
UUP never fully perceived the US involvement as being positive from their 
standpoint.
Ill- THE UUP-US RELATIONSHIP AND THE WIDER 
DEBATE ABOUT LEVERAGE IN MEDIATION
As discussed in chapter one, Bercovitch argues that four main factors are 
decisive in judging the likelihood of success in mediation. First, it must be a
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protracted conflict. Secondly, the actors to the conflict must reach an impasse 
inducing them to search for an alternative. The third factor is to evaluate each 
actor’s level of readiness to carry on the struggle at any cost. Fourth, success in 
mediation also depends on each actor’s will to accept the assistance of a third 
party (Bercovitch & Houston, 1996, p .13, Bercovitch, 1997, p .133, 2000, p.8). 
There is no evidence in their early response to the USA, or even their first 
engagements, that the UUP saw any advantage to US involvement. In this regard, 
there is no evidence that the UUP perceived a hurting stalemate.
Both Bercovitch and Zartman agree with the importance of reaching this 
hurting stalemate, as defined in chapter one, as the realisation by both sides that 
they are ‘never going to win or solve the problem’ (Zartman & Touval, 1997, 
p.452-453). Unionists never felt this hurting stalemate, as they perceived that a 
containment policy was enough to preserve the status quo if not solve the issue.
One of the four main factors underlined in Bercovitch’s work as essential 
for successful mediation, is that all participants must agree with engaging in a 
process of mediation and with the choice of the mediator. Unionists were 
opposed to any external involvement for two main reasons: firstly, the absence of 
an awareness of any hurting stalemate, and secondly, the fear of external 
involvement as being necessarily against their interest. But more particularly, as 
discussed above, Unionists clearly opposed the US acting as mediators in a 
potential peace process in Northern Ireland. Thus, the Northern Ireland situation 
does not fit all of Bercovitch and Zartman’s criteria. Moreover, the US mediation 
only relied on its huge capacity for leverage, as it was clearly not perceived as
14 Private Interview, Northern Irish Official
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being neutral on either side. Thus, beyond neutrality, the US access to the role of 
mediator was actually based on leverage.
A-The “mutually hurting stalemate” and the willingness to accept 
mediation
The evidence of this thesis suggests that the UUP decision to develop a 
strategy towards the US was not based on a pre-existing hurting stalemate. In this 
regard and limited to the UUP relationship with the USA, this thesis cannot be 
used to advance Zartman’s thesis. The UUP support for the GFA was not a result 
of a well-timed mediation at a period when they saw the conflict as a “hurting 
stalemate”. While the thesis is not a refutation of Zartman, it does raise questions 
about his insistence on mutuality. It may well be that the mutually hurting 
stalemate was important for the relationship between Sinn Féin, the IRA and the 
British government. However, the UUP’s engagement with the process 
developed despite the absence of any evidence that they saw their situation in 
those terms. Their involvement was effectively forced upon them and their initial 
engagement was purely defensive. Yet, as we have seen it, their attitude could 
develop and become more positive under Trimble’s leadership and the UUP 
ultimately voted in favour of the Good Friday Agreement.
As the different events used as case studies demonstrate, the UUP was 
forced to accept US involvement. Therefore, their first engagement with the US 
administration was not motivated by internal strategic desire to enlist the support 
of a mediator. The UUP, as much as any other Unionist parties, were radically
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against US involvement. The first five cases examined in this dissertation, from 
Clinton’s first election, his administration’s early involvement, the UUP attitude 
vis a vis the Adams’ visa in refusing to attend the conference, their attitude at the 
Washington Economic Conference in May 1995, all clearly show that the UUP 
did not see the situation in Zartman’s terms. Even in the later case studies, such 
as their reaction to Mitchell’s designation as chairman of the talks, where there is 
some more positive UUP responses are not based on an implied “mutually 
hurting stalemate” analysis. None of the 18 cases could be said to support the 
idea that the UUP saw a mutually hurting stalemate either at the beginning of the 
peace process when they decided to engage or even after Trimble’s election.
This indicates that there was no internal motivation within the UUP to 
engage with an external mediator. Thus, the UUP does not fit Bercovitch’s fourth 
main criteria for a successful mediation. Likewise the relative success of the 
peace process, in bringing the UUP to accept an agreement and in keeping cease­
fires in place for ten years (a long time by international standards) suggests that 
an external intervention can have a successful outcome even when one of the 
central actors does not see the conflict in terms of a hurting stalemate.
B- Neutrality and Leverage
Only the progressive realisation of US leverage influenced the UUP’s 
change of strategy. The first striking event was the granting of the visa to Gerry 
Adams despite British opposition. The visa was perceived as evidence of the US 
President’s sympathy toward the Irish Nationalist agenda. Despite the 
controversy caused by the visa decision, the US became involved. The US was
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the only state powerful enough to accomplish such a gesture without endangering 
their relationship with London in the long term. Therefore, as described in the 
first chapter, the US was the only potentially successful mediator in the Northern 
Ireland case. First, the US was the only remaining superpower, neither the UUP 
nor the British government could easily turn down its offer and it possessed 
considerable weapons of persuasion such as potential economic and political 
rewards. Thus, the US leverage was a key factor in their effective involvement 
and surely contributed to Mitchell’s effective chairmanship of the negotiations. 
As chapter one highlights, if leverage does not automatically bring success, it can 
certainly contribute to the potential mediator’s acceptability in the talks. 
However, despite this strong leverage, the US ability to push the peace process 
was considerably constrained as the suspension of the negotiations between 
March and May 1997 shows. Mitchell, as much as the US administration, could 
not persuade the actors to resume the peace talks. As discussed in chapter one, 
the use of leverage entirely depends on the third party and the way it judges to 
use it (Kleiboer, 2002, p. 127). Therefore, the US lack of persuasion at that 
particular time was certainly based on the idea that the time was not right to do 
so. However, it indicates that potential leverage is only applied according to the 
situation and that the US could not use it with efficiency in any circumstances.
If the US leverage played a strong role in their becoming mediator, the 
US administration also attempted to show its neutrality especially after granting 
the visa to Gerry Adams. First, every actor involved in the conflict has always 
been invited to major events that the administration organised such as the 
Economic conference. Second, the US administration clearly tried to demonstrate 
to Unionists, and the UUP in particular, their will to engage with them by
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showing signs of particular attention, such as the ride in the limousine already 
mentioned; Mitchell’s understanding that the UUP would never buy the first 
draft of the agreement; and President Clinton praising Trimble’s role in the peace 
process after the signing of the GFA. Nevertheless, despite the US efforts, the 
UUP never really saw the US administration as such, as Trimble’s vision of the 
US not pressurising the IRA enough to decommission shows.'5 Therefore, the 
US mediation can be seen to have been more focused on leverage, while being 
conducted in as even-handed a way as possible in its actual operation.
Still, overall, it was a successful operation of mediation while being seen 
as ‘not neutral’ by one key actor. Indeed, roughly five and a half years after the 
signing of the Good Friday Agreement and despite the difficulties that the actors 
involved had to face during this time, the US involvement is still perceived as a 
successful mediation in the sense that it assisted all parties involved to reach 
agreement on a viable model for durable peace in Northern Ireland. The mission 
of the US government along with the independent American delegation led by 
Senator Mitchell was fulfilled when an unprecedented inclusive agreement was 
signed on 10 April 1998.
Therefore, US mediation has been a success as it contributed to the 
signing of the Good Friday Agreement. However, this success must not be 
overstated. The relationship between the UUP and the US tends to show that if 
leverage certainly prevails over neutrality in terms of acceptance and 
collaboration with a third party, it does not necessarily imply a long-term 
success. Indeed, ‘when [external actors] decide to act- engage in peace-making- 
meeting the challenge of implementation is central to success’ (Crocker &
15 David Trimble, UUP Headquarters, 8 Apr. 2004
Hampson, 1996, p.57). Although the US remained actively involved in the 
monitoring of the implementation and review of the agreement, some UUP 
members, such as Molyneaux, denounced it as the ultimate proof of the GFA 
inefficacy.16
Thus, if the US leverage undeniably had a positive impact since it helped 
persuade the UUP to remain in the negotiations and strongly contributed to the 
signing of the agreement, the continuous ambiguity of the UUP mainstream 
towards its support for the GFA and its apparent lack of determination in selling 
the agreement to their community did not help convince a very suspicious 
Unionist population. It is worth remembering that, as discussed in chapter five, 
although a majority of Unionists voted “yes” during the referendum in May 
1998, the majority of Unionist representatives elected at the first assembly were 
anti-agreement. The lack of apparent internal motivation, division within the 
UUP and constant attacks from the DUP led to a stalemate and no institution 
resulting from the agreement is effectively working.
If leverage is a precious argument to convince actors to become involved 
in a peace process, it does not ensure a long-term success However in the wider 
international debates the Northern Ireland example certainly lends weight to 
those who emphasise the importance of a mediator having leverage. A potentially 
more neutral but less powerful mediator would not have had enough influence to 
lead the conflicting parties to an agreement as the offer of acting as a mediator 
would have been easily turned down. In the unlikely case that this potential 
mediator would have been accepted, their suggestions would have been
16 Lord Molyneaux, Westminster, 9 Feb. 2004
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effortlessly rejected and then the negotiations would have failed. The reasons for 
the UUP’s acceptance of the United States as a mediator corroborate this idea.
The party had two options. They could agree to try and implement an 
agreement with the Nationalist minority or they could reject US involvement. 
This last option would have created serious difficulties for the UUP, as they 
would have rejected the help of the most powerful country in the world. More 
crucially, rejection of US efforts by the UUP may have pressurised the British 
government into implementing a new political structure over their heads. The 
UUP would never have gained anything out of such a strategy. The awareness 
within the UUP of this sensitive situation led the party to progressively engage 
with the US.
Thus, to the question regarding the reasons why the UUP evolved toward 
a much more pragmatic approach of the issue when they perceived the US 
administration to be opposed to their interests, the main answer is that they had 
no choice but accept it on the basis of the cost-benefit calculation as the 
consequences of rejection might have been heavier to endure than those of 
welcoming it.
Secondly, regarding the nature of the UUP engagement, it seems that the 
party’s leadership never actually trusted the US but were able to show flexibility 
in their approach to this unwelcome third party. If the initial engagement was 
clearly one of resistance, the UUP managed to become more actively involved 
and above all more proactive, therefore obtaining some advantages such as their 
word being taken into account in the last moment prior to the signing of the
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agreement, gaining a letter from the Prime Minister on issues which were not 
part of the content of the agreement.
Finally, it appears that Northern Ireland offered a very instructive case 
regarding the analysis of the evolution of a relationship between a third party and 
a reluctant actor to mediation. Indeed, the fact that the UUP never perceived the 
US administration as being completely neutral on the Northern Ireland issue did 
not prevent them from gradually engaging and attempting to obtain certain 
advantages. Nevertheless, as discussed above, the USA would never have been 
able to act as a mediator in Northern Ireland without the huge leverage they 
possess, therefore, neutrality automatically becomes a minor parameter if not a 
negligible one. But leverage does not ensure a total success as the continuing 
tension in the UUP-US relationship and the ongoing difficulty of the Northern 
Ireland peace process more generally shows.
304
Appendix I
LIST OF INTERVIEWS
US officials
Congressman Peter King, Rohdes Island, 20 Apr.2002 
Mr. Neumann, Congressman Gilman’s Foreign Policy advisor, 20 Apr. 2002 
Mr. Carlton, Congressman Meehan’s Foreign Policy Advisor, 20 Apr. 2002 
Nancy Soberberg, former deputy director of the National Security Council, 14 May 
2002
Thomas Crohan, Senator Kennedy’s Foreign Policy Advisor, 17 May 2002 
Mary Koenig, US State Department, 17 Jun. 2002 
Anonymous Interviews
British Officials
Terry Evans, British Information Service (BIS), British Consulate, Boston, 31 Jan. 
2002
Paul Johnston, Director of the BIS, British Consulate General in New York, 8 Feb. 
2002
305
Jonathan Caine, Formerly Sir Patrick Mayhew’s Personal Advisor, 25 Jun. 2003 & 20 
Oct. 2003
Lord Dubbs, Former NIO Minister, 28 Mar. 2004 
Irish Official
A member of the Irish Embassy who wished to remain anonymous 
Northern Irish Officials
Dr. Peter Smyth, Northern Ireland American Office, 13 Mar. 2002 
Anonymous interview
Unionist Representatives
Anne Smith, UUP Northern American Office Representative, Washington, 14 Mar. 
2002 & 18 Apr. 2002
Unionist Political Activists in the US
Rev. Charles Reynolds, 3 Sep. 2002 
William McGimpsey, 21 Mar. 2002 
Kevin McGimpsey, 23 Jun. 2002
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UUP
Dermott Nesbitt, MLA, 16 Mar. 2000
Steven King, David Trimble’s advisor, 23 Oct. 2003
David Trimble, Former Northern Ireland First Minister and UUP Leader, 14 Mar. 
2002 & 8 Apr. 2004
Lord Laird of Artigarvan, Former President of the Ulster-Scots Agency, 14 Mar. 2003
Lord Maginnis, Former MP, 6 Dec. 2002
Jeffrey Donaldson, then UUP Representative, 15 Apr. 2003
Barry White, Former UUP coordinator in Westminster, 14 Feb. 2003
Roy Beggs, MP, 30 Jan. 2004
Lord Molineaux, Former UUP Leader, 10 Feb. 2004
William Ross, Former UUP MP, 2 Feb. 2004
DUP
St Clair McAllister, Director of Communication, 6 Apr. 2000 
UKUP
David Vance, Former UKUP Deputy Leader, 15 May 2000 
Sinn Féin
Mearaid Keane, Former SF Representative in the US, 4 Sep. 2003 
Rita O ’Hare, SF Representative in the US, 4 Sep. 2003
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Alliance Party
Sean Neeson, Former AP leader, 9 Jul. 2003 
Allan Leonard, Research Officer, 9 Jul. 2003
SDLP
Mark Durkan, Former Deputy Prime Minister and SDLP Leader, 8 Mar. 2000 
Alasdair McDonell, MLA, 7 Mar. 2000
PUP
David Ervine, 15 May 2000 
NIUP
Elizabeth Roche, NIUP Representative, 15 May 2000 
Journalists
Niall O’Dowd, co-founder of the Irisb-Americans for Clinton/Gore, 13 May 2002
Conor O’Clery, Irish Times Correspondent, 10 May 2002
Ray O’Hanlon, Irish Echo Senior Editor, 10 May 2002
Bob Connelly, Former Journalist at the Boston Globe, 12 Jun. 2002
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Irish American Businessman
Tony Culley-Foster, 14 Mar. 2004, and by telephone on 24 Apr. and 3 May 2002 
Academics
Prof. Michael Dukakis, Former US Presidential Candidate, 16 Apr. 2002 
Prof. Kerbi Millar, Expert on Irish Emigration to North America, 10 May 2002 
Prof. Paul Bew, Expert on Northern Ireland Politics, 18 Dec. 2003
Walsh Visa Program
Patrick Riordan, Director of Housing of the Walsh Visa Program, 25 Feb. 2002 
Thomas Keown, Employment Selection Manager if the Walsh Visa Program, 19 Mar. 
2002
■»*
Ulster Scots Agency
John McIntyre, Former member of the board of the agency, 19 Mar. 2003
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